Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
City Delegations and Civil Rights Realignment 1933-1963

Tom Ogorzalek
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Boston University Initiative on Cities, 2019
How do cities fit into American politics?

- Very challenging local governance
- No formal representation at national level
The Cities on the Hill

How do cities fit into American politics?

Urban-rural divide

- Chronic, but not always partisan
- What holds the hyper-diverse “Blue” side together?
- Across and within cities
NYTimes, CityLab

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
How do cities fit into American politics?

Urban-rural divide

Today

- City delegations and civil rights liberalism
- Mid-century racial Realignment

*The Cities on the Hill*

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*The Cities on the Hill*
Strange bedfellows, 1964

“[On race], the only genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in their accent.”

-Mike Royko, Chicago Sun-Times
Motivation
City Delegations
Civil Rights
Social-Political Geography
Racial Realignment
Cities and race

Urban-Rural Cleavage: Electorate
Source: CSR data

Local Support for Bush, 2004
- 0.01 - 0.33
- 0.34 - 0.45
- 0.46 - 0.55
- 0.56 - 0.66
- 0.67 - 0.79

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Strange bedfellows, 1964

How do different kinds of places “handle” race differently?
North or South? Accounts of Racial Realignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
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<tr>
<td>Issue Evolution</td>
<td>1960s</td>
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Locally, northern cities were divided by race

“[On race], the only genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in their accent.”

-Mike Royko
Nationally, urban representatives were a strong force for racial liberalism

Home to transformative egalitarians
- Civil rights organizations, progressive unions, civil society
Motivating Questions

Given racial division at home, how do we characterize urban representation on civil rights at the national level?

City representation was marked by cohesive liberalism.

Through what mechanisms did locally divided cities embrace racially liberal positions cohesively at the national level?

Local institutions fostered the development and defense of the national civil rights liberalism.
Motivating Questions

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## North or South? Accounts of Racial Realignement

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<td>City Delegations (Ogorzalek)</td>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>Cities unite</td>
<td>Urbanicity, local politics</td>
</tr>
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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
The Paradox of City Government

Urban conditions generate urgent governance needs and distinctive preferences

- Density, Heterogeneity, Size
The Paradox of City Government

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- Density, Heterogeneity, Size
- Economic management: redistribution, regulation, public goods
- Culture: flexibility, pluralism, impersonality
The Paradox of City Government

Urban conditions generate urgent governance needs and distinctive preferences

• Density, Heterogeneity, Size
• Economic management: redistribution, regulation, public goods
• Culture: flexibility, pluralism, impersonality

Cities face distinctive challenges

• City limits: Formal and informal constraints to policymaking
• “Diversity problems” related to heterogeneous constituencies
“The Ungovernable City”

NYtimes.com, US Census

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
“Hyperpluralism”

NYtimes.com, US Census

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
The Paradox of City Government

Urban conditions generate urgent governance needs and distinctive preferences

Cities face distinctive challenges

High demand for government, but constrained supply
The Paradox of City Government

Urban conditions generate urgent governance needs and distinctive preferences

Cities face distinctive challenges

High demand for government, but constrained supply

Cities have developed distinctive institutions for addressing these challenges

- “Institutions of Horizontal Integration” (IHIs)
What are IHIs?

Cities develop institutions to establish order

- Machines (Erie, etc)
- Monopolies (Trounstine)
- Urban regime (Stone)
- Pluralism (Dahl)

These are forms of horizontal integration across an uneven, heterogeneous space (IHIs).
Jurisdictional IHI: Municipal Boundary

Percent Black, Congressional Districts
- 0.00 - 0.05
- 0.06 - 0.10
- 0.11 - 0.25
- 0.26 - 0.50
- 0.51 - 0.60

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Organizational IHI: Party
The Paradox of City Government

Urban conditions generate urgent governance needs and distinctive preferences

Cities face distinctive challenges

Cities have developed distinctive institutions for addressing these challenges

• “Institutions of Horizontal Integration” (IHIs)
• Developed locally, but also have supralocal role
• Bind city districts, not others
Model of Representation: Electoral Connection

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Model of Representation: City delegations

- Jurisdictional (Border) and Organizational (Party)
- IHIs vary over space and time
- H: Local IHIs foster cohesive representation
- H: Cities with strong IHIs will be more cohesive
IHIs allow city delegations to act strategically

“Those of us who have served in the state legislature know of the power that is more than numerical that goes with the organization of the big cities.”

Rep. John Vorys (R-OH)\(^1\)

“Local experience has taught them that in unity there is power.”

Leo Snowiss,

“Congressional Recruitment and Representation”\(^2\)

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\(^1\)“Apportionment of State Legislatures,” Subcom No. 5, House Committee on Judiciary. Aug. 6, 1964, HRG-1964-HJH-0043, p. 504-50

\(^2\)Snowiss (1966), p.630
Motivation
City Delegations
Civil Rights

The Paradox of City Government
Supralocal Horizontal Integration
Cohesion

Mechanisms for cohesion

Municipal
- Common local political identity
- Intergovernmental transfers go downtown, not to district
- Norms of reciprocity within delegation, repeated interaction
- Progressive ambition

Organizational/Partisan
- Control access to nomination (Mayhew 1986)
- Strong local organizations can win elections at all levels, not just local
- Politicians “brung up” in local organizations remain “that way” (Wilson, Snowiss)
Cities on the Hill: City Delegations

Pursue city-friendly policies in state and nation

- Urban reps act strategically as blocs (Weir et al)
- Cohesion a good strategy for success on “urban” issues (Burns et al)
- MCs represent city as well as district
- Transmit local solutions for political order to higher levels.
Cities on the Hill: City Delegations

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City delegations: Empirical summary (Ch. 4)

IHIs associated with cohesion

- City delegations more cohesive than non-city
- Cities with TPO more cohesive delegation
Cities are more cohesive than other blocs

Motivation
City Delegations
Civil Rights

The Paradox of City Government
Supralocal Horizontal Integration
Cohesion

Chicago
Average Rice Cohesion Scores
City
Metro
Suburbs
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1920 1940 1960 1980

New York City

Philadelphia

Los Angeles

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City Delegations
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Supralocal Horizontal Integration
Cohesion

Stronger organizations, more cohesion

Average City Delegation Cohesion on Roll Calls. Series smoothed over time for visibility. Cohesion scores calculated using Desposato (2005). Dotted line indicates congressional party average on all RCs.
City delegations: Empirical summary (Ch. 4)

IHIs associated with cohesion

- City delegations more cohesive than non-city
- Cities with TPO more cohesive delegation
- Pattern is strongest for city-relevant votes
- Same-city dyads more likely to “agree” on party and vote, especially from strong-party cities
- Despite heterogeneity, and even when we account for other kinds of constituency similarities

Cohesion enhances capacity for strategic action/defense of city position
Local Division, National Unity
Faced with difference...

Different groups may respond differently:

- Threat/Rivalry (Mass position)
- Contact-induced or ideological toleration (common but not modal)
- Reduced public coordination (ultimate modal position)
- Pluralism (“City interest” / elite position)
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

How do cities pursue a “city interest” in higher arenas? (Burns et al 2009)

- Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
- Articulate the city position
- Encourage non-city co-partisans to defer to city position
- Defend/represent that position cohesively
Urban arguments for racial liberalism, 1926-1949

Rare on agenda from 1900-1930

Early arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens: classical liberalism
Aspatial Civil Rights

Although he [the African American] has been in possession of (political and civil rights) for relatively so short a time he has shown himself to be worthy of them. As a free man he has always been amenable to reason and persuasion; as a citizen he has uniformly been a patriot, and as a voter he has consistently aligned himself with the intelligence, the efficiency, the administrative ability, and the forces that stand for order and property. What can be said of any other group of our fellow citizens?

Sen William B. McKinley (R-IL), 1926

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3 “To Prevent and Punish the Crime of Lynching,” Hearing before Subcom on S. 121, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Feb.16, 1926. p.4 [HRG-1926-SJS-0003]
Urban arguments for racial liberalism, 1926-1949

Early arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens

New racial liberalism: urban framing

• American pluralism
• Danger of disorder
• Efficiency and production
• Regulation can help foster change, mitigate effects of prejudice
Any organization that is anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti-Jew, and against the foreign element in this country, which comprises over 25 per cent of the voting strength of the country, is really a menace to the community.\textsuperscript{4}

Thomas Ryan (R-NYC), 1921\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{4}[HRG-1921-RUH-0001]

\textsuperscript{5}“Ku-Klux Klan,” Hearing before House Committee on Rules. HRG-1921-RUH-0001, p.8
Pluralism

Chicago is a melting pot city, as you know. Chicago was built by the people of many lands, of every race, creed, color, and ethnic origin. . . Negroes are not the only segment of our population that has benefited from the city’s [fair employment] policy, for nationality and religious groups benefit when the employer adopts fair employment practices.

Richard J. Daley, 1961

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Prejudice of course cannot be eliminated by legislative act or edict, but discrimination—the outward social manifestation of prejudice—can be corrected by legislation and perhaps only by legislation... Although a constantly increasing percentage of the adult population is the product of (education), both prejudice and discrimination are very much in evidence. FEP legislation does work.

Rep. Adolph Sabath (D-Chi), 1955

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Power of Legislation

Law is an effective instrument for changing social conditions and law acts as a powerful factor in preventing discrimination. It fosters the conviction that discrimination is wrong by fixing standards which are respected by the majority of the people. Because people as a rule are law-abiding, their behavior tends to create customs which are in harmony with the law.

Rep. Victor Anfuso (D-NYC), 1955

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Danger of disorder

We [in Detroit] get the jitters. We feel that we are sitting on a powder keg. Our race riot of last summer is still fresh in our memories. . . . Whatever measure of racial harmony we enjoy today in our industrial racial relationships in Detroit is largely attributable to the work of the present FEPC. . . more important than mere civil society and union cooperation.

Clarence Anderson,
Metropolitan Detroit FEP Council, 1944

HRG-1944-EDS-0004, p. 87
Danger of disorder

*If people were permitted to discriminate against others because of their skin color or religion in a city like New York, the whole structure of life would soon break down...*

James Sheldon, Chair of the NY Metro. Council on FEP, 1944

---

Urban arguments for racial liberalism, 1926-1949

Previous arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens

New racial liberalism: urban framing

- American pluralism
- Danger of disorder
- Efficiency and production
- Federal legislation can help foster change, mitigate effects of prejudice
Urban arguments for racial liberalism, 1926-1949

Previous arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens

New racial liberalism: urban framing

- American pluralism
- Danger of disorder
- Efficiency and production
- Federal legislation can help foster change, mitigate effects of prejudice

Despite racial division at home, urban representatives make racial liberalism an urban position at the national level.
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

How do cities pursue a “city interest” in higher arenas? (Burns et al 2009)

- Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
- Articulate the city position
- Encourage non-city co-partisans to defer to city position
- Defend/represent that position cohesively
Civil Rights Roll Calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year*</th>
<th># of votes</th>
<th>Subject(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Frederick Douglass Statue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>School Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Fair Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission, Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission, Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unclear from AIP data what civil rights dimension of this appropriations roll call was. (Source: AIP data)
Proportions of legislators supporting liberal position on House civil rights votes, 1900-1963: At left, proportion of caucuses voting for pro-civil rights position. At Right: Among non-southern Democrats, city representatives were more likely to support civil rights earlier, and they were more supportive later. (Source: Voteview, AIP)
Multivariate Analysis, Civil Rights Liberalism 1933-1963

DV: Agreement with African American position

Predictors of interest

- Urbanicity (City-Suburban-Rural district indicator)
- City delegation descriptor (Indicator for white MCs from city delegation with black MC of the same party)
- Local party strength (TPO score, interacted with Democrat indicator)

Alternative explanations

- Congressional Party (Democrat indicator)
- Section (Non-south indicator)
- Constituency Pressures (Union Density, % Afam, %Far Left)

Sample: Civil Rights roll calls, 73rd-88th Congress
Logit, robust SEs clustered by legislator, vote and congress fixed effects

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Logit regression: Agreement with African American position on civil rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Marginal Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity (7)</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Partner (2)</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>(0.875)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO (4)</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem (1)</td>
<td>-1.554**</td>
<td>(0.402)</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO*Dem</td>
<td>0.466**</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>.25 (See Fig)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-South Dem. (2)</td>
<td>2.149**</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-South (2)</td>
<td>1.692**</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Margin of Victory</td>
<td>-1.694**</td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp;Far Left</td>
<td>-0.365</td>
<td>(3.582)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%BlackVEP</td>
<td>4.210</td>
<td>(2.572)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Blue collar</td>
<td>2.959</td>
<td>(2.385)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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*p < .05 **p < .01, N = 10,313, R² = .47 Sources: CSR; AIP; Voteview

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Predicted Probability of support for racially liberal position by Party and local party strength (Interaction interpretation), 1933-1963. While Republicans from high-TPO places were no more likely to support the racially liberal position than Republicans from weak-party places, Democrats from strong party organizations were (maybe) about 25 percent more likely to take such a position than their copartisans from places with weak local parties.
City IHIs

City representatives supported civil rights liberalism

- Related to local institutions and “city interest”

- Racism present in streets and city hall, but not in national representation

Analyze IHIs and cohesion directly
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

How do cities pursue a “city interest” in higher arenas? (Burns et al 2009)

- Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
- Articulate the city position
- Encourage non-city co-partisans to defer to city position
- Defend/represent that position cohesively
Average City Delegation Cohesion on Civil Rights Votes. Series smoothed over time for visibility. Cohesion scores calculated using Desposato (2005). Dotted line indicates congressional party average on all RCs.
Pairwise cohesion

Delegation-level cohesion may be due to other factors

- Partisan composition
- Demographic similarity

Analyze dyads

- Pairs of representatives are building blocks of delegations
- Can account for some alternative hypotheses: PARTY
- Two steps to representation: selection and voting
Regression: Dyadic agreement on civil rights

Unit of analysis: Dyad of two voting legislators
Pool: Civil rights votes, 1933-1963
DV: Agreement on vote
Explanatory: Similarity on...
  • Shared city institutions
  • Shared National Party
  • Constituency similarities (geography, demography, politics)
Dyad-level agreement on Civil Rights, 1933-1963. Dyads from strong-party cities were more likely to agree on civil rights roll calls. Key explanatory variables of interest highlighted in gray. Marginal effects for statistically significant coefficients estimated as expected change in likelihood of dyad agreement given one-category shift in the dependent variable, other variables held constant at appropriate values (*p < .10, **p < .05). Significance estimated with non-parametric shuffling procedure described in Rader et al 2014; significance at p < .10 means that observed test statistic (Z-score) lies outside 5-95 percentile range of test statistics for that coefficient in simulated models. Estimated with an intercept, congress-, and vote-level fixed effects not listed here.
Dear Mr. O'Hara:

We are against any form of "Open Occupancy" as it is a direct violation of Article 3 and 4 of our Bill of rights. We will never accept these people. We will be watching how you vote on this issue. We are also opposed to the civil marches which breed hatred and violence.
I know the area where you live and I respect the people who have spent not only their money but their energy in keeping up their homes. There is nothing in H. R. 14765 which would necessitate concern on your part. Do not panic!

Cordially and sincerely,

Barratt O'Hara, M. C.

Predictive Margins of Dem with 90% CIs

Predicted Probability of support for racially liberal position by Party and TPO (Interaction interpretation), 1967-1971. As in Figure 3. The relationship between party strength is positive for Democrats, but not for Republicans.

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Antiracism without Antiracists

City IHIs associated with early support for civil rights in House

- Pursue urbanizing strategy, while GOP and non-urbanites silent
- Nearly unanimous support for civil rights by those who share local party with Afam Rep
- 7 percent increase in likelihood of support for civil rights by those in big cities context
- 25 percent increase in support for civil rights for strong-local-party Dems v weak
- 11 percent increase in dyadic cohesion among strong party copartisans on civil rights votes.

Local institutions, not (only) ideologically anti-racist, driving national political change
Paradoxes of City Representation: Race

Local-National differences

- “Sharp racial edge” in cities
- Building local coalition with national positions
- Different “portfolios” across levels
- Not-that-cheap talk
Paradoxes of City Representation: Race

Undemocratic liberalism?

- Racial Threat and Ethnic Whites
- “Conservative” perspective not voiced or voted by machine representatives—at least nationally
- Imperfect but certainly *better*
Big picture

- Local institutions influence character of higher-level representation
- Polarization, Ideology, and Urbanicity
- Racial-Ideological Orders v. Uneasy Alliances
- Democracy and Diversity
Thank you!
Urbanicity associated with civil rights liberalism...
...But not exactly overwhelming
Group means on DW-NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores, 1930-1970. In the chamber as a whole, and outside the South, city representatives were more liberal on average.

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Model of Representation: City delegations

- Jurisdictional (Border) and Organizational (Party)
- IHIs vary over space and time
- H: Local IHIs foster cohesive representation
- H: Cities with strong IHIs will be more cohesive
Do IHIs Enhance Cohesion? Hypotheses

Jurisdictional:

\[ H_{\text{Jurisdictional}} : C_{\text{City}} > C_{\text{Metro,Suburbs}} \]  \quad (1)

Organizational:

\[ H_{\text{Organizational}} : C_{\text{StrongIHI}} > C_{\text{WeakIHI}} \]  \quad (2)
Jurisdictional IHI: Municipal Boundary

Percent Black, Congressional Districts

- 0.00 - 0.05
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- 0.26 - 0.50
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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Forces for cohesion

Municipal

- Common local political identity
- Intergovernmental transfers go downtown, not to district
- Norms of reciprocity, repeated interaction
“Legislative Prospects of the Federal Urban Mass Transit Bill... as of now there is only a total of about 195 votes for the bill.”
“It is necessary that another hard count be made of the following [NYC Congressmen]... it will be appreciated if the NYC Transit Authority will... secure the kind of commitment that will stand up.”
Jurisdictional IHI: City Government as Whip

MEMORANDUM FROM

BERNARD A. RUGGERI
ASSISTANT TO THE MAYOR

6/4/64

To: The Mayor

From: B.J.R.

I communicated with the following Congressmen concerning their vote on the Federal Mass Transit Bill:

Congressman Carey - will vote for the bill
Congressman Murphy - 
Congressman O’Brien - 
Congressman Pike - 
Congressman Stratton - is undecided; understood that New York City would not get any money under the bill. Asked for any information we have to the contrary (I had the Transit Authority send it to him.)

Congressman Kelly - will vote for the bill.

Congressman Powell - I could not reach.

B.J.R.

JUL 9 1964
Organizational IHI: Party

Democratic Slate Makers Confer on Candidates

Pres. Johnson: Did you know [Libonati] had the best voting record of any congressman, as far as I am concerned? 98 percent [party loyalty votes].

Mayor Daley: Well, the fella we’ll send down there will have 99.\(^{11}\)

(Frank Annunzio, the actual successor, was 100% party-loyal in the following congress.)

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\(^{11}\) Conversation between Richard J. Daley and Lyndon Johnson, tape no. 6369, Miller Center Archives, University of Virginia.
Mechanisms for cohesion

Municipal

- Common local political identity
- City government controls allocation to city districts
- Norms of reciprocity, repeated interaction
- Progressive ambition

Organizational/Partisan

- Control access to nomination (Mayhew 1986)
- Mobilize, win all elections, not just local offices
- Politicians “brung up” in local organizations remain “that way” (Wilson, Snowiss)
Observable implications: Delegation level

City delegations will be more cohesive:

- Than sets of representatives not from single local political jurisdiction (eg. suburbs, metro area, national party) (Jurisdictional)

- If they have strong local partisan institutions (eg. Chicago v. LA) (Organizational)
Observable implications: Delegation level

City delegations will be more cohesive:

- Than sets of representatives not from single local political jurisdiction (eg. suburbs, metro area, national party) (Jurisdictional)

- If they have strong local partisan institutions (eg. Chicago v. LA) (Organizational)
Cities are more cohesive than other blocs

Chicago

New York City

Philadelphia

Los Angeles

Tom Ogorzalek  Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Stronger organizations, more cohesion

Average City Delegation Cohesion on Roll Calls. Series smoothed over time for visibility. Cohesion scores calculated using Desposato (2005). Dotted line indicates congressional party average on all RCs.
Proportion of House Southerners in Democratic Party

Share of Southern House seats held by Democrats, post-Civil War congresses. (Census Regional Definition)
District Heterogeneity, not just diversity
District Heterogeneity, not just diversity
District Heterogeneity, not just diversity
District Heterogeneity, not just diversity

Cross-District Heterogeneity Among Congressional Delegations (1960-2000): City delegations are almost always more internally heterogeneous than suburban delegations. *Source: USR data, Lublin (1997)*

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Appearances by big-city mayors. Before the 1930s, mayors seldom appeared before Congressional committees to provide testimony. They visited Washington with increasing frequency through the fiscal crises of the 1970s. Their presence has diminished, but leveled off at a rate much higher than before the 30s. Source: ProQuest Congressional.
Total urban roll call votes, and urban votes as proportion of all roll call votes, 45th-100th Congresses. The number of votes about urban issues has increased since the beginning of the urban interlude. The proportion of the overall agenda taken up by urban issues was generally high throughout the period, and peaked in the 88th congress (1959-1961). Source: AIP
Urban-Rural Cleavage: Congress

Congressional Districts, by urbanicity-type

District Urbanicity-type by Party

Source: CSR data

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Urban-Rural Cleavage: Congressional Leadership

Proportion of House cartel members, by urbanicity

Proportion of members of prestige committees, by urbanicity

Proportion of members of banking committee, by urbanicity

Source: CSR data
Urban Win Rates: Congress

City Bloc Win Rates by Vote Type

City Bloc Leverage

Source: CSR data
There hasn’t always been an urban-rural voting divide

County-level support for Democratic Candidates in 1932, 1960, and 2016 by population density in 25 states. Y-axis is proportion for Democratic Candidate less proportion for Republican. X-Axis is log of population density (persons/sqmi). Lines are local-fit curves for visual clarity. Support for FDR top left, JFK top right, Clinton bottom. Sources: Clubb Flanigan Zingale (2006), McGovern (2016), and National Historic GIS
Urban−Rural Divide, 1932

(Log of) Population Density

%Dem−%Repub

−0.5 0.0 0.5

AL

AZ CA

0 5 10

CO FL

IL... MO MS NC NE

NJ NY OH OR

−0.5 0.0 0.5

PA

−0.5

0.0

0.5

TN TX

VA WA

−0.5 0.0 0.5

WI

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Urban–Rural Divide, 1960

(Log of) Population Density

%Dem−%Repub

−0.5
0.0
0.5

AL

AZ CA

CO FL

IL...MO MS NC NE

NJ NY OH OR

PA

TN TX

VA WA

WI

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Urban–Rural Divide, 2008

(Log of) Population Density

%Dem−%Repub

-0.5
0.0
0.5

AL
AZ CA
CO FL
IL...MO MS NC NE
NJ NY OH OR
PA
TN TX VA WA
WI

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Urban–Rural Divide, 2016

(Log of) Population Density

%Dem−%Repub

−0.5
0.0
0.5

AL

AZ CA

CO FL

IL ... MO MS NC NE

NJ NY OH OR PA

TN TX

VA WA

WI

Tom Ogorzalek  Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Motivation
City Delegations
Civil Rights
Urbanizing Race
Liberalism
Cohesion
Back Matter

1950

Tom Ogorzalek
Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
**Weighted Disproportionality in House Seats**

**Distinctiveness in House Seats by Place-character**

- **Group-fractionalization by district place-character.** At left, the summary measure of weighted disproportionality. Higher values mean City, Suburban, and Rural districts are increasingly different from each other in partisan terms. At right, the general increase in place-character disproportionality is disaggregated. Higher values mean a given bloc is more different from the other blocs. *Source: CSR data*
Group-fractionalization by region. At left, overall regional disproportionality. Higher values mean higher differences across regions. At right, distinctiveness disaggregated by region. Higher values mean a given bloc is more different from the other 3 blocs. Source: CSR data
Partisanship and place-type over time. At left, the partisan balance of city districts. At right, the proportion of Democratic members of the House of Representatives that are from city districts. Source: CSR data.
At left: Mean DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores by urbanicity group over time. Lower scores mean more liberal/Democratic. At right: Mean DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores by party and urbanicity/region subgroup. Lower scores mean more liberal/Democratic.
Proportion of House Southerners in Democratic Party

Share of Southern House seats held by Democrats, post-Civil War congresses. (Census Regional Definition)
Tom Ogorzalek Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Civil Rights Liberalism, 1899–1963

Civil Rights Liberalism, Non–Southern Democrats, 1899–1963
Logit Coefficients for Alternative Specifications of Model of Civil Rights Support, 1933–1963

Standardized Coefficients

Urbanicity
TPO
Democrats
Democrats # TPO
Non-Southern Dem
Non-Southern
%Margin of Victory
%Far Left
%Black VEP (Alt)
union_std
%Black VEP
%Native-born white
% Union (in state)
Black Partner
%Blue Collar

Standardized Coefficients

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Proportion African American, Los Angeles Census Tracts, 1940

Tom Ogorzalek Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Proportion African American, Los Angeles Congressional Districts, 76th Congress (1939-1941)
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Proportion African American, Philadelphia Census Tracts, 1940

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Proportion African American, Philadelphia Congressional Districts, 76th Congress (1939-1941)

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Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Antiracism without Antiracists

City IHIs associated with early support for civil rights in House

- Pursue urbanizing strategy, while GOP and non-urbanites silent
- Unanimous support for civil rights by those who share local party with Afam Rep
- 7 percent increase in likelihood of support for civil rights by those in strong IHI context

Local institutions driving national political change
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

How do cities pursue a “city interest” in higher arenas? (Burns et al 2009)

- Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
- Articulate the city position
- Defend/represent that position cohesively
- Encourage non-city co-partisans to defer to city position
Unanimity Among City Delegations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>IHI strength</th>
<th>All votes</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>IR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYC</td>
<td>Halfway</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAX</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td>13962</td>
<td>10185</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>2814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of votes on which city delegations were unanimous, Congresses 70-100: Cities with strong IHIs are unanimous more often than cities with weaker IHIs. Source: USR Data, AIP
Forces for cohesion/Vertical integration

Municipal

• Common local political identity
• Intergovernmental transfers go downtown, not to district
• Norms of reciprocity within organization, repeated interaction

Organizational/Partisan

• Strong local organizations control access to nomination (Mayhew 1986)
• Strong local organizations can mobilize, win all elections, not just local
• Politicians “brung up” in local organizations remain “that way” (Wilson, Snowiss)
Chicago, Percent black in census tracts, 1940. African Americans were heavily concentrated within cities like Chicago.

Residential segregation led to political segregation: few congressmen had many black constituents.

Tom Ogorzalek

Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
**City Delegation Theory:** Local city IHIs complicate the traditional model of Congressional representation (denoted by the relationships of $A_1$, $A_2$, and $C$). Factors external to both district and chamber will influence representation.
Representation: selection

Jurisdictional:

\[ Pr(Party) = \text{City} + \text{Region} + \text{Section} + \text{State} + \text{Race} + \text{Class} + \text{Urbanicity} + \epsilon \]  

Organizational:

\[ Pr(Party) = \text{City*TPO} + \text{City} + \text{TPO} + \text{Region} + \text{Section} + \text{State} + \text{Race} + \text{Class} + \text{Urbanicity} + \epsilon \]  

- Measures are similarity on dimension in question.
- Vote- and Congress-level fixed effects
- Robust SEs and non-parametric estimation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pool (Dyads)</td>
<td>All (45+)</td>
<td>All (77+)</td>
<td>All (77+)</td>
<td>All (77+)</td>
<td>City Only (77+)</td>
<td>Same City Only (77+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congresses</td>
<td>All (77+)</td>
<td>All (77+)</td>
<td>All (77+)</td>
<td>City Only (77+)</td>
<td>Same City Only (77+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City*TPO</td>
<td>.28* (0.039)</td>
<td>.29* (0.039)</td>
<td>.31* (0.036)</td>
<td>.37* (0.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SameCity</td>
<td>.44* (.011)</td>
<td>.51* (.015)</td>
<td>.52* (.016)</td>
<td>.31* (.035)</td>
<td>.39* (.036)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High TPO</td>
<td>-.068* (.002)</td>
<td>-.08* (.004)</td>
<td>-0.11* (.004)</td>
<td>-0.24* (.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SameState</td>
<td>-.088* (.003)</td>
<td>-0.12* (.004)</td>
<td>-.11* (.004)</td>
<td>-0.11* (.004)</td>
<td>-0.24* (.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SameSection</td>
<td>.25* (.0012)</td>
<td>.09* (.001)</td>
<td>.12* (.002)</td>
<td>.11* (.002)</td>
<td>-.14* (.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SameRegion</td>
<td>.17* (.001)</td>
<td>.17* (.002)</td>
<td>.17* (.002)</td>
<td>.18* (.002)</td>
<td>.12* (.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>.0097* (.0038)</td>
<td>.013* (.0062)</td>
<td>.012* (.001)</td>
<td>.012* (.0011)</td>
<td>.007* (.011)</td>
<td>.026 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-0.12* (.012)</td>
<td>-0.12* (.012)</td>
<td>-0.14* (.012)</td>
<td>-0.39* (.019)</td>
<td>-1.63* (.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>-0.006 (.06)</td>
<td>-0.11 (.0659)</td>
<td>-1.14* (.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.83* (1.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>-.005* (.0002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Probit Regression Results: City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Congress and vote fixed effects not listed here. *p < .05

Tom Ogorzalek  Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Marginal effects of IHI and other explanatory variables on Congressional Party Affinity, 78th-105th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dyads</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>City Only</td>
<td>Same City Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Post-78)</td>
<td>(Post-78)</td>
<td>(Post-78)</td>
<td>(Post-78)</td>
<td>(Post-78)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City*TPO</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO</td>
<td>-0.027*</td>
<td>-0.032*</td>
<td>-0.042*</td>
<td>-0.032*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>-0.034*</td>
<td>-0.050*</td>
<td>-0.042*</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.040*</td>
<td>0.043*</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.069*</td>
<td>0.070*</td>
<td>0.070*</td>
<td>-0.049*</td>
<td>-0.049*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>0.0039*</td>
<td>0.0050*</td>
<td>0.0046*</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RaceSim</td>
<td>-0.052*</td>
<td>-0.055*</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.52*</td>
<td>-0.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClassSim</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.0045</td>
<td>-0.45*</td>
<td>4.35*</td>
<td>4.35*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Marginal Effects: City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. *p < .05
Strength of Same-city effect on large-city dyads by organization-type. Congressional dyads, 1939-1999. Difference in slope significant at $p < .05$. Diff-in-diff: .09
Motivation

City Delegations

Civil Rights

Urbanizing Race

Liberalism

Cohesion

Back Matter

Jursidctional:

\[ Pr(AgreeVote) = City + Party + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

Organizational (Same City Only):

\[ Pr(AgreeVote) = TPO + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)
## Tests of City IHI Influence on Roll Call Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Pool</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Congresses)</td>
<td>All (73-89)</td>
<td>All (78+)</td>
<td>All (78+)</td>
<td>City Votes (78+)</td>
<td>Same City, Party (78+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>.18* (.01)</th>
<th>.24* (0.013)</th>
<th>.24* (.012)</th>
<th>.37* (.014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.65* (.001)</td>
<td>.72* (0.001)</td>
<td>.71* (0.001)</td>
<td>.74* (0.0016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High TPO</td>
<td>.065* (.003)</td>
<td>.050* (0.004)</td>
<td>.03* (0.004)</td>
<td>.034* (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>.045* (.001)</td>
<td>.005* (0.002)</td>
<td>-.02* (0.002)</td>
<td>-.068* (0.002)</td>
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<td>Section</td>
<td>.01* (.002)</td>
<td>-.004* (0.002)</td>
<td>.0002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-.035* (0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>.023* (.0016)</td>
<td>.030* (0.0005)</td>
<td>.032* (0.0005)</td>
<td>.050* (0.0006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>-.3* (.016)</td>
<td>-.20* (0.018)</td>
<td>-.24* (0.018)</td>
<td>-.37* (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>.015* (.0030)</td>
<td>.014* (.0005)</td>
<td>.014* (.0005)</td>
<td>.15* (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>.007* (.0002)</td>
<td>.007* (.0002)</td>
<td>.007* (.0002)</td>
<td>.007* (.0002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Pseudo-\(R^2\) | .06 | .06 | .07 | .119 | .16 |
| N             | 6,407,860 | 4,621,162 | 4,621,162 | 8,272,388 | 11671 |

**Probit Regression Results:** DV: agreement on vote, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Shaded rows are coefficients of interest. All models include (unlisted) congress- and vote-specific fixed effects, and model 7 also includes city fixed effects. \(*p < .05\)
Motivation

City Delegations

Civl Rights

Urbanizing Race

Liberalism

Cohesion

Back Matter

Probit regression: Dyad-level agreement on civil rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>All Dyads</td>
<td>SameCity</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03*</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-city only</td>
<td>SameParty</td>
<td>.015*</td>
<td>.0047</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Same City, Same party</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>.081**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.039**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>1.13**</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.38**</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSRsim</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.416*</td>
<td>.11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Racesim</td>
<td>1.38**</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Classsim</td>
<td>4.56**</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%FarLeftsim</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Psuedo-(R^2)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.99**</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>2,288,558</td>
<td>177,655</td>
<td>6,430</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Dyad-level agreement on Civil Rights, 1933-1963. Dyads from strong-party cities were more likely to agree on civil rights roll calls. Key explanatory variables of interest highlighted in gray. Marginal effects for statistically significant coefficients estimated as expected change in likelihood of dyad agreement given one-category shift in the dependent variable, other variables held constant at appropriate values (*\(p < .10\), **\(p < .05\)). Significance estimated with non-parametric shuffling procedure described in Rader et al 2014; significance at \(p < .10\) means that observed test statistic (Z-score) lies outside 5-95 percentile range of test statistics for that coefficient in simulated models. Estimated with an intercept, congress-, and vote-level fixed effects not listed here.

Tom Ogorzalek Anti-Racism without Anti-Racists
Mean 2nd–Dim. DW scores

In the chamber as a whole, and outside the South, city representatives were more liberal on average.

Group means on DW-NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores, 1930-1970.汤姆·奥格罗泽克 《反种族主义者的反种族主义》
**Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE second-dimension scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>(Robust Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity(7)</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>(0.029)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat(2)</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>(0.018)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South(2)</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>(0.021)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>(0.013)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE 2nd Dimension scores, 1930-1960.** City representatives were on average more “liberal” than suburban or rural representatives on issues of race and region. (*p < .01, N=6313, $R^2 = .70$)
Multivariate Analysis, Civil Rights Liberalism 1933-1963

DV: Agreement with African American position

Predictors of interest

- Urbanicity (City-Suburban-Rural district indicator)
- City delegation descriptor (Indicator for white MCs from city delegation with black MC of the same party)
- Local party strength (TPO score, interacted with Democrat indicator)

Alternative explanations

- Congressional Party (Democrat indicator)
- Section (Non-south indicator)
- Constituency Pressures (Union Density, % Afam, %Far Left)

Sample: Civil Rights roll calls, 73rd-88th Congress

Logit, robust SEs clustered by legislator, vote and congress fixed effects
## Civil Rights Roll Calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year*</th>
<th># of votes</th>
<th>Subject(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Frederick Douglass Statue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>School Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Fair Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission, Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission, Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Unclear from AIP data what civil rights dimension of this appropriations roll call was. *(Source: AIP data)*
Logit regression: Agreement with African American position on civil rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coeff. (Robust SE)</th>
<th>Mfx</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity (7)</td>
<td>0.173** (0.038)</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackPartner ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO*Dem</td>
<td>0.519* (0.211)</td>
<td>(Fig.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO (5)</td>
<td>0.083 (0.126)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-south Dem. Seat (2)</td>
<td>2.705** (0.452)</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Seat (2)</td>
<td>-1.064* (0.501)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-south(2)</td>
<td>1.311** (0.368)</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackVEP (%)</td>
<td>1.728 (3.755)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union (%)</td>
<td>0.067** (0.011)</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of Vic. (%)</td>
<td>-1.060** (0.322)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dem</td>
<td>-1.705** (0.550)</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% FarLeft</td>
<td>3.393 (8.862)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civil Rights Liberalism, 1933-1963.** ***City representatives and those with a black partner in their city delegation were more likely to support civil rights. Local black partnership was perfect predictor of support, those observations are dropped from this model. Exclusion of the variable does not reduce the magnitude or significance of the other predictors of interest. Marginal effects estimated as expected change in likelihood of agreement given one-category shift in the dependent variable, other variables held constant at appropriate values (*p < .05, **p < .01 N=7620, Psuedo-$R^2 = .49$. Estimated with an intercept, vote-level fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by legislator.)
Probability of support for racially liberal position by TPO (Interaction interpretation). While Republicans from strong-party places were no more likely to support the racially liberal position, Democrats from strong party organizations were about 37 percent more likely to take such a position than their copartisans from places with weak local parties.
City IHIs

City representatives supported civil rights liberalism

- Related to local institutions and “city interest”
- Racism present in streets and city hall, but not in national representation

Analyze IHIs and cohesion directly
Dyadic Estimation: Significance Test

Dyadic Agreement as DV

- Observations not independent (voters appear in many dyads)
- Higher change of Type 1 Error with Robust Standard Errors
- Non-Parametric Significance Test (Rader et al 2014)
- Shuffle explanatory variable of interest 1000x
- Save simulated test statistics, compare distribution to observed
Dyadic Estimation: Significance Test

Significance of SameCity, Model 5, Dyad Vote Analysis. Density plot of simulated Z-scores
Cohesion scores

Cohesion: To what extent is a bloc voting cohesively?

- 1 = Perfect Cohesion, 0 = Evenly split

- Cohesion = \[ \frac{|Yea - Nay|}{Total} \]

- Bias correction when comparing blocs of very different sizes (Desposato 2005)

\[ E(C|Yea, Nay, Total) = \frac{Yea(Yea-1)+Nay(Nay-1)}{Total(Total-1)} \]

Likeness: How alike are two blocs of voters?

- 1 = Identical in proportions, 0 = Completely in disagreement

- Likeness_{AB} = 1 - \left| \frac{Yea_A}{Total_A} - \frac{Yea_B}{Total_B} \right|