In successive addresses before the State Duma and a series
of follow-up interviews, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Federal Security
Service Director Nikolai Patrushev addressed the issue of increasing
anti-Moscow sentiment in the former Soviet states. Lavrov suggested in an interview with Izvestiya that the power of Russia, ³which is growing day by
day,² is a factor in rising tensions between Russia and the near abroad. Simply put, ³the strong are not
Given that logic, one might assume that Russia¹s ³growing²
power will result in further unpopularity among those whose undemocratic
governments are among Russia¹s most trusted allies. Indeed, Lavrov noted to the State Duma that ³we are not
concerned about people¹s strivings for democracy.² (2) How reassuring.
Regardless, Patrushev seems concerned enough for both of
This anti-Moscow sentiment is the product of a vast
international conspiracy, Patrushev contends, as ³our opponents are trying to
weaken Russia¹s influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the
international sphere as a whole.
Recent events in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine unambiguously confirm
The time for nuanced diplomacy is over. The FSB Director means business.
He even provided details of the supposed conspiracy,
³foreign intelligence agencies are ever more actively using non-traditional
methods² including the use of ³various non-governmental organizations² as cover
to spy on Russia, incite political upheaval and bankroll revolutionary
movements in the former Soviet sphere. (4) He claimed that ³several acts of espionage by secret
services of the U.S., U.K., Kuwait and Saudi Arabia² had been thwarted,
emphasizing that ³non-governmental organizations operating in Russia carried out these acts.² (5)
While Patrushev offered no specific ³acts of espionage,²
several groups - the U.S. Peace Corps; Merlin; the Saudi Red Crescent Society
and the Society of Social Reforms; and the Society of Islamic Revival, both of
Kuwait - were accused of fronting for "spies."
The accused tended to disagree. Merlin, a U.K. organization, provides ³healthcare and social
services to former prisoners and other patients suffering from tuberculosis in
the city of Dzerzhinsk² [Russia], according to their website (6) and their
spokeswoman in London. (7) The Arab groups have stressed that they were
providing humanitarian assistance to Chechen refugees in Ingushetia. (8)
Accusations levied by Russia against the Peace Corps are
nothing new. However, it is
puzzling that the Peace Corps should be accused of being an NGO acting as a
front for U.S. spies in Russia, when the Peace Corps is neither an NGO nor
operating in Russia. Patrushev himself bragged in 2002 about denying visa
extensions to 30 volunteers he suggested were spying, which soon led the U.S.
headquarters to terminate the program in Russia. Throughout the ordeal, the
organization continued to emphasize that it was entirely non-political, a
statement reiterated by the U.S. Embassy. (9)
Patrushev specifically targeted the International Republican
Institute (IRI), which he said has committed $5 million in U.S. government
money to its Belarussian democracy program. IRI, whose chairman is Arizona Senator John McCain, is old
news in Belarus, where President Lukashenko expelled it as well as other
similar groups from the country. (10)
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan felt the need to
evade a confrontation with the Russian FSB; when asked to respond to
Patrushev¹s allegations, he responded, ³I have not seen those comments, and I
have no idea what he is referring to.² (11)
The White House certainly was not disguising its opinion of
Lukashenko¹s regime when it dubbed Belarus ³the last dictatorship in Europe²
and called for ³a change.² Nor was
it shying away from the issue when it signed the Belarus Democracy Act on 20
October 2004, which the White House said ³demonstrates America¹s deep concern
over events in Belarus and a commitment to sustain² with about $30 million the
various media, electoral and civil society programs for democracy promotion
over the next five years. This
year¹s contribution to the program was rolled into an ³emergency appropriation²
bill for the War on Terror.
Concluding his remarks on this topic, Patrushev asked the
Duma to tighten the rules governing NGOs, saying that current laws are
insufficient to stem the tide of foreign NGO activity that ³damages the
security of our country.² (12)
Patrushev¹s accusations concerning foreign funding for CIS
democracy activities are not news, but he failed to substantiate allegations of
If nothing else, Patrushev seems to have overestimated the
West¹s concern regarding domestic events in the CIS. Following the street fighting in Andizhan, Uzbekistan last
week, for example, the U.S. Administration showed its lackluster commitment to
those former Soviet subjects clamoring for change when it refused to condemn
explicitly the Uzbek government for firing on unarmed civilians.
A government run by former state security agents can be
expected to be paranoid concerning foreign powers that support insurrection in
the post-Soviet space. However
inaccurate, redundant or embellished Patrushev¹s comments were, their timing is
significant. Rather than ruin the
relationship between Presidents Putin and Bush, the Kremlin may have sent
Patrushev to express, in a roundabout way, its dissatisfaction with U.S. actions. President Bush's visits to Riga and Tiblisi
on either side of his WWII victory anniversary visit to Moscow were not well
received in the Kremlin. By
accusing Americans of campaigning to undermine Russia¹s influence in Belarus,
Moscow is highlighting the obvious: Belarus is not Kyrgyzstan and the Kremlin
will work far harder to protect Lukashenko than it did Akayev.
Finally, Moscow may be concerned that the U.S. and E.U. may
not be indifferent to a putative
Putin successor one day being handed power in another opaque Kremlin maneuver.
Thus, the coming Belarussian "elections" may be viewed as a kind of
proxy for that eventuality.
If a Russian government peppered with spies can be of some
use to the U.S. in its war against terrorism, it is far less likely that
affronts to democracy would provoke a dedicated response from the White House.
Washington is a one-issue town, and the siloviki may assume that they can get away with almost anything as long as they
are considered part of the solution to that one issue. Uzbekistan's Karimov apparently bore
this in mind.
(5) Timur Prokopenko, Alexander Shashkov, TASS 12 May 05 via
By Maolmordha McGowan
A month in review
Feisty neighbors, an ³attack² on Russian history, border
treaties, meetings with foreign leaders, summits and a Victory Day celebration
have been the fuel firing Russian foreign relations throughout the month of
May. The bitter dispute with the Baltic states and the ongoing confusion over
Russia¹s stance on a nuclear Iran remain contentious issues. The events of May
clearly evidence Russia¹s desire to thrust itself into the world arena in a
dramatic attempt to demonstrate its self-perceived strength, which Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov said is ³growing day by day.² (1)
The month began with the Victory Day celebration attended by
numerous foreign leaders and dignitaries; President Putin expressed his
gratitude to many of the attendees the following day at the Russia-EU summit,
emphasizing their ³unification in the face of a global threat² and the
difficult decision-making necessary ³to achieve such sensitive goals as
reconciliation and restoration of normal human relations among the peoples and
states the Second World War rolled through.² (2) The Russia-E.U. summit, also
held in Moscow, did not produce anything unanticipated. It reviewed cooperation
mechanisms between the E.U. and Russia and reaffirmed the road maps on the
creation of ³four common spaces² that were previously agreed to: economics;
freedom, security and justice; external security; and research, education and
Russia¹s dispute with the Baltic states – Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania – resurfaced with international attention to the
Victory Day celebration and the Russia-E.U. summit. The Baltic states asserted
that the ³reconciliation and restoration of normal human relations,² which
Putin praised, did not reflect Russian-Baltic relations. They chose instead to
highlight a recent United States Senate resolution that notes that the Soviet
Union¹s incorporation of the Baltic states was ³an act of aggression carried
out against the will of sovereign nations² and that it ³brought boundless
suffering to the Baltic people through terror, killings and deportations to
Siberia.² (4) Putin stated that he is willing to sign border agreements with
Latvia and Estonia if they give up their ³ridiculous territorial demands² (5)
and contention that ³the Soviet Union could not occupy them [the Baltics] in
1941 because they were part of it.² (6) Putin has refused to apologize for the
occupation and claims that denunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by the
Soviet Union in 1989 was the last word on the issue.
Some have charged that this dispute challenges Russia¹s role
in history. One Russian historian commented that ³the Baltic states¹ demand for
recognition of their occupation by Soviet troops is partly attributable to the
inferiority complex of small countries seeking recognition.² (7) Aleksandr
Yakovenko, spokesman for Russia¹s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called it an
attempt to rewrite history. (8) During a press conference, Putin likened the
disputed occupation to slave labor in America, calling it ³a collusion in which
small states and small people become small change.² (9) Though the repudiation
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by the Soviet Union in the 1980s gave some
acknowledgement to the Baltics, it would go Russia no harm to repudiate the
pact once again, this time in its new identity as the Russian Federation, in an
effort to quell the dispute and provide a basis for improved relations. Russia
did sign a border treaty with Estonia on 19 May, after receiving Estonia¹s
assurances that the treaty is final and there would be no future territorial
claims on Russia. A similar border agreement was signed with Lithuania in 2003;
Latvia remains the only Baltic state with which Moscow has not concluded a
treaty. (10) Latvia wanted to
attach a clause restating its (theoretical) reservation concerning former
Latvian lands illegally incorporated in Russia when Latvia was occupied by the
USSR in 1940.
Numerous meetings with Asian foreign leaders were held
throughout the month of May: President Putin met in the Kremlin with Chinese
President Hu Jintao, with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and with
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. A constructive Russian-Chinese dialogue
remains important to Russian foreign relations though Putin (at least in
public) did not discuss the dispute over North Korea¹s nuclear weapons program
with Hu, as he did with the other two leaders. (11) Russia, India and China
also committed to advancing their cooperation. Putin met with Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and then with Indian President Abdul Kalam at the end
of the month to work on issues of trade. (12) An upcoming, ³informal² meeting
will be held with the three countries¹ prime ministers on 2 June in Vladivostok
and will include a large range of international issues: the situation in Iraq,
the Middle East settlement, Afghanistan and North Korea. The meeting is
intended to underscore the countries¹ close approaches to dealing with
globalization, world stability and security, the war on terror and putative
solutions to certain ethnic, regional and religious conflicts. (13)
Russia has, de facto, supported Uzbek President Islam
Karimov in an attempt to keep its influence in what is becoming a very unsteady
neighbor. The violent attacks on administrative buildings and a prison in
Andijon, Uzbekistan in mid-May, which resulted in calls for the president and
his government to step down, prompted a bloody crackdown by the Uzbek
president. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov quickly concluded that foreign
radicals were behind the uprisings, mainly Talibs, and endorsed Karimov¹s harsh
response stating that ³every country with self-respect must take measures to
exercise its right to self-protection.² (14) Lavrov also encouraged the Special
Commission formed by the Uzbek Parliament to investigate the situation in a
manner that would prevent future threats of international terrorism in the
region. (15) Russia encourages Karimov¹s strong fight in this new ³war on
terror² and certainly does not wish to see another revolution occur in this
former Soviet territory.
Russia continues to send mixed signals regarding a nuclear
Iran. It has supported international negotiations with Iran to blunt its
nuclear aspirations, and worked a deal for the spent fuel from the Bushehr to
be returned to Russia. The Director of Russia¹s Federal Atomic Energy Agency
recently stated that Iran should not develop its own uranium but rely on others
to provide it, and then warned: ³Even the U.S. cannot inflict the least damage
on Russia¹s cooperation with Iran.² (16)
(1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 18 May 05, vol. 9, no.
(2) RIA Novosti, 10 May 05, 13:21 (GMT); http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050510/39959670-print.html.
(3) RIA Novosti, 10 May 05, 16:59 (GMT); http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050510/39961057-print.html.
(4) Eurasia Daily Monitor, 25 May 05, vol. 2, issue 102;
³U.S. Senate, European Parliament Condemn Occupation of Baltic States²; email@example.com.
(5) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 May 05, vol.9,
(6) RIA Novosti, 10 May 05, 18:59 (GMT); http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050510/39961777-print.html.
(7) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 May 05, vol. 9, no.
(8) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Information and Press Dept., 21 May 05, 1163; http://www.ln.mid/ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/3efe8f02f2e3ec13.
(9) Ibid., RIA Novosti, 10 May 05, 18:59 (GMT).
(10) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 May 05, vol. 9,
(11) Ibid., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 May 05, vol.
(13) RIA Novosti, 27 May 05, 17:08 (GMT); http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20050527/40429395-print.html.
(14) RIA Novosti via Johnson¹s Russia List, 16 May 05, JRL
9150 no.20; http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9150-20.cfm.
(15) RIA Novosti, 27 May 05, 19:00 (GMT); http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050527/40430305-print.html.
(16) Ibid., Eurasia Daily Monitor, 25 May 05, vol.2, issue
By Rebecca Mulder (firstname.lastname@example.org)
and Legislative Branch
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Russia¹s rule of law
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch and formerly Russia's
richest man, and Platon Lebedev, an executive officer at Yukos, were convicted
on May 31 of 6 out of 7 charges and sentenced to 9 years in a minimum-security
prison by the Meshchansky District Court. They were also instructed to pay over
17 billion rubles (more than $598 million) to tax organs for civil suits.
(1) The reading of the verdict
spanned from May 16 to May 31. From the start, there was little doubt as to the
nature of the verdict; the primary question was the length of the prison
Khodorkovsky stood accused of tax evasion, fraud and
embezzlement, particularly with regard to the privatization of state-owned
entities during the 1990s. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev faced the prospect of up to
ten years in prison.
The spokeswoman for the Russian Prosecutor General's Office,
Natalia Vishnyakova, stressed in a press conference following the verdict that
the sentence was "fair and objective." (2) Vishnyakova also stated that further charges against
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev would be forthcoming. (3)
According to Karinna Moskalenko, one of Khodorkovsky's
lawyers, Khodorkovsky is expected to appeal the verdict within ten days of its
May 31 passage, including an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. (4)
The bulk of the charges against Khodorkovsky were connected
to his position as head of Yukos, Russia¹s largest oil company, whose main arm
was auctioned to Rosneft, a state-owned oil company, in December for a grossly
inadequate $9.35 billion under the pretext of covering Yukos¹ back taxes. The
auction heightened fears in the international investment community about the
possibility of renationalization of companies that were sold in the privatization
schemes of the 1990s, and has had a demonstrable impact on foreign investment.
Foreign direct investment, for example, fell from $7.5 billion in 2003 to $6.6
billion in 2004. (5)
Khodorkovsky was reputed to have political ambitions that
may have threatened President Putin. Before his arrest in 2003, Khodorkovsky
was rumored to be planning to run against Putin in the 2004 presidential
elections. The nine-year verdict ensures that Khodorkovsky remains in jail
until after the 2008 elections. Khodorkovsky also clashed with Putin over
energy taxes and government corruption.
Somewhat ironically, Khodorkovsky¹s companies had made an
increased effort to comply with the law in recent years, an effort that was not
rewarded. The situation raises questions about the rule of law in Putin¹s
Russia and whether the law will be applied arbitrarily against those who appear
to threaten the president¹s monopoly on power.
Under the Soviet system justice was a farce. Attempts at
judicial reform in the last fifteen years have led to slight improvements in
the independence of judges and the strengthening of the arbitrazh (commercial) courts. However, the changes initiated
by Putin in autumn 2004 to strengthen the power vertical brought appointment of
judges well within the president¹s sphere of authority. The presumption of
guilt in Khodorkovsky¹s trial speaks volumes about the state of the rule of law
in Russia today and the extent to which reforms moving toward the consistent
application of the law have genuinely taken hold.
Legal reform was an area that suffered significantly from
the clashes between Boris Yel'tsin¹s executive branch and the legislative
branch during the 1990s. Opposition to reform stymied most of Yel'tsin¹s
attempts to initiate legislation that would develop a legal foundation for
democracy and capitalism in the former Soviet Union¹s largest republic. With
the advent of Vladimir Putin and his substantial support from the United Russia
party, which, together with its allies, constituted a majority in both houses,
legal reform has faced considerably fewer hurdles. Since Putin came to office,
the legislature has passed laws addressing the tax code, the land code, the
labor code and laws on pension reform, all issues that had crashed on the reefs
of legislative opposition in the decade following the Soviet Union¹s collapse.
(6) Although the implementation of
pension reforms generated significant protest by pensioners and the military
earlier this year, the fact remains that its very passage was a significant
achievement given the resistance to pension reform in the Yel'tsin years by a
Communist (KPRF) dominated legislature.
However, the successful passage of laws that move Russia
toward the appearance of a society based on clearly expounded legal rights and
precedents will remain ineffective if those laws are not applied consistently,
without preferential treatment for those who have close connections with the
state and without harassment of those who challenge the state¹s power. The
irony in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky is that his companies had taken extra
measures to follow the law in the few years before his arrest. These efforts
were in contrast to those of other oligarchs who have not attempted to comply
with the law, yet appear safe from the state¹s pursuit of lost tax revenues,
such as Roman Abramovich. The uneven and inconsistent application of the law in
the Khodorkovsky case demonstrates the tentative nature of genuine legal and
judicial reform in Russia. Sadly, the prospects for the consistent application
of laws that guarantee basic property rights and aim to reduce corruption on
both the federal and regional levels appear grim.
The Government attempted to reign in the negative effects of
the Khodorkovsky trial by initiating a bill that would set the statute of
limitations on privatization transactions at three years rather than ten.
(7) However, such a move is
unlikely to stem the wave of concern from international investors over the
investment climate in Russia following the Yukos auction and Khodorkovsky's
conviction. A June 5 statement on NTV by Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir
Kolesnikov is unlikely to ease concerns. According to Kolesnikov, the
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev case may not be the only one against Russia's
oligarchs selected for "special treatment" by the regime. "We
have more cases in addition to those two," he said. "I can say that
this case isn't the last one." (8)
The Public Chamber and citizen control of the media
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly, President
Vladimir Putin mentioned the necessity for media outlets to have substantial
input from citizens. As a follow-up measure, Putin requested that Premier
Mikhail Fradkov and Kremlin Chief of Staff Dmitri Medvedev draft a bill vesting
the Public Chamber with power to ensure civilian control over the media and
submit it to the Duma by December 1. The primary idea floated for the
implementation of civilian control is the creation of a committee composed of
state officials and media industry representatives within the Public Chamber.
(9) It is unclear whether that
Chamber, whose role has been defined clearly as advisory and whose
pronouncements lack the force of law, would be delegated any power to support
its media oversight.
The draft law on electoral reform passed its first reading
in the Duma on May 20. The law moves the election of state bodies and local
governing bodies to the same day, the second Sunday in March, and increases
state financing to viable parties. The law also raises the threshold for
participation in parliament to 7 percent and enshrines the complete shift to
parliamentary elections based on proportional representation of party lists
rather than the previous system that elected half of the legislators based on
proportional representation and the other half on single-member constituencies
using the "first-past-the-post" system. Aleksandr Veshnyakov,
Chairman of the Central Election Commission said, ³The aim of the changes is to
give a boost to genuine political parties, make them more responsible for the
electorate and to eliminate other defects.² (10) However, a byproduct of the new laws will be the increased
difficulty of smaller parties to pass the 7 percent threshold. This is
epitomized by the democratic opposition parties such as Yabloko and the Union
of Right Forces (SPS), who failed to meet the old 5 percent threshold in the
last parliamentary elections. These two parties, as well as Committee 2008,
have discussed forming a single party, but have not reconciled differences over
party structure and leadership and whose party to use as a base of support.
(1) "Court obligates
Khodorkovskiy, Lebedev to pay R17 billion to tax bodies," ITAR-TASS, 31 May 05 via WNC.
(2) "Prosecution content with sentence on Khodorkovsky,"
ITAR-TASS, 31 May 05 via WNC.
(3) "New charges to be
brought against Khodorkovskiy, Lebedev," ITAR-TASS, 31 May 05.
(4) "Khodorkovskiy lawyer
not expecting review of sentence," ITAR-TASS, 31 May 05 via WNC.
(5) ³Russia tries to calm
investors,² The Deal, 13 May 05 via
Lexis-Nexis. Somewhat naively, members of the State Duma have expressed their
belief that the Khodorkovsky verdict will not have a significant impact on
Russia's investment climate ("State
Duma deputies comment on Khodorkovsky sentence," ITAR-TASS, 31 May 05 via WNC).
(6) ³Memorandum of the President of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation to
the executive directors of on a country assistance strategy of the World Bank Group
for the Russian Federation² Report No: 24127-RU; www.worldbank.org, p.38.
(7) ³Investors fear Russian law,² UPI, 13 May 05 via
(8) "INTERFAX Financial
& Business Report," INTERFAX, 7
Jun 05 via WNC.
(9) ³Public Chamber to control observance by media of
freedom of speech,² ITAR-TASS, 11 May 05
(10) ³Interview with Central Election Commission Chair
Alexander Veshnyakov,² Kommersant, 20
May 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
By Robyn Angley (email@example.com)
RUSSIAN MILITARY (EXTERNAL)
Deadline passes on Georgian base closures
Although an agreement on military bases appears to have been
reached between Russia and Georgia (for details see Georgia section), the
background is presented herewith:
In March, the Georgian Parliament
attempted to reinvigorate the bilateral base closure negotiations by passing a
resolution that set an actual deadline date for the seemingly endless political
dialogue between Russia and Georgia. The resolution basically stated that if
negotiations failed to produce an agreement prior to the 15 May deadline then
the two remaining Russian military bases would be declared illegal. The resolution included additional sanctions
that could be activated such as: denying entry visas to Russian troops or
technicians, prohibiting Russian military exercises, placing strict limitations
on troop and equipment movement and imposing various economic sanctions on each
In late April, it appeared that a
possible breakthrough could be on the horizon and no sanctions would be
imposed. While visiting Moscow, Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili
suggested that an agreement had been reached in principle that the withdrawal
should be complete by 1 January 2008. (2)
The timeline has political importance for the current Georgian
leadership due to the parliamentary elections in 2008 and the presidential
elections shortly after. The base closures were important political promises
made by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvill when he came to office.
At the GUAM summit on 22 April,
President Saakashvill said, "We hope we will be able to agree on a
[mutually] acceptable, civilized, and gradual -- yet final -- withdrawal of the
Russian military bases before the Moscow summit." (3) In early May with little progress in
the base closure talks, Georgia continued to exert as much pressure as it could
and President Saakashvili cancelled his visit to Moscow for the 60th
anniversary of the Allied triumph over Nazi Germany.
There have been disagreements on the bases since Georgian
independence, but the key date for discussion is 1999. The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) mandated that Russia and Georgia reach an
agreement on the issue of liquidation of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki Russian
military bases before 2001, but disagreements obviously persist. (4) Georgia is inching closer to achieving
the closure of these two Russian military bases, and the transfer of the four
other military facilities in Georgia.
Russia's argument to delay base closures focuses on its military budget
constraints. While their budget
figures consistently change, Russia has claimed that it will take up to eleven
years to close the bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The Georgian position, which has remained constant, insists
that three years would be quite sufficient. The Russian Defense Ministry¹s
eleven year estimate seems almost ridiculous given the small size of these
bases; there are approximately 1,500 men in Akhalkalaki and 3,000 in Batumi.
(5) The vast majority of personnel
at these bases does not even consist of Russian citizens. Armenians run the Akhalkalaki base and
Batumi is operated primarily by Adjarian Georgians.
In addition to the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases, there is
also continuing disagreement on the Russian military base at Gudauta in
Abkhazia. Russia has stated that,
in accordance with the 1999 OSCE Istanbul treaty, all military equipment has been
removed and the facility is simply being used by Russian peacekeepers. Georgian authorities distrust the
Russian assessment. In accordance
with the CFE Treaty, OSCE inspections of Gudauta are obligatory, but Russia has
managed to delay these inspections by requiring that Georgia ensure the safety
of the international monitoring team, even though Georgia does not control
Abkhazia. Beside the Gudauta,
Akhalkalaki and Batumi military bases, Russia has several other military
facilities in Georgia, which also must be handed over to the Georgian Defense
Ministry. There is little progress in this regard however, and what facilities
have been returned were first completely stripped of useful equipment.
On 10 February 2005, after a
two-year interruption in political relations following the Rose Revolution,
Georgian and Russian officials restarted closure negotiations. These initial negotiations produced
little new, except for increased Russian demands for troop withdrawal. According to Russia's February figures,
one billion dollars will be required for base closures. Additionally, Russia wanted assurances
that Georgia would not host any third-party troops or military installations on
its territory. This was an obvious attempt by Russia to stop Georgia's NATO membership
plans. Russia also required that
Georgia formally recognize Russia's primary role in settling the Abkhazian and
South Ossetian conflicts.
Additionally, Russia asked for political assurances that it would have
continued access to Russian military bases in Armenia via Georgian territory
Since February, Georgia has
"succeeded" in reducing the Russian time and cost estimates to a new
mutally agreeable figure of 4 years and between $150-300 million. Chief of the Russian General Staff
Yuri Baluyevsky has said that in order to support a four-year timeline some of
the military hardware and property will be moved to Armenia, "It is
impossible to build an infrastructure for the military hardware and property on
Russian territory within four years." (6)
On 12 May, Georgian Parliamentary
Chair Nino Burjanadze said that Georgia would adhere to the resolution and
"impose strict measures" against the bases after the deadline.
(6) That same day the U.S. Senate
approved Senate Resolution 139, which stated, "Russia has failed to
fulfill its obligations under the Istanbul Commitments; more than 3,000 Russian
military personnel remain in Georgia at various bases and facilities throughout
the country; and the Russian Federation should respect the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia." (7)
The Georgian Foreign Minister's
statement received the greatest amount of Russian attention and resulted in the
Russian Duma sending an official message of condemnation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
said, ""We won't yield to blackmail, if any steps aimed against our
bases are taken — concerning security and threats to the lives of our
citizens and of weapons ending up in someone else's hands, I assure you we won't
remain passive." (8)
After the initial fire storm of
emotion had died down, President Saakashvili's spokesman,
Gela Charkviani, said,
"Probably the correct thing now is to continue calmly. Of course, the Georgian parliament's
resolution remains in force but, in parallel with this, the process of
negotiations continues. And
it is possible this process will bear fruit. Probably we can give this process
the means to continue." (9)
On 17 May, retired Colonel General
Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian negotiating team said that Georgia had
"misinterpreted" Moscow's commitment to withdraw troops. "Russia pledged only to discuss
the status of its troops in Georgia but not its [sic] withdrawal."
(10) Additionally, he suggested
that Russian military units should be redeployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia
regardless of the negotiations. (11)
While Georgia did not impose any
sanctions despite the missed deadline, it stresses that the resolution remains
in effect and sanctions are a possibility. The Russian Defense Ministry's initial response to the
Georgian Parliament's resolution probably best represented its position:
Defense Ministry spokesman, Vyacheslav Sedov said that "Georgian Parliamentary
deputies lost their sense of reality." (12) Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili offered an
opposing view saying, "They (Russia) are still struggling with accepting
reality, with accepting they're no longer an imperialistic superpower."
Despite recent setbacks in its
"near-abroad," Russia certainly is not ready to accept a position of
equality when dealing with other former Soviet republics. Russia's imperialist
views are still too engrained in its foreign policy for such a seismic
shift. As Georgia continued to
pursue its national interests and works to eject these military bases, it
displayed awareness that Russia might stall as long as possible. It seems certain that Russia will delay
the actual implementation of withdrawal in an attempt to affect Georgia's 2008
domestic elections and its future NATO membership aspirations.
(1) "Georgia: Russia calls
Parliamentary Resolution on Bases 'Counterproductive'," Eurasia Insight
from RFE/RL, 11 Mar 05 via
(2) "Georgia: Tbilisi, Moscow Report Breakthrough over
Russian Military Bases," Eurasia Insight from RFE/RL, 27 Apr 05 via
(4) "Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," 17-19 Nov 99 via www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1990/cfe/cfefinact99e.htm#Anchor-Join-18556.
(5) "Motives in Georgia Are Base," Moscow Times,
13 Jan 04; CDI Russia Weekly via www.cdi.org/Russia/16jan04-6/cfm.
(6) "Russia to Move Some
Military Hardware to Armenia - Chief of Staff," Interfax, 19 May 05 via www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11293546.
(7) "Georgia and Russia March
toward Diplomatic War," Eurasia Daily Monitor, 18 May 05 Volume 2, Issue
(8) United States Senate
Resolution 139, "Expressing support for the withdrawal of Russian troops
from Georgia," 12 May 05 via thomas.loc.gov.
(9) "Georgia Russia Spar Over
Bases," Associated Press, 12 May 05 via
Tbilisi, Moscow Continue To negotiate on Bases," RFE/RL, 17 May 2005, via
Johnson's Russia List, #9152, 18 May 05.
(11) "Retired Generals
toughen Stance on Georgian Bases, NATO," RFE/RL, RFE/RL Newsline, Volume
9, #94, Part 1, 18 May 05.
(12) "Georgia: Russia calls
Parliamentary Resolution on Bases 'Counterproductive'," Eurasia Insight
from RFE/RL, 11 Mar 05 via www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp031105.shtml.
Tbilisi, Moscow Continue To negotiate on Bases," RFE/RL, 17 May 05 via
Johnson's Russia List, #9152, 18 May 05.
By Kyle Colton (firstname.lastname@example.org)
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES
No longer simply a ³Chechen²
On May 19, Moscow-backed
Chechen President Alu Alkhanov suggested that the region ³is entering a new
stage connected primarily with . . . the process of restoration of the economy
and social sphere.² (1) Two weeks earlier, Major-General Ilya Shabalkin, a
spokesman for the Russian government¹s Regional Operation Headquarters in
Chechnya, repeated the oft heard statement, ³The situation in Chechnya remains
stable and is under control of the authorities and law enforcement agencies.²
These statements followed
numerous claims of high profile ³successes² by Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen
forces. In particular, during May, Russian forces claimed that they had killed
Chechen leader Alash Daudov, reportedly an ally of Shamil Basayev, and
announced the death of former Chechen Vice President Vakha
during May, Russian representatives continued to state that rebel attacks have
become less frequent. This is impossible to verify, given the control over
media access in Chechnya, but clearly Chechnya¹s rebel fighters have not laid
down their arms. Just four days after Shabalkin suggested that Chechnya had
entered its new stage, six Russian soldiers were killed and 14 were injured
during 17 attacks conducted over a 24-hour period. (4)
even if all statements made by Russia¹s representatives were true regarding
Chechnya, it likely would make little practical difference for the country.
Even if the conflict in Chechnya were winding down as claimed, the conflict in
Dagestan is winding up.
In recent months, Chechen rebel
leaders have spoken of expanding their fight to regions outside of Chechnya.
Most recently, Doku Umarov told Radio Free Europe that rebel fighters would
³take the war to enemy territory.² (5)
In Dagestan, where only six
percent of the total population is ethnically Russian, Chechnya¹s warlords have
been welcomed and protected by large segments of the population. Ramzan
Kadyrov, pro-Moscow Chechen Deputy Prime Minister and the commander of the most
brutal division of the Chechen armed forces, regularly complains about Chechen
fighters receiving safe haven in Dagestan. ³They recuperate there, gather
themselves up and make hasty raids into Chechnya,² he said. (6) Kadyrov¹s attempts to take his forces
over the border into Dagestan to ³locate and eliminate² Chechen terrorists have
resulted in violent clashes with both local police and residents.
It would appear, however, that
militants in Dagestan are paying far more attention to Dagestan than to
Chechnya. Although it is difficult to find credible and substantiated
information about violence in the Caucasus, by piecing together numerous
reports from a variety of news sources, it is possible to see clearly the trend
toward escalating violence in Dagestan.
During 2005, most sources,
including the Russian government, agree that approximately 30 police officers
have died in terrorist attacks in Dagestan. In May alone, at least seven
officers were killed either in bomb or gun attacks. Three top officials also
were assassinated; the Dagestani Minister of Nationalities, Information and
Foreign Relations was killed in an explosion, and both the police chief and the
head of the Interior Department of the Buinaksk region died during separate gun
In addition, 13 people were
injured in bombings, the Dagestani Interior Minister survived an attack by
gunmen on his car, a bomb was defused near the Federal Security Services
headquarters, 23 artillery shells were removed from a mountain underpass in
Buinaksk, police officers narrowly escaped injury when a bomb exploded as they
passed, two men were intercepted before they were able to detonate ³suicide
belts,² another man was intercepted before explosives went off in his bag and a
bomb was defused in an automobile.
Things clearly are not calm in
Dagestan. Even more, on May 29, a bomb exploded outside the Health Minister¹s
home in the republic of Ingushetia. It may be that the conflict is spreading
Dagestani leaders suggest that
the ethnic tensions in Russia¹s most diverse republic are providing fertile
ground for separatist leaders. Local residents repeatedly have shown themselves
more than willing to confront Russian forces. When met with this attitude
during one of his forays into Dagestan, Ramzan Kadyrov suggested, ³Wahhabi
ideas are taking root in all regions adjacent to Chechnya.² ( 7)
The population of Dagestan does
not appear willing to back down in the near future. In mid-May, residents of
the village of Botlikh in the Botlikshsky District staged the latest in a
series of protests against the construction of a new Russian army base in their
neighborhood. The residents have caused repeated delays in construction, first
by destroying the equipment at the construction site and then by blockading the
area. (8) Neither side seems ready to back down, and the result could
exacerbate an already tense atmosphere.
Not surprisingly, news of the
protests against the Russian army base was not reported in the mainstream
Russian media, but was trumpeted in the Chechen rebel press. It would appear
that Major-General Shabalkin was correct when he spoke of Chechnya entering a
Russian military pull-out .
. . how and for what?
On May 30, after years of
negotiation and often-heated rhetoric, the Georgian and Russian Foreign
Ministers announced an agreement on the closure of Russia¹s military facilities
in Akhalkalaki and Batumi, Georgia. ³We have achieved our goal,² Georgian
Foreign Minister Salome Zurbashvili said. (9)
The closures will be
accompanied by the withdrawal of at least the vast majority of Russia¹s 3,000
troops. Whether all troops will be withdrawn will depend on the result of
negotiations going on now. This is because, although Zurabishvili and her
counterpart Sergei Lavrov portrayed their agreement as a ³done deal,² actually
it is far from complete. In fact, the initialed agreement must be translated
into a detailed technical protocol, which then must be ratified by the Russian
Duma. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was careful to underscore this
point, although he welcomed the deal. This is ³a political agreement,² he said,
which needs ³legal formulation.² (10)
Three potential difficulties
are most apparent from the agreement: First, both sides must agree to
definitive dates for the withdrawal of both weapons and troops. Russia agreed
generally that Akhalkalaki will close by the end of 2007, while the closure of
Batumi ³will be completed within 2008.² (11) However, exact dates for the start of withdrawal have not
been specified, as desired by Georgia. The country¹s negotiators worry about
delaying tactics similar to those employed following Russia¹s previous
agreements to withdraw its troops and weaponry first by 1997, subsequently by
1999, then by 2002. (12)
Georgia is insisting also on
the clear delineation of a plan to monitor ³the situation on the territory
formerly used by the Russian military base [at] Gaduata [Abkhazia].² (13)
Georgian representatives have repeatedly suggested that Russian hardware and
personnel have not been fully withdrawn from Gaduata – as claimed by
Russia. However, the separatist Abkhazian government will not allow access to
its territory in order to verify the situation.
Georgia reportedly has
expressed also concern about Russia¹s plan to relocate some portion of its
weaponry to Armenia instead of Russia. This plan provoked a sharp ³diplomatic
note² from Azerbaijan, which fears that the weapons could find their way inside
its borders, into the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Russia
has already begun relocating weaponry to its Gumri base in Armenia from Batumi.
Specifically, on 31 May, thirteen train cars arrived in Armenia loaded with
hardware and ammunition. (14) Since Armenia has welcomed the transfer of weapons,
it would appear that this method will continue.
The base closure issue that
could be most problematic revolves around a Russian-proposed ³anti-terrorist
center.² The initialed agreement states, ³An agreed-upon portion of the
military personnel and material-technical facilities and infrastructure of the
Russian military base [at] Batumi would be used in the interests of the
Georgian-Russian Anti-Terrorist Center (GRATC) that is being created. This
would be formalized by a separate document.² (15) This wording leaves open the
possibility that a significant portion of Russian personnel and weaponry could
remain within Georgia, amounting to little more than a renaming of the Batumi
base. However, Georgian negotiators say that the Russian presence would be
small, and, ³The center will not be a military unit.² Georgian Deputy Foreign
Minister Merab Antadze said, ³It will employ representatives of secret services
engaged in information and analytical work.² (16) All of this, of course, is
yet to be finalized in negotiations. Judging from past experience, Russia may
not readily agree to these limits – at least, not without significant
incentive. Without these incentives, it is very possible that the actual
legally-binding agreement (as far as any agreement of this kind is binding for
Russia) could not be signed for some time.
President Saakashvili, who has
seen popularity decrease and heard complaints from within his own party, has
identified the resolution of the Russian base issue as a cornerstone of his
presidency. There are questions, therefore, about what concession he may be
willing to make in order to get a deal completed quickly. One of the
concessions Russia may be a seeking is membership in the GUAM (Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) organization. Following base withdrawal
negotiations on 30 May, Zurabishvili did not object to the idea that Russia
would become part of the regional grouping, even though it is designed as a
counterbalance to Russian influence in the region. Further, Ukraine, the de
facto GUAM leader, signaled on 29 May that
it may accept Russian membership. (17)
This would seem radically to alter Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko¹s earlier comment that ³GU(U)AM¹s goal is to create a zone of
stability and security in the region which is to become a worthy part of the
Following the negotiations over
the base closures, one would hope that Georgia has truly made progress in
developing equal relations with Russia, and not sacrificed an organization that
has the potential to provide it an alternative voice in the years to come.
(1) ITAR-TASS, 19 May 05 via
Kuryer, April 05; Defense and Security via
(3) Agence France Presse, 1230
GMT, 17 May 05 and Agence France Presse, 1401 GMT, 16 May 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) Agence France Presse, 1739
GMT, 23 May 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(5) Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, 10 May 05; Associated Press, 2025 GMT, 10 May 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(6) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(8) The Chechen Times, 26 May 05; BBC Monitoring, via
(9) Agence France Presse, 30
May 05 via Yahoo News.
(10) Civil Georgia, 30
May 05 via www.civil.ge.
(11) Text of Joint
Declaration of the Foreign Ministries of the Russian Federation and Georgia, 30
May 05 via www.civil.ge.
(12) For the latest 2002
agreement, see Istanbul Summit Declaration, Article 19, November 1999 via http://www.osce.org/mc/13017.html.
(11) Text of Joint
Declaration of the Foreign Ministries of the Russian Federation and Georgia, 30
May 05 via www.civil.ge.
(14) Azad Azarbaycan TV, 1530
GMT, 01 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(15) Text of Joint Declaration
of the Foreign Ministries of the Russian Federation and Georgia, 30 May 05 via www.civil.ge.
(16) ITAR-TASS, 24 May 05 via
(17) "Russia may join GUAM
in the future - Ukrainian Speaker," ITAR-TASS, 29 May 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(18) RIA Novosti, 22 April 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
Kyrgyzstan update: stability ensured?
Two months ago, amidst a series of nationwide protests and
riots, the government of President Askar Akaev collapsed. In the immediate
aftermath of the "revolution," Kyrgyzstan's Parliament appointed an
interim government consisting of Feliks Kulov, Kurmanbek Bakiev and Roza
Despite Otunbaeva's presence in the leadership, it became
clear rapidly that the race to succeed Akaev would be fought out between Bakiev
and Kulov, the latter having been
acquitted by the Supreme Court of all outstanding charges against him.
(2) Although a legitimate election between two candidates seemed attractive at
face value, it created the specter both of national division and of further
upheaval in the form of possible intervention in the democratic process by the
nation's Security Services, believed to be loyal to Kulov.
Several days after Kulov's candidacy was confirmed, it
emerged that Otunbayeva had taken upon herself the role of facilitator or
interlocutor between the two candidates, telling the press that Kulov would
receive an important government post even if the Presidential election was decided
in Bakiev's favor. (3) On Wednesday 4 May, Kulov's candidacy was made official
when his party, Ar Namys (Dignity)
officially nominated him for the Presidency. (4)
Nine days later, Kulov unexpectedly announced his withdrawal
from the campaign. Reports indicate that Bakiev and Kulov met on 13 May and
agreed to run on a joint ticket. Under the terms of their agreement, Kulov was
given the post of Acting First Deputy Prime Minister. (5) If, as expected,
Bakiev wins the Presidential election, Kulov will be appointed Prime Minister,
and granted considerably expanded powers, including the authority to appoint
and dismiss ministers and oblast heads. (6) A day after reaching the accord
with Bakiev, Kulov released an official statement, explaining that the decision
to withdraw from the election campaign had been made in the interests of
maintaining "stability and peace" in the country. (7)
It is important to note that Kulov's withdrawal was also
aimed in a broader strategic direction. Specifically, he noted that events in
Andijan, Uzbekistan, showed the "fragility of peace" in Central Asia.
The Uzbek situation, he intimated, had played a role in his decision to agree
to share power with Bakiev. (8)
Kyrgyzstan's southern regions, particularly the area surrounding the
border towns of Jalalabad and Osh are home to a vocal Uzbek minority, numbering
some 13.8% of the population according to the 1999 census. (9) This minority
has been problematic for Bishkek in the past, having been particularly critical
of the erosion of its rights during Akaev's tenure.
Bakiev's power center is in the aforementioned southern
regions. As such, it is entirely conceivable that he and Kulov calculated that
a "southern presidency" would serve the vital national interest of
reassuring the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan that its rights are being
represented at the highest possible level, thereby preventing the possible
spread of unrest from across the border. The idea that a compromise has been
reached, at least in part due to the Uzbek crisis, is supported by the fact
that several other important Presidential candidates, including Almazbek
Atambayev (leader of the Social Democrats), Abdygul Chotbayev (National Guard
Commander) and Amangeldi Muraliyev (Minister of Economic Development) have also
withdrawn from the election, citing regional security concerns. (10)
Kyrgyzstan's new leadership is demonstrating that it can
react to and preempt possible crisis situations. In this instance, the removal
of a potentially divisive election (with larger regional implications), and the
formation of a "coalition" can be viewed as a positive development.
At the same time, the Kyrgyz leadership must be careful not to regress into the
undemocratic behavior which so characterized Akaev's rule, and which the
opposition, now in power, so heavily criticized, in the name of national
For several months, peaceful protests have been occurring
outside the city court of Andijan. The cause of the demonstrations was the
arrest and arraignment of 23 local businessmen on charges of supporting Islamic
extremist groups. (11)
On the evening of 12 May, local government forces apparently
arrested several protestors, and transported them to Andijan's prison. At
midnight, a group of approximately 100 (apparently supporters and relatives of
the businessmen) attacked a local military garrison and seized their weapons.
(11) The same group proceeded to the prison, where they reportedly freed
approximately 4000 inmates, including the 23 businessmen. (13) Some 10,000
protestors then gathered outside the Andijan administration's office building,
located in the town's central square, and began to demonstrate, calling for
Karimov's resignation, as well as protesting the regime's economic policies, spiraling
unemployment, and the "lack of foodstuffs" available in the region.
According to witnesses at the scene, the town's central
square had been surrounded and cut off by Interior Ministry and Army forces. On
the morning of 13 May, these troops began firing indiscriminately into the
square from all sides; no regard was given to separating the armed from the
unarmed. (15) When the crowd began to flee the scene, troops in trucks, jeeps
and armored personnel carriers pursued the crowds through the streets, killing
men, women and children as they moved. (16)
On Saturday 14 May, government forces initiated a massive
cleanup operation removing bodies to unknown locations. Renewed protests
occurred at several spots in the city, and there were reportedly several
further shootings. That night, some 546 persons succeeded in escaping the
sealed town, crossing into Kyrgyzstan near Jalalabad early the next morning.
That morning, President Karimov held a press conference in
which he claimed that the jail-break, and subsequent demonstrations had been
planned and orchestrated long in advance by Islamic extremists linked to
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Taliban in Afghanistan (Karimov alleged that telephone
conversations with "their sponsors and masters" had been recorded).
(18) Karimov claimed that he had ordered forces in the area "not to use
weapons," because he wished to resolve the situation peacefully. (19) As
of 13 May, no journalists—including foreign correspondents—were
allowed into Andijan. That ban is apparently still in force. The same day,
demonstrations broke out in Korasuv, a neighboring town. Residents demanded
that the mayor reopen border crossings with Kyrgyzstan, which have been closed
for the last two years. When he refused, protestors torched several government
buildings, including police headquarters. (20) Government forces surrounded
Korasuv and on 19 May, entered the town, arresting the ringleaders of the
protests there, apparently without loss of life. (21)
The incident in Andijan has resulted in massive
international pressure being exerted on Uzbekistan. Britain, the United States
and the United Nations have all demanded that President Karimov allow an
independent investigation, in order to establish what occurred. Perhaps as a
result of this pressure, Uzbek authorities, on May 18, allowed a group of
diplomats to tour the town under tightly controlled conditions. (22) The Uzbek
Prosecutor General, Rashid Qodirov has stated that 169 people were killed in
Andijan, but that government forces had "categorically" killed
"only terrorists" during the operation. Qodirov claimed that all the
civilians who were killed were hostages murdered by the "terrorists."
(23) This number may be too low. A report in the British Independent using an anonymous Uzbek military source indicates
that the number of dead is at least 500. (24)
The Uzbek government's assertions and actions with regards
to the Andijan incident beg several questions. First, if Karimov's claim that
he ordered troops not to open fire is
true, then who controls Uzbekistan's Security Apparatus (and thus, surely the
country), if not the President? Second, if Karimov's assertions regarding
Islamic extremist involvement are correct, why the cover-up? Given Uzbekistan's
position as a vital ally in the United States led Global War on Terrorism,
action against Islamic terrorist groups is likely to be viewed at least
somewhat sympathetically on an international level. As yet, the Uzbek
government has not produced any convincing evidence of either Hizb-ut-Tahrir or
IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) involvement in Andijan, and Karimov has
steadfastly rejected all calls for an independent investigation. (25) At this moment in time, it seems clear
that the demonstrations were political and economic—not Islamist in
motivation—directed against the corruption and economic hardship which so
seriously affects the Fergana valley. President Karimov clearly has learned the
lessons of Kyrgyzstan and Georgia. The crackdown in Andijan was a warning that
he will use all necessary means to maintain his grip on power, and will brook
no opposition or even localized 'rebellions.' In this instance, the cry of
"Islamic extremism" sounds little more than a rehearsed refrain.
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume X, Number
6 (28 Apr 05).
(4) AKIpress News, 4 May 05; AKIpress News Agency via ISI
Emerging Markets Database.
(5) AKIpress News, 16 May 05; AKIpress News Agency via ISI
Emerging Markets Database.
(6) AKIpress News, 13 May 05; AKIpress News Agency via ISI
Emerging Markets Database.
(7) TCA-Kyrgyzstan, 21 May 05; The Times of Central Asia via
ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(9) CIA World Factbook, "Kyrgyzstan" via www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kg.html#People.
(10) TCA-Kyrgyzstan, 21 May 05; The Times of Central Asia
via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(11) "How the Andijan Killings Unfolded," BBC
News, 21 May 05 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4550845.stm.
(13) Central Asia Report, 17 May 05; Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(14) TCA-Uzbekistan, 13 May 05; The Times of Central Asia
via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(15) TCA-Uzbekistan, 21 May 05; The Times of Central Asia
via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(16) "How the Andijan Killings Unfolded," BBC
News, 21 May 05 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4550845.stm.
(18) Uzbek Television First Channel, Tashkent in Uzbek, 14
May 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(19) RTR Russia TV Moscow in Russian, 17 May 05; BBC
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(20) "Uzbek Troops Shut off Second Town," BBC
News, 16 May 05 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4549873.stm.
(21) "Uzbek Troops Retake Rebel Town," BBC News,
19 May 05 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4561279.stm.
(22) "Foreign Envoys Visit Uzbek Town," BBC News,
18 May 05 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4557689.stm.
(23) Uzbek Radio First Program, Tashkent in Uzbek, 17 May
05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
(24)"Uzbekistan: In the Narrow Lane, the Machine Guns
Chattered Remorselessly for Two Hours," The Independent, 22 May 05
(25) "Uzbekistan Rejects UN Inquiry into Killing of
Civilians," The Independent, 21 May 05 via www.news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/story.jsp?story=640069.
By Fabian Adami (email@example.com)