Stability, predictability and transitions

Compared to the Yel'tsin era, "political stability" does indeed seem to be the hallmark of the Putin era…at least for the majority of the business, political and bureaucratic elites.  The problem of stability is that it relies on inertia:  But a situation is only stable until it isn't any more, and change can result from any one of a vast array of possibilities.  Putin's stability rests upon one of the institutions that was not utterly destroyed in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Services.  However, the FSB alone cannot provide support for a modern state.  Russia is driven by economic necessities and a deep (if not broad) business class that motivates a range of policy initiatives, both domestic and foreign.  It is the clash between the conservatism of Putin's KGB base and the dynamism of the government's economic flow that represents the primary schism in the Putin administration (traditionally identified as siloviki versus liberal).

Two crucial differences distinguish Putin's stability from Yel'tsin's chaos:  the back end of the learning curve and the price of oil.  Yel'tsin, his advisers and associates were flying by the seats of their "short pants."  From the machinations to dissolve the Soviet Union to the establishment of federal relations to the relationships with western institutions, there was no rulebook for Yel'tsin's crew.  They learned on the go, and, unfortunately, some of their decisions, policy choices and fiascoes demonstrated their inexperience, at times even their malfeasance. 

The players of the Putin era have the advantage of watching the films on the Yel'tsin team:  the strengths and weaknesses studied, they make fewer errors and learn more effective methods of working with international institutions (financial or political).  Clearly, they still make their fair share of miscalculations, but the result of their experience is a sense that Russia presents itself better (more forcefully, more independently) in its dealings with the international community. 

The domestic response is more difficult to gauge.  The sense of stability contrasted with the chaos of Yel'tsin's rule is evident, but, and here analysis is hampered by the lack of free media, the upheavals of Nord-Ost, Beslan, Nalchik, of military disasters, such as the Kursk, and of the state's initiative to monetize benefits surely have a significant impact on the internal sense of security.

While the high price of oil has provided a buffer for the executive to act both domestically and internationally, an over reliance on petrodollars and the Russian economy's developing "Dutch disease" creates an impression of a window closing on the opportunities of the Putin era. 

All of which leads directly to the initial stages of the succession struggle.  The siloviki vs. liberal clash in Putin's administration initially was marked not by a clear ideological difference, but by an issue of loyalty:  the liberal faction was seeped in the transition economics of the Yel'tsin era—some were considered culpable in the "sell-offs" and scandal auctions of the nineties, and all of them have a definite stake in the "path to market;" preventing a reversal of the economic decisions of the Yel'tsin years, indeed making a reversal impossible, is both an idealistic and deeply pragmatic goal of the liberals.  The siloviki were distinctly separate and apart from the processes that extracted Russia from the command economy (and politics) and pushed it by fits and starts into a new international market, community and status.  Their loyalty lies not in the process of radical transformation, but the maintenance of traditions and holding close to that which they consider good about the Soviet state.  In some ways, the siloviki have a natural, albeit tenuous, alliance with conservative Russian nationalism.

Halfway through Putin's second term however, it has become clear that the chosen siloviki have developed a powerful stake in the status quo.  The quiet placement of Putin insiders on the boards of Russia's largest and most influential companies (an egregious conflict of interest, for which Yel'tsin-era apparatchiki were lambasted), has resulted in a vast intertwining of Kremlin offices with the boardrooms of companies throughout the energy sector, in metals, media holdings, and etc.  The exploits of "Kremlin, Inc." have been widely reported, and current Kremlin denizens do not seem to fear the revelations as previous officials who served during the "kompromat" wars did. (1)

Perhaps what Putin's apparatchiki do fear is an overt leadership struggle.  Just as the "Yel'tsin Family" needed a mechanism to ensure that the President's exit from power would carry guarantees for their safety, retention of their monetary benefits, and the solidification (rather than reversal) of economic reforms (to prevent the spectacle of economic show trials), the current insiders need their own guarantees. 

Putin's path to the Russian presidency was crafted carefully, and resulted in the retention of a large number of Yel'tsin-era government workers (and a continuity of Yel'tsin era state policies); the Kremlin however, became a haven for the siloviki faction.  Putin may have set a precedent for the next Kremlin occupant – leave the overall economic direction of the state at the White House, but put your own imprint on its implementation with your own staff ensconced in the Kremlin. 

While the Putin era may carry the flag of political stability, it is predictability more than stability that is needed from it.  While successive regimes strive to protect their legacies, lives and loot in economic transition, it is the solidification and normalization of the political process and procedures that would produce a more tangible benefit.  Ensconcing standards of conduct by political officeholders and a framework of political transition with a uniformly applied legal code would work wonders for both the stability and predictability of the Russian political process. 

Instead, the central issue of the post-Putin succession, which already is so heated, once again involves the redivision of state assets.  Will Putin's siloviki turned apparatchiki transform once again into private sector businessmen and women, or will the Chairman of the Board of Gazprom be an honorific attached to the post of the Kremlin Chief of Staff, ex officio?

On the President's schedule

On 7 November, President Putin replaced his plenipotentiary representative to the Constitutional Court, Mikhail Mityukov, with Mikhail Krotov. (2)  Krotov is remarkably well-connected:  he was at law school in St. Petersburg with Dmitri Kozak, previously worked with Kremlin Chief of Staff  Dmitri Medvedev, was Senior Deputy General Director of Gazprom-Media and specializes in civil and commercial law.  (3)

Obviously, there can be many reasons to change a Presidential representative to the Constitutional Court, but it is interesting that Putin met with the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valeri Zorkin, along with the heads of the Supreme Court and High Arbitration Tribunal within two days of this announcement. (4)  Also of note, this change in the president's Constitutional Court representative comes just one week before the court is to consider a complaint regarding the abolition of gubernatorial elections. (5)

Putin on MVD staffing

President Putin issued a decree setting a maximum level for staffing at Russian internal affairs agencies.  According to the decree, announced 3 November, the President sets, as of the first of the year, "the maximum staff numbers in the Internal Affairs agencies of the Russian Federation (without the staff guarding and servicing buildings), which are funded from the federal budget, at the level of 821,268 people, which includes 661,275 employees of the Internal Affairs agencies…and 159, 993 federal state civil servants and workers." (6)

Left to the imagination is whether this figure represents an increase, decrease or no change to staffing levels.

Source Notes:

(1) "Kremlin, Inc has performed Well," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 Jul 05; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging Markets; "Entourage of President Controls Companies Worth $222 Billion," newsru.com, 27 Jul 05; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets; "Winners and Losers in Kremlin's Grab for Oil," Financial Times, 6 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets are just a few examples of the many stories on the Kremlin's business connections.

Where’s the coordination among Siloviki?

With Federal Security Service (FSB) men in charge of Russia’s main power ministries, one would expect a higher degree of cooperation and coordination among their respective organizations, a problem that historically has plagued their effectiveness.  Yet, with Nikolai Patrushev leading the FSB, Sergei Ivanov the Defense Ministry (MOD), and Rashid Nurgaliyev the Interior Ministry (MVD), coordination and effectiveness of the security forces under their control seems to have worsened, not improved.  The poorly coordinated response to the Nalchik militant attack on 13 October is a prime example of their lack of progress in the anti-terrorism arena, despite stated efforts to improve.   

Attempts and failures

The well-publicized Vostok 2005 command staff exercise this past July by the Far East Military District is likely the best example of integration, or at least unity of effort, between the security agencies.  The exercise’s primary objectives included coordinating actions between the MOD and other militarized agencies using 5,000 servicemen and 14,000 representatives from the MVD and FSB. (1)   This exercise, however, was in the far east, not in the location of most of Russia’s anti-terrorist activities, the Caucasus; and it was a pre-planned, preemptive exercise against terrorist threats versus an actual, no-notice attack that would rely on time-tested coordination of command and communication elements. 

In late June, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, criticized the security ministries for failure to establish a centralized, joint logistics system that military experts estimated would save 6 billion rubles.  A joint system would have been a remarkable first step to increase coordination among the security ministries.  The MOD led the effort to establish the joint logistics system and realized some initial successes, but the plan fell apart due to bureaucratic infighting regarding loss of control and leadership of each ministry’s logistical efforts. (2) 

Recurring terrorist attacks throughout the Caucasus routinely demonstrate the lack of coordination among the FSB, MOD, and MVD forces deployed throughout the region.  The response to the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis was marred with coordination failures among security agencies.  Less than one month before the attack at Nalchik, the North Caucasus Military District held a large scale exercise designed to create a joint group of forces to increase cooperation between military, internal troops, and border guards. (3)  Clearly, the Siloviki did not learn from Beslan and the touted exercise was not effective in establishing lasting communications networks and cooperation between the security ministries. 

Room for Improvement at Nalchik

Following the death of separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov in March of 2005, the new separatist leader, Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, announced he would establish a new “Caucasus Front” to spread the war well beyond the borders of Chechnya.  Russian security officials responded to his threat with a massive increase in troops (MVD regiments and divisions would replace brigades and battalions) throughout the southern republics, specifically in Nalchik and three other southern Caucasus cities. (4)  Despite the increased troop strength and specific intelligence five days prior that militants would attack Nalchik, the security forces were unable to prevent the attack on 13 October.  (5) 

The coordination and cooperation of security elements during the conduct of the attack were similarly disjointed.  The attack actually began with a raid in the outskirts of the city at 3:00 am, but the police involved did not pass along the information to warn other agencies, providing militants six hours additional time to plan the subsequent attack just after 9:00 am. (6)  During the attack at the airport, MOD officials closed the airport without telling their MVD or FSB counterparts, breeding further resentment among the ministries. (7)  The lack of coordination during the first several hours of the attack resulted in chaos among responding forces.  Army units from the outskirts of the city were too slow to respond due to the fear of ambush because security forces were unable to secure the roadways. (8)  Russian President, Vladimir Putin, hailed the effectiveness of the security forces’ response at Nalchik, but given the security ministries’ preparation and advance notice, the fact the attack occurred represents failure given the slow, disjointed, and uncoordinated response. 

Analysis

The infighting among Russia’s power ministries has a long historical record.  After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia divided the KGB into the FSB, the SVR and the border troops, but left the MOD and MVD virtually untouched, failing to accomplish serious reform based on new security threats.  Instead, each ministry independently fights its own war in Chechnya, and now throughout all the southern Caucasus republics, as if they were engaged in coalition warfare without a supreme commander.  President Putin, the only logical “supreme commander” who could intervene, instead sits silently on the sidelines during times of crisis while the security ministries, whose competence is already challenged by gross corruption, struggle to accomplish basic coordination on security matters. 

The confusion over which ministry is in charge of anti-terrorism efforts is a prime example of Putin’s murky guidance.  Earlier this spring, Putin agreed with his envoy to the Southern Federal District, Dmitri Kozak, to place the FSB in charge of anti-terrorism operations in his region in order to improve “integration and coordination between different agencies.” (9)  Then, in July 2005, Putin emphasized the need for better anti-terrorism measures stating that the “Interior Ministry remains the leading agency in dealing with terrorism” throughout the Caucasus. (10)  Without some level of coordination between the ministries, the FSB, MOD, and MVD can each be in charge.  This is the de-facto situation that seems to have developed in the southern Caucasus republics. 

One could also ask “is anyone in charge?”  Ivanov, a former member of the FSB who military officers hold in little esteem, can only yield so much influence within the military.  Likewise, there are reports that Nurgaliyev’s six deputy chiefs within the MVD, all career MVD employees, severely weaken Nurgaliyev’s position. (11)  Animosities regarding each minister’s relative weakness have devolved to the point where opposing siloviki representatives spend more time with positional games than real work. (12)  The lack of cooperation at the highest levels of the security agencies may simply be a result of their lack of power to do otherwise.  In any case, it has an impact on not only the effectiveness of their Caucasus operations, but certainly has a negative impact on the morale and prestige of forces throughout their ranks as well.  The current state of affairs may explain why the bust of “Iron Felix,” Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the secret police at a time when the word police meant terror, was recently re-erected outside the Interior Ministry headquarters. (13)  Perhaps not all that much has changed within Russia’s security apparatus after all. 

Source Notes:

(1) Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 1 Aug 05, FBIS Translated Text via World News Connection (WNC).

(2) “The Security Ministries Attack the Defense Ministry” by Alexander Babakin, What the Papers Say (WPS) Defense and Security, 14 Sep 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

(3) “Antiterrorism Exercise Planned in Five Russian Republics of North Caucasus” Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 12 Sep 05, FBIS Translated Text via WNC. 

(4) “Moscow and Insurgents Take Steps to Militarize the North Caucasus” by Andrei Smirnov, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol 2, Issue 57, 11 Aug 05. 

(5) “Basayev Claims Responsibility for Nalchik Raid” Russia Reform Monitor No. 1316, 21 Oct 05. 

(6) “Background, Possible Motives for Nalchik Terrorist Attack Explored” by Igor Naydenov, Exvestia, 21 Oct 05 via JRL. 

(7) “Nalchik Battle Shows Moscow’s Weakness, Militants’ Strength” by Paul Goble, Window on Eurasia, 17 Oct 05 via JRL. 

(8) “Nalchik Under Attack: Moscow Unable to Respond” by Andrei Smirnov, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol 2, Issue 191, 14 Oct 05. 

(9) “The FSB Will Be Placed In Charge” by Natalia Gorodetskaya, Kommersant, 24 Feb 05; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets. 

(10) “Firing the First Shot” by Alexei Nikolsky, Vedomosti, 28 Jul 05, What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets.

(11) “Siloviki Continue Interior Struggle” CCPR-Russia Federal Politics, 4 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 

(12) Ibid. 

(13) “Soviet Spy Chief is Back—On a Pedestal” by Kim Murphy, Los Angeles Times, 10 Nov 05 via JRL. 

Lavrov, Gref prepare for APEC summit

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Economic Development Minister German Gref arrived in Busan, South Korea on November 15 in preparation for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that will be held November 18-19 and attended by 21 world leaders including Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President George Bush. (1)

At the top of the Kremlin’s agenda at APEC, and in general, is to “collectively confirm the support to Russia’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO),” said Lavrov the night before the opening of the ministerial meeting. (2) After a meeting with Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshihro Nikai, Gref said, “Russia will join WTO, maybe, in the middle of the next year 2006, but the end of the next year is a more realistic scenario.” (3) That statement differs from Russia’s original plan of hoping to end bilateral accession talks this December and join the WTO by January 2006.

Russia also proposed an APEC sea security center, which is meant to enhance navigation security, according to Lavrov. The intentions and extent of Russia’s sea security center have not been elaborated. After the meeting with APEC foreign ministers however, Lavrov did say, “Particular attention was paid to important issues in the fight against international terrorism, including measures to bolster regional trade and transport security.” (4)

Gref reported on November 15 that Russia and South Korea drafted a joint-action plan to be signed by each country’s president during the APEC summit. The plan includes provisions to improve mutual investment, to allow South Korean companies to enter the Russian market and to liberalize and expand bilateral trade. (5)

“We now perceive South Korea as our strategic partner in the region and political relations between our countries are very favorable,” Gref said. (6)

Lavrov met with his Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing to discuss the situation on the Korean peninsula, relations with Syria, the Middle East settlement and Iranian nuclear ambitions, according to a highly connected source in the Russian delegation. (7) A meeting summary or transcript is not available, but it is known that Russia and China want Bush to offer security assurances to North Korea regardless of North Korea’s nuclear weapons aspirations. (8)

A “warning” for CIS democracies

A popular Russian newspaper recently called comments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “a warning” to CIS countries that have deviated from Russia politically. (9)

In an October 19 interview, sponsored by Rossiya TV Channel and Radio Russia, host Sergei Brilyov asked about reports that Lavrov, in closed hearings at the Federation Council, said that economic sanctions would be imposed “against countries that are not too loyal to Russia or are not disposed to strengthen relations with Russia.” (10)

Lavrov first responded, “I would not like to introduce sanctions against our partners in the CIS.” But after the host probed further on the issue, Lavrov responded, “This will not happen immediately.” When specifically asked about Georgia, in light of the recent political rifts over Georgian demands that Russia remove their peacekeeping troops from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Lavrov reiterated that he would not favor introducing sanctions anytime soon, but spoke sharply of Georgia’s recent actions. (11)

“Naturally, the development of our relations with Georgia on the basis of natural economic interests, closer interaction in the economic and other spheres have certainly been impeded by the political atmosphere as some representatives of the Georgian leadership have constantly tried to stir up tension in our relations…” Lavrov said. (12)

On November 10, Rossiiskie Vesti called Lavrov’s comments “a warning” not only for Georgia, but for Moldova and Ukraine, as well. Vehemently supportive of Lavrov, the article’s only criticism of the comments questioned the timing of the remarks: “If Moscow had issued its ‘fundamental’ statements earlier, in many cases it would have been possible to avert developments which are unfavorable for Russia.” (13)

Thus far, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have not chosen to respond to Lavrov’s comments.

Ongoing issues: Abkhazia and Transdniester

The status of Russian “peacekeepers” in Abkhazia is proving to be a very divisive issue. On November 15, roughly 50 students and young political activists picketed outside the Russian embassy in Tbilisi. The protesters demanded the immediate withdrawal of a Russian peacekeeping force in the Ghali region of Abkhazia because they said the peacekeepers did not fulfill their duty of keeping the local population safe. Furthermore, the picketers stated that the peacekeeping troops actually have worsened the situation by encouraging Abkhazian separatists. (14) [For more on this issue, see Armed Forces: External and the Caucasus region report below.]

In an interview with a Romanian newspaper on November 11, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov promised a “transparent” process regarding the status of the region of Transdniester in Moldova. Yet, he admitted that the process will only be transparent “because discussions on issues related to a solution to the Transdniestrian conflict proceed in parallel with the creation of prerequisites for stability and security in this area of mutual interests.” (15)

Lavrov said the job of the mediators, which include Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), will be to create an environment of trust in which Moldovan and Transdniestrian officials can settle their disagreements. (16)

Source Notes:

(1) ITAR-TASS, 15 Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis

(2) Ibid.

(3) BBC Monitoring, 17 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets

(4) ITAR-TASS, 15 Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis

(5) RIA-Novosti. 15 Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Itar-Tass, 15 Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

(8) CNN, 15 Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

(9) Rossiiskie Vesti, 10 Oct. 05; What the Papers Say (WPS), 14 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

(10) Radio Interview with Sergei Lavrov, Radio Rossiya, 19 Oct. 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Rossiiskie Vesti, 10 Oct. 05; What the Papers Say (WPS), 14 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

(14) Itar-Tass, 15 Nov 05 via Lexis-Nexis.

(15) Interfax, 11 Nov 05; FBIS Translated text via World News Connection (WNC).

(16) Ibid.

By Marissa Payne (mpayne@bu.edu)

~~~~~

DOMESTIC AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

NGOs forced to reregister

A new bill in the State Duma will require Russia’s NGOs to reregister before the next national elections. The bill effectively could outlaw foreign NGOs, as well as endangering the survival of those NGOs whose activities are watched by the state with a less than favorable eye. The bill is sponsored by members of all four Duma factions, giving it a broad band of support in the Duma, and is interpreted widely as an outgrowth of the Russian state’s fears of a “Color Revolution” happening on its own soil.

In the view of many Russian authorities, the recent revolutions in other formerly Communist republics, particularly Ukraine, were the result of NGOs, sponsored (and heavily influenced) by Western foundations. The revolutions centered on invalid or forged elections as a means of inciting political protest. By ridding itself of NGOs that might take the lead in the case of similar protest in Russia, the state is illustrating how concerned it is about the possibility of a popular uprising.

The move to tighten regulations on NGOs is not unexpected. President Vladimir Putin stated publicly in July that he would not tolerate the foreign funding of Russian political activities and essentially accused Russian NGOs, which engaged in political activity, of being puppets in the hands of Western organizations and governments. The new bill is the first attempt to give legislative backing to Putin’s statement.

The bill, “Amendments to Several Laws of the Russian Federation,” would prevent foreign NGOs from maintaining branches in Russia unless they become financially independent organizations. As such, these entities would fall under the same guidelines as Russian NGOs, which depend primarily on grants for financial support. Russian NGOs are subject to the same tax guidelines as small businesses and receive no tax benefits because of their not-for-profit status. Consequently, the money they receive is treated as income, including even membership dues and charitable contributions. The short list of foreign foundations that are permitted to give tax-free grants in Russia is dependent on state approval.

The bill would give NGOs one year to reregister. It would also grant state organs further access to NGOs’ financial records, in addition to those they already have through yearly and quarterly reports. The bill contains a proviso prohibiting the establishment of NGOs by persons with criminal records. This clause would have a negative impact on organizations such as those founded by imprisoned oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Moreover, the bill does not stipulate whether this clause applies only to the post-Soviet period or, in fact, includes the Soviet era. This could mean that Soviet-era dissidents who were convicted of crimes against the state could be disqualified from running NGOs and that NGOs affiliated with them could be targeted by the state.

In regard to foreign NGOs, the proposed legislation allows for the rejection or dissolution of any group "if [its] goals, tasks, and forms of activity by the founder" do not align with Russia’s constitution and legal code. (1)  If an organization is approved by the registration organs, but, in its annual review, is discovered to be engaging in activities outside its stated purpose, the state can issue a warning. The warning would be followed by a one month period during which the group can correct the problem. If this warning goes unheeded, the state can request that the organization be dissolved.

According to Duma Deputy Vladimir Pligin, the goal of the amendments is to prevent money laundering by NGOs and advance Russia’s struggle against radicals and terrorists. (2)  Many NGOs, however, including the human rights organizations Memorial and Moscow Helsinki Group, view the proposed legislation as an attempt to extend state control to the NGO sector. Memorial plans to launch a campaign against the Duma initiative.

While the bill follows up on Putin’s comments in July about the foreign funding of NGOs, it also contains the sequel to his offer to fund NGOs, recognizing, as he stated, “That he who pays the piper calls the tune.” The bill sets aside 500 million rubles (more than $17 million) for the state funding of civil society. Most likely, these funds will be distributed by the recently formed Public Chamber.

All told, the Duma’s new bill, which could be voted on as early as December, could help tighten the state’s growing control on any form of dissent in Russia by strangling ties with Western organizations and filtering out groups that oppose the state. 

As a side note, the US Congress, impervious to Putin’s earlier statements about foreign funding, approved $4 million on November 4 to support “programs for developing political parties in Russia.” (3) 

Source Notes:

(1) Ivan Rodin, "Civil Society Called to Order: The State Duma Adds Some Work To the Public Chamber" Nezavisimaya gazeta via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #9293.

(2) Claire Bigg, “NGOs Denounce Proposed Status Changes As Move To Curb Their Activities,” RFE/RL via JRL #9293.

(3) Andrei Zlobin, “The Price of Democracy,” Vremya novostei, no. 206, Nov 2005 via JRL #9289.

Iran and the nuclear issue

Russia is in the midst of a revealing undertaking in defense of what it calls Iran’s right to civil nuclear power.  Russia is Iran’s most vocal supporter and stands in direct opposition to the wishes of the United States.   Russia is steadfastly resisting Iran’s referral to the UN Security Council and is unmoved by US overtures including an impromptu visit from the US Secretary of State.  In addition, Russia’s stance also is opposed by the European Union, in sharp contrast to Russia’s alignment with the Europeans in criticism of the US invasion of Iraq.  Russia is conferring with the EU-3 (consisting of England, France, and Germany) on the Iranian issue but has not backed away from its support of Iran.  Even Iran’s recent threats to share nuclear technology with other Muslim nations or to wipe Israel from the face of the earth have not deterred Russian support. 

Russian diplomacy is now balancing its relationship with the West with a growing desire to be an indispensable force in Central Asia.  Iran’s insistence on owning the entire nuclear fuel cycle leaves little room for simple solutions with the West.  Iran does not want to be dependent on foreign sources for nuclear fuel while western observers are concerned that Iran covertly will develop weapons grade nuclear material if it is allowed a domestic capability to enrich uranium.   Russia is uniquely poised to broker a compromise solution such as offering to perform uranium enrichment on behalf of Iran. (1)  Russia will achieve a major foreign policy and national security victory if it is able to find a solution tolerable to the US without harming its expanding relationship with Iran.

Growing ties to Iran

Russia’s support of Iran is based partially on their economic relationship.  Trade between the two countries is well over $2 billion per year and growing.  Russian exports account for 90% of the trade, constituting a vital market for Russia’s industrial complex as Iran purchases significant quantities of manufactured goods as opposed to the raw materials that currently buoy Russian global exports. (2)  Russia’s defense industry has specifically targeted Iran as an attractive arms export market while Iranian fears of potential US economic sanctions or invasion persist. (3)  Russia and Iran also have engaged in joint projects throughout Central Asia, with more potential for cooperation in the future as evidenced by the joint venture to build power plants in Tajikistan and the agreement to build and launch Iran’s first communications satellite. (4)

Nuclear power is one of the unique aspects of Russia and Iran’s relationship.  While Russia is not Iran’s largest trading partner, Russia is Iran’s primary nuclear partner.  Beyond the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iran’s parliament passed a resolution calling for the construction of 20 nuclear power plants and Russia is envisaged as a key partner. (5)  Iran’s supposed pursuit of nuclear weapons has deterred most nuclear powers from supporting Iran’s civilian nuclear power pursuits since the demise of the Shah in 1979.  Russia’s willingness to work with Iran allows it to operate with minimal competition from the West.  The acquisition of external markets is viewed as essential for Russia’s large nuclear industry, which must find new projects to remain competitive given the declining scope of domestic Russian nuclear projects. 

Follow the money

State ownership and profit are also telling aspects of the nuclear relationship between Iran and Russia.  Just months prior to the Bushehr reactor agreement, the industrialist Kakha Bendukidze was forced to sell his controlling share in the state-owned company Atomstroiexport as a result of a government audit. (6)  The sales price of $25 million was well below market value, given the billions of dollars Atomstroiexport is expected to reap over the life of the Bushehr project. (7)  The financial profit would be enhanced further if a compromise deal with Iran were to require Russia to provide enriched uranium and other services.  This would not only generate additional income for Russia but strengthen Russia’s leverage over Iran.

State involvement was not only instrumental in securing the Iran deal but is also pivotal for posturing the $3.5 billion Russian nuclear industry to compete in the lucrative global market. (8)  Global demand for nuclear energy is expected to rise dramatically in the next twenty years–especially in Asia. (9)  Russia already is engaged in building reactors for Iran, India and China.  Furthermore, China has announced plans to spend $50 billion for 30 nuclear power plants in the next 15 years, and several countries, including Russia, are lining up to compete for contracts. (10)  Russia’s competitiveness in the cut-throat global nuclear energy market will be enhanced tremendously with success in Iran, particularly if it can show its well-paying customers its ability to obtain nuclear power without having to appease western demands or to be overly transparent with their programs. 

Geopolitics

In addition to its trade and economic concerns, Russian geopolitical interests are intertwined in its support for Iran’s nuclear program.  Iran is an effective ally and advocate in the Muslim world where it frequently defends Russian interests and has not supported Islamic extremists in Russia. (11)  Iran also is an important partner for Russia in negotiations regarding the Caspian Sea and the distribution of the energy resources and other commerce from Central Asia to Europe. (12)  Iran’s geographical location and willingness to cooperate consistently are powerful benefits for Russia’s efforts to increase its influence in Central Asia.

An interesting subplot in the nuclear debate is the response of the other central and south Asian nuclear powers.  Despite the obvious discomfort associated with a nuclear armed Iran, none of the nuclear capable members or observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has mounted significant protest.  Of these countries, only India voted to support the IAEA resolution in September to consider referring Iran to the UN Security Council. (13)  However, lobbying from Russia, Iran, and other SCO affiliates in conjunction with internal politics forced India to backtrack to a pro-Iranian position. (14) Hence, Russia’s success to date in generating and maintaining unified Central Asian support for Iran could be an indication that its Asian counterbalancing strategy against the US is beginning to bear fruit.  

A weakened US position

Russian resistance to US influence is also strengthened by perceptions of US overreach and declining credibility in the region.  The US struggle to maintain order and public support in Iraq and Afghanistan makes near-term military intervention in Iran highly unlikely.  Moreover, US credibility on allegations of Iran’s covert plans for WMD is undermined by the failure to produce evidence following similar assertions against Iraq.  Russia and other countries point to a double standard given US silence on Pakistan’s nuclear program, which is unabashedly dedicated to nuclear weapons and suspected of proliferation, while denouncing Iran, which at least makes a pretence of a peaceful nuclear power program. (15)  The ouster of US forces from Uzbekistan plus growing SCO resistance to the presence of US troops also heightens the ability to coordinate and sustain opposition to the US in the region.  Finally, the pivotal roles played by Russia and China, as opposed to the US, in achieving diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea highlight the growing effectiveness and assertiveness of Asian powers in the region vis-à-vis the US. 

Conclusion

Russia’s response to the US-led challenge against Iran’s nuclear program should provide new insight into the evolving nature of Central Asian relations.  The complex web of current bilateral and multilateral arrangements constitutes a harbinger of future interactions in central and south Asia as world and regional powers pursue competing interests.  Russia appears likely to gain economically and strategically by supporting Iran and brokering a compromise solution to the crisis. 

Source Notes:

(1) “Russia sees role in resolving Iran nuclear crisis,” Agence France-Presse, 11 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

AZERBAIJAN

Who knew that democracy could be this confusing?

Despite condemnation from the West, and rampant dissatisfaction among the electorate, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and his Russian counterpart announced how pleased they were that the recent elections to Azerbaijan’s parliament, the Milli Majlis, went well.  That the presidents were pleased should come as no surprise; after all, the pro-Aliyev party, Eni Azerbaijan, managed to retain its strong majority; preliminary counts put the ruling party into 63 out of the available 125 seats. (1) But what was surprising was the characterization of the elections as democratic.

Anything but democratic was the consensus of others. The number of observers from local and international organizations numbered around 60,000 persons, no small feat considering the fact that until the week before the election international observers were not going to be allowed in; the president’s last-minute change of mind was a welcomed, but unexpected, move. (2) 

The largest groups of observers were not favorably impressed by the polling, although many did note that there was an improvement over the presidential elections two years ago.  The Election Monitoring Center, an alliance of non-governmental organizations and other groups, reported serious problems during the pre-election campaign, as well as during the actual voting, counting and tabulation of results.  Such violations included officials attempting to influence and intimidate voters, inconsistencies with the voter lists, physical and verbal harassment of observers, ballot stuffing, and bribes of voters with money and goods. (3)  The International Election Observation Mission—an undertaking of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly—issued a statement with similar findings, noting irregularities (at best) in a large percentage of precincts. (4)  So, too, did the US State Department (5) and several smaller observer missions.  Not surprisingly, the opposition coalition called for an annulment of the election results. (6)

And yet, Azerbaijani officials, commentators from Russia, Turkey, the CIS observer mission, and even some Westerners, refused to accept an indictment of the process, although all noted some “minor” difficulties with the process. (7)  Former Missouri Governor Bob Holden, an independent election observer, reported that his visits to 52 polling stations did not turn up any serious violations. (8)  A similar report came from the US-based International Strategic Studies Association. (9) (Perhaps some Americans felt reluctant to drive Azerbaijan back into Moscow’s arms.)  Certainly, only a cynic would raise an eyebrow at the “convincing victory” enjoyed by Aliyev’s wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, whose popularity was credited with gaining her 91.12% of the vote. (10)

Yet, with everyone agreeing on irregularities, there was a handful of scapegoats, particularly after the secretary of the Central Electoral Commission, Vidadi Mahmudlu, called for an emergency meeting of the commission, charging that results in at least 20 electoral districts were falsified.  With that, CEC Chairman Mazahir Panahov admitted “some incidents” should be investigated.  (11) Subsequently, results in two constituencies were annulled. (12)  Prosecutors opened seven criminal cases and detained four chairmen of electoral commissions. (13)

These enforcement efforts seem to trivialize the Azerbaijan government’s cavalier attitude toward democracy.  Reports of violent, and nonviolent, suppression of political rallies before the election were rife.  But officials apparently didn’t limit themselves to flexing their muscles at mass demonstrations. Police officers searched the office of the leader of Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, Rasul Quliyev, just days before the election, and reportedly detained some party members.  (14)  Two days later, police detained Qabil Mammadrzayev, the head of a People’s Front of Azerbaijan Party, for several hours.  (15) On election day, Azerbaijani journalists reported harassment by the authorities, including expulsion from polling areas and police detention.  (16)

Nor did the situation calm down after the election:  On 8 November, Interior Ministry forces seized control of the opposition coalition’s headquarters in Baku, but according to a ministry spokesman, only for the bloc’s own good.  “These measures are meant to prevent interference from any third parties rather than to obstruct the bloc’s work. … The Interior Ministry is guarding strategic sites for the election period, as well as sites where provocative action is likely,” he said.  (17)  That must have been reassuring to the individuals who were surrounded.

The opposition has tried to drum up voter outrage, with a series of rallies in the capital.  Sometimes turnout is good – up to 20,000 individuals (according to the opposition), or 5,000 (according to police) have shown up.  Opposition leaders repeatedly have called for a new election, but make it clear they intend to stay within the confines of constitutionally accepted activity.  There have been no calls for revolution.

And that’s just fine with the president.  Aliyev has repeatedly said that no colorful revolution, a la Ukraine and Georgia, will succeed on his turf, despite the opposition’s attempt to replicate the symbols of Ukraine’s orange revolution.  “All attempts to fan tensions, in or outside Azerbaijan, will fail,” he warned before the election.  (18)

Still, it might have gone either way:  Tens of thousands of persons gathered in the capital of Baku during a three-day protest rally following the elections, and yet opposition leaders could not spark a revolution. (19) It’s unlikely that revolution will hit the streets of Baku, unless and until the opposition can generate some serious anger over defeated expectations of democracy.  But in order to do that, there actually has to be an expectation that democracy can come to this country.  And in the current climate created by government control over the process and most of the media, there can be no such expectation.

GEORGIA