| The ISCIP Analyst Volume XII Number 1 (27 January 2006) |
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RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
Illarionov
takes his leave
The
resignation of Presidential Adviser Andrei Illarionov late last year had long
been telegraphed. His remarks at
the US-Russian Investment Symposium in November focused on a stark point,
antithetical to the Putin regime: state controlled, owned and run companies, like UES, don't make
sufficient profits; privately-owned companies with transparent accounting
practices and dynamic and well-connected CEOs, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky's
Yukos, do make remarkable profits…at least until they run afoul of the state.
(1)
When
Illarionov agreed to join the Putin team as economic adviser, replacing
Aleksandr Livshits in 2000, there was a distinct and seemingly ascendant
liberal economic wing to Putin's administration, centered around the Strategic
Initiatives Institute, German Gref, Mikhail Kasianov, Aleksei Kudrin and Dmitri
Kozak. While Kudrin and Gref are
still nominally present (more on Kudrin's current position below), Kasianov has
been replaced, Kozak has been sent to quell the Caucasus and now Illarionov has
resigned.
Illarionov
made it clear that his resignation was policy-based: He no longer felt that he was effective in formulating
Kremlin economic policy, "my opportunities to influence economic decision
making were considerably reduced." (2) His problem was not a lack of access to Putin: "I had
the opportunity to talk to the president and express my point of view up to the
very last moment." (3)
"I
had come to the job to pursue an economic policy of broadening economic
freedoms…. We essentially ceased
pursuing that policy a minimum of two and a half years ago. (…) At the very least, the interests of
some corporations, which one may call state corporations, have a
disproportionate influence on decision-making." (4)
While
Andrei Illarionov had been one of the few remaining proponents in the Putin
Kremlin of both liberal economic and democratic reforms, it is interesting to
consider that he began his career in the Putin government at the crest of the
wave that swept the "oligarchy" out of Russian politics, in order to
develop a stronger state input, a "Chinese model" of economic
reform. The difference in Russian
political and economic governance from 2000 to 2006 is stark indeed: In 2000, a few wealthy businessmen
formally or informally controlled a wide swathe of government policy formation
and implementation through the state bureaucracy; whereas in 2005, a few
bureaucrats, most of whom previously worked for the security organs, formally
or informally control a wide swathe of government policy formation and
implementation through the state bureaucracy, and along the way have become
wealthy businessmen.
It is
unclear whether Illarionov has learned the political lessons of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky. When asked about his
plans for the future Illarionov replied: "No decision has been made on
making the decision public." (5)
Mikhail
Kasianov, who is in the process of creating a new political or civic movement
(reportedly to be called, Muzhiki—hopefully, the reports are inaccurate), apparently
is considering asking his former colleague to join the new group. The Illarionov camp claims, however
that "he has not received any proposals to join Kasianov's movement."
(6)
"How
does the Government feel about Gazprom's position?"
Lest
Andrei Illarionov's concerns about the creeping corporatist nature of the Putin
regime be disregarded, an end of the year round-up at the Security Council
resulted in a very telling interplay between the Chairman of the Board of
Directors for Gazprom (Aleksei Miller) and the Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov.
After
briefly surveying the results of government policy in 2005 over a wide range of
issues (economic indices lower than anticipated, training in the army and navy
"improving," the "acute" housing problem, and the MVD,
where "there is still a great deal to do, a very great deal"), Putin
broached the topic of negotiations with Ukraine over gas prices.
Miller
claimed the Ukrainians were trying to get gas at unreasonably low costs, and
accused Ukraine of "trying to artificially create problems for European
gas consumers and, in this way, improve its negotiating position with
Gazprom." (7) Miller also sketched the latest
proposal in the negotiations to resolve the impasse.
President Putin, after hearing a few remarks on the issue,
asked Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov: "How does the Government feel about
Gazprom's position?" Fradkov's response that "we are making a reasonable offer,"
brought a more emphatic question from the president: "Does the Government support Gazprom's
position?" "Yes,"
Fradkov replied, "we support Gazprom's position." (8)
Perhaps Illarionov was on to something.
A plumbing operation?
An interesting crime log report has decidedly political
overtones: "Burglars broke
into apartments belonging to Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and UES Chair
Anatoli Chubais in an elite residential building…." (9) According to the report, thieves
ransacked the apartments at the Ulitsa Akademika Zelinskogo complex, making off with 50,000
rubles in cash and some jewelry from Kudrin, but leaving Chubais' place
empty-handed (Chubais allegedly doesn't keep valuables in the apartment). (10)
While the report cautions that break-ins usually spike
during the stretch between New Year's Eve and the Orthodox Christmas holiday,
is it really possible that the last two powerful liberals in Putin's
administration were the victims of a random criminal attack? Where was the security? You would think after his close call
last Spring, Chubais, at least, would have state-of-the-art protection for his
property. Perhaps he just
didn't take the assassination attempt seriously enough. Perhaps it was a reminder that no
matter their official positions, Chubais and Kudrin are still vulnerable. Then again, maybe it was just a couple
of lucky cat burglars. Random or orchestrated, the effect is chilling.
Source
Notes:
1) The
ISCIP Analyst, 6 Nov 05.
2) Ekho
Moskvy, 1305 GMT,
29 Dec 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
3) Ibid.
4) Ibid.
5) Ibid.
6) The
Moscow Times, 20 Jan 06 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
7)
Transcript of the Meeting with Security Council Members, 31 Dec 05 via www.kremlin.ru.
8) Ibid.
9) Moscow
Times, 10 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
10) Ibid.
By Susan
J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu)
~~~~~
MVD
and OMON
The
activities and organization of Russia’s MVD police units are not widely
publicized. During the Soviet era,
Russia relied heavily on its elite OMON units to control public unrest in the
country. Attempts to determine
details such as their current organizational structure, recruitment pool, and
dependability during operations remain illusive. Nonetheless, OMON units clearly remain widely active
throughout the country, and MVD forces continue to play a prominent role in Russian
security affairs.
Synopsis of Recent OMON Activity
Daily press reports concerning security affairs routinely make mention
of OMON involvement in operations throughout the country, particularly in the
North Caucasus. The following
paragraphs highlight only a few of the typical OMON operations throughout the
Russian Federation.
Over the past year, OMON special forces have been accused of human
rights violations in two operations outside the immediate North Caucasus
area. In December 2004, OMON
special forces conducted four days of “mopping up” operations in
Blagoveshchensk, a town in Russia’s Far Eastern District near the Chinese
border, where hundreds were beaten. (1) In June 2005, OMON forces conducted a “clean-up” operation in a village
of Stravropol territory, south of Moscow and closer to the Caucasus, where
dozens were arrested and beaten after a policeman had been killed. (2)
In October 2005, OMON forces reportedly were active in operations
throughout the North Caucasus. In
the well-publicized Nalchik attack in the Kabardino-Balkaria region, OMON
forces were active in repulsing the attack. (3) In Ingushetia, the commander of an OMON detachment was
killed during a night raid by 50-60 gunmen. (4)
In an unusual Moscow operation that appears politically
motivated, a squad of masked OMON officers raided Boris Nemtsov's Neftyanoi
Bank, reportedly as part of a "criminal investigation" into money
laundering by the Prosecutor General's Office. Nemtsov, the bank's director, was a former leader of the
Union of Right Forces and former deputy prime minister under Yeltsin who
publicly supports former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanoy's run for the
presidency in 2008. (5)
Most
recently, OMON forces have been cited in operations both in Chechnya and
Dagestan. In the first, OMON
staffers were injured during a New Year’s Eve attack by gunmen in Groznyy.
(6) During the recent large-scale
operations to “eliminate a gang of bandits” in Dagestan, several OMON officers
were reported killed or wounded. (7)
MVD
reorganizing for success or failure?
Although some officials, even some within the MVD, have proposed
efforts to reform Russian security forces, they do not appear to be
effective. Russian officials
continue to display a lack of confidence in MVD tactical leadership, despite
increases both in funding and personnel.
Former Defense Minister, Marshal Sergeyev, proposed a reform in 2000,
which would have consolidated all armed forces (currently dispersed among ten
ministries) under the Ministry of Defense. His proposal was never enacted, perhaps due to the lack of
“checks and balances” between the ministries that his proposal would entail.
(8) No doubt the other “services”
were not eager to be subordinated.
More recently, Russian officials established Tactical Command Teams in
the Southern Federal Region, headed by an Internal Troops Colonel. The teams include “united forces” with
units from the Internal Troops, OMON, Defense Ministry, Civilian Defense and
Emergency Ministry. (9) During an
interview in December 2004, the Commander of MVD Internal Troops,
Colonel-General Nikolai Rogozhkin, described the same organization as
Operational Control Groups (GrOU), with a combined number of 19,000. (10) Regardless of their name, their purpose
remained the same. The Tactical
Command Team Commander would, in response to a security situation,
“automatically become the head of the operational headquarters” with the power
to make decisions without consultations with Moscow. (11)
In practice, however, senior officials seem to lose confidence in the
teams when situations arise to use them as designed. Despite having been formed and ready prior to the Beslan
tragedy, the role of the Tactical Command Team Commander was essentially zero;
Valeri Andreev, the chief of the local Federal Security Service (FSB)
directorate, nominally ran the tactical headquarters. Again, during the October 2005 Nalchik response, the
Tactical Command Team ran the operation only for the first four hours, after
which the Commander of Internal Troops assumed command. In February 2005, Dmitry Kozak, the
Presidential Envoy in the Southern Federal Region, argued to shift the command
from the Tactical Command Teams to the regional FSB. (12)
Regardless of their effectiveness or even the concerns of senior
leadership, Russia is investing in the MVD and its organizations. The Military Balance reports the number of Interior
troops grew from 140,000 a few years ago to 170,000 in 2005. (13) In May 2005, President Putin signed an
executive order providing for Interior Troops numerical strength of 199,800,
the same number previously reported by Colonel-General Rogozhkin in his
December 2004 interview, effective by 2006. (14) On the funding side, the Deputy Interior Minister reported
in October 2005 that the OMON and rapid-reaction detachments would receive an
extra 370 million rubles for specialized equipment this year. (15)
No one appears to have a long-term strategy concerning security forces
and command and control of those forces during crisis. Clearly, despite the continued prolific
use of OMON units throughout Russia, infighting between the FSB and MVD over
who is in charge of anti-terrorism efforts remains (FSB units are notably
absent in the makeup of Tactical Command Teams). Putin’s November 2005 decree on the maximum number of staff
in the MVD adds to the confusion. The decree, effective 1 Jan 06, set the maximum staff at 821,268 which
includes 661,275 with MVD agencies and 159,993 civil servants and workers. (16) These are very specific numbers without
detailing the number of Interior Troops or stating whether the numbers
represent an increase or decrease in authorizations. The decree itself is unusual, given that Putin seldom, if
ever, publishes decrees establishing maximum numbers in any ministry, and given
the previous executive order increasing the Interior Troops to approximately
200,000. Does anyone have a
strategic plan to grow the MVD and special forces or are petrol dollars simply
fueling bureaucratic growth?
Source
Notes:
1)
“Rights Activists Worried About Violations by Law Enforcement,” Interfax, 4 Oct 05; FBIS Transcribed Text
via World News Connection (WNC).
2)
“Mass Rights Violations Reported in Police Raid on Southern Russian Village,” BBC
Worldwide Monitoring,
19 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
3)
“Declaring a State of Emergency,” Gazeta.ru, 14 Oct 05; FBIS Translated Text
via WNC.
4) "No
Change on North Caucasus Front. Fighting and Sweep Operations Continued
Yesterday in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria", by Andrey
Riskin and Mariya Bondarenko, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Oct 05; FBIS Translated Text
via WNC.
5) “OMON
Raids Nemtsov Bank” by Valeria Korchagina, The Moscow Times, 9 Dec 05 via ISI Emerging
Markets.
6)
“Five Killed in Night Shoutout in Chechnya” Ria Novosti, 1 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
7)
“Bodies of Two Russian Soldiers Found in Dagestan,” ITAR-TASS, 6 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
8)
“Defense Minister Reported to be Seeking Single Military Commander,” BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 Apr 00 via Lexis-Nexis.
9)
“Rapid Reorganization Force,” by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, Novaya
gazeta, 5 Dec 05
via Lexis-Nexis.
10)
“Russia: Internal Troops Emphasize Anti-Terrorist Role,” Moscow Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye,
24 Dec 04 via WNC.
11)
Ibid, “Rapid Reorganization Force.”
12)
Ibid.
13) The
Military Balance 2005-2006, International Institute for Statistical Studies (Routledge, Taylor,
and Francis Group, London, UK), Oct 05.
14)
“Kremlin Set to Reinforce Interior Troops,” Moscow News, 1 Jun 05 via ISI Emerging
Markets.
15)
“Russian Police Commandos to Receive Extra R370 Million Funds,” RIA-Novosti, 11 Oct 05, FBIS Translated Text
via WNC.
16)
Interfax, 3 Nov 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.
By
John H. Kafer (kaferj@bu.edu)
~~~~~
Crimean
lighthouse illuminates Russia-Ukraine strife
The
beginning of 2006 has been rocky for Russo-Ukrainian relations. On January 13,
Ukraine seized a Crimean lighthouse, which supposedly had been under contract
until 2017 to the Russians. According to Ukrainian officials, the lighthouse’s
staff was prevented form entering the lighthouse in Yalta due to allegedly
expired documents. (1)
But
Russian officials have claimed that this incident is about more than a single
lighthouse. Russian Foreign Ministry official Mikhail Kamynin said "This
incident can hardly be regarded as anything other than an attempt by certain
forces in Ukraine to once again complicate the situation around the Black Sea
Fleet, creating incidents that hinder the normal operation of its
navigation-hydrographic facility.” (2)
By
“certain forces,” Kamynin most probably is referring to the administration of
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who swept to power in 2004’s Orange
Revolution. It is no secret that since Yushchenko has oriented Ukraine more
toward the European Union and NATO, President Putin’s Russia has entered upon a
more turbulent relationship with Ukraine.
The
Russian media were quick to cover the lighthouse dispute, which it portrayed as
a “territorial claim” that is likely to affect the status of Russia’s Black Sea
fleet. An NTV correspondent stated, “The Russian Foreign Ministry complains
that Ukraine is stirring passions and politicizing issues—solutions to
which should be sought at talks.” (3)
Ukrainian
Transport Minister Viktor Bondar stated that the lighthouse dispute would be
resolved over two months of negotiations but that the facilities are Ukrainian
property and should remain so. (4) Moreover, the deputy chief of staff to
Yushchenko, Anatoliy Matvienko, said that the Ukrainian president agrees with
Bondar’s remarks (5).
Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the aforementioned assertions
“unacceptable” and vowed to make the Black Sea fleet a priority in next month’s
talks with Ukraine (6).
However,
the lighthouse dispute comes at a time when Russo-Ukrainian relations are
churning over the question of gas supplies and Russian demands for higher
prices. (See Armed Forces: External for more on the lighthouse situation)
Taking
into account the wider strife between Russia and Ukraine that followed the
Orange Revolution, it seems likely that the lighthouse dispute is not simply a
territorial claim. While it is unclear how this issue will be resolved, it
seems probable that Ukraine may demand higher rents for continued Russian use
of the lighthouses and, more widely, the Crimean section of the Black Sea
within the context of its negotiations with Russia over gas prices.
Diplomacy
in Iranian nuclear bids
In a January 17 press conference, Foreign Minster Sergei
Lavrov maintained that Russia’s top priority regarding Iranian nuclear
ambitions is “to ensure the inviolability of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime” and “to act carefully and avoid unnecessary sharp moves that may
artificially create additional problems and exacerbate the situation” regarding
Iran. (7)
Yet in a January 20 meeting between President Vladimir
Putin and the Director of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Sergei
Kiriyenko, Kiriyenko maintained that Russia would go ahead with its plans with
Iran. He reported to Putin that Russian officials are “ready and have even
prepared production facilities.” (8)
Putin discussed with Kiriyenko the details of Russia’s
role in Iranian nuclear activities, asking how his agency plans to avert
security threats, including the possibility of Iran using nuclear materials to
produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Kiriyenko assured the president that
the plan has taken any security issues into consideration and will serve to
allay international concern:
“There are two dangerous elements involved in developing
nuclear energy – the enrichment and processing of spent fuel. Regarding
the situation in Iran, Russia has concluded a contract with this country under
which spent fuel from the nuclear power plant we are building there will be
returned to Russia and in this sense, in accordance with all the international
regulations, there is no security risk involved, and this is something that all
countries recognize.” (9)
However, Russia is walking a thin line, trying to address
both economic interests and international obligations. Lavrov obviously prefers
discussing Iran’s compliance with international nonproliferation agreements at
next month’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting rather than at
the United Nations. Lavrov’s approach differs sharply from US preference for
imposing sanctions on Iran if it does not stop its supposed nuclear enrichment
programs.
Russia has been quite clear that it would rather not leave
the matter to the United Nations Security Council. Russian state TV has
stressed the use of diplomacy in negotiating with Iran during next month’s IAEA
meeting. On Rossiya TV, host of Vesti Plyus Dmitry Kiselov stated, “The
forthcoming meeting of the governing council of IAEA is not simply a formality
for referring the Iran dossier to the UN Security Council, as the Europeans and
American think, but remains an opportunity for proper discussion of Iran’s
actions – a chance to not let things get out of hand. Russia is using all
its influence to this end.” (10)
It seems likely that the Europeans and Americans will not
easily be persuaded to agree with Russia on this matter.
Cold
War Revisited
On a
popular Russian television program, a group of persons claiming to be officials
of Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) said they possessed footage
demonstrating a British attempt at espionage.
The
program aired a grainy video, centering around a rock that supposedly was
equipped to transmit secret data from up to 60 feet away. The FSB officials on
the Rossiya TV
channel explained that the individuals, who they claimed used the rock to
transmit secret information, were British diplomats. FSB officials did not
comment on the purpose of the alleged espionage, but were quick to point out
that there was a link to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the
Eurasia Foundation and the Moscow Helsinki Group. (11)
The
British Foreign Office quickly refuted the spying claims and issued this
statement: "We reject any allegations of improper conduct in our dealing
with Russian NGOs. ... All our assistance is given openly and aims to support
the development of a healthy civil society in Russia.” (12)
Spokeswoman
Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group in Moscow, confirmed
to having received a grant that may have been signed by one of the accused
British diplomats, Marc Doe. However, she questioned why the FSB was making an
issue of the grant’s signatory, “We did receive a grant from the British
embassy two years ago…I do not remember who signed it off. It could have been
[First Secretary] Marc Doe, given his position in the embassy. But does it
really matter?” (13)
Clearly
the fear of “color” revolutions is boiling over in Putin’s Russia, and
particularly its security organs. The paranoia over NGOs and the precise source
of their funding reveals a strong sense of fear in the Kremlin.
The
purported espionage allegations say more about Russian domestic politics than
international relations. It is an embarrassing off-shoot of Russia’s fear of
foreign-funded revolution in Russia. If, indeed, the accusations had any
genuine merit, it would seem likely that legal action and arrests would have
been made. The fact that the supposed FSB officials took a piece of grainy
black-and-white surveillance footage to a Sunday night television program to
make their claims speaks volumes as to the seriousness of the changes.
Source
Notes:
1) “Russia
says Ukraine lighthouse incident will harm bilateral relations, RIA Novosti, 13
Jan 06 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060113/42999090.html.
2) Ibid.
3) “Russo-Ukrainian
Lighthouse Dispute ‘Almost a Territorial Claim’ – NTV,” BBC Monitoring,
15, Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
4) “Ukrainian
Minister Says Lighthouse Dispute to Be Resolved Through Negotiation,” BBC
Monitoring, 16 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
5)
“Yushchenko Inisists Ukraine Owns Disputed Lighthouses, Senior Aide Says,”
Associated Press, 20 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
6) Ibid.
7) “Press
Conference with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,” Official Kremlin News
Broadcast, 17 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
8) “Beginning
of Working Meeting With Director of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency Sergei
Kiriyenko,” President of Russia, 20 Jan 06 via http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/01/20/1928_type82913_100398.shtml.
9) Ibid.
10)“Russian
State TV Plays Up Hopes of Diplomatic Solution to Iran Crisis,” BBC Monitoring,
18 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
11)
“Echoes of Cold War: Russia Accuses Britain of Spying,” New York Times. 23 Jan
06 via http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/international/europe/23cnd-russia.html?pagewanted=all
12)
“Britain denies Russian TV spy claims” UPI 23 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis
13)
“Moscow group rebuts spy claims, admits U.K. official gave grant” RIA Novosti
23 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis
By Marissa
Payne (mpayne@bu.edu)
~~~~~
DOMESTIC
AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
Religious
issues
According
to recent statistics, one third of Russians are atheists, Islam stands at
around 20 million adherents (up 4 million in the last 15 years) and Buddhists
constitute about 1.5 million. The biggest competition for converts is among the
Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Christians. (1) Fifty percent of Russians
consider themselves Orthodox (up from 16 percent in 1986), although only 1.5 to
2 percent take Communion and attend confession regularly, a number that has not
shifted since perestroika. (2)
Russia
formally acknowledges four “traditional” religions: Orthodox Christianity,
Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism. Apart from these religions, the presence of other
religious groups, including Protestants, greatly increased during the 1990s
under the relatively relaxed laws governing religious activity. The presence of
these groups introduced new, sometimes problematic, issues into religious
interaction.
Funding
from various Western religious organizations increased the sense of competition
between denominations. Western organizations also gravitated toward younger
leaders, many of whom were in their late teens and had little or no memory of
the church’s experiences under Communism. The perception of Russia’s older
generation that church leaders had been as compromised under Communism left an
entire generation feeling that they had lost out in the past, and with funding
directed to youth, they were being passed over in the present. (3)
The
relationship between evangelicals and the Russian Orthodox Church was another
contentious issue in the 1990s. The Russian Orthodox were dependent on
Protestants to receive Bibles and other literature because satellite Russian
Orthodox congregations lacked the resources to supply them.
Russian
religious groups faced the problem of receiving Western funds while attempting
to promote Russian goals. As a 1993 “Open Letter to the Missionary Coordinating
Council to All Western Missionary Organizations” stated, “In Moscow alone, over
one hundred Western organizations were registered. And each one wants to
accomplish its program by using the existing church infrastructure, which is
still so weak that is cannot resist this pressure, neither organizationally nor
spiritually….Indigenous missionary organizations cannot compete with strong
Western missions and the best individuals prefer to work for Western
organizations and, naturally, for better payment….Finally, instead of
[receiving] assistance and support from Western missionaries, local missions
[find that they] have to defend their own vision of missionary service.”
(4) This problem was not, and is
not, unique to religious organizations which received Western funding; other NGOs often face
the same issue.
The
freedom of “non-traditional” religious groups may soon be put in check.
Recently, the Justice Ministry has proposed new restrictions on religious
groups with the intent of stemming “foreign religious expansion,” according to Vedemosti. (5) The proposals are designed
to make the process of procuring a visa more difficult for missionaries as well
as to ease the process for shutting down religious groups.
In the
meantime, however, Protestant Christian groups and others exercise relative
freedom. A young Protestant missionary living in Perm recently reported, “The
local authorities are not fighting anything we do since we are an organization
registered with the government. We are not harassed or impaired by the
authorities in any way. Having said that, over all, Protestant groups are
looked down upon by the local authorities. Legally we have the right to
be here, but that does not change their attitude. I know some churches are
having a hard time right now. There is a church in Perm called New
Testament. They are registered but they needed to buy a bigger building since
they were getting too big. They made a bid for a large building and
won the contract over a casino. It became big news in Perm. Even the governor
got involved. The governor is very upset about this church buying
property in the middle of the city. He even said he will give this building
back to the people no matter what. If that happens, most likely it will become
a casino.” (6)
Although
the Russian Orthodox Church has stated that it has no intention of seeking to
become the state church, (7) its
involvement with authorities is growing. A new course offered by the Russian
Academy of State Administration (RASA) is taking cooperation of church and
state to a new level. The purpose of this 9-day class, which is offered to the
leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, is “to inform about the latest
innovations in the sphere of church and state relations,” said RASA Pro-Rector
Anatoli Tupinin. The course participants met with people such as Sergei Popov,
head of the Duma’s committee on public associations and religious groups,
Education and Science Minister Andrei Fursenko, and Culture and Media Minister
Aleksandr Sokolov. (8)
The
number of Russian adherents to Islam is growing. Among the most public
conversions was the Russian Orthodox priest, Vyacheslav Polosin, whose decision
to become a Muslim in the 1990s drew considerable attention. (9) The increase in numbers in the Muslim
community has led to greater political organization. Muslim groups are
beginning to organize in both the political and social spheres. The National
Organization of Russian Muslims (NORM), for example, was formed in 2004 and, in
a departure from previous Muslim organizations, has taken up issues not
strictly pertaining to religion. (10)
Religion,
as well as ethnicity, has become an increasingly important topic in Russia as
issues such as xenophobia and ethnic tension are highlighted by events such as
the attack on a Jewish synagogue earlier this month. In fact, one of the
responsibilities being assumed by the newly convened Public Chamber is the
issue of addressing xenophobia.
Source
Notes:
1)
“Russian Orthodox Church losing flock to other faiths,” 9 Sep 05; BBC
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets.
2) “Does
church threaten secular life in Russia?” 7 Jun 05, RIA Novosti via
ISI Emerging Markets.
3) Walter
Sawatsky, “After the Glasnost Revolution: Soviet Evangelicals and Western
Missions,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, April 1992.
4) Otonas
Balchunas (Shaulai, Lithuania), Semen Borodin (Krasnodar, Russia), Andrei
Bondarenko (Elgava, Latvia), Anatoly Bogatov (Saransk, Moldova), Vassily
Davidyuk (Kiev, Ukraine), Piotr Lunichkin (Vladikavkaz, Ossetia), Pavel Pogodin
(Nalchik, Kavkaz), Franz Tissen (Saran, Kazakhstan), Henri Fot (Bishkek,
Krgyzstan), and Victor Shiva (Almaty, Kazakstan), “Open Letter of the
Missionary Coordinating Council to All Western Missionary Organizations
Interested in Spreading the Gospel in the Former Soviet Union,” 23 March 1993,
Russian Ministries Files, Wheaton Illinois as cited in Peter Deyneka and Anita
Deyneka, “Evangelical Foreign Missionaries in Russia,” International Bulletin
of Missionary Research, April 1998, p. 57.
5)
“Russia seeks to bolster checks on religious groups,” 14 Nov 05, Agence
France-Presse via ISI Emerging Markets.
6) Jonathan Dulin, e-mail communication with author, 4
Dec 05.
7) “Alexy
II refutes claims Russian church seeking state status,” 28 Dec 05, ITAR-TASS
via FBIS transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC).
8)
“Clergy will be taught the basics of state administration,” 18 Nov 05, Kommersant; What the Papers Say via ISI
Emerging Markets.
9)
“Muslim Russia,” 19 Aug 05, Versiya; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets.
10) Ibid.
By Robyn
Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)
~~~~~
RUSSIA
AND UKRAINE
Radar
disputes
Hiding in
the shadow of the current skirmish between Russia and the Ukraine over gas
prices is the contention over the use of early warning radar sites in the
Ukraine. Russia has enjoyed
exclusive use of data from Ukraine’s radars in Sevastopol and Mukachevo since
the fall of the Soviet Union. However,
in December 2005, Ukrainian officials made overtures suggesting Russia needs to
pay more for the radar data and that the radar sites might also be made
available to support US missile defense efforts. (1) There is no official link between Ukraine’s dissatisfaction
with the radar arrangement and gas prices, but it does seem likely that Ukraine
is using military security as leverage against Russia. This is especially true given the
suspicious timing of several additional announcements such as a proposal from
Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko to reinstitute the Missile Troops
and rumors of a Ukrainian refusal extend the service life of the Russian SS-18
long range missiles. (2)
As
highlighted in Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov’s recent Wall Street Journal
article, Russia’s nuclear forces continue to be its first priority and primary
military deterrent against large-scale military attack. (3) The purpose of Russia’s network of
indigenous and allied early warning systems is to detect a large scale attack
with sufficient warning to protect Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capability. These systems also have an important
associate mission of space surveillance and tracking. Radars such as the ones located in Ukraine are critical due
to their capability for day/night and all-weather operation. In addition, the importance of the ground-based
sensors is magnified in light of the reduced capability of Russia’s space based
early warning systems since the end of the Soviet.
The
handling of the radar controversy presents an interesting dilemma for
Russia. The radars at Sevastopol
and Mukachevo are 1970’s era Dnepr class radars and are formally the property
of Ukraine. Furthermore, these
large radars are situated to detect objects over Europe, the Mediterranean, the
Middle East, and as far east as Iran. Presently, Russia does not have adequate backup coverage of this sector
from any other sensor except the Pill Box anti-ballistic missile radar, which
is primarily a tracking radar and not particularly suited to early warning and
space surveillance. Hence, the
loss of Ukraine radars would leave a sizeable hole in Russia’s early warning
fence. Colonel General Volter
Kraskovsky, former commander of Russia's missile defense troops, asserts that
“U.S. access to the Sevastopol and Mukachevo radars could significantly damage Russia's
missile defenses in the direction of central and southern Europe, and towards
the Mediterranean.” (4) Furthermore, Maj-General Roman Popkovich (ex-chairman of the Duma
Defense Committee) suggests, “Russia should take appropriate measures in
response, up to and including providing protection by units from our armed
forces for the stations that we built in Ukraine in the interests of our state
and that are part of the missile defense of Russia and the CIS.” (5)
While
concern is voiced over the potential loss of access to the radars, there are
dissenting voices and other options. Russia continues to describe the United States as the primary military
threat for large scale attack against its territory; but realistically, the
loss of access to Ukraine’s radars does not substantially change Russia early
warning against putative US attack. The Ukraine radars do not cover the most likely avenues of US ingress,
and Russia has more than sufficient nuclear forces to maintain a highly
credible second strike retaliatory force. A more pragmatic view was voiced by Ruslan Pukhov, Head of the Centre
for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, who states: “the early-warning
radars are only part of the former Soviet Union's defense system. The system's already full of
holes. In particular, the Glonass
satellite system for global positioning is not fully operational. There are
lots of other things that are not fully functional, either…It's not good, of
course, but it won't lead to tragedy.” (6)
An
alternative for Russia is to accelerate plans to build replacement radars on
its own turf. Russia has long
realized the hazards of foreign dependence for early warning assets and has
developed bilateral agreements for the near-term. For the future, Russia announced the development of a
modular early warning radar in 2001 with the aim of building a system which can
be constructed and operated less expensively than the aging, behemoth systems
currently deployed. (7)
After
Ukraine hinted at possible cooperation with the US, Russia responded by
announcing that initial tests of the new modular radar have started. Also, more information was released on
the new radar now known as the Voronezh-DM radar system developed by NIIDAR
(Scientific Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communication). (8) In addition, speculation was confirmed
that the Voronezh is planned to replace the Daryal and Dnepr class radars
including the Ukrainian radars. (9) Funding for construction of the first operational unit was specified by
name in the state defense order announced by Mikhail Fradkov. (10) General Kraskovsky believes fielding
the Voronezh radar is a viable alternative, “but this would take two or three
years, and the costs could equal or exceed Moscow's additional revenues from
charging Ukraine a higher price for natural gas.” (11) Thus, in a relatively short period of
time, Russia could field a serviceable and much more reliable early warning
radar on its own territory which could replace the information gleaned from the
Ukrainian sites.
Another issue
for Russia is how to prevent US access to the Ukrainian radar sites and foil
any US encroachment into Ukraine for missile defense. US access to Ukraine’s radar site would provide tremendous
insight into the internal concept of operations of the Russian early warning
system. The early warning radars
are so powerful that detecting their transmissions is unproblematic; however,
there is much uncertainty over how the information gleaned from the radar sites
is processed and fused with data and algorithms from other sources to inform
the Russian leadership on topics to include early warning, intelligence
collection, and satellite tracking. Russia’s General Popkovich summarized this concept: “Our crews and Ukrainian
crews service the radar and I think this is the same as handing over a whole
series of secret documents to a country that, when all's said and done, is not
our friend when it comes to military matters.” (12)
A further
Russian preoccupation concerns the putative deployment of new US missile defense
assets in Ukraine. The US is
interested in acquiring additional sites for sensors and missile launchers to
monitor and defeat missile threats from the Middle East or Central Asia. As mentioned previously, Ukraine is
well-positioned geographically to monitor activity in these areas. For Russia, the specter of US missiles
and radar sites in the Ukraine seems nothing short of abhorrent, as reflected
in the tone of Ivanov’s recent policy article. (13) The presence of US personnel, sensors, and missiles in
Ukraine would clearly generate Russian angst.
From
Ukraine’s perspective, the haggling over the radar sites presents opportunities
as well as risks. If Ukraine
continues its march toward increasing ties to the West, then cooperation on the
radar sites is an attractive bargaining tool. Moreover, full access to the sites as well as allowing
basing of US assets would likely engender strong US support. Conversely, Russia can apply
significant political and economic pressure which could be more than Ukraine’s
weakening pro-West movement can handle. In terms of bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine stands to get a
little more money in the near term for the data from the early warning radars. Moreover, Russia will have to consider
seriously the costs of being truly militarily independent of Ukraine. Replacing Ukraine’s radars and missile
technology will be very costly perhaps even more than cost of gas these
days.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s
desire to increase costs for Russian access to early warning data and possibly
to cooperate with the West is a fascinating example of the “Great Game”
politics and military positioning currently on display in Russia’s near
abroad. Russia can survive the
loss of data from the early warning sites, although it would leave the country
with a hole in its early warning fence until a new modular system is brought on
line in a few years. The greater
issue for Russia is preventing the West and especially the US from gaining a
foothold in the Ukraine.
Source
Notes:
1)
“Ukraine Will Reveal Russian Secrets To The United States,” Kommersant, 9 Dec 05, WPS Defense and
Security via ISI Emerging Markets.
2)
"Yushchenko Ready To Grab Missiles. The Question Is, Against Whom Will
They Be Aimed and With What Will They Be Equipped" Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 Jan 06 via Johnson’s Russia
List. “Ukraine Threatens Russia's
Radar Security,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Dec 05, WPS Defense and Security via ISI Emerging
Markets.
3) Sergei
Ivanov, “Russia Must Be Strong,” Wall Street Journal, 11 Jan 06 via http://www.america-russia.net/eng .
4) “Ukraine
May Host US Radars,” UPI, 13 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
5)
“Russia: Experts View Ukrainian Threat To Give US Access To Missile Defense,”
Ekho Moskvy radio (Moscow), 12 Dec 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets.
6) Ibid.
7) Pavel
Podvig, “Plans For New Early Warning Radar,” http://russianforces.org/eng .
8) Ibid.
9)
“Voronezh Will Cover St. Petersburg From The North-Western Sector,” Kommersant, 11 Jan 06, WPS Defense and
Security via ISI Emerging Markets.
10)
“Mikhail Fradkov Distributed The State Defense Order,” Kommersant, 1 Dec 05, WPS Defense and
Security via ISI Emerging Markets.
11)
“Ukraine Threatens Russia's Radar Security,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Dec 05, WPS Defense and
Security via ISI Emerging Markets.
12)
“Russia: Experts View Ukrainian Threat To Give US Access To Missile Defense,”
Ekho Moskvy radio (Moscow), 12 Dec 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets.
13)
Sergei Ivanov, “Russia Must Be Strong,” Wall Street Journal, 11 Jan 06 via http://www.america-russia.net/eng .
By
Jeffrey Butler (butler88@bu.edu)
~~~~~
ARMED
FORCES (EXTERNAL)
Lighthouse row follows gas war, highlighting tense
relations between Ukraine and Russia
Over the past few weeks Russia and Ukraine have played a
game of tit-for-tat with Ukrainian-based hydrographic and navigation facilities
used by Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Although recent events involve merely a
lighthouse near the Crimean city of Yalta and a navigation facility located on
Ukraine’s Azov Sea coast, the larger issue seems to be the status of Russia’s
Black Sea Fleet, which is home-ported in Ukraine’s autonomous Crimea
region. Moreover, though apparently unrelated to December’s gas war, the
incidents on the Black Sea and Azov Sea followed on the heels of the dispute
between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas in which, it appears, Russia got
the upper hand. In one respect, the natural gas and Black Sea Fleet
disputes are centered on adherence to agreements previously reached by Russia
and Ukraine; but, in another respect, the disputes differ because brinkmanship,
a bit of chaos and the threat of armed conflict have often marked the running
14-year dispute over the status of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
What just happened, exactly?
Both Russia and Ukraine seem to agree that their most
recent spat began on 13 January 2006. On that day, an eight-man team from
Ukraine’s ministry of transportation reportedly prevented personnel from
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from entering a lighthouse, designated Ya-13, near the
city of Yalta. These actions by Ukraine government employees occurred conspicuously
just nine days after Russia and Ukraine ostensibly negotiated an end to their
dispute over natural gas supplies and a mere two days after Russian President
Vladimir Putin met and praised Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko for the
success of the aforementioned negotiations. (1) Regardless, on 15
January, amid debate about possession of the Yalta lighthouse and the Black Sea
Fleet agreements that supposedly govern such issues, the conflict between
Russia and Ukraine expanded north when Russia apparently dispatched 20 troops
to guard the Mars-75 radio navigation facility near the Ukrainian town of
Henichesk, on the Azov Sea. On the same day Russian troops deployed to
the Mars-75 facility, Captain 1st Rank Igor Dygalo, aide to the commander-in-chief
of the Russian navy, claimed that Russia’s security guards at Mars-75 had
prevented five unidentified persons from taking over the station. (2) Two
days later, on 17 January, Ukraine demanded that the Russian dredging vessel Urengoi put “an
immediate stop” to its work in the disputed waters of the Kerch strait, which
separates the Azov Sea from the Black Sea. (3) Meanwhile, back in
Henichesk, the Ukrainian Student Brotherhood, a Ukrainian nationalist student
organization, maintained a picket at the Mars-75 facility where Russian forces
reportedly had hung a banner claiming, “Territory of the Russian Federation.”
(4) Accompanying the events in Henichesk was the appearance of leaflets
stating that Russia had “made the decision to bring a limited contingent of
Russian troops and special units to Ukraine to establish control over gas
pipelines considered vital to Russia.” (5) The source of the leaflets
remained unclear.
How did it all begin?
Theoretically, when then Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
and Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlov Lazarenko signed the Black Sea Fleet
Accords in 1997, Russia and Ukraine solved the vexing problem of what to do
with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the wake of the Soviet Union’s breakup.
In practice, the Accords seem to have raised as many issues as they
solved. Although the agreement apportioned approximately 82% of the Black
Sea Fleet to Russia and the remaining 18% to Ukraine, neither Russia nor
Ukraine has completed a comprehensive inventory of the fleet. Further,
even though the Accords stipulated that Russia would lease several bays in the
port of Sevastopol for approximately USD $100 million per year to house its
Black Sea Fleet, both Ukraine and Russia have questioned these terms that are
not set to expire until 2017. It also is notable that Russia’s lease
payments originally were intended to reduce some of the nearly $3 billion
Ukraine owed to the state-owned Russian gas supplier and prime player in
December’s gas war, RAO Gazprom. (6)
The Black Sea Fleet Accords affected not only the Black
Sea Fleet, but Ukraine’s autonomous region of Crimea as well.
Specifically, Russia supposedly acknowledged Crimea’s borders and agreed that
the region was “legally and territorially a sovereign part of Ukraine.” (7)
Yet, in 2003, Ukraine and Russia embroiled themselves in a bitter three-month
dispute over Crimea’s eastern border, located across the narrow Kerch strait
from Russia’s Krasnodar Krai. Literally and figuratively at the center of
the dispute was Tuzla, a tiny island situated in the middle of the strait that
opens into the Azov Sea. Rich in fishing resources, including sturgeon,
the source of caviar, and part of the only all-water path from the Black Sea to
the oil-rich Caspian Sea, the Azov Sea is a more important body of water than
its size suggests. So, in the fall of 2003, when Russia began to build an
earthen dike from Krasnodar to Tuzla in an apparent land-grab, Ukraine deployed
additional troops to Tuzla and protested vigorously that Russia’s actions
threatened the status of the island, the territory of Ukraine, and control of
the Kerch strait. (8) In the end Russia stopped its move toward Tuzla,
but the two neighbors left unresolved the issue of demarcation in the Kerch
strait.
Would Russia and Ukraine proceed to armed conflict over
a lighthouse and a navigation facility?
Today, armed conflict over the latest incidents on the
Black Sea and the Azov Sea seems unlikely. The dispute over Tuzla in 2003
was just one in a long series of tense standoffs between Russia and Ukraine
over the region. Before 2003, rows similar to the one over Tuzla saw both
Russia and Ukraine deploy troops either to protect or to seize military
facilities in Crimea, and the disputes even witnessed the “defection” to Ukraine
of a Russian navy frigate. (9) However, despite having been authorized to use force to secure their
respective country’s interests, neither Ukraine’s nor Russia’s armed forces
fired a shot in any of these face-offs. In this light, it is not clear
why Russia last week reportedly gave its service members “all the powers which
are mentioned by the garrison’s guard regulations” in order to protect Russia’s
interests in the facilities of the Black Sea Fleet. (10) Similarly, on 16
January Anatoly Kinah, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense
Council, declared that Ukraine “…will step up the use of all methods available
to protect its interests and ensure compliance with the [Black Sea Fleet
Accords],” it wasn’t apparent whether he was making more of a diplomatic threat
than a military one. (11)
Thus, although war over the Black Sea Fleet and control of
the Azov Sea does not seem likely, destabilizing factors at play in these
disputes prevent any foregone conclusions. While it seems clear that employees
of Ukraine’s government first barred Russian service members from entering the
Ya-13 lighthouse in Yalta, it is less clear whether official Kiev ordered its
employees to act. In fact, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 17
January declared, “the Ukrainian presidential administration told [Russia] that
[Ukraine] had learnt about [the incident at Ya-13] from the papers.” (12)
Furthermore, official Moscow has lamented that, with regard to the recent
incidents in Crimea, “…it is difficult to understand who speaks for Ukraine
– the Ukrainian presidential administration, a certain youth organization
called Brotherhood or the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.” (13)
Reaching an agreement…
Before their most recent flare-up on the Black Sea, the
governments of Ukraine and Russia had already established committees to
consider the issues at hand. Against the backdrop of Ukrainian
parliamentary elections coming in March, these committees are scheduled to meet
in February to attempt to reach agreements on the lease Russia’s Black Sea
Fleet has with Ukraine and on Russia’s use of Ukrainian navigation facilities
for the aforementioned fleet. The two governments also will attempt to
reach consensus on the status of the Ukrainian-Russian border at the Kerch
strait. (14) However, January’s cat-and-mouse game on the Black Sea and
Azov Sea, uncertainties about official Ukraine, and the history of the
long-running dispute in Crimea all suggest that negotiators are destined to
emerge from February’s meetings without much to show for their efforts.
Source Notes:
1) “Wrap: Putin, Yuschenko on bilateral relations,” RIA
Novosti, 11 Jan
06 via ISI Emerging Markets.
2) “Russian official says seizure of another Black Sea
fleet facility prevented,” BBC Monitoring of ITAR-TASS, 15 Jan 06 via ISI
Emerging Markets.
3) “Ukraine says Russian dredge ship ‘violates
sovereignty’,” Agence France-Presse, 17 Jan 06 via ISI Emerging Markets.
4) “Ukraine Seeks Control of Russian Naval Facilities on
its Soil,” Socor, Vladimir, 19 Jan 06, Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM) Volume 3,
Issue 13.
5) “Leaflets Predicting Russian Invasion Appear in
Ukraine,” JM, 19 Jan 06, RFE/RL Volume 10, Number 10, Part II.
6) “Ukraine, Russia and the Black Sea Fleet Accords,”
Felgenhauer, Tyler, February 1999, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs.
7) Ibid.
8) “2003: The Year in Review, A tiny island in the news:
the dispute over Tuzla,” 11 Jan 04, The Ukrainian Weekly, Number 2, Vol. LXXII.
9) Tyler Felgenhauer, Ibid.
10) “Russian Defense Minister Offers Ukraine Negotiations
Over Crimea Military Facilities,” Mosnews.com, 17 Jan 06 via Johnson’s Russia
List (JRL) 2006-#15 (#28).
11) “Ukraine security supreme talking tough on lighthouse
row with Russia,” BBC Monitoring of TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, 16 Jan 06 via ISI
Emerging Markets.
12) “Russian Foreign Minister urges Ukraine to explain
lighthouse incident,” Interfax-AVN, 17 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
13) Ibid.
14)
Vladimir Socor, Ibid.
By J.
Marcel LeBlanc (jleblanc@bu.edu)
~~~~~
Nothing
personal
Following
the shock wave that swept through most of Europe when Russia temporarily halted
gas supplies to Ukraine over the holidays, other regular customers of RF fuel
are still reeling from sticker shock. Russia informed its clients of a substantial jump in prices to be
charged, regardless of how fondly (or not) individual governments might be
viewed by Moscow. As Gazprom
officials explained, it’s not personal, it’s not politics: it’s business, at
$110 per 1,000 cubic meters for gas deliveries, the amount it charges in
European markets.
Of
course, to the governments faced with increased costs and potential shortages
as winter hits full force, it’s anything but purely business. At a December meeting of the
Atlantic Council of the United States, Georgian Vice Premier Georgy Baramidze
mentioned his country’s strong support of new pipelines “from the Caspian
region to Europe” to be built by Western energy companies. (1) Georgia actually has a bargaining
chip, although Western officials advise against using it. Gazprom has proposed a 10-year
extension of a transitional period before raising the gas price to $110/1,000
cubic meters… if Georgia agrees to hand over some control over its pipeline.
(2) US Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European and Eurasian Affairs, Maathew Bryza, told Georgia that selling a
trunk gas pipeline to Russia would increase Georgian dependence on Russian fuel
deliveries, which is not recommended. (3) While Georgia mulls
over the proposal, an earlier agreement contains the higher contract price.
Azerbaijan,
too, is looking for solutions, after Gazprom announced it would use “European
prices” in contracts on gas supplies to that Caucasian country. (4) Baku is in the best position of the
Caucasian capitals, given Azerbaijan’s primary reliance on its own oil and gas
supplies and its “very successful” cooperative venture with British Petroleum
to bring supplies to international markets. (5) However, President Ilkham Aliyev told the Azerbaijani
Security Council that the country needed to strengthen its energy security,
since it does still need imported gas, from Russia, and it faced an increase
from $61 dollars/1,000 cubic meters (per a 2004 agreement) to the $110 rate
Gazprom announced for everyone. (6) Whence would the extra supplies come? Central Asia. Indeed, a second pipeline to increase the amount of Kazakhstani and
Turkmen oil through Azerbaijan and connect the terminals of Azartrans Ltd. and
BP-Azerbaijan, was just completed. (7) Kazakhstan, moreover,
agreed to join the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, and is considering also
building a pipeline to Baku, according to Kazakh Prime Minister Daniyal
Akhmetov. (8)
However,
while Azerbaijan and Georgia could have expected no kind treatment from the
Russian company, Armenia did. And
Yerevan is trying to bring politics into pipelines. Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan reviewed Armenia’s great
relations with Russia, emphasizing in particular economic, as well as political
and security, cooperation. Because
of that cooperation, Oskanyan explained, he hoped that the two countries would
“arrive at a mutually acceptable solution [regarding gas tariffs] which will
not have a serious impact on the living standards of the Armenian population
and the pace of the country’s economic growth.” (9) Russia currently supplies gas, as Armenia’s only source of
energy, at $56/1,000 cubic meters, but Gazprom’s profit loss has prompted
renegotiating, at the higher $110 rate.
Gazprom
officials deny that control over gas supplies is politics by another means,
citing the continuation of supplies during the democratic revolutions in both
Ukraine and Georgia as proof “there is no tint in our attitudes – either
orange or pink. … What we value much higher is our reputation as an excellent
supplier.” (10) “This is not
policy, but economics,” Alexander Ryazanov, chairman of the board at Gazprom,
explained when announcing the increase to all CIS countries. (11) Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili, for one, is not
buying that argument; he urged ministers to search for alternative sources for
energy because “Russia constantly uses blackmail, it
constantly seeks to use energy as a means of pressure on Georgia.” (12)
GEORGIA
No New
Year’s resolution in sight
The New
Year did not bring any hint of resolution to the continuing, and apparently
escalating, conflict between Georgia and its breakaway region South
Ossetia. Georgia seems intent on
its earlier-stated goal of unifying all of the country, and South Ossetia seems
equally intent on the path that has, admittedly, worked quite well for it so
far… de facto independence from Georgia, if not from the Russian Federation.
Indeed, Georgian officials spent much of the autumn months attempting to garner international support for President Mikheil Saakash