Illarionov takes his leave

The resignation of Presidential Adviser Andrei Illarionov late last year had long been telegraphed.  His remarks at the US-Russian Investment Symposium in November focused on a stark point, antithetical to the Putin regime:  state controlled, owned and run companies, like UES, don't make sufficient profits; privately-owned companies with transparent accounting practices and dynamic and well-connected CEOs, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Yukos, do make remarkable profits…at least until they run afoul of the state. (1)

When Illarionov agreed to join the Putin team as economic adviser, replacing Aleksandr Livshits in 2000, there was a distinct and seemingly ascendant liberal economic wing to Putin's administration, centered around the Strategic Initiatives Institute, German Gref, Mikhail Kasianov, Aleksei Kudrin and Dmitri Kozak.  While Kudrin and Gref are still nominally present (more on Kudrin's current position below), Kasianov has been replaced, Kozak has been sent to quell the Caucasus and now Illarionov has resigned.

Illarionov made it clear that his resignation was policy-based:  He no longer felt that he was effective in formulating Kremlin economic policy, "my opportunities to influence economic decision making were considerably reduced." (2)  His problem was not a lack of access to Putin: "I had the opportunity to talk to the president and express my point of view up to the very last moment." (3)

"I had come to the job to pursue an economic policy of broadening economic freedoms….  We essentially ceased pursuing that policy a minimum of two and a half years ago. (…)  At the very least, the interests of some corporations, which one may call state corporations, have a disproportionate influence on decision-making."  (4) 

While Andrei Illarionov had been one of the few remaining proponents in the Putin Kremlin of both liberal economic and democratic reforms, it is interesting to consider that he began his career in the Putin government at the crest of the wave that swept the "oligarchy" out of Russian politics, in order to develop a stronger state input, a "Chinese model" of economic reform.  The difference in Russian political and economic governance from 2000 to 2006 is stark indeed:  In 2000, a few wealthy businessmen formally or informally controlled a wide swathe of government policy formation and implementation through the state bureaucracy; whereas in 2005, a few bureaucrats, most of whom previously worked for the security organs, formally or informally control a wide swathe of government policy formation and implementation through the state bureaucracy, and along the way have become wealthy businessmen.

It is unclear whether Illarionov has learned the political lessons of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.  When asked about his plans for the future Illarionov replied: "No decision has been made on making the decision public." (5)

Mikhail Kasianov, who is in the process of creating a new political or civic movement (reportedly to be called, Muzhiki—hopefully, the reports are inaccurate), apparently is considering asking his former colleague to join the new group.  The Illarionov camp claims, however that "he has not received any proposals to join Kasianov's movement." (6)

"How does the Government feel about Gazprom's position?"

Lest Andrei Illarionov's concerns about the creeping corporatist nature of the Putin regime be disregarded, an end of the year round-up at the Security Council resulted in a very telling interplay between the Chairman of the Board of Directors for Gazprom (Aleksei Miller) and the Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov.

After briefly surveying the results of government policy in 2005 over a wide range of issues (economic indices lower than anticipated, training in the army and navy "improving," the "acute" housing problem, and the MVD, where "there is still a great deal to do, a very great deal"), Putin broached the topic of negotiations with Ukraine over gas prices. 

Miller claimed the Ukrainians were trying to get gas at unreasonably low costs, and accused Ukraine of "trying to artificially create problems for European gas consumers and, in this way, improve its negotiating position with Gazprom."  (7)  Miller also sketched the latest proposal in the negotiations to resolve the impasse.

President Putin, after hearing a few remarks on the issue, asked Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov: "How does the Government feel about Gazprom's position?"  Fradkov's response that "we are making a reasonable offer," brought a more emphatic question from the president:  "Does the Government support Gazprom's position?"  "Yes," Fradkov replied, "we support Gazprom's position." (8)

Perhaps Illarionov was on to something.

A plumbing operation?

An interesting crime log report has decidedly political overtones:  "Burglars broke into apartments belonging to Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and UES Chair Anatoli Chubais in an elite residential building…." (9)  According to the report, thieves ransacked the apartments at the Ulitsa Akademika Zelinskogo complex, making off with 50,000 rubles in cash and some jewelry from Kudrin, but leaving Chubais' place empty-handed (Chubais allegedly doesn't keep valuables in the apartment).  (10)

While the report cautions that break-ins usually spike during the stretch between New Year's Eve and the Orthodox Christmas holiday, is it really possible that the last two powerful liberals in Putin's administration were the victims of a random criminal attack?  Where was the security?  You would think after his close call last Spring, Chubais, at least, would have state-of-the-art protection for his property.   Perhaps he just didn't take the assassination attempt seriously enough.  Perhaps it was a reminder that no matter their official positions, Chubais and Kudrin are still vulnerable.  Then again, maybe it was just a couple of lucky cat burglars.   Random or orchestrated, the effect is chilling.

Source Notes:

1) The ISCIP Analyst, 6 Nov 05.

2) Ekho Moskvy, 1305 GMT, 29 Dec 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.

3) Ibid.

4) Ibid.

5) Ibid.

6) The Moscow Times, 20 Jan 06 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.

MVD and OMON

The activities and organization of Russia’s MVD police units are not widely publicized.  During the Soviet era, Russia relied heavily on its elite OMON units to control public unrest in the country.  Attempts to determine details such as their current organizational structure, recruitment pool, and dependability during operations remain illusive.  Nonetheless, OMON units clearly remain widely active throughout the country, and MVD forces continue to play a prominent role in Russian security affairs.  

Synopsis of Recent OMON Activity

Daily press reports concerning security affairs routinely make mention of OMON involvement in operations throughout the country, particularly in the North Caucasus.  The following paragraphs highlight only a few of the typical OMON operations throughout the Russian Federation.

Over the past year, OMON special forces have been accused of human rights violations in two operations outside the immediate North Caucasus area.  In December 2004, OMON special forces conducted four days of “mopping up” operations in Blagoveshchensk, a town in Russia’s Far Eastern District near the Chinese border, where hundreds were beaten. (1)  In June 2005, OMON forces conducted a “clean-up” operation in a village of Stravropol territory, south of Moscow and closer to the Caucasus, where dozens were arrested and beaten after a policeman had been killed. (2)  

In October 2005, OMON forces reportedly were active in operations throughout the North Caucasus.  In the well-publicized Nalchik attack in the Kabardino-Balkaria region, OMON forces were active in repulsing the attack. (3)  In Ingushetia, the commander of an OMON detachment was killed during a night raid by 50-60 gunmen. (4)

In an unusual Moscow operation that appears politically motivated, a squad of masked OMON officers raided Boris Nemtsov's Neftyanoi Bank, reportedly as part of a "criminal investigation" into money laundering by the Prosecutor General's Office.  Nemtsov, the bank's director, was a former leader of the Union of Right Forces and former deputy prime minister under Yeltsin who publicly supports former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanoy's run for the presidency in 2008. (5)

Most recently, OMON forces have been cited in operations both in Chechnya and Dagestan.  In the first, OMON staffers were injured during a New Year’s Eve attack by gunmen in Groznyy. (6)  During the recent large-scale operations to “eliminate a gang of bandits” in Dagestan, several OMON officers were reported killed or wounded.  (7) 

MVD reorganizing for success or failure? 

Although some officials, even some within the MVD, have proposed efforts to reform Russian security forces, they do not appear to be effective.  Russian officials continue to display a lack of confidence in MVD tactical leadership, despite increases both in funding and personnel. 

Former Defense Minister, Marshal Sergeyev, proposed a reform in 2000, which would have consolidated all armed forces (currently dispersed among ten ministries) under the Ministry of Defense.  His proposal was never enacted, perhaps due to the lack of “checks and balances” between the ministries that his proposal would entail. (8)  No doubt the other “services” were not eager to be subordinated.

More recently, Russian officials established Tactical Command Teams in the Southern Federal Region, headed by an Internal Troops Colonel.  The teams include “united forces” with units from the Internal Troops, OMON, Defense Ministry, Civilian Defense and Emergency Ministry. (9)  During an interview in December 2004, the Commander of MVD Internal Troops, Colonel-General Nikolai Rogozhkin, described the same organization as Operational Control Groups (GrOU), with a combined number of 19,000. (10)  Regardless of their name, their purpose remained the same.  The Tactical Command Team Commander would, in response to a security situation, “automatically become the head of the operational headquarters” with the power to make decisions without consultations with Moscow.  (11)

In practice, however, senior officials seem to lose confidence in the teams when situations arise to use them as designed.  Despite having been formed and ready prior to the Beslan tragedy, the role of the Tactical Command Team Commander was essentially zero; Valeri Andreev, the chief of the local Federal Security Service (FSB) directorate, nominally ran the tactical headquarters.  Again, during the October 2005 Nalchik response, the Tactical Command Team ran the operation only for the first four hours, after which the Commander of Internal Troops assumed command.  In February 2005, Dmitry Kozak, the Presidential Envoy in the Southern Federal Region, argued to shift the command from the Tactical Command Teams to the regional FSB. (12)

Regardless of their effectiveness or even the concerns of senior leadership, Russia is investing in the MVD and its organizations.  The Military Balance reports the number of Interior troops grew from 140,000 a few years ago to 170,000 in 2005. (13)  In May 2005, President Putin signed an executive order providing for Interior Troops numerical strength of 199,800, the same number previously reported by Colonel-General Rogozhkin in his December 2004 interview, effective by 2006. (14)  On the funding side, the Deputy Interior Minister reported in October 2005 that the OMON and rapid-reaction detachments would receive an extra 370 million rubles for specialized equipment this year. (15)

No one appears to have a long-term strategy concerning security forces and command and control of those forces during crisis.  Clearly, despite the continued prolific use of OMON units throughout Russia, infighting between the FSB and MVD over who is in charge of anti-terrorism efforts remains (FSB units are notably absent in the makeup of Tactical Command Teams).  Putin’s November 2005 decree on the maximum number of staff in the MVD adds to the confusion.  The decree, effective 1 Jan 06, set the maximum staff at 821,268 which includes 661,275 with MVD agencies and 159,993 civil servants and workers. (16)  These are very specific numbers without detailing the number of Interior Troops or stating whether the numbers represent an increase or decrease in authorizations.  The decree itself is unusual, given that Putin seldom, if ever, publishes decrees establishing maximum numbers in any ministry, and given the previous executive order increasing the Interior Troops to approximately 200,000.  Does anyone have a strategic plan to grow the MVD and special forces or are petrol dollars simply fueling bureaucratic growth? 

Source Notes:

1) “Rights Activists Worried About Violations by Law Enforcement,” Interfax, 4 Oct 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via World News Connection (WNC). 

2) “Mass Rights Violations Reported in Police Raid on Southern Russian Village,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

3) “Declaring a State of Emergency,” Gazeta.ru, 14 Oct 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.

4) "No Change on North Caucasus Front. Fighting and Sweep Operations Continued Yesterday in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria", by Andrey Riskin and Mariya Bondarenko, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Oct 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.

5) “OMON Raids Nemtsov Bank” by Valeria Korchagina, The Moscow Times, 9 Dec 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 

6) “Five Killed in Night Shoutout in Chechnya” Ria Novosti, 1 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.

7) “Bodies of Two Russian Soldiers Found in Dagestan,” ITAR-TASS, 6 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.

8) “Defense Minister Reported to be Seeking Single Military Commander,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 Apr 00 via Lexis-Nexis. 

9) “Rapid Reorganization Force,” by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, Novaya gazeta, 5 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 

10) “Russia: Internal Troops Emphasize Anti-Terrorist Role,” Moscow Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 24 Dec 04 via WNC.

11) Ibid, “Rapid Reorganization Force.”

12) Ibid.

13) The Military Balance 2005-2006, International Institute for Statistical Studies (Routledge, Taylor, and Francis Group, London, UK), Oct 05. 

14) “Kremlin Set to Reinforce Interior Troops,” Moscow News, 1 Jun 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 

15) “Russian Police Commandos to Receive Extra R370 Million Funds,” RIA-Novosti, 11 Oct 05, FBIS Translated Text via WNC. 

16) Interfax, 3 Nov 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.

Crimean lighthouse illuminates Russia-Ukraine strife

The beginning of 2006 has been rocky for Russo-Ukrainian relations. On January 13, Ukraine seized a Crimean lighthouse, which supposedly had been under contract until 2017 to the Russians. According to Ukrainian officials, the lighthouse’s staff was prevented form entering the lighthouse in Yalta due to allegedly expired documents. (1)

But Russian officials have claimed that this incident is about more than a single lighthouse. Russian Foreign Ministry official Mikhail Kamynin said "This incident can hardly be regarded as anything other than an attempt by certain forces in Ukraine to once again complicate the situation around the Black Sea Fleet, creating incidents that hinder the normal operation of its navigation-hydrographic facility.” (2)

By “certain forces,” Kamynin most probably is referring to the administration of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who swept to power in 2004’s Orange Revolution. It is no secret that since Yushchenko has oriented Ukraine more toward the European Union and NATO, President Putin’s Russia has entered upon a more turbulent relationship with Ukraine. 

The Russian media were quick to cover the lighthouse dispute, which it portrayed as a “territorial claim” that is likely to affect the status of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. An NTV correspondent stated, “The Russian Foreign Ministry complains that Ukraine is stirring passions and politicizing issues—solutions to which should be sought at talks.” (3)

Ukrainian Transport Minister Viktor Bondar stated that the lighthouse dispute would be resolved over two months of negotiations but that the facilities are Ukrainian property and should remain so. (4) Moreover, the deputy chief of staff to Yushchenko, Anatoliy Matvienko, said that the Ukrainian president agrees with Bondar’s remarks (5).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the aforementioned assertions “unacceptable” and vowed to make the Black Sea fleet a priority in next month’s talks with Ukraine (6).

However, the lighthouse dispute comes at a time when Russo-Ukrainian relations are churning over the question of gas supplies and Russian demands for higher prices. (See Armed Forces: External for more on the lighthouse situation)

Taking into account the wider strife between Russia and Ukraine that followed the Orange Revolution, it seems likely that the lighthouse dispute is not simply a territorial claim. While it is unclear how this issue will be resolved, it seems probable that Ukraine may demand higher rents for continued Russian use of the lighthouses and, more widely, the Crimean section of the Black Sea within the context of its negotiations with Russia over gas prices.

Diplomacy in Iranian nuclear bids

In a January 17 press conference, Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov maintained that Russia’s top priority regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions is “to ensure the inviolability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime” and “to act carefully and avoid unnecessary sharp moves that may artificially create additional problems and exacerbate the situation” regarding Iran. (7)

Yet in a January 20 meeting between President Vladimir Putin and the Director of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Sergei Kiriyenko, Kiriyenko maintained that Russia would go ahead with its plans with Iran. He reported to Putin that Russian officials are “ready and have even prepared production facilities.” (8)

Putin discussed with Kiriyenko the details of Russia’s role in Iranian nuclear activities, asking how his agency plans to avert security threats, including the possibility of Iran using nuclear materials to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Kiriyenko assured the president that the plan has taken any security issues into consideration and will serve to allay international concern:

“There are two dangerous elements involved in developing nuclear energy – the enrichment and processing of spent fuel. Regarding the situation in Iran, Russia has concluded a contract with this country under which spent fuel from the nuclear power plant we are building there will be returned to Russia and in this sense, in accordance with all the international regulations, there is no security risk involved, and this is something that all countries recognize.” (9)

However, Russia is walking a thin line, trying to address both economic interests and international obligations. Lavrov obviously prefers discussing Iran’s compliance with international nonproliferation agreements at next month’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting rather than at the United Nations. Lavrov’s approach differs sharply from US preference for imposing sanctions on Iran if it does not stop its supposed nuclear enrichment programs.

Russia has been quite clear that it would rather not leave the matter to the United Nations Security Council. Russian state TV has stressed the use of diplomacy in negotiating with Iran during next month’s IAEA meeting. On Rossiya TV, host of Vesti Plyus Dmitry Kiselov stated, “The forthcoming meeting of the governing council of IAEA is not simply a formality for referring the Iran dossier to the UN Security Council, as the Europeans and American think, but remains an opportunity for proper discussion of Iran’s actions – a chance to not let things get out of hand. Russia is using all its influence to this end.” (10)

It seems likely that the Europeans and Americans will not easily be persuaded to agree with Russia on this matter.

Cold War Revisited

On a popular Russian television program, a group of persons claiming to be officials of Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) said they possessed footage demonstrating a British attempt at espionage. 

The program aired a grainy video, centering around a rock that supposedly was equipped to transmit secret data from up to 60 feet away. The FSB officials on the Rossiya TV channel explained that the individuals, who they claimed used the rock to transmit secret information, were British diplomats. FSB officials did not comment on the purpose of the alleged espionage, but were quick to point out that there was a link to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the Eurasia Foundation and the Moscow Helsinki Group. (11) 

The British Foreign Office quickly refuted the spying claims and issued this statement: "We reject any allegations of improper conduct in our dealing with Russian NGOs. ... All our assistance is given openly and aims to support the development of a healthy civil society in Russia.” (12)

Spokeswoman Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group in Moscow, confirmed to having received a grant that may have been signed by one of the accused British diplomats, Marc Doe. However, she questioned why the FSB was making an issue of the grant’s signatory, “We did receive a grant from the British embassy two years ago…I do not remember who signed it off. It could have been [First Secretary] Marc Doe, given his position in the embassy. But does it really matter?” (13)

Clearly the fear of “color” revolutions is boiling over in Putin’s Russia, and particularly its security organs. The paranoia over NGOs and the precise source of their funding reveals a strong sense of fear in the Kremlin.

The purported espionage allegations say more about Russian domestic politics than international relations. It is an embarrassing off-shoot of Russia’s fear of foreign-funded revolution in Russia. If, indeed, the accusations had any genuine merit, it would seem likely that legal action and arrests would have been made. The fact that the supposed FSB officials took a piece of grainy black-and-white surveillance footage to a Sunday night television program to make their claims speaks volumes as to the seriousness of the changes.

Source Notes:

Religious issues

According to recent statistics, one third of Russians are atheists, Islam stands at around 20 million adherents (up 4 million in the last 15 years) and Buddhists constitute about 1.5 million. The biggest competition for converts is among the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Christians. (1) Fifty percent of Russians consider themselves Orthodox (up from 16 percent in 1986), although only 1.5 to 2 percent take Communion and attend confession regularly, a number that has not shifted since perestroika. (2)

Russia formally acknowledges four “traditional” religions: Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism. Apart from these religions, the presence of other religious groups, including Protestants, greatly increased during the 1990s under the relatively relaxed laws governing religious activity. The presence of these groups introduced new, sometimes problematic, issues into religious interaction.

Funding from various Western religious organizations increased the sense of competition between denominations. Western organizations also gravitated toward younger leaders, many of whom were in their late teens and had little or no memory of the church’s experiences under Communism. The perception of Russia’s older generation that church leaders had been as compromised under Communism left an entire generation feeling that they had lost out in the past, and with funding directed to youth, they were being passed over in the present. (3)

The relationship between evangelicals and the Russian Orthodox Church was another contentious issue in the 1990s. The Russian Orthodox were dependent on Protestants to receive Bibles and other literature because satellite Russian Orthodox congregations lacked the resources to supply them.

Russian religious groups faced the problem of receiving Western funds while attempting to promote Russian goals. As a 1993 “Open Letter to the Missionary Coordinating Council to All Western Missionary Organizations” stated, “In Moscow alone, over one hundred Western organizations were registered. And each one wants to accomplish its program by using the existing church infrastructure, which is still so weak that is cannot resist this pressure, neither organizationally nor spiritually….Indigenous missionary organizations cannot compete with strong Western missions and the best individuals prefer to work for Western organizations and, naturally, for better payment….Finally, instead of [receiving] assistance and support from Western missionaries, local missions [find that they] have to defend their own vision of missionary service.” (4)  This problem was not, and is not, unique to religious organizations which received Western funding; other NGOs often face the same issue.

The freedom of “non-traditional” religious groups may soon be put in check. Recently, the Justice Ministry has proposed new restrictions on religious groups with the intent of stemming “foreign religious expansion,” according to Vedemosti. (5) The proposals are designed to make the process of procuring a visa more difficult for missionaries as well as to ease the process for shutting down religious groups.

In the meantime, however, Protestant Christian groups and others exercise relative freedom. A young Protestant missionary living in Perm recently reported, “The local authorities are not fighting anything we do since we are an organization registered with the government. We are not harassed or impaired by the authorities in any way. Having said that, over all, Protestant groups are looked down upon by the local authorities.  Legally we have the right to be here, but that does not change their attitude. I know some churches are having a hard time right now.  There is a church in Perm called New Testament. They are registered but they needed to buy a bigger building since they were getting too big. They made a bid for a large building and won the contract over a casino. It became big news in Perm. Even the governor got involved. The governor is very upset about this church buying property in the middle of the city. He even said he will give this building back to the people no matter what. If that happens, most likely it will become a casino.” (6)

Although the Russian Orthodox Church has stated that it has no intention of seeking to become the state church, (7)  its involvement with authorities is growing. A new course offered by the Russian Academy of State Administration (RASA) is taking cooperation of church and state to a new level. The purpose of this 9-day class, which is offered to the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, is “to inform about the latest innovations in the sphere of church and state relations,” said RASA Pro-Rector Anatoli Tupinin. The course participants met with people such as Sergei Popov, head of the Duma’s committee on public associations and religious groups, Education and Science Minister Andrei Fursenko, and Culture and Media Minister Aleksandr Sokolov. (8)

The number of Russian adherents to Islam is growing. Among the most public conversions was the Russian Orthodox priest, Vyacheslav Polosin, whose decision to become a Muslim in the 1990s drew considerable attention. (9)  The increase in numbers in the Muslim community has led to greater political organization. Muslim groups are beginning to organize in both the political and social spheres. The National Organization of Russian Muslims (NORM), for example, was formed in 2004 and, in a departure from previous Muslim organizations, has taken up issues not strictly pertaining to religion. (10)

Religion, as well as ethnicity, has become an increasingly important topic in Russia as issues such as xenophobia and ethnic tension are highlighted by events such as the attack on a Jewish synagogue earlier this month. In fact, one of the responsibilities being assumed by the newly convened Public Chamber is the issue of addressing xenophobia.

Source Notes:

1) “Russian Orthodox Church losing flock to other faiths,” 9 Sep 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets.

2) “Does church threaten secular life in Russia?” 7 Jun 05, RIA Novosti via ISI Emerging Markets.

3) Walter Sawatsky, “After the Glasnost Revolution: Soviet Evangelicals and Western Missions,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, April 1992.

4) Otonas Balchunas (Shaulai, Lithuania), Semen Borodin (Krasnodar, Russia), Andrei Bondarenko (Elgava, Latvia), Anatoly Bogatov (Saransk, Moldova), Vassily Davidyuk (Kiev, Ukraine), Piotr Lunichkin (Vladikavkaz, Ossetia), Pavel Pogodin (Nalchik, Kavkaz), Franz Tissen (Saran, Kazakhstan), Henri Fot (Bishkek, Krgyzstan), and Victor Shiva (Almaty, Kazakstan), “Open Letter of the Missionary Coordinating Council to All Western Missionary Organizations Interested in Spreading the Gospel in the Former Soviet Union,” 23 March 1993, Russian Ministries Files, Wheaton Illinois as cited in Peter Deyneka and Anita Deyneka, “Evangelical Foreign Missionaries in Russia,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, April 1998, p. 57.

5) “Russia seeks to bolster checks on religious groups,” 14 Nov 05, Agence France-Presse via ISI Emerging Markets.

6) Jonathan Dulin, e-mail communication with author, 4 Dec 05.

7) “Alexy II refutes claims Russian church seeking state status,” 28 Dec 05, ITAR-TASS via FBIS transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC).

8) “Clergy will be taught the basics of state administration,” 18 Nov 05, Kommersant; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets.

9) “Muslim Russia,” 19 Aug 05, Versiya; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets.

10) Ibid.

By Robyn Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)

~~~~~

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Radar disputes

Hiding in the shadow of the current skirmish between Russia and the Ukraine over gas prices is the contention over the use of early warning radar sites in the Ukraine.  Russia has enjoyed exclusive use of data from Ukraine’s radars in Sevastopol and Mukachevo since the fall of the Soviet Union.  However, in December 2005, Ukrainian officials made overtures suggesting Russia needs to pay more for the radar data and that the radar sites might also be made available to support US missile defense efforts. (1)  There is no official link between Ukraine’s dissatisfaction with the radar arrangement and gas prices, but it does seem likely that Ukraine is using military security as leverage against Russia.  This is especially true given the suspicious timing of several additional announcements such as a proposal from Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko to reinstitute the Missile Troops and rumors of a Ukrainian refusal extend the service life of the Russian SS-18 long range missiles. (2)

As highlighted in Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov’s recent Wall Street Journal article, Russia’s nuclear forces continue to be its first priority and primary military deterrent against large-scale military attack. (3)  The purpose of Russia’s network of indigenous and allied early warning systems is to detect a large scale attack with sufficient warning to protect Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capability.  These systems also have an important associate mission of space surveillance and tracking.  Radars such as the ones located in Ukraine are critical due to their capability for day/night and all-weather operation.  In addition, the importance of the ground-based sensors is magnified in light of the reduced capability of Russia’s space based early warning systems since the end of the Soviet. 

The handling of the radar controversy presents an interesting dilemma for Russia.  The radars at Sevastopol and Mukachevo are 1970’s era Dnepr class radars and are formally the property of Ukraine.  Furthermore, these large radars are situated to detect objects over Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and as far east as Iran.  Presently, Russia does not have adequate backup coverage of this sector from any other sensor except the Pill Box anti-ballistic missile radar, which is primarily a tracking radar and not particularly suited to early warning and space surveillance.  Hence, the loss of Ukraine radars would leave a sizeable hole in Russia’s early warning fence.  Colonel General Volter Kraskovsky, former commander of Russia's missile defense troops, asserts that “U.S. access to the Sevastopol and Mukachevo radars could significantly damage Russia's missile defenses in the direction of central and southern Europe, and towards the Mediterranean.” (4)  Furthermore, Maj-General Roman Popkovich (ex-chairman of the Duma Defense Committee) suggests, “Russia should take appropriate measures in response, up to and including providing protection by units from our armed forces for the stations that we built in Ukraine in the interests of our state and that are part of the missile defense of Russia and the CIS.” (5)

While concern is voiced over the potential loss of access to the radars, there are dissenting voices and other options.  Russia continues to describe the United States as the primary military threat for large scale attack against its territory; but realistically, the loss of access to Ukraine’s radars does not substantially change Russia early warning against putative US attack.  The Ukraine radars do not cover the most likely avenues of US ingress, and Russia has more than sufficient nuclear forces to maintain a highly credible second strike retaliatory force.  A more pragmatic view was voiced by Ruslan Pukhov, Head of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, who states: “the early-warning radars are only part of the former Soviet Union's defense system.  The system's already full of holes.  In particular, the Glonass satellite system for global positioning is not fully operational. There are lots of other things that are not fully functional, either…It's not good, of course, but it won't lead to tragedy.” (6)

An alternative for Russia is to accelerate plans to build replacement radars on its own turf.  Russia has long realized the hazards of foreign dependence for early warning assets and has developed bilateral agreements for the near-term.  For the future, Russia announced the development of a modular early warning radar in 2001 with the aim of building a system which can be constructed and operated less expensively than the aging, behemoth systems currently deployed. (7)

After Ukraine hinted at possible cooperation with the US, Russia responded by announcing that initial tests of the new modular radar have started.  Also, more information was released on the new radar now known as the Voronezh-DM radar system developed by NIIDAR (Scientific Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communication). (8)  In addition, speculation was confirmed that the Voronezh is planned to replace the Daryal and Dnepr class radars including the Ukrainian radars. (9)  Funding for construction of the first operational unit was specified by name in the state defense order announced by Mikhail Fradkov. (10)  General Kraskovsky believes fielding the Voronezh radar is a viable alternative, “but this would take two or three years, and the costs could equal or exceed Moscow's additional revenues from charging Ukraine a higher price for natural gas.” (11)  Thus, in a relatively short period of time, Russia could field a serviceable and much more reliable early warning radar on its own territory which could replace the information gleaned from the Ukrainian sites.

Another issue for Russia is how to prevent US access to the Ukrainian radar sites and foil any US encroachment into Ukraine for missile defense.  US access to Ukraine’s radar site would provide tremendous insight into the internal concept of operations of the Russian early warning system.  The early warning radars are so powerful that detecting their transmissions is unproblematic; however, there is much uncertainty over how the information gleaned from the radar sites is processed and fused with data and algorithms from other sources to inform the Russian leadership on topics to include early warning, intelligence collection, and satellite tracking.  Russia’s General Popkovich summarized this concept: “Our crews and Ukrainian crews service the radar and I think this is the same as handing over a whole series of secret documents to a country that, when all's said and done, is not our friend when it comes to military matters.” (12)

A further Russian preoccupation concerns the putative deployment of new US missile defense assets in Ukraine.  The US is interested in acquiring additional sites for sensors and missile launchers to monitor and defeat missile threats from the Middle East or Central Asia.  As mentioned previously, Ukraine is well-positioned geographically to monitor activity in these areas.  For Russia, the specter of US missiles and radar sites in the Ukraine seems nothing short of abhorrent, as reflected in the tone of Ivanov’s recent policy article. (13)  The presence of US personnel, sensors, and missiles in Ukraine would clearly generate Russian angst.

From Ukraine’s perspective, the haggling over the radar sites presents opportunities as well as risks.  If Ukraine continues its march toward increasing ties to the West, then cooperation on the radar sites is an attractive bargaining tool.  Moreover, full access to the sites as well as allowing basing of US assets would likely engender strong US support.  Conversely, Russia can apply significant political and economic pressure which could be more than Ukraine’s weakening pro-West movement can handle.  In terms of bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine stands to get a little more money in the near term for the data from the early warning radars.  Moreover, Russia will have to consider seriously the costs of being truly militarily independent of Ukraine.  Replacing Ukraine’s radars and missile technology will be very costly perhaps even more than cost of gas these days. 

Conclusion

Ukraine’s desire to increase costs for Russian access to early warning data and possibly to cooperate with the West is a fascinating example of the “Great Game” politics and military positioning currently on display in Russia’s near abroad.  Russia can survive the loss of data from the early warning sites, although it would leave the country with a hole in its early warning fence until a new modular system is brought on line in a few years.  The greater issue for Russia is preventing the West and especially the US from gaining a foothold in the Ukraine.

Source Notes:

1) “Ukraine Will Reveal Russian Secrets To The United States,” Kommersant, 9 Dec 05, WPS Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets.

2) "Yushchenko Ready To Grab Missiles. The Question Is, Against Whom Will They Be Aimed and With What Will They Be Equipped" Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 Jan 06 via Johnson’s Russia List.  “Ukraine Threatens Russia's Radar Security,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Dec 05, WPS Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets.

Nothing personal

Following the shock wave that swept through most of Europe when Russia temporarily halted gas supplies to Ukraine over the holidays, other regular customers of RF fuel are still reeling from sticker shock.  Russia informed its clients of a substantial jump in prices to be charged, regardless of how fondly (or not) individual governments might be viewed by Moscow.  As Gazprom officials explained, it’s not personal, it’s not politics: it’s business, at $110 per 1,000 cubic meters for gas deliveries, the amount it charges in European markets.

Of course, to the governments faced with increased costs and potential shortages as winter hits full force, it’s anything but purely business.   At a December meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United States, Georgian Vice Premier Georgy Baramidze mentioned his country’s strong support of new pipelines “from the Caspian region to Europe” to be built by Western energy companies. (1)   Georgia actually has a bargaining chip, although Western officials advise against using it.  Gazprom has proposed a 10-year extension of a transitional period before raising the gas price to $110/1,000 cubic meters… if Georgia agrees to hand over some control over its pipeline. (2)  US Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Maathew Bryza, told Georgia that selling a trunk gas pipeline to Russia would increase Georgian dependence on Russian fuel deliveries, which is not recommended.  (3)  While Georgia mulls over the proposal, an earlier agreement contains the higher contract price.

Azerbaijan, too, is looking for solutions, after Gazprom announced it would use “European prices” in contracts on gas supplies to that Caucasian country. (4)  Baku is in the best position of the Caucasian capitals, given Azerbaijan’s primary reliance on its own oil and gas supplies and its “very successful” cooperative venture with British Petroleum to bring supplies to international markets. (5)  However, President Ilkham Aliyev told the Azerbaijani Security Council that the country needed to strengthen its energy security, since it does still need imported gas, from Russia, and it faced an increase from $61 dollars/1,000 cubic meters (per a 2004 agreement) to the $110 rate Gazprom announced for everyone. (6)  Whence would the extra supplies come?  Central Asia.  Indeed, a second pipeline to increase the amount of Kazakhstani and Turkmen oil through Azerbaijan and connect the terminals of Azartrans Ltd. and BP-Azerbaijan, was just completed.  (7)  Kazakhstan, moreover, agreed to join the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, and is considering also building a pipeline to Baku, according to Kazakh Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov.  (8)

However, while Azerbaijan and Georgia could have expected no kind treatment from the Russian company, Armenia did.  And Yerevan is trying to bring politics into pipelines.  Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan reviewed Armenia’s great relations with Russia, emphasizing in particular economic, as well as political and security, cooperation.  Because of that cooperation, Oskanyan explained, he hoped that the two countries would “arrive at a mutually acceptable solution [regarding gas tariffs] which will not have a serious impact on the living standards of the Armenian population and the pace of the country’s economic growth.” (9)  Russia currently supplies gas, as Armenia’s only source of energy, at $56/1,000 cubic meters, but Gazprom’s profit loss has prompted renegotiating, at the higher $110 rate.

Gazprom officials deny that control over gas supplies is politics by another means, citing the continuation of supplies during the democratic revolutions in both Ukraine and Georgia as proof “there is no tint in our attitudes – either orange or pink. … What we value much higher is our reputation as an excellent supplier.” (10)  “This is not policy, but economics,” Alexander Ryazanov, chairman of the board at Gazprom, explained when announcing the increase to all CIS countries.  (11)  Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili, for one, is not buying that argument; he urged ministers to search for alternative sources for energy because “Russia constantly uses blackmail, it constantly seeks to use energy as a means of pressure on Georgia.” (12)

GEORGIA

No New Year’s resolution in sight

The New Year did not bring any hint of resolution to the continuing, and apparently escalating, conflict between Georgia and its breakaway region South Ossetia.  Georgia seems intent on its earlier-stated goal of unifying all of the country, and South Ossetia seems equally intent on the path that has, admittedly, worked quite well for it so far… de facto independence from Georgia, if not from the Russian Federation.

Indeed, Georgian officials spent much of the autumn months attempting to garner international support for President Mikheil Saakash