

IR 345
Force in IR: The Instruments of Power
Fall, 2007
(T, R, 9:30 - 11)
Professor Angelo M. Codevilla
Office hours T, R, 11- 12:30, W 10- 12 and by appointment.
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OBJECTIVES

This course examines the forceful means of statecraft: coercive diplomacy, economic force, subversion, and military operations. It does so against the background of affections and aversions nowadays called “soft power.” It is an introduction to the relationship between the ends of international affairs, and the means by which one government causes another to do things that it does not want to do.

Compulsion in any and all forms breaks peace. Yet any and all acts of compulsion make sense only as parts of plans to fashion – against another’s will -- a peace more acceptable than the one just broken. All reasoned uses of force seek some objective, the achievement of which makes force worthwhile and allows the user of it to go on to other things. Victory is the achievement of one’s own preferred peace. Force that is not reasonably calculated to achieve a peace that one can live with is literally senseless. Hence the meaning of victory depends primarily on the peace that is the goal in the conflict. The diplomatic, economic, manipulative, and military means of achieving victory are meaningful only in relation to any given objective.

Force is a common denominator of international affairs. It transcends the intellectual and moral differences of regimes to some extent. A government that pays little attention to another's arguments cannot help but pay greater attention to the other's blows – actual or prospective. Governments tend to find greater merit in arguments backed by force than in arguments alone. “A good argument and a gun work better than just a good argument.” Vice versa, the suspicion that a government is unwilling or unable to force its objectives tends to discredit those objectives. In sum, force accredits a government only insofar as it is used successfully, insofar as the harm it does to others does some good to itself. To study the role of force, then, is to study the ways in which it is used productively. The unproductive use of force is a double abomination.

The course studies how the major kinds of force contribute to the achievement of victory - that is, one’s preferred peace.

I. Soft Power

The course begins with a brief examination of the factors that enhance or limit any government’s use of the instruments of power. Chief among them is public sentiment. Although seldom does “Soft Power” trump force in the short run, “Soft Power” may be compared to the weather: All contenders must deal with it, and it may sweep any and all away.

II. Coercive Diplomacy.

Diplomacy is a medium of communication – not the substance of any communication. Rarely has diplomacy been merely a courier service, or legal or moral advocacy divorced from

the prospect of compulsion. In most instances, diplomacy communicates different mixes of interest, law, morality and compulsion. The course studies the factors that affect such mixes.

III. Economic Force

After briefly surveying the practical meaning of the term "economic power," the course studies economic coercion carried out for wholesale purposes (economic exploitation, military debilitation, as well as economic development) as well as for retail modification of government policies (sanctions and bribery).

IV. Subversion

The category of international manipulation or subversion--known in the U.S. as "covert action" and elsewhere as "active measures" - includes all manner of forceful pressure, including incitement of domestic factions, use of agents of influence, and even the waging of paramilitary operations. The course studies how difficult it is to orchestrate many low-level acts of force to a common purpose, and yet how effective a single act can be if it has the proper affect on the adversary's "center of gravity."

V. Military Operations

In war, death, destruction and passionate struggles are meaningful only insofar as they displace what Clausewitz called the adversary's "center of gravity," and produce victory. But figuring out what that center of gravity is, and marshaling forces to displace it, is the essence of strategy—the most difficult of political-military tasks.

Requirements

The midterm examination counts for one fourth of the grade. The final exam counts for one half. Class participation counts for the final fourth. Students may choose to do a research paper which, if accepted will count for extra credit. Papers should be circa 3,000 words. Topics and outlines must be elaborated with the professor before September 30. Students who choose to are encouraged to turn in as many drafts as they wish for comment. Final drafts are due by November 15. No extensions.

Readings

Required readings are available at the bookstore, **or as part of a course packet**. Readings in the course packet are indicated by an *. Nye and Paret are to be purchased. Seabury/ Codevilla and Codevilla will be available either in the bookstore or electronically, The full texts of Baldwin and Ikle', together with supplemental readings, will be on reserve at Mugar Library.

Required Books

1. Joseph Nye *Soft Power* (Perseus books 2004)
2. Angelo M. Codevilla *No Victory, No Peace* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.)

3. Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. Press, 1986).
4. Angelo M. Codevilla, And Paul Seabury *War Ends and Means* (2nd ed. Potomac Books 2006).

Recommended Books: (*especially interesting)

1. Robert Art, Kenneth Waltz, *The Use of Force* (NY: University Press of America, 1993).
2. * Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford U. Press, 1963).
3. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy* (New York: Appleton Century Crafts, 1968).
4. * Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1971).
5. *Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1964).
6. Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. Press, 1987).
7. R. Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action* (Washington DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1981).
8. * Angelo M. Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft* (NY: Free Press, 1992).
9. * Paul Johnson, *Modern Times* (NY: Harper & Row, 1983).
10. Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War* (NY: Doubleday, 1995).
11. Edward Creasy, *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* (NY: MacMillan, 1964).
12. * William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1982).
13. *Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964)
14. * Donald Kagan, Frederick Kagan *While America Slept* (ST. Martin's 2000).
15. George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, (NY Harper Collins, 2001)

Course Outline

Weeks 1, 2

S. 4, 6

11, 13

Introduction to the Course.

Force and “soft power”

Required Readings:

Joseph Nye, *Soft Power*

*James Kurth, "The Adolescent Empire," *The National Interest*. Summer, 1997

*Peter Berger, "Secularism in retreat," *National Interest*, (Winter 1996/97).

* George Weigel *Witness to Hope* Ch. 9

Suggested Readings:

Samuel P. Huntington *Soft Power*

Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 47-54, 105-114, 148-155, 181-200.

Fred Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate*, Chapters 5 & 7.

Jeffrey Salmon et al., *Power, Principles, and Interest*.

John Voll and John Esposito, "Islam's Democratic Essence" with ripostes by Clawson, Muravchik, Rubin and Satloff, *Middle East Quarterly*, Sept. 1994.

R. B. Mowat, *Diplomacy and Peace* (London: Williams and Nongate, 1935).

Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
Orbis (Special Issue on Religion and Statecraft), Spring, 1998.

Weeks 3, 4

S. 18, 20

25, 27

Coercive Diplomacy

Case Study I: The Peloponnesian War

Required Readings:

Carnes Lord *Crisis Management, a Primer* (IASPS Papers in Strategy #7 August 1998)
available electronically

*Fred Ikle', *How Nations Negotiate*, Chs. 4, 5, 7

*Thucydides, "The Melian dialogue," (5:84 – 5:116) "The Camarinean negotiation."
(6:75- 6:88) "Brasidas' campaign." (4:81- 4:88, 4:101- 4:116)

Suggested Readings:

Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre Entre les Nations* (Paris: Calman Levy, 1962).

Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*.

Week 5

O. 2, 4

Case Study III The Lebanon War of 2006

Case Studies II US Yugoslavia, 1992 – 2000; IV US Iraq 1990 –96

Required Readings:

*Kagan and Kagan, *While America Sleeps*, Ch. 17 – 18, pp.367- 423

Suggested Readings:

*Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists*, Chs. 1, 15.
Fred Ikle, "After detection, What?" *Foreign Affairs*, 1961.
Walter MacDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise*, pp. 521-530, 568-589.
Gordon Craig, "Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic Negotiation," in A. O. Sarkisian, (ed.) *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography* (London: Longmans Green, 1961).

Week 6

O. 9 (No class) O. 11 Midterm exam

Week 7

O. 16, 18

Tools of Economic Statecraft: Sanctions and Strategic Measures
Case Study I: Baldwin's cases

Required Readings:

*David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 145-205.
Edward Meade Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Frederic List, The Economic Foundation of Military Power," in Paret, ed., *MOMS*, pp. 64-90.
*David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 58-88.
*Machiavelli, *Discourses*, II, 10.

Suggested Readings:

Comparative Strategy (Special Issue on Economic Strategy), Volume 2, 1980.
Chalmers Johnson, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 1995.
Clyde Prestowitz et. al., *Powernomics: Economics and Strategy after the Cold War* (Washington DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1991).
Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers* (New York: Harper, 1986).

Week 8

O. 22, 25

Case Study II: Iraq, 1991-2004

Case Study III: Switzerland in World War II

Required Readings

*Paul D. Taylor, "Clausewitz on Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1995.

Congressional documents and assorted articles on the UN Oil for Food program, 2004 (available electronically)

*Angelo M Codevilla *Between The Alps And A Hard Place* pp.125- 169

*David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield *The Hidden Weapon The story of Economic Warfare* (New York, Harper, 1947) Chapter on Switzerland, Sweden, et al.

Week 9

O. 30, N.1

Principles of Subversion

American Covert Action

Required Readings:

*Angelo M. Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft*, pp. 37-47, 355-386.

"Intelligence (covert action and counterintelligence) as an instrument of policy" in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Intelligence and Policy*, Vol. 7, 1986, pp. 87-106.

Suggested Readings:

Joseph Finder, *Red Carpet* (New York: Scott Foresman, 1983)

Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran* (New York: Knopf, 1981).

Harold (Kim) Philby, *My Silent War* (New York: Grove Press, 1968).

David Atlee Philips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977).

Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

Richard Schultz et. al., *Dezinformatzya* (New York: Penguin Brasseys, 1984).

Week 10

N. 6, 8

Case Study I: Iran, 1953, Guatemala, 1954.

Case Study II: Spain, 1936-1938, Vietnam, 1945-1975.

Required Readings:

*Angelo M. Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft*, pp.240-274,

Paul Seabury and Angelo M. Codevilla, *War Ends and Means*, Ch. 8.

*Alexander Orlov, *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*, (Ann Arbor: U. Michigan Press, 1963), (selections).

Suggested Readings:

Paul Smith, *On Political War* (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1989).
Harry Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).
Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1996).
John Collins, *Green Berets, Seals, and Spetznaz* (New York: Penguin)

Week 11

N. 13, 15

War and Violence
The Classic Concept of Victory

Required Readings:

Paul Seabury and Angelo M. Codevilla, *War Ends and Means*, Ch. 5.
*Machiavelli's *Discourses*, II--10, 24, 30.
*Paul Seabury and Angelo M. Codevilla, *War Ends and Means*, Chapter 3.
Peter Paret, "Clausewitz" in Paret, ed., *MoMS*, pp. 186-216.

Suggested Readings:

Edward Creasy, *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* (NY: MacMillan, 1964).
Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War* (NY: Doubleday, 1995).
William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (U. of Chicago Press, 1982).

Week 12, 13

N. 20, N. 22 (Thanksgiving holiday) N. 27, 29

The Various Contexts of Victory
The Meaning of Strategy
Strategy, Victory, and Geopolitics

Required Readings:

Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought" in Paret, ed. *MoMS*, pp. 354-376.
Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallien, Lyautey. . ." in Paret, ed. *MoMS*, pp. 377-407.
Phillip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan. . ." in Paret, ed., *MoMS*, pp. 444-480.
* Angelo M. Codevilla And Paul Seabury, *War Ends and Means*, Chapters 6 & 7.
*Basil Lidell Hart, *Strategy*, (NY: New America Library, 1974), Chapter 19.
Hajo Holborn, "The Prussian German School," in Paret, ed., *MoMS*, 281-295, 481-509.
Condolezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy," in Paret, ed., *MoMS*.
Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Questions of Nuclear Strategists" in Paret, ed., *MoMS*, pp. 735-778.
Maurice Matlo, "Allied Strategies in Europe 1939-1945" in Paret, ed., *MoMS*, 703-734.

Suggested Readings:

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*.

Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.

Andre Beaufre, *Strategy for Action* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967).

Hamley's *The Operation of War: Explained and Illustrated* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1869).

Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Freeport, NY: Books for Library Press, 1922).

Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower* (Kentucky: U. Press of Kentucky, 1988).

Halford MacKinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (NY: Holt, 1942).

Halford MacKinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal*, XXXIII, April 1904.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*.

Week 14

D. 4, 6

The War on Terror

The wars on Iraq

Required Readings

Angelo M. Codevilla *No Victory, No peace*

*Selections from: Bob Woodward *Plan of Attack* and Laurie Mylroie *The War against America*