The ISCIP Analyst Volume XI Number 4 (08 December 2005) |
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION
PRESIDENCY
Name
your successor?
For some
reason, as yet unclear, the race for succession in the Kremlin has started
remarkably early. Last week,
Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev—two prime contenders for the
throne—had their job descriptions tweaked a bit (actually Medvedev had
his clipped), and now analysis focuses on the president's sly nomination of two
successors. Two successors? A leader who appoints two successors
doesn't really think he can be replaced. And that may be the real point.
As for
the new jobs: Medvedev has been
exiled from the Kremlin to the White House, where he will assume the revived
"First Deputy Prime Minister" position. If he is truly to be the chosen successor, then this would
be his "Prime Minister in-training" phase. Of course, he would also be a prime target for Fradkov and
every other politically ambitious denizen of the White House. Perhaps it is a test—a trial by
fire; or perhaps Putin simply is fed up with Medvedev's presence in his Kremlin
office every day. Either way,
Medvedev has lost his access and his administrative "tail." He claims that he will be continue in
his role at Gazprom's Board of Directors, but time will tell. (1)
Sergei
Ivanov, Minister of Defense and Putin pal, has seen his titles augmented with
the rank of Deputy Prime Minister. Ivanov, and his coterie, are clever operatives and decided to evacuate
Moscow for a tour of the regions, specifically of defense enterprises (suggesting
he is "touching base" with an important constituent and contributor
base—the arms industry) shortly after the announcement. (2) The space and time allotted to this
trip gives his friends and enemies alike the time to scheme—and gives Ivanov
time to plan his response to the new circumstances.
If
accommodations speak volumes about relative position within the Russian
executive, then the allocation of office space for the new White House
officials leaves plenty of grist for the mill: Medvedev will take over a suite of offices on the sixth floor,
previously reserved for Putin's reformer extraordinaire, Dmitri Kozak (who, of course,
has since been dispatched to the Southern Federal District); Medvedev's First
Deputy Prime Minister office will have convenient access to the Government's
Chief of Staff, Sergei Naryshkin, which means that they will have an easier
time keeping an eye on each other. Sergei Ivanov has been given a "Guest" office on the fifth
floor of the White House—one previously reserved for Duma Chair Boris
Gryzlov, in case he had to "do some paperwork" while at the
government offices. (3)
And in
other newsÉtwo more appointments
Left
somewhat under-analyzed in the frenzy of successor chats are the appointments
of Sergei Sobyanin to Medvedev's seat as Kremlin Chief of Staff (did Viktor
Ivanov, Igor Sechin, et al. just lose out again or are they not quite Chief of
Staff material?), and Sergei Kiriyenko's move to Rosatom.
Sergei
Sobyanin, Governor of (oil-rich)
Tyumen, Putin's former Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Federal
District, and former Federation Council member gains significant access to the
president (and even more crucially, control of the access of others) as the new
Kremlin Chief of Staff. Sobyanin
is an interesting choice, being neither St. Petersburger nor one of the siloviki. He is, and clearly will be in the Kremlin, an outsider,
which makes his appointment a bit of particularly good fortune for those who
will need to guide him (and therefore Putin) for his first few months in the
job. Perhaps one of his deputies
deserves more credit for "big picture" thinking than he normally
receives.
While an
outsider in the Kremlin schemata, Sobyanin has been a fairly high-profile
politician for years, and has, of course, accumulated some very powerful
friends, not least among them the oligarch-Governor of Chukot Autonomous
District, Roman Abramovich, who helped get Sobyanin elected Speaker of the
Khanty-Mansiisk legislature and, through Sibneft, supported Sobyanin's run for
Governor of Tyumen in 2001. (4) Abramovich, who has seemed slighted in recent Kremlin oil and gas deals,
may not be so remote from presidential favor as was believed and having a
friend in the President's front office can't hurt.
As for
his Sobyanin's political views, Anatoli Chubais evaluates him as "similar
in style" to Putin: "He
is not radical, he is moderately democratic, he is measured, unhurried,
sensible. It is a combination of
qualities that makes him blend in." (5) It certainly doesn't sound like he'll upstage his boss.
Sergei
Kiriyenko seems an odd choice for Rosatom. Although the longtime Presidential Envoy to the Volga
Federal District also has headed the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament
since 2001, Kiriyenko lacks the experience in nuclear physics or engineering
that predecessors Yevgeni Adamov or Aleksandr Rumyantsev had in the position.
(6)
It is
possible that Kiriyenko was parachuted out of his Envoy position and found a
comfortable landing at Rosatom, or that his western-oriented,
economic-reforming reputation might be an appreciated salve at an agency
roiling US-Russian relations over the Iranian nuclear situation. With the focus
of the Russian-Iranian nuclear relationship shifting to contingent arms deals
however, and with the arrest and extradition fight of Adamov, it might be the
case that the political leadership is hoping to see Rosatom shrink back from
the international spotlight. Kiriyenko might be just the sort of leader to temper the hot nationalism
of previous Atomic Energy administrations and replace it with a cool-headed
economic mission.
Kiriyenko
apparently has been tasked with a reorganization of Rosatom, separating a
civilian nuclear power sector from its predominant military missions. (7)
Former Atomic Minister Viktor Mikhailov (an early proponent of the Iranian
deal) claimed that he discussed restructuring plans with Kiriyenko, but did not
see the utility or feasibility of separating out a uniquely military use. The plans are likely to include the creation
of a separate entity to address energy creation concerns. (8)
Apparently,
President Putin's much-discussed reassertion of the "power vertical"
is revealing a redundancy in the positions of the super-region presidential
plenipotentiary representatives. As this once-vaunted administrative reform is left by the wayside,
debate focuses on the relative strength and clout of the remaining
representatives, making more executive appointments and restructuring a strong
possibility.
Source
Notes:
1)
ITAR-TASS, 27 Nov 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via World News Connection
(WNC). Medvedev announced,
apparently unprompted, that he would stay with Gazprom.
2)
"Sergei Ivanov Attacks," Center for Current Political Research
(CCPR), 29 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
3) Moskovsky
komsomolets, 16
Nov 05; BBC Monitoring, 1 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
4)
"The Unexpected Sobyanin," Moskovsky komsomolets, No. 260, 16 Nov 05; What the
Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis.
5)
"Russian power grid boss critical of Putin's economic policy," Ekho
Moskvy in
Russian, 1704 GMT, 19 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
6) Russica
Izvestiya, 16 Nov
05; Izvestiya Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets Database; Gazeta.ru website, 15 Nov 05;
BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
7) Russica
Izvestiya, 23 Nov
05; Izvestiya Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
8) Ibid.
By Susan
J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu)
~~~~~
NurgaliyevÕs
fight against corruption
Over the past several months RussiaÕs Minister of Internal
Affairs (MVD), Rashid Nurgaliyev, appears to be taking much more of a look at
his own cadres in his fight against corruption. Previously, his press statements focused on the ministryÕs
successes in combating crime and corruption in other organizations; his March
report to legislators lauded the MVDÕs capture of more corrupt officials taking
bribes, prevention of money laundering incidents, and confiscation of illicit
drugs. (1) Over the past several
months, however, his remarks have focused on the internal corruption within his
police units.
In August, Nurgaliyev made unannounced inspections of
police departments in several regions and referred to the Òviolations of the
lawÓ and Òabsolute immoralityÓ he found. (2) This was one of the few times the police has been chastised
openly by its minister. Nurgaliyev
followed his remarks by issuing special orders that amount to a new ÒPolice
Code of Conduct.Ó He commanded the
police to be understanding and polite, to abide by the law, and not to harass
citizens with unnecessary interrogations. As a root cause of the problem, he criticized the police as poorly
educated, particularly in the basic principles of civilized culture. (3)
In September, Nurgaliyev responded to reports
indicating that the population is far more afraid of police and security forces
than of criminal organizations by agreeing that MVD staffersÕ disregard of
their official duties breeds much police corruption. (4) He provided other
objective reasons for MVD corruption, including police not having enough
training and expertise and their fraternizing with criminals. In an open letter published on the
departmentÕs web site, Nurgaliyev criticized the low moral standards of MVD
staffers, their callousness and rudeness in dealing with citizens, police using
their internal affairs work to get rich unlawfully, and police collusion with
criminals. (5)
On 26 October, Nurgaliyev spoke in the Kurgan town
of Shadrinsk during a visit to police precincts in the region, a visit
apparently prompted by his lack of trust in reports received from senior
officers there. During his speech,
he called the level of police work ÒcatastrophicÓ and Òrife with violationsÓ
and stated that police officers boost crime-solving rates by manipulating
statistics. Furthermore, Nurgaliyev
stated that the MVD witnessed a 41% increase in crimes and violations by police
officers in the January to September period, compared to the same period last
year. (6)
Finally, Nurgaliyev used the 10 November annual
ÒPolice DayÓ to criticize police inefficiency and to exhort the officers to do
more to win the trust of the people. (7) The Chairman of the DumaÕs Security Committee, Vladimir Vasilyev, also
acknowledged that the public had little respect for police authority due, in
part, to widespread corruption. He
called for an overhaul of the police to make them leaner and more professional.
(8)
An internal look certainly is warranted. Recent statistics indicate 38% of the
population is more fearful of the police than of any other profession. (9) However, NurgaliyevÕs introspective
criticism is rather new. Has
police corruption reached such epidemic proportions that even he, as a former
Federal Security Service (FSB) officer, feels compelled to act or is something
else motivating him?
Nurgaliyev, along with heads of the other security
ministries, has been criticized for weak leadership and lack of control over
their ministries. Nurgaliyev may
be trying to accomplish real reform, or he may be trying to distance himself
from MVD failures and the indignation of his FSB colleagues. Perhaps, as a former FSB officer, his
lack of MVD allegiance enables him to act more boldly than would a career MVD
officer. In either case, his
efforts are noteworthy, but his own statistics indicate police corruption is getting
worse, not diminishing.
Although corruption within the MVD arguably is worse than
elsewhere, the FSB cannot be far behind. Their brutal, unprofessional, and corrupt conduct in Beslan, Nalchik,
and throughout the Caucasus bears witness to that fact. Indeed, corruption permeates all of
Russian society. By NurgaliyevÕs
own admission, corruption has Òturned from a local threat into a dangerous
transnational phenomenon.Ó (10) Anti-corruption efforts within a single ministry will have little impact;
Russia needs similar efforts within the other security ministries and elsewhere
throughout its government.
In contrast to NurgaliyevÕs internal look at MVD
corruption, FSB leader Patrushev barely mentioned corruption within his FSB
when talking about the need to wage a universal struggle against corruption.
(11) If indeed Nurgaliyev is
publicly critical of his own ministry because he is a relative outsider,
perhaps a career MVD officer could lead the FSB and take a similar approach.
However, with ex-FSB officers currently running all the power ministries and
Ivanov now a deputy prime minister as well, donÕt hold your breath.
North Ossetia Parliamentary Commission on Beslan
Stanislav Kesayev, Chairman of the North Ossetia
Commission investigating the 2004 Beslan school hostage tragedy, summarized the
commissionÕs results during a recent speech. (12) Previously, investigation announcements seemed to support
many of the arguments made by the local Beslan investigators (including the
Beslan MotherÕs Committee) while contradicting much of the federal DumaÕs
Torshin Commission investigation. (13) While KesayevÕs investigation remained critical of the slow, poorly
coordinated response by Russian security forces, he minimized many previously
critical actions of federal authorities while not addressing others.
Just a few months ago, Kesayev criticized federal
investigators on several issues. (14) In contrast, his recent summary did not address
the question of how weapons were brought to the school, did not confirm that
authorities had advance information about the impending hostage situation, and
did not address the conduct of security forces during and after the crisis
(including command and control questions, the use of tanks, and lack of
protection of the investigation site). Furthermore, KesayevÕs investigation did not name persons responsible
for the poor response, much to the disappointment of Beslan locals.
The previous animosity between federal investigators and
KesayevÕs North Ossetia investigation seems to have subsided as well. In addition to KesayevÕs earlier
comments on the Òsuperficial federal investigation,Ó the Beslan MotherÕs
Committee remained dissatisfied with the progress of the federal investigation
and repeatedly called for the resignation of Nikolai Shepel, the Deputy
Prosecutor-General for the Southern Federal District. (15) Likewise, in June, Shepel described
Kesayev as ÒshamelessÓ and his commission as Òillegitimate.Ó (16) With a turn of the tides, Kesayev
reported during his speech that Shepel, that morning, wished him luck and
stated that Òwe are doing the same work.Ó (17) In a TV interview, the chairman of the DumaÕs commission
investigating Beslan, Aleksandr Torshin commended Kesayev for getting at the
truth and now agreed there may have been more than 32 terrorists (a previous
point of dispute between the investigations). (18)
The reason for KesayevÕs apparent about-face is unclear,
but according to one report the sides Òreached agreement and cut all the sharp
cornersÓ in the interests of the Republic. Reportedly, the agreement was reached after the involvement
of Taimuraz Mansurov, the head of North Ossetia, and Dmitri Kozak, President
PutinÕs envoy to the Southern Federal District. (19) The Torshin commission is expected to release its results
sometime after 20 December.
Source Notes:
1) ÒMironov and Nurgaliyev Exchanged Caustic RemarksÓ by
Irina Romancheva, Moscow Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Mar 05; FBIS Translated Text
via WNC.
2) ÒRussian Police-ÔTo Protect and to Serve?ÕÓ by Vasili
Kononenko, RIA Novosti, 1 Sep 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
3) Ibid.
4) ÒCriticism With Unchanged Content,Ó Gazeta.ru, 13 Sep
05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.
5) Ibid.
6) ÒTop Cop Chastises His ForceÓ by Carl Schreck, The
Moscow Times, 28 Oct 05 via
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/10/28/012.html.
7) ÒPolice Criticized on Their DayÓ by Anatoli Medetsky,
The Moscow Times, 11 Nov 05 via
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/11/11/011.html.
8) Ibid.
9) ÒRussian Police-ÔTo Protect and to Serve?ÕÓ Ibid.
10) ÒRussia, Politics, Officials, CorruptionÓ by Vasili
Kononenko, RIA Novosti, 3 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
11) ÒFSB Head Patrushev
Interviewed on Fight Against Terrorism,Ó BBC Monitoring, 24 Nov 05 via ISI
Emerging Markets.
12) ÒBeslan Report Was Heard
Differently than It Was Written,Ó by Zaur Farniev, Vladikavka, Kommersant, 30
Nov 05 via JRL #9208.
13) See "Security Services," The NIS Observed, Vol. XI, No. 1,
20 Oct 05.
14) ÒThere were Actions that Resembled Storming the
School,Ó by Pavel Pushkin, Kommersant-Vlast, 29 Aug 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
15) ÒWe
Do Not Rule Out the Possibility of Prosecuting Security Ministers,Ó by
Margarita Kondratyeva, Gazeta, 19 Sep 05; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging
Markets.
16)
ÒThere were Actions that Resembled Storming the School,Ó Ibid.
17)
Ibid.
18) TV
Interview With Alexander Torshin, Vesti Podrobnosti TV Russia Program, 29 Nov 05 via
JRL #9311.
19) ÒThere were Actions that Resembled Storming the
School,Ó Ibid.
By John H. Kafer (kaferj@bu.edu)
~~~~~
Russia
and the G8
Rampant
corruption, a shaky economy and indications of moves in an authoritarian
direction have weakened RussiaÕs international position. However, Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak claim that
next yearÕs Group of Eight (G8) summit in St. Petersburg will boost RussiaÕs
status.
Storchak
contends that Russia eventually will become a full member of the G8, but claims
Russia would not push the issue: Ò[I]tÕs a normal process, no one is planning
to force it.Ó (1) The deputy finance minister is being diplomatic, but in
reality, his statement is irrelevant: Even if Russia wanted to, it could not
enforce full membership in the G8. Until Russia becomes a member of the WTO,
its chances of becoming a full G8 member remain remote.
Despite
RussiaÕs obvious shortcomings compared to the other members of the G8, Lavrov
extolled RussiaÕs position on the world scene: ÒRussia has become a constant in
the international arena.Ó He thinks that the summit in 2006 will demonstrate
what he believes is RussiaÕs international strength: a consistent and
predictable foreign policy. (2)
Russia,
Iran and the world
Despite
hopes of becoming a full member of the G8 and WTO, Russia continues to irritate
the Untied States and many European countries with its provocative policy
regarding Iran. The latest agreement, which stipulates that Russia will sell
Iran anti-air missiles (against low flying missiles and aircraft) is causing
many Western diplomatic and security leaders major concern. The deal appears
intended to secure IranÕs putative nuclear weapons arsenal.
The one
billion dollar agreement with Iran, signed on December 2, coincided with a
visit to Moscow by R. Nicholas Burns, the US Under Secretary of State for
political affairs. In a radio interview on Echo Moskvy, Burns demanded that RussiaÕs
Foreign Ministry explain the arms deal, expressing his concern regarding IranÕs
real purpose for obtaining these missiles. (3)
ÒFor 25
years, Iran has supported terrorists in the Middle East, and that is why we
have very bad relations with them. You can understand why we do not support the
sales of weapons,Ó Burns said. (4)
A
spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry defended the deal as being: Òin
full conformity with our international obligations, including in the sphere of
nonproliferation.Ó (5)
However,
the transaction has to be viewed in the context of Russian-Western friction
regarding RussiaÕs role concerning putative nuclear proliferation in Iran.
ÒWe
believe Russia is a country that has influence over Iran, and we want Iran to
return to negotiations,Ó Burns noted. (6) However, while Russian leaders have
expressed agreement with the United States and Europe that Iran should not have
nuclear weapons, Russia continues to provide nuclear materials to Iran. The
agreement between Russia and Iran does contain a stipulation stating that the
nuclear material is only to be used for energy needs, but without a clear means
of enforcement of that clause, there is substantial cause for worry still
exists.
Secretary
of IranÕs High Council of National Security, Ali Larijani, claimed that Ò...This is not the first
time we have bought an anti-missile system. We also make them ourselves.Ó (7)
LarijaniÕs
statement is misleading. While Iran produces their own surface-to-surface
missiles, specifically the Mushak and Fateh series, the country is not known to
produce any surface-to-air missiles. (8) Moreover, the act of buying
surface-to-air missiles is not what is upsetting to the international
community. It is the type of missiles sold that makes this deal especially
controversial.
Russia
has agreed to sell Iran anti-air missiles against low flying missiles and aircraft, that can
fly under the radar, thus attacking nuclear facilities. The deal is troubling,
especially at a time when Iran is planning to continue its nuclear enrichment
work regardless of what the US or the Europeans want.
Larijani
has stated that nuclear enrichment work would start Òwithin a few months.Ó
ÒThis is
not up for negotiation, and the when and how of a resumption concerns us
alone,Ó Larijani said, (9) claiming that Iran is Òready to give guaranteesÓ
that it will not make nuclear weapons. (10) However, Òready to give guaranteesÓ
is not the same as actually giving guarantees and the issue of whether Russia
is willing to regulate the nuclear production of a close ally in order to
please the international community is debatable.
Russian
press predictably defends Putin
Sergei
Zemyanoi, a doctoral student of philosophy, claims Russia faces a choice
between either becoming a sovereign power or once again becoming an empire. The
article, which was published in Politichesky zhurnal, contends that the United States is
making it hard for Russia to take the first path because of the WestÕs
Òanti-Putin campaign.Ó (11)
Zemlyanoi
tries hard to establish that there is a viable force inside of Russia to take
on Putin and his United Russia party. The problem with this article is that
there is no real opposition to Putin. While there are extremists who clamor for
a return to Cold War style politics or even to a Tsarist empire, these parties,
led by compromised figures, such as Edvard Limonov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky,
are hardly viable contenders in Russia today, where the presidentÕs approval
ratings constantly hover around 70 percent.
The
ÒRussia at the CrossroadsÓ approach to foreign policy analysis, as set out by
Zemlyanoi, is viewed more as comedy (tragic though it may be), especially by
RussiaÕs neighbors, such as Georgia and Ukraine, than as serious political
discourse.
Source
Notes:
1)
Reuters, 3 Dec 05 via JohnsonÕs Russia List (JRL) #9311, Dec. 3, 2005.
2) RIA
Novosti, 28 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
3)
ÒRussia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar DealÓ by
Andrew Kramer. New York Times, 3 Dec 05.
4) Ibid.
5) RIA Novosti, 3 Dec 05 via
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20051203/42303019.html.
6)
ÒRussia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar DealÓ by
Andrew Kramer. New York Times, 3 Dec 05.
7)
Al-Jazeera, 4 Dec 05 via
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1AD09BE-A1D6-4EF6-A1E4-A54331B0F0D0.htm.
8)
GlobalSecurity.org, 28 Apr 05 via http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/mushak.htm.
9)
Al-Jazeera, 4 Dec 05 via
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1AD09BE-A1D6-4EF6-A1E4-A54331B0F0D0.htm.
10) Ibid.
11) What
the Papers Say (WPS), 1 Dec 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
By
Marissa Payne (mpayne@bu.edu)
~~~~~
DOMESTIC
AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
Moscow
elections
The
elections to the newly restructured Moscow city Duma were dominated by United
Russia, which won 28 out of 35 seats. United Russia, which has the support of the
President and whose ticket was led by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzkhov, won 13 out of
20 seats elected by party lists and all 15 of the single-mandate seats. The
Communist Party, which was not represented in the last Duma (elected in 2001),
received 17 percent of the vote and will hold four seats in the new Duma.
Yabloko, the liberal democratic party cobbled together from Yabloko and Union
of Right Forces (SPS), earned 11 percent of the vote, proving that it could woo
a constituency despite internal haggling. (1) However, Moscow in the halcyon
days after the USSRÕs implosion had been the democratic stronghold. The other parties and factions that
contested the election but failed to pass the 10 percent threshold for
representation in the city Duma included the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR),
Party of Life, the Green party, Free Russia, Party of Social Justice and
PeopleÕs Will. The Russian Election Commission has declared that there were no
serious infringements of election law, despite the fact that some members of
Yabloko were crying foul. (2)
The
previous Moscow Duma was composed of four parties. United Russia held 18 seats,
Rodina (Motherland) four seats, Russian Party of Life three seats, and SPS two.
The new composition of United Russia 28, Communists four, and Yabloko three,
reflects the changing nature of Russian politics and, according to critics,
LuzkhovÕs attempt to protect his own network before leaving office by securing
for them places in the municipal organs. However, there is some speculation that
Luzkhov may not leave office after all, but will instead use the United Russia
majority in the City Duma to return to his position. (3) The new Moscow Duma
will be responsible for appointing the next mayor of Moscow.
A list
that did not receive any votes was the Rodina party, which held four seats in
the previous Duma. The partyÕs name was removed from the ballot following
charges by the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party that RodinaÕs election
advertising was inciting ethnic strife. RodinaÕs television ad showed two men
of non-Slavic descent picking up watermelon rinds and trash from the dirt. A
voice over said, ÒDo you speak any Russian at all?Ó and was followed by an
injunction from party leader Dmitri Rogozin. ÒLetÕs clean up our city. LetÕs
clear away all the dirt.Ó (4)
The
Moscow Municipal Court ruled on 26 November that Rodina be removed from the
elections because of the television ad. Rodina appealed the case to the Supreme
Court, but it upheld the decision. The allegations from LDPR reflect the
contention between two parties that are using nationalistic appeals to rally
the electorate. During the course of the electoral campaign, each party had
accused the other of provoking ethnic tension. Of the two, RodinaÕs chance of a
successful election was the greater prior to its television fiasco. A poll
taken by the Levada Center just before the Municipal Court ruling showed that
Rodina could expect support from 15 percent of the respondents. However,
RodinaÕs support appears to have been picked up the Communists rather than the
LDPR.
Public
Chamber, NGOs, and protest
The bill
mandating the re-registration of NGOs and imposing harsher regulations on NGOs
that receive foreign funding has caused quite a controversy, both domestically
and in the international arena. In the Public Chamber, a body whose stated
purpose is to provide societal oversight of state organs in general and the
legislature in particular, the bill has led to the ChamberÕs first attempt to
exercise its rights. Twenty-one of the ChamberÕs members have submitted a
letter to the Duma requesting that the new bill on NGOs be delayed so the
chamber can review it before it is passed.
Ella
Pamfilova, head of the Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil
Society Institutions and Human Rights, recently met with Putin to discuss the
bill. Pamfilova said that the law violates the Russian Constitution as well as
RussiaÕs obligations under international law. She also raised the issue of what
impact this bill might have on RussiaÕs influence in its Ònear abroad.Ó She
stated that ÒÉthis draft law would also deal a serious blow to our cooperation
with our compatriots abroad, especially in the post-Soviet area. It also
contradicts what is a good idea – that of allocating budget funds to
support our public organizations [sic] in the neighboring countries.Ó (5) Putin responded that he would speak to
the Duma Òto ensure that any measures taken in this area are not to the
detriment of civil society in Russia.Ó (6)
The NGO
bill also is affecting RussiaÕs relationship with the United States. The two
countries are engaged in a tit-for-tat squabble over the nature of democracy
and the extent to which countries can support NGOs in other nations. The US
Congress recently allotted four million dollars for the promotion of democracy
in Russia. In response, Russia designated more than $17 million for use in
promoting civil society in Russia and its Ònear abroad.Ó Now a hefty team of
officials from the US State Department are headed to Moscow. Officially, the
purpose of the trip is to discuss counterterrorism, but an anonymous American
source cited in Kommersant has mentioned that the conversation will also include the
controversial legislation. (7)
Media
report
Anchorwoman
Olga Romanova of Ren-TV was cut from the lineup after stating on Ekho Moskvy that the stationÕs leadership was
exercising restrictive control over the content of her program, Ò24.Ó Romanova
claimed that shortly after the Ekho Moskvy interview, she was prevented from entering the
station by three security guards. Among the offending pieces that the
management withheld from broadcasting was a segment on how Aleksandr Ivanov,
son of Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, was not charged for the death of an
aging pedestrian who died as a result of being struck by his vehicle in May.
(8) Romanova has handed in her resignation to the television station along with
several other employees who had worked on Ò24.Ó (9)
Source
Notes:
1) ÒThree
parties win Moscow Duma mandates,Ó 5 Dec 05, ITAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis.
2)
ÒYabloko party reports abuses in Moscow elections,Ó 5 Dec 05, Interfax; FBIS
Transcribed Text via WNC.
3) ÒYuri
Luzhkov: Muscovites have made their choice," 6 Dec 05, Rossiyskaya
gazeta; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.
4)
ÒRodina party in last ditch appeal before 4 December polls,Ó 1 Dec 05,
ITAR-TASS; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.
5)
ÒBeginning of meeting with Chairwoman of the Council for Facilitating the
Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Ella Pamfilova,Ó 24
Nov 05; http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/11/24/2210_type82913_98112.shtml.
6) Ibid.
(7)
ÒNon-foreign-government organizations,Ó 1 Dec 05, Izvestiia Press Digest;
Russica Izvestiia via
ISI Emerging Markets.
8)
ÒForced removal,Ó 28 Nov 05, Izvestiia Press Digest; Russica Izvestiia via ISI Emerging Markets.
9)
ÒRomanova, several others to quit REN-TV,Ó 5 Dec 05, Interfax; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.
By Robyn
Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)
~~~~~
The
plight of the space program
RussiaÕs
military and civilian space capability continues to deteriorate as highlighted
by a series of failed launches and the recent firing of a senior space agency
official. In June, a critical
military communications satellite was lost shortly after launch. The Molniya-M communications satellite
was launched from the Plesetsk military space center; unfortunately, the rocket
crashed in its sixth minute of flight. (1) After an investigation, the Space Forces attributed the most
likely cause of the crash to a second stage engine failure. (2) This was followed the next day by
another unsuccessful launch when an experimental US-Russian satellite, the
Solar Sail, failed to achieve orbit following launch from a Russian
submarine. The rocket was launched
effectively from the submarine but the booster shut down prematurely resulting
in an unrecoverable loss. (3)
The
launch maladies of the Russian space program resurfaced in October with
additional failures. The most
egregious was the loss of the European Space AgencyÕs (ESA) CryoSat satellite
which was destroyed following the failure of its Russian booster. The $140 million plus satellite was a
cornerstone of the ESAÕs plan to study global warming. This was also a prime opportunity for
RussiaÕs beleaguered space industry to accumulate badly needed foreign
cash. The Nezavisimaya gazeta lamented, "The scale of
losses from that failure is hard to calculate. Accidents like that which happened to CryoSat may
irrevocably undermine Western customers' confidence in Russia's delivery
vehicles." (4) To make
matters worse, an unmanned Demonstrator spacecraft was also lost in October
following launch from a Russian submarine. The satellite controllers lost control of the vehicle as it
approached its target. This experimental
spacecraft was designed to demonstrate a cheap alternative to the Soyuz
spacecraft for transporting cargo to the international space station. It was the fourth failure of the
Demonstrator, leading an Izvestiya journalist to comment: "It seems that the spacecraft
is haunted by doom." (5) Also
in October, Russian engineers lost contact with a previously launched
Earth-monitoring satellite and a new optical research satellite was lost due to
a booster failure. (6)
The
plight of the Russian space program has attracted high level government and
industry attention. Two days after
the loss of the Molniya-M satellite, Anatoli Perminov, the head of the Russian
Space Agency (Roskosmos) publicly declared that whoever was at fault for the
crash would be brought to justice. (7) Perminov further stated that if the rocket was designed poorly the
culprits would be prosecuted, or if operator error was involved then the senior
officers of the Space Corps would be reprimanded. (8) Not surprisingly, the officers of the Space Corp
recommended filing a lawsuit against the rocket manufacturer following a surely
impartial review of the incident. Space Force Commander Vladimir Popovkin stated: "We have sent a
complaint to the rocket's producer and are considering filing a lawsuit
together with the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos) to sue the factory through
an arbitration court for the expenses incurred by the Defense Ministry.Ó
(9) Popovkin was willing to allow
some accommodation, ÒOf course, we cannot ruin the Progress design bureau,
which produced the miserable rocket. Unfortunately, there are no other rocket
producers and we are well aware of that." (10)
The
consequences of failure for the loss of the ESA launch were more personal as
President Putin fired the head of RussiaÕs Khrunichev space construction
company responsible for building the faulty Rokot booster. In November, Putin signed a decree
installing Vladimir Nesterov as the head of Khrunichev while relieving Aleksandr
Medvedev of this responsibility. (11) MedvedevÕs company publicly
apologized for the loss of the CryoSat, but it apparently was not enough to
save his job. (12)
While the
Russian space program is having difficulty getting satellites to orbit, the
ones already there are experiencing decline. Most of RussiaÕs satellites are well beyond their design life
with little hope of reconstituting the constellation back to the level of the
Soviet era. In November, Anatoli
Perminov reported to Russian lawmakers that, ÒRussia has only 96 spacecraft in space,
62 of them well past their service life." (13) As for military satellites, the head of Roskomos said, Ò33
out of 40 spacecraft have outlasted their usefulness.Ó (14) At the same conference, General Oleg
Gromov, deputy commander of the Space Forces stated the, Òmissile-attack
warning system can no longer be restored through the launch of the hopelessly
obsolete 71X6 and 73D6 satellites.Ó (15) He also announced that Russia has fewer than half (3 of 8) of the
satellites it needs for space-based missile launch detection. Other types of military reconnaissance
satellites are also in dire straights even by General GromovÕs own assessment,
ÒTwelve or 13 US electronics intelligence spacecraft are permanently monitoring
us, we have only one such craft that is flying." (16)
While the
constellation ages, new Russian space capabilities are predictably falling
behind. Col-General Aleksandr
Zelin, deputy commander of the Air Force reported that Russian aviation uses
the American Global Positioning System (GPS) as a stopgap because RussiaÕs own
GLONASS navigation satellite system does not have enough satellites to support
flight over all of the Russian territory. (17) This is a major deficiency as US armed forces have shown the
tremendously positive effect precision navigation and timing standards have on
modern combat forces. The US GPS
is available globally for peacetime use, but the high-precision modes can be
selectively encrypted and would then be only available to forces with the
proper US-controlled military gear. Consequently, Russian forces are partially dependent on the good favor
of the US military until the GLONASS system reaches full operational
capability.
A prime
example of the disconnect between funding and reality is RussiaÕs GLONASS
system, which is scheduled to be fully populated by 2007. The program is severely under funded
and needs a significant boost in financing to hold this schedule. RussiaÕs top space official publicly
lobbied for an additional $100 million after declaring that the GLONASS program
was 72% under funded. (18) On a
larger scale, RussiaÕs funding for space is nearly 30 times less than that of
the US and 2.5 times less than China according to Roskosmos. (19) Anatoli Perminov expounded on this
assessment stating Òthe United States spends $16.4 billion on space needs, we,
$800 million as of 2007." (20) $800 million per year is not nearly sufficient to maintain the Russian
space industry, ground infrastructure, and current spending on orbit
satellites.
Furthermore,
this level of funding is insufficient to produce satellites incorporating next
generation technologies. For
example, the US plans to spend over a billion dollars in 2006 alone for
development of two new communication satellites: the Advanced EHF and the Transformational
Satellite. (21) Given the problems
and delays that plague US satellite development even with hefty funding levels,
it is unlikely Russia will make much progress in developing advanced satellite
technology with its meager resources. Perminov succinctly summarized the Russian disconnect between
expectations and reality as, ÒOur people do not understand why we cannot cater
for the same timeframe and level of space developments as the United States,
and hoping that it will be possible to preserve the balance of forces with this
level of funding is utopia." (22)
Conclusions
The
plight of the Russian space program has significant implications. First, the deterioration of the early
warning system contributes to RussiaÕs perceived need to maintain a large
nuclear arsenal. Russia must rely
on ground based radar to detect a missile launch, which does not give enough
time to sort through the data and make a sound decision before launching a
counterstrike. Indeed, RussiaÕs
deterrence is based on maintaining a nuclear arsenal large enough to survive a
large-scale attack with enough weapons to mount a credible retaliatory
strike. In addition, the decline
of the Russian space-based early warning system increases the importance of
data sharing between the West and Russia in order to prevent mistakes with
regard to false alarms since Russia has little remaining indigenous capability.
The
inability of the space program to deliver reliable communications and
intelligence limits the effectiveness of the military. The incorporation of space assets has
been a key factor in the surge in US conventional capability in the years since
the end of the Cold War.
Finally,
thereÕs little hope of recovery for the Russian space program if the fragmented
industrial base is not restructured, utopian expectations are not replaced by
realistic goals, and funding is not increased to an appropriate level. The Cold War inventory of Russian
rockets and satellites is dwindling and the clock is ticking.
Source
Notes:
1) ÒSpace
Forces to sue over Molniya-M rocket crash,Ó RIA Novosti, 15 Jul 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
2) Ibid.
3) ÒWhy
do Russian satellites fail to reach orbit?,Ó RIA Novosti, 23 Jun 05 via
Lexis-Nexis.
4) ÒTwo
abortive launches hurt Russia's space ambitions,Ó Associated Press Worldstream,
10 Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
5) Ibid.
6) ÒPutin
fires head of space company after launch failures,Ó Associated Press, 29 Nov 05
via Lexis-Nexis.
7) ÒGuilty
parties in Molniya-M rocket accident to be punished,Ó RIA Novosti, 23 Jun 05
via ISI Emerging Markets.
8) Ibid.
9) ÒSpace
Forces to sue over Molniya-M rocket crash,Ó RIA Novosti, 15 Jul 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
10) Ibid.
11)
ÒPutin fires head of space company after launch failures,Ó Associated Press, 29
Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
12) ÒTwo
abortive launches hurt Russia's space ambitions,Ó Associated Press Worldstream,
10 Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
13) ÒRussia's space industry: plagued by funding again,Ó RIA Novosti,
25 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
14) Ibid.
15) ÒThe Orbital Group Is on its Last Legs:
the Motherland of Gagarin Is Dependent on Satellite Information of the United States
and Canada,Ó Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 24 Nov 05; FBIS Translated text
via World News Connection (WNC).
16) Ibid.
17) Ibid.
18)
ÒOfficial says RussiaÕs GLONASS project underfinanced by 72%,Ó Prime-TASS Business Newswire, 15 Apr 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
(19)
ÒRussia's space industry: plagued by funding again,Ó RIA Novosti, 25 Nov 05 via
ISI Emerging Markets.
20) ÒThe
Orbital Group Is on its Last Legs: the Motherland of Gagarin Is Dependent on
Satellite Information of the United States and Canada,Ó Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye,
24 Nov 05; FBIS Translated text via World News Connection (WNC).
21) http://www.globalsecurity.org/space
22) ÒThe
Orbital Group Is on its Last Legs: the Motherland of Gagarin Is Dependent on
Satellite Information of the United States and Canada,Ó Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye,
24 Nov 05; FBIS Translated text via World News Connection (WNC).
By
Jeffrey Butler (butler88@bu.edu)
~~~~~
ARMED
FORCES (EXTERNAL)
The NATO-Russia Council: cooperation and conflict
At NATO Headquarters on 8 December 2005, the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC) will meet at the level of foreign ministers. This
twice-annual gathering follows NovemberÕs meeting of the NRC at the chiefs of
staff level. (1) Observers to the meeting on the 8th should expect to
hear themes that similarly were present at NovemberÕs meeting. Namely,
Russia will continue to pursue its sometimes antagonistic and often
contradictory partnership with NATO. The difficulties in this
relationship will be manifest in at least three ways: RussiaÕs hesitancy to
participate in a NATO naval exercise that potentially could expand into the
Black Sea; RussiaÕs general support of NATO peacekeeping operations throughout
the world, except, of course, in Georgia and Moldova; and, RussiaÕs persistent
resistance to compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
(CFE).
Operation Active Endeavor
At NovemberÕs NRC meeting for chiefs of staff, General
Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff, pledged RussiaÕs military
cooperation with NATO in Operation Active Endeavor. (2) The latter is a joint
naval exercise NATO began in 2001 as a means to Òhelp detect and deter
terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.Ó (3) The annual exercise is
multi-faceted but mainly involves the monitoring, boarding, and inspection of
ships at sea. Although Baluyevsky pledged RussiaÕs cooperation in Active
Endeavor, he also
reserved the right to withdraw from the exercise as Russia sees fit. (4)
This is a threat Russia implemented when it last promised Active Endeavor participation at the end of 2003.
Russia withdrew from that exercise for a number of reasons, most notably the
reticence of Russian ships to participate in Òmutual inspection procedures.Ó
(5) Ironically, it is RussiaÕs interests in the Black Sea that will
affect its ultimate decision to participate in next yearÕs Active Endeavor.
Russia wants to keep NATO out of the northern and eastern
portions of the Black Sea, and it will use Active Endeavor for leverage. Chief among
RussiaÕs concerns could be that Active Endeavor sets a precedent of NATO military
cooperation that subsequently could challenge Russian activities in the Black
Sea. Currently, RussiaÕs military presence in breakaway Abkhazia renders
possible Russian maritime activity at the port of Sukhumi; a significant
portion of RussiaÕs arms industry is located on TransdniestrÕs Dnestr River as
it flows through the separatist region and into the Black Sea; and, finally,
RussiaÕs Black Sea Fleet is based in the (Crimean) territory of
Warsaw-member-turned-NATO-partner Ukraine. (6) Russia can secure these
interests by keeping Active Endeavor from moving out of the Mediterranean and by pre-empting a
Black Sea version of the exercise with one of its own.
Peacekeeping operations
In addition to RussiaÕs pledge of support for Operation Active Endeavor, it
also has pledged to support other NATO missions around the globe, including
NATOÕs International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. (7) Although
Russia supplies little more than technical assistance in Afghanistan, its
commitment nonetheless is significant given the location, and RussiaÕs history
there. Also, in the past Russia has partnered with NATO in more meaningful
ways, such as providing sizeable troop commitments to NATOÕs peacekeeping
operations in the Balkans. However, RussiaÕs commitments to Afghanistan
and its participation in the Balkans will not translate to Georgia and Moldova,
where Russia does not want NATOÕs help.
Russian troops have been serving as ÒgarrisonsÓ or
ÒpeacekeepersÓ both in Georgia and Moldova for more than a decade, increasingly
despite the demands of the two sovereign republics to leave. Although Russia
recently changed its military footprint in Georgia, it still has no plans to
vacate the country–especially as Georgia continues to move toward NATO
membership. (8) The same holds true in Moldova where Russia maintains about
1,500 troops which, at last yearÕs NRC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov
stated would remain in Moldova Òindefinitely.Ó (9) That Georgia and Moldova are
NATO partner countries in search of more substantial relationships with NATO
only adds a further excuse for staying. Moldova expects to finalize its
Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO next year. (10) Meanwhile,
GeorgiaÕs foreign minister has expressed his countryÕs desire Òto adopt the
NATO accession plan as early as 2006.Ó (11) Russia counters NATO influence by
further entrenching its military troop presence in Georgia and Moldova, where
the governments seek to join NATO as a hedge against RussiaÕs persistent
pressures.
Arms reduction in the ÒflankÓ countries of Georgia and
Moldova
Although the presence of Russian arms in Georgia and
Moldova has been contentious less publicly than the presence of RussiaÕs troops
there, it nonetheless remains a sore point in NATO-Russia relations. The
Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) remains at the
heart of the matter. Since its inception more than 15 years ago, this
arms-reduction treaty has gone through several iterations, the latest of which
is called the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE. (12) Unfortunately,
this Adaptation has yet to enter into force because Russia has yet to comply
with the AdaptationÕs military reduction requirements for the ÒflankÓ regions
of Moldova and Georgia. (13)
There has been some progress in both places. Russian
Foreign Minister Lavrov and former Georgian Foreign Minister Zourabichrili in
2005 signed an agreement stipulating the removal of Russian military hardware
from and the closure of Russian bases in Georgia. (14) Meanwhile, Russia
has removed significant amounts of military stockpiles from Moldova. (15)
However, the Russian State Duma has questioned the legality of the
Russia-Georgia arms agreement and some experts contend Russia has only
destroyed or removed obsolete equipment from Moldova while it supports
Russian-owned arms factories in Transdniestr. (16) Furthermore, Russia
uses a chicken-and-egg argument that it must maintain troops in Transdniestr to
protect arms stockpiles that it cannot remove without first having a political
settlement (which it continues to obstruct). (17) The very presence of until
Russian troops and military arms poses an obstacle to a settlement.
A place to air grievances
DecemberÕs NRC meeting will be full of diplomatic
niceties. But, using history as a guide, the meeting also will serve as a
forum in which Russia can air grievances and issue threats, something Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov did not hesitate to do in 2004. (18) The root
cause of this antagonism is obvious: NATO continues to expand into areas that
Russia claims are in its sphere of influence. Last year the Baltic states
joined NATO, a move that encountered particularly vitriolic Russian rhetoric.
This year, Georgia and Moldova entered on the path that leads to eventual NATO membership,
and NATOÕs anti-terrorism exercise, Active Endeavor, may include Black Sea waters.
(19) Although Russia has promised a better relationship with NATO, it will
pursue what it describes as Russian self-interests in the Black Sea, Georgia,
and Moldova, even at the expense of a meaningful partnership with NATO.
Source Notes:
1) www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-143e.htm.
2) ÒRussian General says Moscow will participate in NATO
naval exercise,Ó BW, 16 Nov 05 via RFE/RL Volume 9, Number 215, Part I.
4) RFE/RL Vol. 9, No. 215, Part I, Ibid.
5) ÒRussians not joining NATO Operation Active Endeavor,Ó Vladmir Socor, 30 Nov 04 via
Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM) Vol. 1, Issue 136.
6) www.ukraineinfo.us/about/armed-forces.html#4
7) ÒThe NATO-Russia Council: A Vital Partnership in the
War on Terror,Ó speech by R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to
NATO, 4 Nov 04 via www.nato.int.
8) For background on RussiaÕs peacekeepers in Georgia, see The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XI, No. 3, 17 Nov 05, Armed Forces: External by J.M. LeBlanc.
9) ÒRussian defense minister misuses NATO forum,Ó Socor,
Vladmir, 19 Oct 04 via www.Jamestown.org.
10) ÒRussia acknowledges punishing MoldovaÕs western
orientation,Ó Interfax, 8 Nov 05 via EDM, Vol. 2, Issue 211.
11) ÒGeorgia aims to join NATO and EU – foreign
minister,Ó RIA Novosti, 31 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.
12) ÒNATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declarations by
Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian
Federation,Ó May 2002 via www.nato.int.
13) www.useu.be/issues/cft1209.html.
14) For background on RussiaÕs peacekeepers in Georgia,
see The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XI, No. 3, 17 Nov 05, Armed Forces: External by J.M. LeBlanc.
15) www.osce.org/moldova/13425.html.
16) For background on RussiaÕs arms reduction in Moldova,
see Behind the Breaking News, Vol. 1, #4, 1 Dec 05 by Tammy Lynch.
17) Vladmir Socor, Ibid.
18) Ibid.
19)
Interfax, 15 Nov 05; FBIS Translated Text via World News Connection.
By J.
Marcel LeBlanc (jleblanc@bu.edu)
~~~~~
GEORGIA
Who
should take Georgia to the prom?
Just in
case there was any doubt in which diplomatic direction Georgia is leaning,
Tbilisi issued the countryÕs National Military Strategy late last month that
put all questions to rest. The
document, a requirement for NATO, was drafted by the General Staff,
parliamentÕs Committee on National Defense and Security, non-governmental
organizations and other experts, from Georgia and some NATO countries. (1) In the document, Tbilisi points to the
continued existence of Russian military bases on Georgian soil as a
Òdestabilizing factorÓ along with instability in the North Caucasus, armed
formations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and new crisis points on other
Georgian territory. (2)
To
counter these and other threats, the Georgian military (reformed to NATO
standards) will receive a significant chunk of the national budget, to the tune
of about US$218 million, for 2006. (3)
In a
response only missing the words Òsays you,Ó the Russian Foreign Ministry
criticized the notion that Russian troops could be considered
destabilizing: ÒThe absurdity of
such assertions is apparent,Ó he said. (4)
Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili and his cabinet have made no secret of the
countryÕs plans to join the alliance. According to the State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi
Baramidze, once the country finishes work on the NATO Individual Partnership
Action Plan (IPAP), ÒWe hope our relations will then move to a higher level:
the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).Ó Still, Georgia is ready to keep open
the doors to all powers: ÒWe are
looking for opportunities to cooperate with Russia, with which we have more
common interests than disputes,Ó he added. (5)
Georgia
is not above using its new best friend to put added pressure on Russia to
continue working toward troop withdrawal; Tbilisi proposed that NATO monitor
the withdrawal from Russian bases in Georgia once the final protocol is signed.
(6) Georgian Prime Minister Zurab
Nogaideli asserted further that GeorgiaÕs plan for settling the conflict in
South Ossetia had garnered the approval of the European Union, NATO and the
Belgian government following the ministerÕs trip to Brussels. (7) Officials from Russia and the two separatists republics,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, of course, most definitely have not agreed to the
plan. (8)
In terms
of alliances, though, Georgia is not limiting itself to NATO. According to the PresidentÕs Chief of
Staff, Giorgi Arveladze, an international forum held last week in Kyiv was
intended to create an Òaxis of democratic countries that do not wish to be in
the orbit of Russian influence.Ó Included in the forum were the heads of state
of countries that have struggled to regain and retain independence from Moscow,
such as Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova, as well as
representatives of some states in the Balkans. (9) Despite ArveladzeÕs clear speaking, Saakashvili appeasingly
said subsequently the new ÒDemocratic Choice CommunityÓ to be formed as a
result of the forum was not Òan anti-Russian association.Ó ÒNo one in Georgia could say such a
stupid thing. Russia will only
benefit from gaining neighboring democratic states,Ó the Georgian president
said. (10) Perhaps one should note
that Arveladze was not Òin GeorgiaÓ when he made his remarks.
Meanwhile,
comments from the Georgian parliament that the country should consider
withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States resulted in a
less-than-friendly shot across the bow from counterparts in Moscow. According to Russian Duma deputy
Aleksei Mitrofanov, Russia should bomb Tbilisi and install Igor Giorgadze,
GeorgiaÕs former security chief now in exile, in place of Saakashvili. (11) The parliamentary scuffling was put to rest when Nogaideli
attended the Council of the CIS Heads of Government meeting in the Russian
capital.
ARMENIA
Not in
my yard
Armenian
President Robert Kocharian, on the other hand, stressed that aspiring to NATO
membership is not on the agenda in Yerevan. ÒNow just look at the political map of the world, at the
South Caucasus with always strong Russian influence and at Armenia bordering on
Turkey and Iran and ask yourselves – will membership of NATO increase
ArmeniaÕs security or not?,Ó he said, ÒThat is why we are not talking about
membership of NATO or setting ourselves such a task.Ó (12)
Who
could say ÔnoÕ?
ArmeniaÕs
recent nationwide constitutional referendum also has generated its share of
international ink, as opponents of the expansion of parliamentary powers balk
at accepting the stated results of the poll.
Before
results were announced, the opposition accused the president and
prosecutor-general of applying open pressure and blackmail to opposition
representatives. (13) Alas, the
opposition demanded the annulment of the results by the Central Election
Commission, or Òappropriate political stepsÓ would be taken; however, the CEC
responded that the Constitutional Court, not the CEC, was the place where
appeals could be heard. (14) In any case, appeals should be heard,
given the preliminary results: according to the Central Commission for the Referendum chairman Garegin
Azarian, over 93 percent of Armenian voters approved the constitutional
amendment. (15)
Despite
noting instances where Òthe low turnout in many elections districts in Yerevan
and in the regions contradicts the exaggerated figured reported by the
electoral commissions,Ó Òsome
forged signatures of electorsÓ and the breach of the principle of secret
balloting, as well as Òunequal conditions for the opponentsÓ of the reform,
monitors from the Council of Europe announced that the voting met
Òinternational criteriaÓ in most districts. (16)