Atomic balm

The detention of former Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeni Adamov grows more and more interesting as it drags along.  Initially, it appeared as an extremely well timed extradition request by the United States, which complained to Swiss authorities that Adamov should face charges that he embezzled funds earmarked for securing nuclear facilities during his tenure (1998-2001) as Minister of Nuclear Energy.  The request (and Adamov's arrest in Bern) came just days before Condoleezza Rice was due in Moscow, intent on addressing issues of Russian nuclear safety and security of its nuclear materials.  Already, what might have been a simple corruption case had taken on ominously political overtones. 

Hard on the heels of the first stories came debate as to Adamov's worth to the United States:  Would he divulge Russia's nuclear secrets if he was extradited from Switzerland?  Clearly, there was some concern in Russia, as the state chose to file its own charges against Adamov to seek his extradition back to Russia, rather than the U.S.

The Adamov case provoked intriguing memories of the Borodin–Mabetex case from early 2001:  Pavel Borodin (the former Kremlin "Butler" or Property Manager) was detained in the U.S. while awaiting extradition to Switzerland to face money laundering charges.  Oddly enough, then-Secretary of the Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, was in Washington to meet with Condoleezza Rice, Bush's then-National Security Advisor, and raised the issue of Borodin with her.  (1)

The Borodin case, it may be recalled, was resolved when the Russian government paid a $3 million bond to Swiss authorities for the release of Putin's one-time boss (Putin's first Kremlin gig was in the Economic/Property Management office).  Borodin then was found not guilty by a Russian judicial body (of course, at that moment money laundering was not yet illegal in Russia).  The $3 million payment was viewed as a ransom, of sorts, to keep Borodin out of jail and away from interrogators.   Soon after, Borodin was named to his current post in the Russian-Belarus Union, a position that carries immunity.  (2)

As if anticipating the start of the haggling process over the price of freedom for Adamov, an unusual interview with Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, just days after Adamov's arrest in May 2005, began with questions about nuclear security and the safety of nuclear materials and proceeded directly to the question of the level of Adamov's knowledge of Russia's nuclear secrets:  "[A]s a minister, Solovtsov Adamov was privy to all classified information. (Š) In terms of Strategic Missile Forces secrets, Adamov is not a valuable asset." (3)

Adamov, who pleaded his case in the Russian media with an article in Izvestiya in August and a call to Echo Moskvy from his Swiss jail cell in September, claimed that the charges evolved more from his role in strengthening Russia's international position (along with Yevgeni Primakov – whom Adamov singled out for particular praise) than his role in diverting US assistance funds.  (4)  In his radio call, Adamov emphasized his work with Anatoli Chubais, his "partner" in ensuring "Russia's nuclear energy stability." (5)

Perhaps hedging his bet that his lauding of powerful officials would not be sufficient to save him from extradition, Adamov then played a desperate card: "If I spend at least [sic] a night in a US jail, there will be problems with state secrets." (6)

US indictments of Adamov, both from the US Federal Prosecutor's Office and the US Federal Grand Jury in Pittsburgh, PA claim that Adamov, while serving as Russia's Nuclear Minister, embezzled millions of dollars intended for nuclear safety and research programs.  According to the Federal Prosecutor's indictment, "Adamov fraudulently transferred to American firms under his control more than $15 millionŠ." (7) 

Earlier this month, Swiss authorities decided to extradite Adamov to the United States, with caveats about his repatriation to Russia, if found not guilty in US courts. (8)  The debate over Adamov's arrest and possible trial – including the question of what a Russian official with his level of security clearance was doing traveling abroad and just who permitted the misuse of funds earmarked for nuclear safety  – have reached a crescendo with the decision of the Swiss to extradite him. (9)

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov downgraded Adamov's worth to US authorities, claiming that Adamov had no access to state secrets after 2000.  (10)  The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, was pushed on the issue following his meeting with Condoleezza Rice, but denied that Adamov had been the subject of any discussions with the US Secretary of State.  (11)  Adamov, who ended his hunger strike upon hearing of the decision to extradite him (he had been protesting the delay in having his case resolved), must have been chagrined to realize that Russian authorities seemed unwilling to barter to keep him out of the hands of the American authorities.

But there is still hope for ex-Minister Adamov:  US (Pennsylvania) attorney Mary Beth Buchanan, whose office issued the indictment for the arrest of Adamov, is currently in Moscow with an entourage of FBI and tax authorities.  Details of the visit are being held close to the vest, but it seems a possible accommodation over Adamov's fate is very much in the cards. (12)

Source Notes:

1) See The Ballad of Borodin, The NIS Observed, Vol. VI, No. 7, 18 Apr 01.

2) See "What price freedom? $3million," The NIS Observed, Vol. VI, No. 5, 21 Mar 05.

3) Vremya novostey, 6 May 05; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging Markets.

4) Izvestiya, 16 Aug 05; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets.

5) Kommersant report of Ekho Moskvy interview, 7 Sep 05; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets.

6) Ibid.

Over the past year, the ³Beslan Mothers² committee asked repeatedly to meet with President Putin to ask pointed questions over the perceived lack of progress in investigating the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 1-3, 2004.  According to the Beslan Mothers committee, key regional leaders, as well as Federal Security Service and Internal Affairs leaders bear responsibility for the outcome of the terrorist act which resulted in 331 hostages killed, including 170 children. (1)  One year later, Putin agreed to meet with Beslan Mothers committee representatives at the Kremlin.  Following the September 2005 meeting, Putin agreed to send yet another group of investigators from the Prosecutor General¹s Office to Beslan to ³revitalize² the year-old investigation and use the findings to reform the police and security services.  The new investigation will be led by the Deputy General Prosecutor, Vladimir Kolesnikov. (2) 

Certainly a reform of the security services is in order, but Putin cannot expect to uncover new, revealing evidence to forward this cause by establishing another investigation a year after the tragedy.  Two parallel investigations were already underway:  Alexander Torshin is Chairman of the Duma¹s parliamentary commission investigating Beslan; and Stanislav Kesayev is chairman of a separate, ad hoc, North Ossetian commission.  Additionally, the local Beslan community, lacking confidence in the Russian authorities, set up their own, unofficial investigation.  So far, the investigations revealed more questions than answers and do not address the heart of the security problems – resulting in a loss of confidence in Russian security forces among populations throughout the Caucasus.

The contradictions among the various investigations and the lack of any conclusions have only added to the confusion.  Basic questions about the siege remain either disputed or unanswered, including the number of terrorists, how they arrived at the school, how the weapons were brought into the school, how and where fire was opened. (3)  For example, official Russian investigators insist there were only 32 terrorists (all of whom were killed except one, Kulayev, who is on trial), while various reports suggest there likely were more terrorists, some of whom got away. (4)  The North Ossetian investigator, Kesayev, was very critical of the uncoordinated actions of the various local and federal agencies.  He questioned the security coordination that enabled the terrorists to accomplish all their preparatory work, including driving across several heavily-guarded borders to find an obscure school next to a police station via a route with many dead-end roads, without being stopped or checked.  The authorities then failed to surround the school for three days.  Kesayev also faults the organization of the investigation, which allowed the school site to be bulldozed the day after the siege ended, and investigators who failed to confiscate weapons for ballistics tests, did not examine clothes terrorists had changed into, and conducted no post mortems. (5)  At this point, none of the investigations are likely to uncover the true cause of the security failure or pinpoint blame.  There are too many varying witness accounts, changed testimony, and lost evidence. 

The lack of control throughout the crisis is clear.  There was simply no one in charge.  General Andreev, head of the local Federal Security Forces (FSB) division, was officially appointed commander on the second day; however, it is clear that proper coordination between the FSB, the armed forces, and the Interior Ministry never occurred. (6)  Although Putin assigned the FBS as the lead to fight terrorism in the Caucasus, it appears each security apparatus is fighting its own, uncoordinated war. 

In August, the Defense Ministry reported on the results of a 3,000 troop sweep of Chechnya.  Maj-Gen Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the 42^nd Division, explained how they split the area into sectors, divided into subunits to control each sector, eliminated bandits and captured weapons.  However, it appears the only coordination that occurred with FSB officials, who are supposed to be leading the fight, was at the end of the sweep, when those captured by the armed forces were handed over to the FSB. (7) 

In a recent exercise, Russian Interior Minister Nurgaliyev praised the teamwork and the efficiency of Internal Troops and police subunits repelling a simulated rebel attack in the Chelyabinsk Region.  The exercise had many moving parts including amphibious troops, helicopters, a hovercraft, and various small arms, but no FSB. (8) 

While Russian forces have held occasional exercises to increase the level of coordination between the disparate security forces, they do not appear to have been effective.  Initial reports from the most recent militant attacks in the city of Nalchik in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, against multiple police, FSB, and Internal Affairs targets indicate another slow, uncoordinated response by Russia¹s military and security forces. (9)  It appears that Putin¹s curious decision, ten days after the Beslan crisis, to abolish direct gubernatorial elections allegedly to prevent the spread of terrorism was less than effective; the separatists¹ rebellions have spread to yet another republic.  The soldier fighting the war on the ground requires a clear chain of command from his supervisor all the way to the President.  The reform Putin needs is not another centralization of control, but an entire reorganization of all security functions in the military, FSB, and Interior Ministry.  The current structure looks surprisingly similar to the structures that existed during the cold war.   

Reforms themselves will not make the security forces more effective without addressing their loss of legitimacy as a result of pervasive corruption.  Russia¹s senior leaders recognize the need to fight corruption, but have not been effective in combating it.  President Putin gave Dmitri Kozak, the presidential envoy to the Southern federal district ³carte blanche to fight corruption in the security and law enforcement agencies² in the Caucasus. (10)  Additionally, Internal Affairs Minister, Nurgaliyev publicly criticized those responsible for corruption within the police forces.  He pointed to the lack of expertise among policeman and the tendency of staffers and servicemen to fraternize with criminals as particular contributors to corruption. (11)  Both Kozak and Nurgaliyev  themselves are alumni of the ³special services.²

In an annual corruption rating by Transparency International, Russia is tied in 76^th place out of 102 countries for its high rate of corruption. Police Major General Yuriy Kokov, First Deputy Chief of the RF MVD Department for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, who is considered one of the leading specialists in combating corruption in Russia, assessed the situation regarding official corruption in Russia. (12) Russian legislation lacks a concept of corruption which makes it difficult to prosecute. He criticized Russia¹s lack of statistical records on manifestations of corruption, hindering efforts to organize effective programs to counter it. He provided numerous examples to highlight how much corruption has permeated society, from regional officials accepting bribes to provide tax benefits for corporations, to doctors and medical facilities accepting bribes for treatment, to police routinely accepting bribes.  General Kokov recognizes that fighting corruption requires the broad support of the population and will take a complex solution, which would include effective law enforcement activities, increasing wages, and actively engaging public institutions and ordinary citizens. (13) 

General Kokov primarily addressed corruption by Russian government officials; much of the corruption in the Caucasus involves bribes and abductions, which permeate through the security personnel at the lowest levels.  It is highly unlikely the Beslan hostage takers were not confronted by police at various checkpoints.  In all likelihood, meagerly paid security forces accepted a ³standard toll² to enable their transit.  Regarding kidnappings, international human rights groups blame Russian federal troops and security forces for an estimated 1700 abductions throughout Chechnya (14). 

The continued dispute over the number of Beslan terrorists adds to the lack of credibility among Russia¹s security services.  Official Russian accounts continue to insist the number was 32, while local accounts insist there were far more. (15)  Russia¹s security forces need to address basic problems of corruption and loss of legitimacy before that can hope to become effective fighting separatists in the Caucasus or elsewhere. 

Aleksandr Torshin stated that the parliamentary commission investigation of Beslan is final, but the report will not be ready before the end of the year.  He freely admitted that after one year¹s work, there are now more questions than answers. (16)  The Beslan Mothers are asking Putin to find those responsible for the security failures and make them accountable for their actions and their failures.  It is clear that the security response (or lack thereof) and subsequent investigation into the Beslan tragedy was so poorly led and uncoordinated that no one knew what was going on or who was responsible.  An additional investigation, one year later, is unlikely to uncover new evidence to the contrary.   Perhaps Putin agreed to re-investigate this tragedy because he is bending to the new political pressures from the vocal Beslan Mothers Committee; perhaps he has a particular scapegoat in mind.  

Source Notes

1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 Sep 05 via World News Connection (WNC).

2) ³Putin Accepts Guilt for Beslan Tragedy² by Simon Saradzhyn, Moscow Times, 8 Sep 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.

3) ³Russia: Official, Local Versions of Beslan Siege Cause 'Open Tension,'² by Madina Sageyeva, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 Aug 05 via WNC.

4) "Gunmen Miscounted. North Ossetians Certain That There Were More Terrorists in School Than Investigators Claim," by Andrey Riskin, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1105 via WNC

5) ³Stanislav Kesayev:  Khodov was an Agent of Four Special Services² by Timofey Borisov, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12 Sep 05; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets. 

6) ³There were Actions that Resembled Storming the School,² by Pavel Pushkin, Kommersant-Vlast, 29 Aug 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 

7) ³Russian Division Deploys 3,000 Regular Troops in Chechnya Sweeps², Itar-Tass, 12 Aug 05, via WNC

. 

8) ³Interior Minister Praises Southern Russian Anti-Terror Exercise,² Itar-Tass, 5 Oct 05 via WNC. 

9) ³Nalchik Under Attack: Moscow Unable To Respond,² Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 Oct 05, Vol 2, Issue 191.  

10) ³Further Reforms to Security and Law Enforcement Agencies,² by Marina Saidukova, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Jul 05 via Lexis Nexis.

11) ³Criticism With Unchanged Content,² Gazeta.ru, 13 Sep 04 via WNC.

12) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 21 Aug 05 via WNC. 

13) Ibid. 

14) ³Putin Hints He May Stay in Politics,² by Oksana Yablokova and Francesca Mereu, Moscow Times, 28 Sep 05 via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL) #9256.

15)  ³Russia: Official, Local Versions of Beslan Siege Cause 'Open Tension,'² by Madina Sageyeva, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 Aug 05 via WNC.

16)  ³Parliamentary Report on Beslan Now In Doubt,² Izvestiya, 8 Sep 05 via WNC. 

Bilateral matters

LITHUANIA

Russia¹s relations with Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors took a turn for the worse when a Russian fighter pilot recently ejected recently from his SU-27 fighter jet before crashing into an empty field. Other contentious issues were sidled as Lithuania undertook an investigation into the crash. With the investigation now complete, and theories that the incident was a fumbled intelligence mission or a test of NATO¹s air defenses put to rest, the Russian pilot has been repatriated. (NATO forces did not become engaged.) It remains unclear why his plane was fully equipped for combat.

An uncooperative Russia withheld information that the Lithuanians deemed critical to the crash investigation. Lithuania ³followed the letter of international law, treated the Russian pilot with full courtesies, and allowed a Russian team of officers to witness all phases of the investigation.² (1)  (NATO treated the investigation as a bilateral matter between Lithuania and Russia and distanced itself from the incident.) Although the crash has highlighted possible Russian threats to Baltic security, it seems unlikely to add momentum to Lithuania¹s effort in the European Union to raise the issue of demilitarization of the Kaliningrad region.

IRAN

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov again has denied a recent British news report which alleged that former members of the Russian military had helped Iran secretly to obtain technology needed to make missiles capable of hitting European capitals.

The British news report stated that the Russians were intermediaries in a multi-million dollar deal negotiated between Iran and North Korea in 2003, enabling Tehran to receive regular clandestine shipments of top-secret missile technology. (2)

The British news report was published following a visit to Russia by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Calling the report ³delirium² and ³nonsense,² and indirectly addressing Washington¹s concerns, Ivanov responded by stating that ³Russia is a responsible partner and is interested in the strict observance of all nonproliferation regimes.² (3) Ivanov went so far as to accuse Britain indirectly of involvement of proliferation, recalling a European international consortium that developed a few years ago and included British companies. According to Ivanov, the consortium delivered a uranium centrifuge to Pakistan, which later surfaced in Iran. (4)

THE US

Despite diplomatic remarks by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov¹s, following recent talks in Moscow with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the visit was not without tension and disagreement. The two clashed over Iran¹s nuclear program and exchanged views on Central Asia following Rice¹s trip to the region, which noticeably excluded a stop in Uzbekistan. Lavrov reiterated that Iran should not pursue nuclear proliferation, a view held in common with the US, but he disagreed with Rice¹s stance that Iran cannot be trusted with uranium enrichment. Rice¹s response countered the notion that Iran has a ³right² to enrich uranium: ³It is not a question of rightsŠthe NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] doesn¹t come only with rights but also with obligations.² (5) This disagreement over Iran¹s nuclear program is not a new issue in US-Russian relations, however the rift between the two countries was clearly evident following Rice¹s unexpected visit.

During the talks, Rice reaffirmed that Washington would not install any new military bases in Central Asia and that, as the threat from Afghanistan diminishes, the US presence will also diminish, although no time frame has been set for troop departures. Following her visit to Central Asia and her talks with Lavrov, Rice met briefly with President Putin, who congratulated her on the results of her trip. (6)  However, Putin¹s remarks highlighted another area of discord between Russia and the United States: the contest for influence in Central Asia.

Seizing a possible opportunity in Central Asia, Lavrov and other Russian officials have criticized US and EU sanctions against Uzbekistan, calling for ³dialogue instead of sanctions.² The latter were intended to punish Uzbekistan¹s leadership for backsliding on democratic reform, its ruthless handling of the May riots in Andijan, and the eviction of American troops from the Karshi-Khanabad base. This rift between the West and Uzbekistan has given Moscow an edge in pursuing stronger relations with Tashkent. Russian-Uzbek joint military exercises in September and Uzbek President Karimov¹s invitation to Putin to upgrade their relationship from the level of strategic partnership to that of ³full-blown alliance² seem to indicate this increasing closeness. (7) Recent statements by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) also emphasize Moscow¹s reassertion in the region, while denying that a Central Asian army group, supported by Russia, would be created in the near future so as to defend CSTO members from all sides. (8)

The geopolitical struggle in the region between Russia and the US is often downplayed by Washington, but Moscow¹s decision to engage fully in the region – politically, strategically, militarily – is clear.

RUSSIA AND THE WTO

As the end of 2005 approaches, Russia¹s rush to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems to have slowed; it may join in 2006 or 2007 instead. Government officials now believe that timing is less important than the conditions under which Russia will enter, and with oil prices high, Russia can take its time and push for more favorable conditions. (9) Since 1993, Russia has been in the process of negotiating with the fifty countries that must approve its entrance into the WTO; Russia will engage in talks with ten of those countries throughout the next six weeks. The US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland appear to be the countries least favoring Russia¹s request. Disagreements over tariffs, Russia¹s exclusion of foreign banks, intellectual property rights, and agricultural matters remain most contentious.

Source Notes

The Public Chamber and the media

President Vladimir Putin submitted a amendment to the State Duma on 13 October to the law ³On the Public Chamber.² Putin wants to broaden the functions of the newly created Public Chamber to included oversight of the mass media. The Public Chamber¹s duties and privileges also would include the convening of citizens, mass media representatives and public organizations to discuss the issue of freedom of speech, the protection of citizens¹ access to legally available information, defense of freedom of speech by the media, and the drafting of recommendations or conclusions about issues related to free speech. These conclusions could be submitted to state organs or media outlets, depending on the circumstances. As usual, any action taken by the Public Chamber would remain purely advisory. An additional function of the Chamber would be to ensure that the media are not granting privileged access to one political party (e.g. United Russia, the dominant party in the State Duma) over another.

In accordance with the law that established the Public Chamber, Putin has selected the first third of the Chamber¹s 126 members. These 42 persons are supposed to choose the next 42 members from among nation-wide civic organizations. Finally, the remaining one third would be selected by the previously selected two thirds from among regional civic organizations. Although the Public Chamber ostensibly represents the active involvement of the Russian public, in overseeing the state, the members of the Chamber who have been selected by Putin are having trouble overseeing even the selection of the next 42 members of the Public Chamber. Instead, that job is reportedly being carried out by Mikhail Ostrovsky, deputy chief of the President¹s domestic policy directorate. (1)

The President¹s appointees to the Public Chamber represent a broad array of professions, including medicine, journalism and athletics. However, none of the members are from human rights organizations, the segment of civic groups most likely to criticize the present administration. The pro-Kremlin composition of the Chamber and the executive¹s unwillingness to relinquish responsibility for member selection suggest that the Chamber will struggle for any real influence on state policy.

Moscow¹s elections and liberal political parties

The democratic parties Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko have decided to put aside their differences long enough to contest Moscow¹s November elections on the same ticket. The two parties face a crisis of legitimacy because of the recently raised threshold for participation in the State Duma; 7 percent of the vote rather than the former 5 percent requirement. The elimination of single mandate seats, which had previously comprised half of the seats in the Duma and represented the best chance for small parties to gain a place in the legislature, also complicates the task of such parties attempting to play a role in the government. The SPS-Yabloko joint ticket will face a formidable opponent in United Russia, whose list of contenders will be headed by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The success or failure of the SPS-Yabloko venture could well determine whether either party contests the next Duma elections.

Foreign media licensing

The task of licensing foreign publications has been transferred from the Press Ministry to the Federal Service for Preservation of Cultural Values. This shift in responsibilities was announced not long after ABC aired an interview by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky with Shamil Basayev, the notorious Chechen separatist. Foreign print licenses have not been issued since January, when the Press Ministry was dismantled. Deputy Head of the Federal Service for Preservation of Cultural Values Viktor Goreglyad has stated that licensure is not meant as a means of censorship. (2) However, the announcement¹s proximity to the ABC scandal gives rise to fears that it may be employed for exactly those purposes. Publications currently awaiting licensure include Ukrainian, British and American periodicals.

Growing xenophobia

The immigration of citizens from former Soviet republics to Russia on a seasonal or permanent basis in order to find work and better economic opportunities has led in some regions to heightened nationalism and aggression against ethnic minorities or members of other races.  For instance, the recent murder of a Peruvian student in Voronezh Oblast on 9 October has raised concerns about the increase of xenophobia in Russia. The murder occurred in a city park, with police nearby, although they were not patrolling the area. One suspect has been detained by local authorities. Officials consider the murder to be ethnically motivated. Local groups, including human rights organizations and other civic groups, have asked Governor Vladimir Kulakov to establish an independent council to address the issue of xenophobia. The proposed council would involve government representatives as well as human rights activists. (3)

Another example of aggression against ethnic minorities involves the Batumi Kurds (Kurmanch), Khemshil, and Yezids of Krasnodar Krai in the region of Kuban. The Batumi Kurds were deported by Stalin to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944. They moved to the Kuban region (located in Krasnodar Krai) in the 1980s along with the Khemshil Meskhetian Turks. These ethnic minorities have appealed to the United States for refugee status on the basis of ³repeated racist statements made by the governor of Krasnodar Krai² (Aleksandr Tkachev) and ³endless degradations and acts of repression by the authorities and militarized structures.² (4) 

The ethnic minorities seeking refugee status comprise approximately 2500 persons. Although more than 80 percent of the Batumi Kurds have received citizenship and registration, it has not prevented abuse by local authorities. The Batumi Kurds submitted their request to the US ambassador a year ago. They were informed initially that their plea was not being considered. However, State Department officials have met recently with human rights organizations that are working on the issue.

Source Notes

1) ³Russian paper reveals confusion in newly-formed Public Chamber,² Kommersant, 11 Oct 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.

2) ³Licensing of foreign print media to resume,² Gazeta, 12 Aug 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.
3) ³Voronezh NGOs call for council to fight xenophobia after student's murder,² Itar-Tass, 10 Oct 05 via World News Connection (WNC).  4) ³Ethnic minorities in Krasnodar Krai appeal for US refugee status,² Izvestiya, 14 Oct 05 via WNC.

By Robyn Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)

~~~~~

ARMED FORCES (INTERNAL)

Russian missile strategy

Russia appears committed to the effort of reestablishing strategic nuclear parity with the United States. Russian military exercises and testing increased significantly in recent months with particular emphasis on long range missiles.  In late September, Russia held a large-scale exercise of its Strategic Missile Troops, demonstrating the ability to secure its weapons from terrorists while also projecting the capability of the Topol missile to defeat missile defense systems. (1)  Also in September, Russia demonstrated a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the R-30 ³Bulava² which includes features designed to defeat emerging ballistic missile defense systems. (2)  Moreover, Russian strategic forces conducted several other launches of older missiles as part of training and maintenance of the ICBM force as well as a new nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile. (3)   

Recent strategic missile activity is consistent with Russia¹s continued reliance on strategic forces as a hedge against attack or coercion while continuing to modernize its conventional forces. (4)  The publicity surrounding the recent upswing in activity also points to Russia¹s desire to be a player on the world stage.  Russia¹s conventional force capability is significantly less than the juggernaut status of the old Soviet Union; however, it is clear that the Russian political and military leadership continues to view Russia¹s tremendous nuclear capability as vital to national prestige as well as a counter to Western influence.  Any hint of the previous debate between Kvashnin and Dvorkin over decoupling nuclear force levels from the US is gone, and Russia is committed to nuclear parity. (5)

Russia and the United States

Russia¹s long-term nuclear strategy is focused primarily on the United States. (Unquestionably, there is a short-term priority on securing the ³Near-Abroad² through diplomatic, economic, and military means.) Russia considers the U.S. as the primary opponent. (6) The concept of the ³main adversary² dates back to the Soviet period, and is focused on whatever power has the capability on inflicting decisive damage, irrespective of intent and verbal statements. The fact that the United States currently enjoys an overwhelming advantage in non-nuclear forces contributes to the Russian view that the United States is that main adversary. This approach feeds on U.S. discussions of preemptive nuclear strikes against suspected WMD states, continued exploration of the expanded use of nuclear weapons for missions such as ³bunker busting² and the development of ballistic missile defense. The U.S.-initiated NATO attack on Serbia, and its support of regime change in Ukraine and Georgia have served to reinforce such views, held particularly by the Russian military and security services. (7)

The US pursuit of missile defense appears to have a significant effect on Russian nuclear forces.   Russian response to termination of the ABM treaty was to back away from the START II agreement on force structure. (8)  This maneuver allowed Russia not only to avoid the cost of dismantling its heavy missile force, but also provided greater flexibility in trying to defeat a hypothetical US missile defense through the retention of rockets with multiple warheads.  A specific goal of Russian missile modernization is to ensure, if possible, that future ballistic missiles can defeat missile defense.  Russian officials have consistently asserted that its new strategic missiles, such as the Topol-M, have the ability to defeat missile defenses well into the future. (9)

The news is not all confrontational, and there has been some significant cooperation between the US and Russia on nuclear threat reduction.  The cooperative efforts between the US, Russia, and other actors such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have had an impact on the reduction of weapon grade materials and on ways toward a putatively peaceful resolution to a nuclear related crisis.  In fact, these were the considerations that led to the IAEA receiving the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize. (11)  A joint US-Russian press release hailed the midpoint of a program to convert excess Russian weapons grade uranium into material for civilian nuclear power plants.  This program has converted some 250 tons (the equivalent of 10,000 nuclear warheads) to peaceful use. (12) US-and Russian cooperation efforts include the recovery of nuclear materials from post-Soviet Republics and former client states such as Czechoslovakia (13).

Russia, Europe, and Asia

No other nuclear power seems to concern Russia as much as the US. There appears to be decreasing nuclear tension between Russia and Europe. (10) Russia and China have increased cooperation to balance perceived US hegemony, particularly in Asia.  The expansive Peace 2005 military exercise and resolution of border issues also suggest an decreased level of distrust between China and Russia. 

US and Russian cooperation on nuclear counter-proliferation and threat reduction bears close scrutiny in the future.  While programs to secure Russian nuclear materials have undoubtedly made progress to date, but increasingly are stymied by the Russian refusal to provide access.  Russian military officials claim their nuclear assets are safe and do not need to provide the additional access requested by US inspectors. (14)  In addition, Russian suspicion of US motives is voiced repeatedly, and key Russian officials claim the US is intentional trying to edge Russia out of the global nuclear energy market by supposedly exaggerating the vulnerability of security measures and opposing the transfer of Russian nuclear know-how and material to Iran and North Korea. (15)  The recent extradition of the former Russian Atomic Energy Minister from Switzerland to the US to investigate proliferation charges is cited in this context. (16)  One area of particular concern is the security and use of tactical nuclear weapons – largely neglected in negotiations to date, but representing a tempting target for terrorists. (17)

The way ahead

Nuclear superpower status is a centerpiece of Russia¹s strategy in Asia, Europe, and the global stage.  The maintenance and modernization of its strategic missile force also allows Russia to balance US, European, and Chinese pressure as it transforms its conventional forces and seeks to reestablish its influence in Central Asia.

The Maintenance and aging of the Russian strategic missile force may become an area of increasing concern. Validating and characterizing the operation of aging missile systems are primary reasons for the increase in strategic missile testing.  Many of these systems are beyond their initial warranties, and it is likely that some of the test failures are due to the age and poor maintenance of the systems.  Hence, the sheer number of Russian nuclear missiles will provide significant deterrence; however, the aging inventory also presents a substantial risk in terms of safety, security, reliability, and cost.   In addition, Russian command and control and early warning systems will need to be maintained and improved in order to safeguard operation of the strategic missile forces.

Continued cooperation on threat reduction and counter-proliferation will be an area of concern on the road ahead.

Source Notes

1) ³Russian Topol strategic missile's invulnerability demonstrated,² Strana.Ru website, Moscow, 27 Sep 05, BBC World Wide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.

2) ³Nuclear Dilemmas Reveal Fragility of Russian Military System², Pavel K. Baev, Eurasian Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, vol 2, no. 188, 11 Oct 05.

3) Ibid; ³Strategic Missile Carriers Rearmed,² Dmitri Litovkin, Izvestia, 5 Oct 05, WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis.

4) Miller, Steven and Trenin, Dmitri, The Russian Military: Power and Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004, pp 188-190.

Tragedy in Southern Russia

Last week¹s attack in Nalchik highlighted the spreading unrest in the Caucasus region.  The attack on local, regional and federal structures was similar in many ways to the July 2004 attack in Nazran, Ingushetia, by forces led by Shamil Basayev and Doku Umarov.  Nalchik also opened the still-sensitive wounds of the September 2004 debacle in Beslan.

According to Kabardino-Balkarian presidential Chief of Staff Oleg Shandirov, ³several hundred² militants were involved in the attack of the republic¹s capital city. (1)  The statistics vary with the sources.  When the fighting stopped, 61 militants were killed, according to official sources while 17 were captured. (2)  In all, 24 troops and 12 civilians were killed, and 100 individuals were wounded, including 51 law-enforcement officers, eight seriously.  3)  A rapid-deployment police task force has since been established in the region. (4)

Even before Nalchik, commemoration of the first anniversary of the deaths of 331 schoolchildren and adults in Beslan, the result of hostage-taking by armed guerillas and the federal authorities¹ response, had already served as a focal point for analysts.  In that instance, many of those affected directly by the Beslan tragedy charge that the investigation has been (at best) misguided or (at worst) obstructionist. (5)  The Beslan Mothers, those whose children were killed, converged on Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir Kolesnikov when he went to the site of the school, seeking answers to questions about the investigation into the assault on the school; they received only the mildest of reassurances that he cared more for them than for the ³bureaucrats.² (6)

Chechen and Russian authorities continue to claim, with little evidence, that the situation on the ground is improving and that Chechen ³rebels² are being soundly defeated. (7)  The deteriorating situation cannot be blamed exclusively on those seeking independence.  Aside from incursions and attacks against government agencies, the region is beset by an increasing number of kidnappings. (8)  Many of these may be orchestrated by federal forces.  Amnesty International reported recently that there ³is no end to gross human rights violations in Chechnya and Ingushetia with the Russian authorities implicated in the torture, abduction and secret detention of civilians.² (9)

Although Russian-supported officials have denied Amnesty¹s charges, during a television show broadcast towards the end of last month Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted that the kidnappings in Chechnya, which he linked to unresolved ³security questions,² could be the work of pro-Moscow forces.  ³It is impossible to say who stands behind these crimes: disguised bandits or law enforcement workers abusing their power.² (10)

Timing may have led to the relative speed with which the Nalchik incursion was suppressed.  Just one week before the attack, the North Caucasian Military District finished 10 days of exercises meant to improve mobilization of troops and weapons training. (11)  The exercise was just one example of a concerted effort by the military district to be prepared for crisis: while over 4,000 troops underwent the September training, another 2,200 reservists were assigned to participate in maneuvers held by the 58^th combined Arms Army in the region this month. (12)

There is certainly cause for increased training.  In 2005 there has been a reported total of 28 terrorist attacks and over 90 attacks on law enforcement officers in Dagestan, primarily in Makhachkala, according to Dagestani Internal Affairs Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov.  He added that OMON training of local officers had contributed greatly to the increased success rate of investigations and prosecutions.  ³A total of 23 terrorist acts have been cleared up, and two cases have been sent to court. Š. The identities of over 130 active members of bandit groups have been established; 55 of them have been arrested and convicted as a result of special operations; 34 have been eliminated when presenting armed resistance. Š All the arrested members of terrorist-sabotage groups are currently confessing.² (13)

Yet, there is also cause to wonder how good those confessions are.  Case in point: One week before the attack in Nalchik, two suspected religious extremists were arrested, accused of planning what officials termed a ³terrorist act² at Nalchik Airport. (14)  So, perhaps officials might have guessed that more than those two individuals were plotting something?  Yet within a few hours on the morning of 13 October, heavy damage reportedly was inflicted on several district police stations as well as Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service buildings. (15)  Other sites included the border guards headquarters and Š the airport. (16) 

This approach may create bigger problems in the long run.  At issue, according to Shamyl Beno of the Russian Islamic Heritage movement and former member of two Chechen governments, is the Russian center¹s inability or unwillingness to take into account the distinct nature of the peoples of the Caucasus.   ³What can be done to ensure that Chechens do not want to blow up Moscow in 20 years¹ time? Š In the Caucasus, people are accustomed to living independentlyŠ. The social aspirations of Chechens are simple: to have a home, a normal family, a car, the possibility to watch your children get married and to show society as a whole that every one of them has made it.  And all that is required of the regional authorities is not to get in the way of all this.² (17)

Alas, it looks like Russian authorities have every intention of getting in the way: An additional 800 million rubles (over US$28 million) had been earmarked for infrastructure work in the North Caucasus Military District, including housing for two mountain rifle brigades in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessiya. (18)

GEORGIA

Paying attention to the man behind the curtain

Following the ill-advised celebration of independence day in (the unrecognized republic of) South Ossetia, a reported shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops (asserted by South Ossetian and Russian officials, and denied by Tbilisi), (19) and subsequent reports of shelling of Georgian villages from South Ossetia, the Georgian parliament issued two diplomatic shots across the bow:  a demand for the removal of Russian troops, based on allegations that the Russian ³peacekeepers² are turning a blind eye to violations of agreements, and the demand for a substantial change in the format of negotiations between Georgia and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (20)

According to Georgian State Minister for Separatist Conflicts Giorgi Khaindrava, Tbilisi continues to seek a peaceful settlement to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but is reacting to a perceived ratcheting up of the situation by others, particularly Russia, which has troops on the ground purportedly for peacekeeping purposes.  The military parade in Tskhinvali included the display of military hardware, specifically, tanks, Khaindrava said.  That hardware, he added, ³is new, and South Ossetia had no other way of acquiring it except from Russia through the Roksky tunnel.²  In addition, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been holding military exercises. (21)

³We do not understand why Russia is openly supporting and giving armaments to separatist authorities,² Khaindrava said. (22)

Certainly, the suggestion that Russia remove its ³peacekeepers² managed to roil the waters, not calm them.  Sergei Shamba, the foreign minister of Abkhazia, responded that demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces would result in a return to hostilities. (23)

Assuring all the players that Georgia does not want a resumption of hostilities, Khaindrava subsequently made a second demand.  ³Negotiations cannot go on in their current format, with representatives of Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, Vladikavkaz and Moscow.  The format should be changed. Š Russia and Georgia should settle problems in the conflict zone with the assistance of the OSCE,² he said. (24)

According to Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Loshchinin, any attempts to change the current negotiating process, which is being handled by a Joint Control Commission consisting of representatives of Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (i.e., with Georgia outnumbered 3:1), ³are counterproductive.² (25)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov asserted that Georgia does not get to make a unilateral decision of this sort.  The peacekeepers, Ivanov said, ³are in the conflict zone under the mandate which has been given to them by the two conflicting sides.  Abkhazia and Georgia, as well as South Ossetia and Georgia, should decide whether Russian peacekeepers should be there,² he said. (26)

The new Georgian ambassador to the Russian Federation, Irakli Chubinishvili, was not quite as belligerent about Russia¹s actions, or inactions, as Khaindrava, but nonetheless remained firm about Georgia¹s expectations.  ³If Moscow is to be the mediator in this process, it should act more decisively instead of being so passive. Š If [the peacekeepers¹] work is unsatisfactory, there is no point in keeping them there.  The problem now is that Russian military officials Š did allow the heavy equipment of the South Ossetian army to join the parade.  A special agreement signed by Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia, however, stipulates that no tanks, armored personnel carriers, or heavy weapons will be allowed within the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone.  This is something the peacekeeping forces should be enforcing.² (27)

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili was quick to point out that this discussion does not negate other, more positive, negotiations between Georgia and Russia.  To be sure, some discussions are successful: Russia agreed in September to a ³full-scale withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia² beginning in 2006, a member of the Russian delegation said. (28) While not recognizing the authority of Russian officials placed in leading positions in the breakaway republics, Georgia is committed to maintaining relations with its significantly larger and more powerful neighbor, he said.  ³A dialogue with Russia is a rather thorny process.² (29)

Russian-Georgian relations are likely to get thornier:  a report out of Abkhazia on the establishment of an ethnic Georgian battalion in Abkhazia¹s Gali District includes the allegations of an interesting mix of carrot and stick recruitment policies:  Georgians are promised favorable conditions for family business endeavors, with the implied unfavorable conditions for those who refuse.  The price of signing up: renunciation of Georgian citizenship. (30)

Meanwhile, Tbilisi has had to contend with rumblings from other ethnic minorities.  Visiting Azeri official Nazim Ibrahimov, who led a delegation to Georgia to investigate the situation of ethnic Azeris living in Georgia, said ³The state committee had earlier conducted research and held meetings with our compatriots living in Georgia and familiarized itself with their problems. Having met them again and learnt their problems, we realized how serious the issue was.² (31)  Ibrahimov added that he saw a need ³to bring these problems to the attention of the Azerbaijani public and to raise the alarm.²

While Ibrahimov did not elaborate further, Georgian officials are getting clearer signals from a representative of the Armenian population in the Georgian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, who has complained of Georgians moving into the area in what he described as a ³large-scale attack against Javakhk.  David Rstakyan, chairman of the Virk organization, said the Georgian Armenians will work towards autonomy within the confines of the Georgian constitution; however, if those attempts fail, they will fall into actions of civil disobedience and form local authorities. (32)  While Rstakyan was quick to differentiate between the goals of the Javakhetians and the breakaway actions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, he noted that they are ³inspired² by the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh independent exclave in Azerbaijan.

AZERBAIJAN/ARMENIA

Nagorno-Karabakh Update

While Nagorno-Karabakh may serve as inspiration for the Javakhetians to seek autonomy in Georgia, the exclave is serving as inspiration for an arms race between Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Azerbaijan announced recently a plan to increase its defense budget to the equivalent of $600 million in 2006. (33)

 ³Azerbaijan seeks to resolve the Karabakh problem peacefully, but the talks yield no results. Š Under these conditions, the buildup of a strong military potential is an important factor² that ³will be continued in future and will help to liberate the occupied territories,² President Ilkham Aliev said. (34)

Armenia responded in kind, raising its defense allocation to $155 million in 2006, due to what it terms ³the militarist rhetoric of Baku.²  ³We view the enlargement of defense expenditure in the context of reality and do not forget that Azerbaijan is planning to enlarge its defense budget to $600 million next year,² said Mger Shakhgeldian, chairman of the Armenian parliament¹s defense and national security committee.  However, he added, ³It is our unambiguous opinion that international organizations should pay more attention to Azerbaijan increasing its military budget, and that an arms race is not the path that the region needs.² (35)

Nonetheless, according to Armenian Deputy Defense Minister Artur Agabekyan, some of the increased defense spending will focus on 10 fighter jets, reportedly Russian SU-27 and SU-25 jets, as well as some MI-24 helicopter gunships. (36)

Source Notes

1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC.

2) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 Sep 05; FBIS translated text via WNC.

3) Izvestiya, 7 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC.

4) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 5 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC.