PRESIDENCY

Name your successor?

For some reason, as yet unclear, the race for succession in the Kremlin has started remarkably early.  Last week, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev—two prime contenders for the throne—had their job descriptions tweaked a bit (actually Medvedev had his clipped), and now analysis focuses on the president's sly nomination of two successors.  Two successors?  A leader who appoints two successors doesn't really think he can be replaced.  And that may be the real point.

As for the new jobs:  Medvedev has been exiled from the Kremlin to the White House, where he will assume the revived "First Deputy Prime Minister" position.  If he is truly to be the chosen successor, then this would be his "Prime Minister in-training" phase.  Of course, he would also be a prime target for Fradkov and every other politically ambitious denizen of the White House.  Perhaps it is a test—a trial by fire; or perhaps Putin simply is fed up with Medvedev's presence in his Kremlin office every day.  Either way, Medvedev has lost his access and his administrative "tail."  He claims that he will be continue in his role at Gazprom's Board of Directors, but time will tell. (1)

Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense and Putin pal, has seen his titles augmented with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister.  Ivanov, and his coterie, are clever operatives and decided to evacuate Moscow for a tour of the regions, specifically of defense enterprises (suggesting he is "touching base" with an important constituent and contributor base—the arms industry) shortly after the announcement. (2)  The space and time allotted to this trip gives his friends and enemies alike the time to scheme—and gives Ivanov time to plan his response to the new circumstances.  

If accommodations speak volumes about relative position within the Russian executive, then the allocation of office space for the new White House officials leaves plenty of grist for the mill:  Medvedev will take over a suite of offices on the sixth floor, previously reserved for Putin's reformer extraordinaire, Dmitri Kozak (who, of course, has since been dispatched to the Southern Federal District); Medvedev's First Deputy Prime Minister office will have convenient access to the Government's Chief of Staff, Sergei Naryshkin, which means that they will have an easier time keeping an eye on each other.  Sergei Ivanov has been given a "Guest" office on the fifth floor of the White House—one previously reserved for Duma Chair Boris Gryzlov, in case he had to "do some paperwork" while at the government offices.  (3)

And in other newsÉtwo more appointments

Left somewhat under-analyzed in the frenzy of successor chats are the appointments of Sergei Sobyanin to Medvedev's seat as Kremlin Chief of Staff (did Viktor Ivanov, Igor Sechin, et al. just lose out again or are they not quite Chief of Staff material?), and Sergei Kiriyenko's move to Rosatom.

Sergei Sobyanin, Governor of  (oil-rich) Tyumen, Putin's former Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Federal District, and former Federation Council member gains significant access to the president (and even more crucially, control of the access of others) as the new Kremlin Chief of Staff.  Sobyanin is an interesting choice, being neither St. Petersburger nor one of the siloviki.  He is, and clearly will be in the Kremlin, an outsider, which makes his appointment a bit of particularly good fortune for those who will need to guide him (and therefore Putin) for his first few months in the job.  Perhaps one of his deputies deserves more credit for "big picture" thinking than he normally receives.

While an outsider in the Kremlin schemata, Sobyanin has been a fairly high-profile politician for years, and has, of course, accumulated some very powerful friends, not least among them the oligarch-Governor of Chukot Autonomous District, Roman Abramovich, who helped get Sobyanin elected Speaker of the Khanty-Mansiisk legislature and, through Sibneft, supported Sobyanin's run for Governor of Tyumen in 2001. (4)  Abramovich, who has seemed slighted in recent Kremlin oil and gas deals, may not be so remote from presidential favor as was believed and having a friend in the President's front office can't hurt.

As for his Sobyanin's political views, Anatoli Chubais evaluates him as "similar in style" to Putin:  "He is not radical, he is moderately democratic, he is measured, unhurried, sensible.  It is a combination of qualities that makes him blend in." (5)  It certainly doesn't sound like he'll upstage his boss.

Sergei Kiriyenko seems an odd choice for Rosatom.  Although the longtime Presidential Envoy to the Volga Federal District also has headed the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament since 2001, Kiriyenko lacks the experience in nuclear physics or engineering that predecessors Yevgeni Adamov or Aleksandr Rumyantsev had in the position. (6) 

It is possible that Kiriyenko was parachuted out of his Envoy position and found a comfortable landing at Rosatom, or that his western-oriented, economic-reforming reputation might be an appreciated salve at an agency roiling US-Russian relations over the Iranian nuclear situation. With the focus of the Russian-Iranian nuclear relationship shifting to contingent arms deals however, and with the arrest and extradition fight of Adamov, it might be the case that the political leadership is hoping to see Rosatom shrink back from the international spotlight.  Kiriyenko might be just the sort of leader to temper the hot nationalism of previous Atomic Energy administrations and replace it with a cool-headed economic mission.  

Kiriyenko apparently has been tasked with a reorganization of Rosatom, separating a civilian nuclear power sector from its predominant military missions. (7) Former Atomic Minister Viktor Mikhailov (an early proponent of the Iranian deal) claimed that he discussed restructuring plans with Kiriyenko, but did not see the utility or feasibility of separating out a uniquely military use.  The plans are likely to include the creation of a separate entity to address energy creation concerns. (8)

Apparently, President Putin's much-discussed reassertion of the "power vertical" is revealing a redundancy in the positions of the super-region presidential plenipotentiary representatives.  As this once-vaunted administrative reform is left by the wayside, debate focuses on the relative strength and clout of the remaining representatives, making more executive appointments and restructuring a strong possibility.

Source Notes:

1) ITAR-TASS, 27 Nov 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via World News Connection (WNC).  Medvedev announced, apparently unprompted, that he would stay with Gazprom. 

2) "Sergei Ivanov Attacks," Center for Current Political Research (CCPR), 29 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.

3) Moskovsky komsomolets, 16 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring, 1 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

4) "The Unexpected Sobyanin," Moskovsky komsomolets, No. 260, 16 Nov 05; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis.

5) "Russian power grid boss critical of Putin's economic policy," Ekho Moskvy in Russian, 1704 GMT, 19 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.

6) Russica Izvestiya, 16 Nov 05; Izvestiya Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets Database; Gazeta.ru website, 15 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.

7) Russica Izvestiya, 23 Nov 05; Izvestiya Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets Database.

8) Ibid.

By Susan J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu)

~~~~~

NurgaliyevÕs fight against corruption

Over the past several months RussiaÕs Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD), Rashid Nurgaliyev, appears to be taking much more of a look at his own cadres in his fight against corruption.  Previously, his press statements focused on the ministryÕs successes in combating crime and corruption in other organizations; his March report to legislators lauded the MVDÕs capture of more corrupt officials taking bribes, prevention of money laundering incidents, and confiscation of illicit drugs. (1)  Over the past several months, however, his remarks have focused on the internal corruption within his police units. 

In August, Nurgaliyev made unannounced inspections of police departments in several regions and referred to the Òviolations of the lawÓ and Òabsolute immoralityÓ he found. (2)  This was one of the few times the police has been chastised openly by its minister.  Nurgaliyev followed his remarks by issuing special orders that amount to a new ÒPolice Code of Conduct.Ó  He commanded the police to be understanding and polite, to abide by the law, and not to harass citizens with unnecessary interrogations.  As a root cause of the problem, he criticized the police as poorly educated, particularly in the basic principles of civilized culture. (3)

In September, Nurgaliyev responded to reports indicating that the population is far more afraid of police and security forces than of criminal organizations by agreeing that MVD staffersÕ disregard of their official duties breeds much police corruption. (4) He provided other objective reasons for MVD corruption, including police not having enough training and expertise and their fraternizing with criminals.  In an open letter published on the departmentÕs web site, Nurgaliyev criticized the low moral standards of MVD staffers, their callousness and rudeness in dealing with citizens, police using their internal affairs work to get rich unlawfully, and police collusion with criminals. (5)

On 26 October, Nurgaliyev spoke in the Kurgan town of Shadrinsk during a visit to police precincts in the region, a visit apparently prompted by his lack of trust in reports received from senior officers there.  During his speech, he called the level of police work ÒcatastrophicÓ and Òrife with violationsÓ and stated that police officers boost crime-solving rates by manipulating statistics.  Furthermore, Nurgaliyev stated that the MVD witnessed a 41% increase in crimes and violations by police officers in the January to September period, compared to the same period last year. (6)

Finally, Nurgaliyev used the 10 November annual ÒPolice DayÓ to criticize police inefficiency and to exhort the officers to do more to win the trust of the people. (7)  The Chairman of the DumaÕs Security Committee, Vladimir Vasilyev, also acknowledged that the public had little respect for police authority due, in part, to widespread corruption.  He called for an overhaul of the police to make them leaner and more professional. (8)

An internal look certainly is warranted.  Recent statistics indicate 38% of the population is more fearful of the police than of any other profession. (9)  However, NurgaliyevÕs introspective criticism is rather new.  Has police corruption reached such epidemic proportions that even he, as a former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer, feels compelled to act or is something else motivating him?

Nurgaliyev, along with heads of the other security ministries, has been criticized for weak leadership and lack of control over their ministries.  Nurgaliyev may be trying to accomplish real reform, or he may be trying to distance himself from MVD failures and the indignation of his FSB colleagues.  Perhaps, as a former FSB officer, his lack of MVD allegiance enables him to act more boldly than would a career MVD officer.  In either case, his efforts are noteworthy, but his own statistics indicate police corruption is getting worse, not diminishing. 

Although corruption within the MVD arguably is worse than elsewhere, the FSB cannot be far behind.  Their brutal, unprofessional, and corrupt conduct in Beslan, Nalchik, and throughout the Caucasus bears witness to that fact.  Indeed, corruption permeates all of Russian society.  By NurgaliyevÕs own admission, corruption has Òturned from a local threat into a dangerous transnational phenomenon.Ó (10)  Anti-corruption efforts within a single ministry will have little impact; Russia needs similar efforts within the other security ministries and elsewhere throughout its government. 

In contrast to NurgaliyevÕs internal look at MVD corruption, FSB leader Patrushev barely mentioned corruption within his FSB when talking about the need to wage a universal struggle against corruption. (11)  If indeed Nurgaliyev is publicly critical of his own ministry because he is a relative outsider, perhaps a career MVD officer could lead the FSB and take a similar approach. However, with ex-FSB officers currently running all the power ministries and Ivanov now a deputy prime minister as well, donÕt hold your breath. 

North Ossetia Parliamentary Commission on Beslan

Stanislav Kesayev, Chairman of the North Ossetia Commission investigating the 2004 Beslan school hostage tragedy, summarized the commissionÕs results during a recent speech. (12)  Previously, investigation announcements seemed to support many of the arguments made by the local Beslan investigators (including the Beslan MotherÕs Committee) while contradicting much of the federal DumaÕs Torshin Commission investigation. (13)  While KesayevÕs investigation remained critical of the slow, poorly coordinated response by Russian security forces, he minimized many previously critical actions of federal authorities while not addressing others. 

Just a few months ago, Kesayev criticized federal investigators on several issues. (14)    In contrast, his recent summary did not address the question of how weapons were brought to the school, did not confirm that authorities had advance information about the impending hostage situation, and did not address the conduct of security forces during and after the crisis (including command and control questions, the use of tanks, and lack of protection of the investigation site).  Furthermore, KesayevÕs investigation did not name persons responsible for the poor response, much to the disappointment of Beslan locals. 

The previous animosity between federal investigators and KesayevÕs North Ossetia investigation seems to have subsided as well.  In addition to KesayevÕs earlier comments on the Òsuperficial federal investigation,Ó the Beslan MotherÕs Committee remained dissatisfied with the progress of the federal investigation and repeatedly called for the resignation of Nikolai Shepel, the Deputy Prosecutor-General for the Southern Federal District. (15)  Likewise, in June, Shepel described Kesayev as ÒshamelessÓ and his commission as Òillegitimate.Ó (16)  With a turn of the tides, Kesayev reported during his speech that Shepel, that morning, wished him luck and stated that Òwe are doing the same work.Ó (17)  In a TV interview, the chairman of the DumaÕs commission investigating Beslan, Aleksandr Torshin commended Kesayev for getting at the truth and now agreed there may have been more than 32 terrorists (a previous point of dispute between the investigations). (18) 

The reason for KesayevÕs apparent about-face is unclear, but according to one report the sides Òreached agreement and cut all the sharp cornersÓ in the interests of the Republic.  Reportedly, the agreement was reached after the involvement of Taimuraz Mansurov, the head of North Ossetia, and Dmitri Kozak, President PutinÕs envoy to the Southern Federal District. (19)  The Torshin commission is expected to release its results sometime after 20 December.

Source Notes:

1) ÒMironov and Nurgaliyev Exchanged Caustic RemarksÓ by Irina Romancheva, Moscow Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Mar 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.

2) ÒRussian Police-ÔTo Protect and to Serve?ÕÓ by Vasili Kononenko, RIA Novosti, 1 Sep 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

3) Ibid.

4) ÒCriticism With Unchanged Content,Ó Gazeta.ru, 13 Sep 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.

5) Ibid.

6) ÒTop Cop Chastises His ForceÓ by Carl Schreck, The Moscow Times, 28 Oct 05 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/10/28/012.html.

7) ÒPolice Criticized on Their DayÓ by Anatoli Medetsky, The Moscow Times, 11 Nov 05 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/11/11/011.html.

8) Ibid.

9) ÒRussian Police-ÔTo Protect and to Serve?ÕÓ Ibid.

10) ÒRussia, Politics, Officials, CorruptionÓ by Vasili Kononenko, RIA Novosti, 3 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 

11) ÒFSB Head Patrushev Interviewed on Fight Against Terrorism,Ó BBC Monitoring, 24 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 

12) ÒBeslan Report Was Heard Differently than It Was Written,Ó by Zaur Farniev, Vladikavka, Kommersant, 30 Nov 05 via JRL #9208. 

Russia and the G8

Rampant corruption, a shaky economy and indications of moves in an authoritarian direction have weakened RussiaÕs international position. However, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak claim that next yearÕs Group of Eight (G8) summit in St. Petersburg will boost RussiaÕs status.

Storchak contends that Russia eventually will become a full member of the G8, but claims Russia would not push the issue: Ò[I]tÕs a normal process, no one is planning to force it.Ó (1) The deputy finance minister is being diplomatic, but in reality, his statement is irrelevant: Even if Russia wanted to, it could not enforce full membership in the G8. Until Russia becomes a member of the WTO, its chances of becoming a full G8 member remain remote.

Despite RussiaÕs obvious shortcomings compared to the other members of the G8, Lavrov extolled RussiaÕs position on the world scene: ÒRussia has become a constant in the international arena.Ó He thinks that the summit in 2006 will demonstrate what he believes is RussiaÕs international strength: a consistent and predictable foreign policy. (2)

Russia, Iran and the world

Despite hopes of becoming a full member of the G8 and WTO, Russia continues to irritate the Untied States and many European countries with its provocative policy regarding Iran. The latest agreement, which stipulates that Russia will sell Iran anti-air missiles (against low flying missiles and aircraft) is causing many Western diplomatic and security leaders major concern. The deal appears intended to secure IranÕs putative nuclear weapons arsenal.  

The one billion dollar agreement with Iran, signed on December 2, coincided with a visit to Moscow by R. Nicholas Burns, the US Under Secretary of State for political affairs. In a radio interview on Echo Moskvy, Burns demanded that RussiaÕs Foreign Ministry explain the arms deal, expressing his concern regarding IranÕs real purpose for obtaining these missiles. (3)

ÒFor 25 years, Iran has supported terrorists in the Middle East, and that is why we have very bad relations with them. You can understand why we do not support the sales of weapons,Ó Burns said. (4)

A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry defended the deal as being: Òin full conformity with our international obligations, including in the sphere of nonproliferation.Ó (5)

However, the transaction has to be viewed in the context of Russian-Western friction regarding RussiaÕs role concerning putative nuclear proliferation in Iran.

ÒWe believe Russia is a country that has influence over Iran, and we want Iran to return to negotiations,Ó Burns noted. (6) However, while Russian leaders have expressed agreement with the United States and Europe that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, Russia continues to provide nuclear materials to Iran. The agreement between Russia and Iran does contain a stipulation stating that the nuclear material is only to be used for energy needs, but without a clear means of enforcement of that clause, there is substantial cause for worry still exists.

Secretary of IranÕs High Council of National Security, Ali Larijani,  claimed that Ò...This is not the first time we have bought an anti-missile system. We also make them ourselves.Ó (7)

LarijaniÕs statement is misleading. While Iran produces their own surface-to-surface missiles, specifically the Mushak and Fateh series, the country is not known to produce any surface-to-air missiles. (8) Moreover, the act of buying surface-to-air missiles is not what is upsetting to the international community. It is the type of missiles sold that makes this deal especially controversial.

Russia has agreed to sell Iran anti-air missiles against low flying missiles and aircraft, that can fly under the radar, thus attacking nuclear facilities. The deal is troubling, especially at a time when Iran is planning to continue its nuclear enrichment work regardless of what the US or the Europeans want.

Larijani has stated that nuclear enrichment work would start Òwithin a few months.Ó

ÒThis is not up for negotiation, and the when and how of a resumption concerns us alone,Ó Larijani said, (9) claiming that Iran is Òready to give guaranteesÓ that it will not make nuclear weapons. (10) However, Òready to give guaranteesÓ is not the same as actually giving guarantees and the issue of whether Russia is willing to regulate the nuclear production of a close ally in order to please the international community is debatable.

Russian press predictably defends Putin

Sergei Zemyanoi, a doctoral student of philosophy, claims Russia faces a choice between either becoming a sovereign power or once again becoming an empire. The article, which was published in Politichesky zhurnal, contends that the United States is making it hard for Russia to take the first path because of the WestÕs Òanti-Putin campaign.Ó (11)

Zemlyanoi tries hard to establish that there is a viable force inside of Russia to take on Putin and his United Russia party. The problem with this article is that there is no real opposition to Putin. While there are extremists who clamor for a return to Cold War style politics or even to a Tsarist empire, these parties, led by compromised figures, such as Edvard Limonov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, are hardly viable contenders in Russia today, where the presidentÕs approval ratings constantly hover around 70 percent.

The ÒRussia at the CrossroadsÓ approach to foreign policy analysis, as set out by Zemlyanoi, is viewed more as comedy (tragic though it may be), especially by RussiaÕs neighbors, such as Georgia and Ukraine, than as serious political discourse.   

Source Notes:

1) Reuters, 3 Dec 05 via JohnsonÕs Russia List (JRL) #9311, Dec. 3, 2005.

2) RIA Novosti, 28 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

3) ÒRussia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar DealÓ by Andrew Kramer. New York Times, 3 Dec 05.

4) Ibid.

5) RIA Novosti, 3 Dec 05 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20051203/42303019.html.

6) ÒRussia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar DealÓ by Andrew Kramer. New York Times, 3 Dec 05.

7) Al-Jazeera, 4 Dec 05 via http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1AD09BE-A1D6-4EF6-A1E4-A54331B0F0D0.htm.

8) GlobalSecurity.org, 28 Apr 05 via http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/mushak.htm.

9) Al-Jazeera, 4 Dec 05 via http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1AD09BE-A1D6-4EF6-A1E4-A54331B0F0D0.htm.

10) Ibid.

11) What the Papers Say (WPS), 1 Dec 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

Moscow elections

The elections to the newly restructured Moscow city Duma were dominated by United Russia, which won 28 out of 35 seats. United Russia, which has the support of the President and whose ticket was led by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzkhov, won 13 out of 20 seats elected by party lists and all 15 of the single-mandate seats. The Communist Party, which was not represented in the last Duma (elected in 2001), received 17 percent of the vote and will hold four seats in the new Duma. Yabloko, the liberal democratic party cobbled together from Yabloko and Union of Right Forces (SPS), earned 11 percent of the vote, proving that it could woo a constituency despite internal haggling. (1) However, Moscow in the halcyon days after the USSRÕs implosion had been the democratic stronghold.  The other parties and factions that contested the election but failed to pass the 10 percent threshold for representation in the city Duma included the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Party of Life, the Green party, Free Russia, Party of Social Justice and PeopleÕs Will. The Russian Election Commission has declared that there were no serious infringements of election law, despite the fact that some members of Yabloko were crying foul. (2)

The previous Moscow Duma was composed of four parties. United Russia held 18 seats, Rodina (Motherland) four seats, Russian Party of Life three seats, and SPS two. The new composition of United Russia 28, Communists four, and Yabloko three, reflects the changing nature of Russian politics and, according to critics, LuzkhovÕs attempt to protect his own network before leaving office by securing for them places in the municipal organs. However, there is some speculation that Luzkhov may not leave office after all, but will instead use the United Russia majority in the City Duma to return to his position. (3) The new Moscow Duma will be responsible for appointing the next mayor of Moscow.

A list that did not receive any votes was the Rodina party, which held four seats in the previous Duma. The partyÕs name was removed from the ballot following charges by the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party that RodinaÕs election advertising was inciting ethnic strife. RodinaÕs television ad showed two men of non-Slavic descent picking up watermelon rinds and trash from the dirt. A voice over said, ÒDo you speak any Russian at all?Ó and was followed by an injunction from party leader Dmitri Rogozin. ÒLetÕs clean up our city. LetÕs clear away all the dirt.Ó (4) 

The Moscow Municipal Court ruled on 26 November that Rodina be removed from the elections because of the television ad. Rodina appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but it upheld the decision. The allegations from LDPR reflect the contention between two parties that are using nationalistic appeals to rally the electorate. During the course of the electoral campaign, each party had accused the other of provoking ethnic tension. Of the two, RodinaÕs chance of a successful election was the greater prior to its television fiasco. A poll taken by the Levada Center just before the Municipal Court ruling showed that Rodina could expect support from 15 percent of the respondents. However, RodinaÕs support appears to have been picked up the Communists rather than the LDPR.

Public Chamber, NGOs, and protest

The bill mandating the re-registration of NGOs and imposing harsher regulations on NGOs that receive foreign funding has caused quite a controversy, both domestically and in the international arena. In the Public Chamber, a body whose stated purpose is to provide societal oversight of state organs in general and the legislature in particular, the bill has led to the ChamberÕs first attempt to exercise its rights. Twenty-one of the ChamberÕs members have submitted a letter to the Duma requesting that the new bill on NGOs be delayed so the chamber can review it before it is passed. 

Ella Pamfilova, head of the Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, recently met with Putin to discuss the bill. Pamfilova said that the law violates the Russian Constitution as well as RussiaÕs obligations under international law. She also raised the issue of what impact this bill might have on RussiaÕs influence in its Ònear abroad.Ó She stated that ÒÉthis draft law would also deal a serious blow to our cooperation with our compatriots abroad, especially in the post-Soviet area. It also contradicts what is a good idea – that of allocating budget funds to support our public organizations [sic] in the neighboring countries.Ó (5)  Putin responded that he would speak to the Duma Òto ensure that any measures taken in this area are not to the detriment of civil society in Russia.Ó (6)

The NGO bill also is affecting RussiaÕs relationship with the United States. The two countries are engaged in a tit-for-tat squabble over the nature of democracy and the extent to which countries can support NGOs in other nations. The US Congress recently allotted four million dollars for the promotion of democracy in Russia. In response, Russia designated more than $17 million for use in promoting civil society in Russia and its Ònear abroad.Ó Now a hefty team of officials from the US State Department are headed to Moscow. Officially, the purpose of the trip is to discuss counterterrorism, but an anonymous American source cited in Kommersant has mentioned that the conversation will also include the controversial legislation. (7)

Media report

Anchorwoman Olga Romanova of Ren-TV was cut from the lineup after stating on Ekho Moskvy that the stationÕs leadership was exercising restrictive control over the content of her program, Ò24.Ó Romanova claimed that shortly after the Ekho Moskvy interview, she was prevented from entering the station by three security guards. Among the offending pieces that the management withheld from broadcasting was a segment on how Aleksandr Ivanov, son of Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, was not charged for the death of an aging pedestrian who died as a result of being struck by his vehicle in May. (8) Romanova has handed in her resignation to the television station along with several other employees who had worked on Ò24.Ó (9)

Source Notes:

1) ÒThree parties win Moscow Duma mandates,Ó 5 Dec 05, ITAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis.

2) ÒYabloko party reports abuses in Moscow elections,Ó 5 Dec 05, Interfax; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.

3) ÒYuri Luzhkov: Muscovites have made their choice," 6 Dec 05, Rossiyskaya gazeta;  FBIS Translated Text via WNC.

4) ÒRodina party in last ditch appeal before 4 December polls,Ó 1 Dec 05, ITAR-TASS; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.

5) ÒBeginning of meeting with Chairwoman of the Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Ella Pamfilova,Ó 24 Nov 05; http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/11/24/2210_type82913_98112.shtml.

6) Ibid.

(7) ÒNon-foreign-government organizations,Ó 1 Dec 05, Izvestiia Press Digest; Russica Izvestiia via ISI Emerging Markets.

8) ÒForced removal,Ó 28 Nov 05, Izvestiia Press Digest; Russica Izvestiia via ISI Emerging Markets.

9) ÒRomanova, several others to quit REN-TV,Ó 5 Dec 05, Interfax; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.

By Robyn Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)

~~~~~

The plight of the space program

RussiaÕs military and civilian space capability continues to deteriorate as highlighted by a series of failed launches and the recent firing of a senior space agency official.  In June, a critical military communications satellite was lost shortly after launch.  The Molniya-M communications satellite was launched from the Plesetsk military space center; unfortunately, the rocket crashed in its sixth minute of flight. (1)  After an investigation, the Space Forces attributed the most likely cause of the crash to a second stage engine failure. (2)  This was followed the next day by another unsuccessful launch when an experimental US-Russian satellite, the Solar Sail, failed to achieve orbit following launch from a Russian submarine.  The rocket was launched effectively from the submarine but the booster shut down prematurely resulting in an unrecoverable loss. (3)

The launch maladies of the Russian space program resurfaced in October with additional failures.  The most egregious was the loss of the European Space AgencyÕs (ESA) CryoSat satellite which was destroyed following the failure of its Russian booster.  The $140 million plus satellite was a cornerstone of the ESAÕs plan to study global warming.  This was also a prime opportunity for RussiaÕs beleaguered space industry to accumulate badly needed foreign cash.  The Nezavisimaya gazeta lamented, "The scale of losses from that failure is hard to calculate.  Accidents like that which happened to CryoSat may irrevocably undermine Western customers' confidence in Russia's delivery vehicles." (4)  To make matters worse, an unmanned Demonstrator spacecraft was also lost in October following launch from a Russian submarine.  The satellite controllers lost control of the vehicle as it approached its target.  This experimental spacecraft was designed to demonstrate a cheap alternative to the Soyuz spacecraft for transporting cargo to the international space station.  It was the fourth failure of the Demonstrator, leading an Izvestiya journalist to comment: "It seems that the spacecraft is haunted by doom." (5)  Also in October, Russian engineers lost contact with a previously launched Earth-monitoring satellite and a new optical research satellite was lost due to a booster failure. (6)

The plight of the Russian space program has attracted high level government and industry attention.  Two days after the loss of the Molniya-M satellite, Anatoli Perminov, the head of the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos) publicly declared that whoever was at fault for the crash would be brought to justice. (7)  Perminov further stated that if the rocket was designed poorly the culprits would be prosecuted, or if operator error was involved then the senior officers of the Space Corps would be reprimanded. (8)   Not surprisingly, the officers of the Space Corp recommended filing a lawsuit against the rocket manufacturer following a surely impartial review of the incident.  Space Force Commander Vladimir Popovkin stated: "We have sent a complaint to the rocket's producer and are considering filing a lawsuit together with the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos) to sue the factory through an arbitration court for the expenses incurred by the Defense Ministry.Ó (9)  Popovkin was willing to allow some accommodation, ÒOf course, we cannot ruin the Progress design bureau, which produced the miserable rocket. Unfortunately, there are no other rocket producers and we are well aware of that." (10)

The consequences of failure for the loss of the ESA launch were more personal as President Putin fired the head of RussiaÕs Khrunichev space construction company responsible for building the faulty Rokot booster.  In November, Putin signed a decree installing Vladimir Nesterov as the head of Khrunichev while relieving Aleksandr Medvedev of this responsibility. (11)   MedvedevÕs company publicly apologized for the loss of the CryoSat, but it apparently was not enough to save his job. (12)

While the Russian space program is having difficulty getting satellites to orbit, the ones already there are experiencing decline.  Most of RussiaÕs satellites are well beyond their design life with little hope of reconstituting the constellation back to the level of the Soviet era.  In November, Anatoli Perminov reported to Russian lawmakers that, ÒRussia has only 96 spacecraft in space, 62 of them well past their service life." (13)  As for military satellites, the head of Roskomos said, Ò33 out of 40 spacecraft have outlasted their usefulness.Ó (14)  At the same conference, General Oleg Gromov, deputy commander of the Space Forces stated the, Òmissile-attack warning system can no longer be restored through the launch of the hopelessly obsolete 71X6 and 73D6 satellites.Ó (15)  He also announced that Russia has fewer than half (3 of 8) of the satellites it needs for space-based missile launch detection.  Other types of military reconnaissance satellites are also in dire straights even by General GromovÕs own assessment, ÒTwelve or 13 US electronics intelligence spacecraft are permanently monitoring us, we have only one such craft that is flying." (16) 

While the constellation ages, new Russian space capabilities are predictably falling behind.  Col-General Aleksandr Zelin, deputy commander of the Air Force reported that Russian aviation uses the American Global Positioning System (GPS) as a stopgap because RussiaÕs own GLONASS navigation satellite system does not have enough satellites to support flight over all of the Russian territory. (17)  This is a major deficiency as US armed forces have shown the tremendously positive effect precision navigation and timing standards have on modern combat forces.  The US GPS is available globally for peacetime use, but the high-precision modes can be selectively encrypted and would then be only available to forces with the proper US-controlled military gear.  Consequently, Russian forces are partially dependent on the good favor of the US military until the GLONASS system reaches full operational capability.

A prime example of the disconnect between funding and reality is RussiaÕs GLONASS system, which is scheduled to be fully populated by 2007.  The program is severely under funded and needs a significant boost in financing to hold this schedule.  RussiaÕs top space official publicly lobbied for an additional $100 million after declaring that the GLONASS program was 72% under funded. (18)  On a larger scale, RussiaÕs funding for space is nearly 30 times less than that of the US and 2.5 times less than China according to Roskosmos. (19)  Anatoli Perminov expounded on this assessment stating Òthe United States spends $16.4 billion on space needs, we, $800 million as of 2007." (20)  $800 million per year is not nearly sufficient to maintain the Russian space industry, ground infrastructure, and current spending on orbit satellites. 

Furthermore, this level of funding is insufficient to produce satellites incorporating next generation technologies.  For example, the US plans to spend over a billion dollars in 2006 alone for development of two new communication satellites: the Advanced EHF and the Transformational Satellite. (21)  Given the problems and delays that plague US satellite development even with hefty funding levels, it is unlikely Russia will make much progress in developing advanced satellite technology with its meager resources.  Perminov succinctly summarized the Russian disconnect between expectations and reality as, ÒOur people do not understand why we cannot cater for the same timeframe and level of space developments as the United States, and hoping that it will be possible to preserve the balance of forces with this level of funding is utopia." (22)

Conclusions

The plight of the Russian space program has significant implications.  First, the deterioration of the early warning system contributes to RussiaÕs perceived need to maintain a large nuclear arsenal.  Russia must rely on ground based radar to detect a missile launch, which does not give enough time to sort through the data and make a sound decision before launching a counterstrike.  Indeed, RussiaÕs deterrence is based on maintaining a nuclear arsenal large enough to survive a large-scale attack with enough weapons to mount a credible retaliatory strike.  In addition, the decline of the Russian space-based early warning system increases the importance of data sharing between the West and Russia in order to prevent mistakes with regard to false alarms since Russia has little remaining indigenous capability.

The inability of the space program to deliver reliable communications and intelligence limits the effectiveness of the military.  The incorporation of space assets has been a key factor in the surge in US conventional capability in the years since the end of the Cold War. 

Finally, thereÕs little hope of recovery for the Russian space program if the fragmented industrial base is not restructured, utopian expectations are not replaced by realistic goals, and funding is not increased to an appropriate level.  The Cold War inventory of Russian rockets and satellites is dwindling and the clock is ticking.

Source Notes:

GEORGIA

Who should take Georgia to the prom?

Just in case there was any doubt in which diplomatic direction Georgia is leaning, Tbilisi issued the countryÕs National Military Strategy late last month that put all questions to rest.  The document, a requirement for NATO, was drafted by the General Staff, parliamentÕs Committee on National Defense and Security, non-governmental organizations and other experts, from Georgia and some NATO countries. (1)  In the document, Tbilisi points to the continued existence of Russian military bases on Georgian soil as a Òdestabilizing factorÓ along with instability in the North Caucasus, armed formations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and new crisis points on other Georgian territory. (2)

To counter these and other threats, the Georgian military (reformed to NATO standards) will receive a significant chunk of the national budget, to the tune of about US$218 million, for 2006. (3)

In a response only missing the words Òsays you,Ó the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the notion that Russian troops could be considered destabilizing:  ÒThe absurdity of such assertions is apparent,Ó he said.  (4)

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his cabinet have made no secret of the countryÕs plans to join the alliance.  According to the State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, once the country finishes work on the NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), ÒWe hope our relations will then move to a higher level: the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).Ó Still, Georgia is ready to keep open the doors to all powers:  ÒWe are looking for opportunities to cooperate with Russia, with which we have more common interests than disputes,Ó he added. (5)

Georgia is not above using its new best friend to put added pressure on Russia to continue working toward troop withdrawal; Tbilisi proposed that NATO monitor the withdrawal from Russian bases in Georgia once the final protocol is signed. (6)  Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli asserted further that GeorgiaÕs plan for settling the conflict in South Ossetia had garnered the approval of the European Union, NATO and the Belgian government following the ministerÕs trip to Brussels.  (7)  Officials from Russia and the two separatists republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, of course, most definitely have not agreed to the plan.  (8)

In terms of alliances, though, Georgia is not limiting itself to NATO.  According to the PresidentÕs Chief of Staff, Giorgi Arveladze, an international forum held last week in Kyiv was intended to create an Òaxis of democratic countries that do not wish to be in the orbit of Russian influence.Ó Included in the forum were the heads of state of countries that have struggled to regain and retain independence from Moscow, such as Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova, as well as representatives of some states in the Balkans. (9)  Despite ArveladzeÕs clear speaking, Saakashvili appeasingly said subsequently the new ÒDemocratic Choice CommunityÓ to be formed as a result of the forum was not Òan anti-Russian association.Ó  ÒNo one in Georgia could say such a stupid thing.  Russia will only benefit from gaining neighboring democratic states,Ó the Georgian president said. (10)  Perhaps one should note that Arveladze was not Òin GeorgiaÓ when he made his remarks.

Meanwhile, comments from the Georgian parliament that the country should consider withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States resulted in a less-than-friendly shot across the bow from counterparts in Moscow.  According to Russian Duma deputy Aleksei Mitrofanov, Russia should bomb Tbilisi and install Igor Giorgadze, GeorgiaÕs former security chief now in exile, in place of Saakashvili.  (11)  The parliamentary scuffling was put to rest when Nogaideli attended the Council of the CIS Heads of Government meeting in the Russian capital.

ARMENIA

Not in my yard

Armenian President Robert Kocharian, on the other hand, stressed that aspiring to NATO membership is not on the agenda in Yerevan.  ÒNow just look at the political map of the world, at the South Caucasus with always strong Russian influence and at Armenia bordering on Turkey and Iran and ask yourselves – will membership of NATO increase ArmeniaÕs security or not?,Ó he said, ÒThat is why we are not talking about membership of NATO or setting ourselves such a task.Ó (12)

Who could say ÔnoÕ?

ArmeniaÕs recent nationwide constitutional referendum also has generated its share of international ink, as opponents of the expansion of parliamentary powers balk at accepting the stated results of the poll. 

Before results were announced, the opposition accused the president and prosecutor-general of applying open pressure and blackmail to opposition representatives.  (13) Alas, the opposition demanded the annulment of the results by the Central Election Commission, or Òappropriate political stepsÓ would be taken; however, the CEC responded that the Constitutional Court, not the CEC, was the place where appeals could be heard.  (14)  In any case, appeals should be heard, given the preliminary results:  according to the Central Commission for the Referendum chairman Garegin Azarian, over 93 percent of Armenian voters approved the constitutional amendment.  (15)

Despite noting instances where Òthe low turnout in many elections districts in Yerevan and in the regions contradicts the exaggerated figured reported by the electoral commissions,Ó  Òsome forged signatures of electorsÓ and the breach of the principle of secret balloting, as well as Òunequal conditions for the opponentsÓ of the reform, monitors from the Council of Europe announced that the voting met Òinternational criteriaÓ in most districts.  (16)