ABSTRACT: For the last several decades, historians have studied America’s post-Civil War Reconstruction by focusing on the eastern United States and, even more so, the South. With its intensive focus on state and local developments, this literature has deeply enriched our understanding of the period. Yet, as this paper and presentation will demonstrate, concern over the South by no means inhibited an active interest and often deep concern for the wider world. In fact, Americans braided vibrant discussions of international affairs and domestic developments together as part of a larger conversation concerning their national character and purpose. Focusing on an insurrection on the island of Crete against Ottoman imperial rule from 1866 to 1869, this paper explores the interconnections between foreign and domestic affairs and the importance of nationalism in the political culture of Reconstruction-era America.
“Crete the Opening Wedge”: International Affairs and American Worldviews during Reconstruction

“Thou sobbing captive in a sea of smiles,  
Whose fairy sails on sunny errands flee,  
Shall the blue waves that bless thy sister isles  
Bind on thy brow the curse of slavery?  
--Unattributed

“Oh! what were the projects you made, Mrs. Howe,  
When you went where the Cretans were making a row?  
Emancipation—civilization—redintegration of a great nation,  
Paying no taxes, grinding no axes—  
Flinging the Ministers over the banisters.  
These were the projects of good Mrs. Howe  
When she went where the Cretans were making a row.”  
-- Julia Ward Howe

From August of 1866 to the spring of 1869, an insurrection by Greek Orthodox Christians on the island of Crete against Ottoman imperial rule drew the attention of Americans from California to Canea and from Massachusetts to Memphis. Although the Cretan Insurrection, as it was often called, may now seem an obscure and trivial foreign affair, contemporary Americans readily discussed it and easily invested it with meaning. To uncover why, we must look anew at the relationships between America’s North-South sectional conflict, the nation, and international affairs. Although ongoing sectional strife remained central to American politics and culture after the Civil War, this by no means precluded or even inhibited interest in the world beyond. Instead, even as Americans discussed, debated, and died over Reconstruction, they found themselves searching further afield for the means to articulate and affirm their rival understandings of what kind of country they could and should create.
Historians of Reconstruction have neglected foreign affairs—the Cretan Insurrection included—due to an intensive focus on social, economic, and political conditions in states, counties, and localities in the eastern United States, especially the South. Certainly, this approach has with great insight and rigor produced a much richer and more balanced understanding of Reconstruction. Yet in the process, our understanding of the broader political culture of Reconstruction, rife with discussions of national and international affairs, has remained underdeveloped. Fortunately, a handful of studies from the past decade have started to uncover the ways in which contemporaries blurred lines between and braided their discussions of the South, the nation, and the world. Building on these, this essay explores the ways in which Reconstruction-era Americans treated sectional, national, and international arenas as overlapping and interrelated spheres of interpretation and action. As American discussions of the Cretan Insurrection demonstrate, the worldviews arrayed against each other during Reconstruction were precisely that: worldviews. Contemporary Americans did not limit the scope of their interest to their locality, state, or country, nor did their perspectives emerge solely from domestic experiences. In fact, the terms “foreign” and “domestic” were themselves part of a debate, central to the political culture of Reconstruction, over what America was, who was a citizen, and what were the proper relationships between insiders and outsiders and the United States and the world.

Paradoxically, the tendency in Reconstruction historiography to disregard American interest and involvement in events abroad reflects the limited attention
it has devoted to nationalism. Eric Foner, for example, dedicates but a handful of pages of his landmark study, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877*, to note the growth of nationalism among northern Unionist during the war and southern freedpeople during Reconstruction. The continued lack of interest is especially striking given the now rich scholarship on the transformation and intensification of nationalism among both Unionists and Confederates during the Civil War. While some studies of Civil War nationalism do conclude with insightful sections on Reconstruction, they necessarily treat the period briefly. So too there are studies that look at the transformation of national identity from the end of the Civil War until the turn of the century but, given their chronological breadth, they are necessarily selective in their treatment of Reconstruction.

In fact, one of the most provocative insights on the legacy of Civil War nationalism comes from a work addressing its impact abroad. As David Potter has argued, the Union’s eventual commitment to emancipation and its ultimate victory convinced many in America and Europe that dedication to one’s nation could serve the causes of freedom and progress. For Potter, the Civil War was a decisive event that “fused the two great forces of the nineteenth century—liberalism and nationalism” so thoroughly that they became largely indistinguishable. In Europe, this fusion took shape in the context of independence struggles against monarchical empires, whereas in America the opponents were secessionist slaveholders. But in both cases, nationalism became synonymous with the contemporary liberal faith in and quest for material and moral progress along with freedom from coercive political and economic
relationships among men. Such liberal nationalists in Europe and America understood themselves to be in battle against reactionaries who embraced stasis, cruelty, and hierarchy.\textsuperscript{13} If Potter’s essay uses the terms “nationalism” and “liberalism” somewhat broadly, this in part reflects contemporary usage. American liberal nationalists did not actually share identical notions of what constituted freedom, progress, or even a nation among themselves or with Europeans.\textsuperscript{14} Yet, many Americans nonetheless convinced themselves that struggles for national independence in Europe embodied the same principles as the war to preserve the Union.\textsuperscript{15}

As the Cretan Insurrection demonstrates, a liberal nationalist spirit captivated many in the North after the Civil War and can be roughly associated with supporters of the Republican Party.\textsuperscript{16} Many Republicans, in fact, believed that with its domestic reactionaries chastened, the United States now embodied the principles of liberalism. The mantra of these Republican liberal nationalists was “civilization,” a word that signified to them the interlocking forces of freedom and progress. “Barbarism,” in contrast, described the stagnation and cruelty endemic to societies mired in coercive, iniquitous, and retrograde ways.\textsuperscript{17}

Believing that their new America represented “civilization,” Republicans concluded that spreading its institutions and values was a humanitarian enterprise. These institutions and values included not only free labor and elective government, but everything from modern technologies, to “commerce,” to their gendered, sentimental family values. As Republicans understood the cause of freedom and progress through an idealized version of their own lives, their
humanitarianism proved prone to contempt and outrage. Whether looking south, west, or abroad, Republicans could lament and disdain the presence of “barbarisms” wherever they perceived difference.

Democrats, in both the North and the South, espoused an alternative American nationalism. Despite their aversion to forced reunion, Democrats had few qualms over asserting a rival definition of American national identity, one that wedded ideals to a pronounced racism. As Drew Gilpin Faust, Peter Kolchin, and others have pointed out, the Confederates modeled themselves as the true inheritors of the American Revolution and American identity. It is therefore unsurprising that, once back in the Union on uncertain terms and with an equally uncertain future, ex-Confederates and their northern allies could turn to the language of American nationalism. This Democratic nationalism was a critical part of a multi-sided nationwide struggle to define the mission and membership of the reunified United States. As Kolchin has argued, focusing on both former slaves and former masters, “What was at stake in the Reconstruction struggle was not only what it meant to be a southerner, but also what it meant to be an American.”

This debate concerned not only the collective domestic identity and citizenship of the United States, but also America’s relationship with the wider world. Understanding Reconstruction therefore requires that we attend to how historians and contemporaries employed the distinction between things “foreign” and “domestic” with great care. As Amy Kaplan has shown, this distinction is an unstable and contested social construction that deals with the relationships
between people, places, and states. Too often, Reconstruction historiography neglects developments abroad when contemporaries followed them closely and anxiously. For Republicans, this broader interest stemmed from their belief that the struggle of “civilization” against “barbarism” transcended national borders. They found freedom fighters, sadistic patriarchs, savage warriors, indolent exploiters, and imperial despots at home and abroad. Democrats were critical of the global scope of Republican sympathy, yet they too turned their attention abroad to assert their understanding of America.

The causes of the Cretan Insurrection have been subject to passing disagreement among a small number of historians of modern Greece and American diplomacy. Regardless by the spring of 1866, an assembly of Greek Orthodox Cretans had remonstrated against the Ottoman governor of Crete, Ismael Pasha, in an appeal to the government of the Ottoman Empire, or the “Sublime Porte.” Confronting this challenge to his authority and mounting tensions between the island’s Greek Orthodox and Muslim populations, Ismael Pasha appears to have opted to confront the assembly of Greek Orthodox Cretans while calling the island’s Muslim population into the walled cities for protection. Tensions quickly boiled over into panic and violence. On August 28, 1866 the Cretan assembly declared the island’s independence and shortly thereafter union with Greece proper. The Ottoman Empire, along with its quasi-independent ally Egypt, blockaded the island and sent large armies to subdue the insurrection. The poorly prepared and lightly armed rebels proceeded to fight an
off-and-on guerilla war for two and half years. While pitched battles did occur, so
too did long interludes as the Ottoman and Egyptian forces remained near cities in
the coastal perimeter while the rebels occupied the mountainous interior. Starting
with the outbreak of the war, thousands of Greek Orthodox Cretans fled to
mainland Greece, the surrounding islands, and nearby mountains. 26

Despite the intermittent nature of fighting on Crete, a lack of ready
information, and repeated reports of the insurrection’s demise, Crete garnered
substantial Republican interest. 27 Certainly, there were Republicans who
hesitated to embrace the cause of the Cretan rebels, and others concerned with
developments elsewhere. 28 But Republican sympathy for the Cretan Insurrection
was common, developed with remarkable ease, and could be intense. Central to
Republican concern, as evinced in personal and official correspondence,
newspaper editorials, petitions to Congress, fundraising events, poems, and public
lectures, was the belief that the Cretan Insurrection was a struggle for freedom
and progress against a barbaric empire. Although official American support for
the Cretan Insurrection never went beyond some cautious statements of sympathy,
on the level of both public rhetoric and personal conviction, many Republicans
believed that the Cretan Insurrection spoke to American principles. 29

A handful of Republican humanitarians and diplomatic officials became
deeply concerned with the uprising. Particularly active were the American consul
on Crete, William J. Stillman, the New England philhellene Samuel Gridley
Howe, and his wife, Julia Ward Howe. Stillman not only wrote of the
insurrection in his diplomatic correspondence with the State Department, but also
for *The Nation* and *Atlantic Monthly*. After Stillman left the eastern Mediterranean in the summer of 1869, he wrote *The Cretan Insurrection* in 1870 – published in 1874 – and later devoted two chapters to Crete in his *Autobiography of a Journalist*. The Howes’ efforts on behalf of the Greek Orthodox Cretans began with speeches, a pamphlet, and the organization of fundraising committees in Boston and New York that mustered $37,000 in donations, over 20 cases of supplies, and nearly 400 breech loading rifles. The Howes then sailed to Greece and distributed this aid. Returning to Boston, Julia Ward Howe tried her hand at some poems for Crete and organized another fair while the couple published a nearly-monthly magazine, *The Cretan*. As with other Republicans, the underlying force shaping Stillman’s and the Howes’ reaction to the Cretan Insurrection was their faith that it was a fight against an exploitative and retrogressive despotism.

American press coverage of the insurrection facilitated Republican interest. Initially motivated in part by the insurrection’s significance in Europe geopolitics, the *New York Times*, the *New York Tribune*, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Sacramento Daily Union* all offered front-page coverage. News from Crete could slacken for weeks at a time, but leading newspapers offered detailed accounts of developments when information, however unreliable, was available. Leading magazines including *The Nation*, *Harper’s Weekly*, and *The Atlantic Monthly*, also discussed the insurrection. Public lectures further sustained interest. Wendell Phillips and Samuel Gridley Howe were among the more notable to give speeches in Boston on January, 1867 and March, 1868, while
Henry Ward Beecher spoke in New York City at a meeting presided over by the mayor in January, 1867. The *Chicago Tribune* reported that the English author and visitor to Crete, J. E. H. Skinner, lectured before a full house at the Christian Union Institute in April of 1868. Skinner had to explain some of the basic geographical features of Crete, but his audience already knew of the most dramatic events of the insurrection. The *Tribune* reported that “Everyone had read and heard of” a Turkish attack on the Orthodox monastery of Arkadi in November of 1866. Similarly, Stewart L. Woodford, the Lieutenant Governor of New York, gave an “interesting and eloquent lecture on Crete” in Steinway Hall, also in April of 1868, and “was listened to with deep attention by the large audience present.”

William J. Stillman sounded the earliest note of what would be a mounting chorus of Republican sympathy in his diplomatic dispatches to the State Department. Like other Republicans, he depicted a cruel, coercive, and retrogressive Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the insurrection, the Cretan rebels delivered to Stillman an appeal addressed to President Andrew Johnson, which Stillman then sent on to Secretary of State William Seward. Despite Stillman's expectation that the insurrection would prove futile, he stressed to Seward that “every word” of the appeal was “wrung from patriotic hearts by bitter and most unmerited oppression.” Stillman added that, if “the people of America” could only see how “a barbarous and licentious soldiery,” drove Greek Cretans from their homes, destroyed churches, and “paralyzed” industry, they could not help but be moved. In December of 1866, Stillman again described to Seward
how the insurrection had been “conducted with so much heroism and constancy on one side and savage barbarity on the other.” Stillman explained: “The sympathy I ought to feel for a people aspiring to freedom was, thus, much increased by the injustice of the Government and still more by its subsequent barbarity and excessive cruelty.”37 Stillman did not hesitate to conclude that he was moved to sympathy for the rebels because of his “American instincts.”38

Northern newspapers and magazines also stressed the “barbarity” of Ottoman rule and their sympathy for Cretan independence. The Ottoman attack on Greek Orthodox Cretan soldiers and civilians in the Monastery of Arkadi in November of 1866 became the most famous episode of supposed savagery. In its February 2, 1867 edition, Harper’s Weekly provided an overview of the insurrection that dwelt on Arkadi. The article explained that Crete had been “the theatre of many bloody attempts” on the part of the Greek Orthodox Cretans to achieve their independence from Ottoman rule. These Cretans, argued Harper’s, were motivated not only by “a common patriotic desire that Crete should be governed by Cretans,” but also by a “system of continued cruelties” that had “few parallels on record.” Harper’s claimed that while both sides fought with intense hatred in the current struggle, it was the Turkish Muslims who were guilty of “slaughtering without mercy to wreak their vengeance.” As Harper’s explained, the Greek Orthodox Cretans were “enduring great suffering, and even ending their own lives” to avoid being “borne away as captives of the infidel Moslem.” Harper’s then explained that “The most tragic event” in this war was the attack on Arkadi, and included an account of the attack from the Levant Herald – an
English language paper in Istanbul. The Herald reported that the much larger Turkish forces bombarded the monastery and its force of resilient rebels and innocent women and children for four days. When the Turkish forces finally breeched Arkadi’s outer walls, the rebel soldiers put up a desperate fight in the courtyard before taking refuge in the cellars, while hundreds of women and children barricaded themselves in the refectory. With these last defenses collapsing, explained the Levant Herald, “the insurgents after a short council,” resolved to blow themselves up.39

Harper’s Weekly drove home this depiction of rebel dignity with a “vivid sketch” from a Cretan resident of Istanbul familiar with the monastery (see Image 1). In it, Cretan soldiers fight in the background while Cretan men and women together strain to hold shut the last door between themselves and the Ottoman forces, represented by only an axe blade and a spear point. At the center of the sketch, a Cretan woman clutches a naked babe to her body and defiantly stares at the door, while Orthodox priests standing near her carry out the decision to ignite the rebels’ store of powder. Whether the sketch was originally drawn by a Greek Orthodox, an American, or someone else, its message to Harper’s readers was clear. Faced with an unrelenting Turkish onslaught, the Cretan rebels fought bravely and unceasingly. When overpowered, they preferred death to having their women and children fall into the hands of the Ottoman forces. At approximately the same time as Harper’s article on Akardi, the New York state legislature passed a concurrent resolution expressing “sympathy for the Greeks, who are now
struggling for freedom,” and urging “our national government to protest against the barbarous and inhuman system of warfare adopted by the Turks.”

The fame of Arkadi in America could compel coverage even among skeptics. Although *Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper* supported Reconstruction, and although it had an insatiable fascination with foreign affairs and foreign cultures, it initially derided American interest in the Cretan Insurrection. *Leslie’s* not only rejected the claim that the Greek Orthodox Cretans deserved Protestant sympathy, but went further to note that, even if such a claim were valid, America’s policy of non-intervention in European affairs left little room for action. Its wariness, however, did not prevent *Leslie’s* from repeatedly covering Arkadi in its illustrated European news section, nor from conceding that the insurrection was “exciting great attention all over the civilized world.” Nor did *Leslie’s* abandon coverage of the insurrection after the attack. As it explained nearly a year after Arkadi, Crete had so “engrossed the attention and enlisted the sympathies of the public” that *Leslie’s* was “induced” to better cover the insurrection. In doing so, all *Leslie’s* could do was question to how civilized the Greek Orthodox Cretans really were and caution, in a later column, that American entanglement abroad would cause “The fathers of the Republic” to turn “uneasily in their graves.”

Despite manifest cultural differences, Republicans regularly alleged that Greek Orthodox Cretans had virtues Americans could appreciate. Writing of his travels around Crete for the *Atlantic Monthly*, Stillman described the peasants of the Apokorona valley as a “hardy and independent breed, warlike to a degree.”
Similarly, the adjoining mountainous region of Sphakia was always the “abode of the bitterest resistance to local tyranny.” S. G. Howe praised Greeks as “the most intelligent, active, and cultivated” of the Christian races under Ottoman rule. Since the Greeks were rarely considered a “barbaric” people, whatever distinctiveness they had suggested to Republicans that they should be united in their own independent nation. Wendell Phillips stated clearly how the Greek’s foreignness actually justified American sympathy. “Crete stretches her arm across the Atlantic,” he explained, “and asks us to protest against Europe, and to advocate the American idea that every nation has the right to govern itself.”

The Howes and others described the “Turks” as foreign in more damning ways. While the “Turks” had once been “brave, warlike, and enterprising” during their medieval expansion, argued S. G. Howe, they had become a “ferocious race” disinclined to cultural progress. "[U]nder the demoralizing influences of Mahometanism” and polygamy, the “Turks” then became totally incapable of advancement. The height of the Howes’ revulsion was reserved for the alleged Turkish disregard for the affective bonds of sentimental family life. As S.G. Howe explained it, Turkish treatment of “boys, girls, and women,” violated civilized norms and was “often so cruel and so abominable that one can hardly find comprehensible language in which to speak of it.” Similarly, believing that the “Turks” survived by exploiting the industrious Greek Orthodox, the New York Times casually characterized the “Turks” as the “vapid and indolent” antithesis of the ideal free laborer. Likewise, Stillman claimed in the Atlantic Monthly that the Christian Cretan was “the only industrious citizen.” The inclinations of the
Ottomans, in these characterizations, were to destroy the emotional and economic bonds that propelled civilization.

In their discussions of the insurrection, Republican liberal nationalism also tapped into a longstanding faith in commerce and technology. Sympathizers claimed that, given freedom from Ottoman rule, Crete would begin to flourish economically. Writing for *Atlantic Monthly*, Stillman elaborated on how Ottoman misrule could be measured in the island’s poverty and lack of modern infrastructure. He explained how towns such as Canea suffered from “dilapidation and decay,” and offered little entertainment during the summer other than smoking “a nargile on the Marina, studying primitive civilization the while.” Stillman also noted how the “wretchedness of the roads,” combined with “benighted restrictions” on cabotage, prevented farmers from profitably selling their produce. When Stillman came across a bridge that had fallen into disrepair he opined, “Under the Turks, nothing but decay obtains.” The rural plain of Cydonia, he contended, was “capable of sustaining a much larger population than it now supports, if the Mohammedan blight were off it.” Stillman hoped it might return to its “prosperity and security” of classical days, for only “freedom is wanting now to restore both.”

Discussions of the insurrection’s geopolitical significance became another avenue for Republicans to assert their version of American nationalism. For decades the Great Powers of Europe had jockeyed for control in the eastern Mediterranean before a weakening Ottoman Empire. Republicans appreciated this in their own self-congratulatory ways. In an article titled, “The Eastern
Question—Crete the Opening Wedge,” the New York Times informed its readers of the “growing significance of the Cretan outbreak,” which it believed would spread revolution throughout the Ottoman Empire.57 A later article, “The Clouds Accumulating–Turkey About to Fall to Pieces,” argued that the backwards Turkish Empire would soon collapse under the forces of progress in southeastern Europe and sympathy from the west. 58 The New York Tribune similarly boasted how its foreign correspondents roamed from the capitals of Europe, to “Constantinople, where an effete Mohammedanism struggles in vain against the aggressive spirit of Christian civilization.”59 Despite their faith that the Ottoman Empire was near collapse, Americans also recognized that England and France might support the Ottomans to prevent Russian expansion.60

Republicans depicted England and France as callous global powers capable of understanding only their own strategic interests. In fact, claimed Samuel Gridley Howe, Crete had not been granted independence alongside Greece in 1832 because “European diplomats, just as indifferent to her rights as Asiatic despots had been, cruelly decreed that she must be sacrificed to propitiate Turkey.”61 England in particular became the target of much liberal nationalist ire.62 The Sacramento Daily Union asserted that the English elite had a “habitual indifference to moral and human considerations” and would help sustain “A loathsome, heathen despotism” to prevent Russian expansion.63 Similarly, when the Sultan went on a diplomatic tour of Europe, a correspondent for the New York Tribune referred to it as a “magnificent farce,” in which “enthusiastic Englishmen who went down on their knees in the mud before him.”64 Once again Harper’s
Weekly gave graphic expression to liberal nationalist sentiment (Image 2).

Responding to the Sultan’s diplomatic visit to England, Harper’s issued a political cartoon portraying John Bull stooping to kiss the hand of the Sultan and singing “God preserve thee, Sultan, long;/Ever keep thee from all woes:/May the State and thee be strong,/To dismay and resist thy foes!” The Sultan, meanwhile, whispers to his Grand Vizier, “These infidel John Bulls don’t see those little Massacres of their Christian brethren in Crete,” while Turkish flags float over a hillside attack on Cretan Christians in the background.

Set against England, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Power diplomacy in Republican writings was the great liberal nation of the United States. Stillman, for one, proved willing to step beyond his limited consular duties to advise Seward to take action on behalf of the Cretans. After noting how Turkish “barbarities” had drawn attention to the conflict, he suggested to Seward that benevolent influence abroad would be a source of national glory. Stillman then asked Seward, “May the friends of humanity not hope that America will lead off in a question where no political interest can stain the purity of her motives?”

The Howes also believed that American diplomatic recognition of the Cretan rebels, if granted soon, would “diffuse the lesson throughout Christendom” that America remained an uncompromising and unmatched defender of “freedom, civilization, virtue, and Christianity.” Frustrated by the limited and contradictory reports coming from Crete, the New York Times became critical of American diplomats in the East. Though the Times, like Frank Leslie’s, warned against formal American entanglement in the “Eastern Question,” it also argued
that America had a unique obligation to master diplomacy. “Untrammeled by the
traditional and selfish policy of the old dynasties,” claimed the *Times*, “the friends
of freedom and progress throughout the world justly expect from the United
States an attitude of intelligent sympathy toward them.” If the *Times* both urged
cautions and demanded sympathy, it was in large part because it believed influence
of freedom and progress was already “irresistible.”

The *Sacramento Daily Union* was more ambitious. It suggested that Europe recognized the Union’s
newfound strength and reminded readers that European monarchs had long
interfered in American affairs. “What if,” asked the *Union*, “the republic should
venture to retaliate, and begin to exercise an intervening influence in European
affairs in favor of free institutions?” Surely, claimed the *Union*, this could bring
American diplomacy in line with “the strength and mission of the republic,”
without necessarily leading to war.

If the American government failed to take action to aid the rebels,
Republicans still felt a national tie to Crete. For the Howes, the limited actions of
the American government reflected only Andrew Johnson’s ignorance of popular
sentiments. As they argued in an address to Congress published in *The Cretan,*
supporters of the insurrection “have the right to expect and demand, that, as soon
as the existing administration is overthrown, there shall be a radical change of our
foreign policy.” And if Seward had failed to recognize the provisional
government of Crete after two years of fighting, the Howes found some
consolation in their belief that it was “virtually” recognized “by the American
people.” Moreover, while European powers had strained their own consciences
by exerting themselves in the power politics of the Eastern Question, Americans had shown their sympathy through democratic action. American people, claimed the Howes, were also “doing a great deal… by the moral force of our ideas and institutions.”72 “America can save Crete,” quipped The Cretan, “even if Mr. Seward does not buy it.”73

Wishful though such thinking was, it was emblematic of the ease with which Republicans discussed foreign and domestic developments together. The supposed struggle between civilization and barbarism that sat at the center of the Republicans’ notion of America’s national mission itself defied borders. What resulted was a complex relationship involving the distinction between civilization and barbarism on the one hand and the distinction between things foreign and domestic on the other. The absences of a simple and rigid divide between foreign and domestic affairs was apparent in the border-crossing analogies and comparisons Republicans made as they discussed Crete.74

Republicans were quick to refer back to domestic stereotypes and historical memories when discussing the Cretan Insurrection. Interpretations of the Civil War, for one, were quick to come into play. Stillman, for example, stressed the connection to Seward by explaining that he had followed developments in Crete “with no less anxiety than that I felt during our own struggle with the criminal organization of the enemies of Freedom.”75 Similarly, the Howes explained, tersely, that reports of the insurrection’s demise had the “internal marks of having being [sic] written in Constantinople, by a copper-head employee of a republican government,” who had espoused “anti-American and
despotic ideas.”⁷⁶ The alleged disregard of the “Turks” for the affective bonds of the sentimental family found expression through comparisons to the Confederate prison of Andersonville. As the *New York Times* declared, “We are accustomed to shrink from contemplating the miseries of Andersonville; but they were perpetrated upon men—soldiers who had braved the horrors of war.” The *Times* demanded to know, “Shall such horrors go on, and the Christian world stand mute and unprotesting?”⁷⁷

Republicans made still further references to the practices of slave holders, Mormons, and Native Americans. S. G. Howe wrote that, while Cretan Christians could appeal to the local government, “so might once the unhappy negro in the center of Alabama [may perhaps again] apply to a white justice of the peace against his master!” Likewise, the Turkish rulers suffered under “the curse which slavery brought upon our Southern slavocrats; to wit, the power to make other men do their sweating.”⁷⁸ To those who thought Crete too distant to be of interest, *Harper’s Weekly* countered that many had once felt similarly about southern slavery.⁷⁹ If the Cretan rebels were made familiar through analogies, the “Turks” became only more different. *The Cretan* routinely equated the “Turks,” with their allegedly insatiable lusts and disregard for the family, with Mormons.⁸⁰ It claimed, for example, that “The English Government, the quondam champion of the slave Confederacy, sees fit to be also the champion of a Mormon Empire.”⁸¹ And *The Cretan* could only hope that America would cease indirect support for the “Mohammedan and Mormon slavocrats in the east” as it had its support for the “Southern slavocrats.”⁸² Comparisons to Native Americans also
worked to bring Cretan conditions home. When explaining how the “barbarous
nature of Turkish warfare” had produced so many Cretan refugees, S. G. Howe
noted that, “Even the Polish peasant did not thus fly before Russian armies; and
the only parallel is to be found among barbarians, or savages on our own
frontier.”

Paradoxically, even while these analogies blurred the distinction between
things “foreign” and “domestic,” they reaffirmed the Republican’s sense of
national mission. These Republicans ardently believed that the extension of their
“American” institutions and values was a humanitarian cause. Not surprisingly,
the spirit of this Republican liberal nationalism found zealous expression in The
Cretan. As it said of Cretan refugees at temporary, American-run schools in
Greece:

they will be imbued to some extent with American ideas. Every scholar
will grow up with a knowledge of, and partiality for, our people and for
our institutions. They will be half Americans. They will be native
missionaries from this generation to succeeding ones.

A flyer addressed to “the people of the United States” by one “New York
National Reconstruction Club” went further still (see Image 3). Following
the not uncommon practice of referring to Crete by its old Venetian name
Candia, it urged the United States to acquire the island. Doing so would
provide a naval and commercial outpost in the Levant, which, the flyer
argued, would soon be largely free from Ottoman control. Acquisition of the
island, however, would also mean a territory “in which we may establish
American Institutions.” Believing erroneously that the Ottoman government could not defeat the insurrection, the Club asserted that the Porte would be glad to sell the island. “Let us acquire Candia,” the flyer confidently suggested, “our commerce requires it, our mission among the Nations demands it.”

Democrats, North and South, also interpreted the Cretan Insurrection, and particularly Republican interest in it. The Constitution of Atlanta, the New York World, the Richmond Enquirer and Sentinel, and the Daily Memphis Avalanche were among those who challenged Republican understandings of the insurrection. For Democrats, Crete became a means of expressing both their sectional grievances – particularly against Radical Republicans – and a rival strain of nationalism that wedded freedom to a rigid and pronounced understanding of race. While Republicans no doubt harbored racial prejudices, race itself remained loosely defined and largely latent in their discussion of the insurrection. For Democrats, in contrast, race signified the irrevocable superiority of specific peoples and the obligations of northerners to their fellow “whites” in the South.

The Constitution was a particularly spirited critic, focusing its derision on “Yankee” humanitarian sympathy. When Charles Sumner introduced a congressional resolution expressing sympathy for the Greek Orthodox Cretans, The Constitution described his foreign relations committee as having, “resolved itself into a universal sympathetic society.” The “Radical party,” it further complained, “sheds tears over the down-trodden everywhere, and its wailings for
the distressed go forth into the uttermost parts of the earth.” *The Constitution* lamented that underlying this sympathy was a belief that, “all are bound by a common brotherhood.” “No stretch of distance,” argued *The Constitution*, “can annihilate [the Radical party’s] tender feelings for suffering humanity.”*86* *The Constitution* further claimed that Radical Republican sympathy for the Cretan Insurrection stemmed from moralistic arrogance. At the heart of the Radicals’ “transcendental faith” was its claim “to be the missionary through which the world shall be converted from heathenism to its progressive ideas.”*87* Boston, home of the Howes, attracted a heavy dose of criticism. She was, claimed *The Constitution*, “the center of this great moral solar system,” and “arrogates to herself the lead in all schemes” to uplift the oppressed people of the world.*88* As *The Constitution* described it, Boston’s perspective was that, “she being the center of the universe, all must obey.”*89* The *New York World* also criticized what it saw as the self-righteous grandstanding of the local “Cretan Committee.” It suggested that the committee forgo the cause of Crete and instead raise funds to save a group of now-destitute missionary settlers who had left Maine for Palestine in 1866. While mocking the settlers as “Main-iacs who left the land of lumber” only to demonstrate the falsehood of northern self-sufficiency, the *New York World* still believed that as fellow white Americans, the “Main-iacs” were deserving of aid. The *World*, however, doubted that Republicans would take up an issue that was “not a tempting one for orators…”*90* Similarly, the *World* noted over a year later that if Bostonians were “half as much in love with truth as themselves” they would perhaps recognize the complexity and dangers of the insurrection.*91*
Democrats further alleged that the actions of Republicans were hypocritical. Most obviously, they now supported an act of rebellion. After explaining to its readers that Boston was now home to “a paper devoted to the cause of the rebel Cretans,” The Constitution cautioned its readers not to be “startled.” Even “cold and stoic Boston,” The Constitution explained with heavy derision, “has a heart; and even rebels are touching it to tenderness and tears.”

Like Republicans, Democrats explained Crete through analogies to their domestic experiences. The New York World, for one, suggested that, “Being copperheads in respect to Crete,” Republicans sympathizers should “show consistent courage in their opinions, and become copperheads also in respect to the South.”

For Democrats the perceived hypocrisy ran deeper still, for Republicans not only sympathized with rebels, but did so despite their domination of the South, which purportedly matched and exceeded Turkish tyranny and cruelty. The Daily Memphis Avalanche was sure that even the radicals of the North could not honestly expect the rest of the world to ignore “the fact that the North is doing to the South of this country just what Turkey is trying to do to Greece.” Like Turkey, claimed the Avalanche, the North sought to “strip a gallant race of the rights of self-government” and impose its own ideas at bayonet point. The New York World mocked the Republicans' attempts to get Americans “to discriminate in a question of legitimate rule between New Englanders in black satin waistcoats holding sway in Washington, and Turks in green silk Turbans exercising dominion at Constantinople.”

The Richmond Enquirer & Sentinel, went further to allege that, despite all the “usual gabble about the inhumanity of Russia to the
Poles, the Turks towards the Greeks and the Cretans, &c., &c.” only the Radicals had been so cruel as to surrender a conquered people to mercies of their former slaves.96

Democrats claimed that they, and not Republicans, shared a bond with the Cretan rebels. Responding to the call for aid from The Cretan, The Constitution noted that southerners could not help but sympathize with the Cretans, for “Their condition is too much like our own.” Both had fought long, brutal wars for their independence, and both remained under the control of another power. Referring to a Turkish military commander in Crete, The Constitution asserted that, “A dozen or so Oma Pachas came upon us from their Turkish strong-holds, a few years since, with fire and sword, reducing us to skin and bones, until we languish in our native nudity.”97 And surely, The Constitution surmised, the Senate’s statement of sympathy would meet with disregard from the Ottoman Empire. Turkey would no doubt “delicately direct the attention as well as the sympathies of Mr. Sumner” to the South. For it was in Sumner’s own country, claimed The Constitution, where “insults and outrages, tyrannies and oppressions of which the Crete [sic] never dreamed” continued. The New York World went even further once the Ottoman Empire offered the Cretan rebels clemency in mid 1868. “In what striking contrast is this action of the Grand Turk,” exclaimed the World, “to that of the Rump Congress with their insurrection.”98

Of particular concern to Democrats was the seeming disregard of Republicans, especially Radicals, for racial hierarchies.99 Democrats, in fact, ignored Republican prejudices and conflated liberal nationalism with racial
egalitarianism. According to *The Constitution*, Boston’s “generous nature was such” that she anticipated “that period when some of the lower orders of being, through her benign influences, shall assume a place in the family of man.”

*The Constitution* was convinced that this “meddlesome disposition of the Radical” underlay interest in both the Cretan Insurrection and the Reconstruction of the South. *The Constitution* described how, “Whilst expressing in one breath the canting, sycophantic sympathy for the [sic] poor Crete, in the very next they propose a dark and damning scheme for the introduction of civil war in the South, by the arming of negroes against the whites.” The Radicals, it seemed, would continue to interfere with racial hierarchies until they made “the chain of brotherhood universal” and gathered “into its welded links all the different races of men, giving them the same cast, language, law, government.”

For Democrats, Republican sympathy for Crete was most aggravating because it underscored this lack of racial fidelity. In contrast to Ottoman rule of Crete, *The Constitution* stressed that southern whites suffered from wrongs that were “offered to, visited upon, and erected over a people of the same race” as and “kindred in tongue” with their oppressors. The *Daily Memphis Avalanche* decried how the same people “who would enslave eight millions of their own race and color in order to control the votes of three millions of blacks who know nothing of liberty… are shedding tears over the struggle of Greece!” Similarly, the *New York World*, in reference to those “Main-iac” settlers in Palestine, stated its suspicion that Radicals in Congress would not come to their aid precisely because the missionaries were white. In reply to Republican liberal
nationalism, Southern whites and Democrats invoked the ideas of a nation bounded fundamentally not only by ideals, but also by race.

Crete became a powerful metaphor in Democratic interpretations of the United States and their place in it. It allowed Democrats to lament the destruction of the Old South while deriding what they understood to be contradictory and self-righteous nationalism of Republicans, especially Radicals. Democrats believed, moreover, that the Republican desire to remake the South in accordance with its own ideals reflected an ideology whose boundless ambitions were clearly evident in sympathy for Crete. Most worrisome to Democrats was the apparent Republican disregard for the racial hierarchy that was the foundation of southern social order, Democratic identity, and – according to the Democratic press – the nation. The sense of betrayal was intense enough that The Constitution felt it could justly “warn” Bostonians that “as their eyes wander sorrowfully and their hearts heave pathetically towards the distant Cretes [sic],” they should “remember, occasionally, their own self-created Crete in our midst.”

The Civil War left a profound faith among many Republicans that the United States was now a nation embodying the twin liberal goals of freedom and progress. Far from asserting that different peoples might pursue these in distinctive ways, post-bellum Republicans assumed that their institutions and values exemplified “civilization.” As their interest in the Cretan Insurrection demonstrates, these beliefs impelled Republicans to understand developments in the South, the nation, and the world as part of a larger struggle against the cruel,
hierarchical, and retrogressive forces of “barbarism.” Republicans, moreover, did
not merely describe the insurrection in the same language that they used to
criticize domestic “barbarisms”: they made the connection explicit. Comparisons
between the alleged characteristics of “Turks,” southern slaveholders, Native
Americans, Mormon polygamists, and European imperialist, elaborated
Republican notions of what it meant to be “civilized” and therefore, “American.”

From Republican interest in Crete we can only speculate on the broader
implications regarding the period of Reconstruction. Yet it is worth noting that
Republican concern for “barbarism” abroad – and no doubt out West – could both
reinforce the values underlying efforts to reconstruct the South and provide
alternative outlets for those energies. Though the Republican Party was founded
in large part as an antislavery party, its underlying values did not limit the
attention of its supporters to the South. With the right circumstances, Republican
attention could wander without jeopardizing their sense of mission. For many
Republicans, moreover, confrontations with racially-othered barbarians likely
proved easy to digest.

Democrats countered Republicans by asserting their own sympathy for the
Cretan Insurrection. In the process, they claimed that the United States was a
country dedicated to liberty but defined by race. In their interpretation, the Greek
Orthodox Cretans and the former Confederates were racially superior rebels who
sought freedom from the imperious sway of outsiders. For Democrats, however,
the former Confederates faced a more galling situation because their oppressors
were supposedly people of the same race and nation. Worse still, in the
Democratic interpretation, these northerners forsook southern whites precisely for the sake of uplifting and empowering an inferior race. Democrats, like Republicans, found in Crete the means to articulate and affirm their understanding their nation and their place in it.

Reconstruction has long been studied as unfolding entirely within the eastern United States. Certainly, the longstanding focus on plantations, southern counties, eastern states, and Washington, D.C. has brought to the fore many of the pivotal battlegrounds in the changing social, political, and economic order in America. Yet, contemporaries, for all their focus on conflicts within and between the North and the South, never questioned the existence of nor abandoned their focus on national identity. Though these ongoing discussions about “America” were quintessentially domestic, they also motivated a constant concern over the proper relationship with foreign peoples, places, and states.
Titled “The War in Crete—the Attack on the Monastery of Arcadi—[From an Original Sketch],” this drawing appeared in Harper’s Weekly. Greek Cretan men and women barricade a door from Turkish Muslims, while two orthodox priests carry out the decision to blow the rebels’ store of powder.
“Which is the infidel?” asks this political cartoon from Harpers Weekly. In the foreground John Bull bends to kiss the hand of the Ottoman Sultan. Republicans saw British support for Ottoman territorial integrity as an important reminder of their distinctive role as a defender of liberties in a world of despots and diplomats. It reads:

“God preserve thee, Sultan, long;  
Ever keep thee from all woes;  
May the State and thee be strong,  
To dismay and resist thy foes!”

*Song of Welcome to the Infidel Sultan*

Sultan (sotto voce to Grand Vizier). “These infidel John Bulls don’t see those little Massacres of their Christian brethren in Crete.”

Grand Vizier. “Great is John Bull, and Abdul Aziz is his temporary profit.”
RECONSTRUCTION.

Eastward "the Star of Empire...."

THE ACQUISITION OF CANDIA.

The New York National Reconstruction Club to the people of the United States.

FELLOW CITIZENS:

This Club propose that the United States acquire the Island of Candia. The pressing want of the country at this moment is territory in the Levant suitable for a Naval Depot and a Commercial Entrepôt, and in which we may establish American Institutions.

The Ottoman Empire is in a state of transition. Before the close of the current year the Turkish Government will be obliged to yield Candia, a change which will doubtless be immediately followed by important concessions to other provinces of the Empire, and probably at an early day by the surrender of Palestine to the Hebrews.

There is now much reason to believe that in order to meet the necessity of the hour gracefully, the Porte would cede Candia to the United States for a nominal consideration, and thus in a summary and most unexpected manner, adjust the "Eastern question" for the present. The moment is opportune.

Let us acquire Candia, our commerce requires it, our mission among the Nations demands it. Already the prize awaits our grasp.

The spirit of the age—the still small voice of the new dispensation, moves over the Mediterranean peoples, opening with resistless power new and inviting fields to the transforming genius of the West.

Americans! Let us act wisely and promptly, and secure for the Republic a PLACE in the Rising East.

New York, May 1867.


2 Excellent guides to changing interpretations of Reconstruction include Eric Foner, “Reconstruction Revisited,” Reviews in American History, 10 (1982): 82-100; Brown, ed., Reconstructions; and “Part III” of Lacy K. Ford, ed., A Companion to the Civil War and Reconstruction (Malden, Mass., 2005). A number of comparative analyses, of course, have had a central place in Reconstruction historiography.


5 For a discussion of the changing and contested meanings of the terms “foreign” and “domestic,” see Kaplan, Anarchy of Empire, 1-12.

6 Key studies on Civil War nationalism during the last twenty years include, but are by no means limited to: Peter Parish, The North and the Nation in the Era of the Civil War, (New York, 2003); Susan-Mary Grant, North over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era (Lawrence, 2000); Melinda Lawson, Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North, (Lawrence, Kansas, 2002); Alice Fahs, The Imagined Civil
War: Popular Literature in the North and South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill, 2001); Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge, 1988); Anne Sarah Rubin, A Shattered Nation: the Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill, 2005).

10 See, for example, the conclusions to Lawson, Patriot Fires and Grant, North over South. Rubin’s A Shattered Nation is exceptional for its sustained coverage.

11 See, for example Edward J. Blum, Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898 (Baton Rouge, 2005).

12 A number of scholars have noted the importance of ideas of “freedom” and “progress” in 19th-century American political culture. For discussions of the northern belief in the self-reinforcing nature of freedom and progress see Eric Foner, Reconstruction, 29; Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (Oxford, 1995), 36, 38-9; Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 1817-1862 (New York, 1996), 34-5; and Susan-Mary Grant, North over South, 97. For the tensions between these ideas in the southern branch of the Republican Party after the war, see Mitchell Snay, “Freedom and Progress: The Dilemma of Southern Republican Thought during Radical Reconstruction,” American Nineteenth Century History, 5 (2004): 100-114.


15 For an example of a similar faith on the part of many Americans during the Antebellum period, see Donald S. Spencer, Louis Kossuth and Young America: A Study of Sectionalism and Foreign Policy, 1848-1852 (Columbia, MO, 1977), especially, p. 110.

16 Certainly the Republican Party did not hold a monopoly on pro-Union sentiment. And there were no pro-Republican Republicans who cared little for or dissented from this strain of liberal nationalism. Some Democrats, like George Bancroft, became involved in Republican-dominated fundraising through personal connections; see, for example, Repousis, “Greek-American Foreign Relations from Monroe to Truman,” 200-1.


22 See Amy Kaplan, *Anarchy of Empire*, 1-12.


25 See Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*, 50-51, 55, which is less neutral in its description of these events.

26 For a general overview of the course of the insurrection, see Arnakis, *American Consul in a Cretan War*, 17-21. By most accounts, the Ottoman forces and their allies pursued a brutal campaign to subdue the rebels. While there are fewer reports on Greek Orthodox atrocities, one may suspect that the harshness was often reciprocated. For some limited evidence, see Commander Jeffers’s account in D. G. Farragut to Gideon Welles, Sept. 20, 1867, no. 27, vol. 223, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons, 1841-1886, European Squadron, RG 45, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

War,” *New York Times*, June 11, 1867, p. 1; “Foreign News,” *Harper’s Weekly*, Aug. 17, 1867, p. 515; “Cretan War Ended” *The Cretan*, Dec. 1868, p. 3. That Crete was off the telegraph lines explains the absence of ready information. The *Chicago Tribune*, for example, filed its updates from Crete under its “By Mail” section. See, for example, *Chicago Tribune*, Feb. 18, 1868; 3 April 1868; May 26, 29, 1868; and June 10, 1868. All of which, incidentally, are on the front page. What news came from the eastern Mediterranean was often wildly conflicting; see “The East,” *New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1867, p. 8; and E. Joy Morris to Secretary of State Seward, 28 Nov. 1866, republished in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Executive Documents, no. 38, *Revolution in Candia*, 39 Cong. 2 sess., p. 17.

28 Some Republicans worried over Greece’s monarchical government and the Greek Orthodox Church’s state support and hierarchical organization. See, for example, Julia Ward Howe, *From the Oak to the Olive. A Plan of a Pleasant Journey* (Boston, 1868), 173-4, 222-233; Julia Ward Howe Diary, vol. 5, February 7, 1868, Howe Family Papers, Harvard University Library, Houghton; and S.G.W. Benjamin, “Historical Sketch of Crete,” *Harpers New Monthly Magazine*, May 1867, 758-64. Some Republican newspapers focused attention on other foreign events, such as the Mobile, Alabama *Nationalist*, which covered the suppression of the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica. See, for example, “Jamaica Cruelties Admitted,” *The Nationalist*, April 19, 1866, p. 1.


30 Stillman sailed from Crete in September of 1868 on a leave of absence to recover his nerves and take his family to safety. Shortly thereafter, politicking in Washington cost him his post. He returned to Crete occasionally over the next ten months to hand over the consulate. When Stillman left the eastern Mediterranean he was not only impoverished, but had lost his wife to suicide, which he claimed was brought on by her sympathy for the Cretans, stress, and childbirth. On the end of Stillman’s career in Crete, see his *Autobiography of a Journalist*, 449-50, 454-55, 457-8, and his dispatches to the State Department, 22 September, 16 November, 6 and 31 December 1868, and 6 March 1869, 10 June 1869, and 11 and 19 July 1869, all of which are available in Arnakis, *Articles and Despatches from Crete*. On his wife’s sympathy for the insurrection and her death, see Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*, 59-60, and *Autobiography of a Journalist*, 455-6. In the 1890s Stillman became critical of the Greek “race,” along with other Southern Europeans; see *ibid.*, 431-2; and Gemme, *Domesticating Foreign Struggles*, 156-162.


38 See William J. Stillman to William Seward, Aug. 18, 1866, available in Arnakis, *Articles and Despatches from Crete*, 35. Edward Joy Morris, a former Whig Congressmen and the American minister to Constantinople during the insurrection, also explained to Seward how Ottoman imperial rule was marked by cruelty and economic retrogression, and that, as an American, he felt a special connection to the Cretan rebels. See his diplomatic correspondence from Aug. 28, 1866 and Nov. 2, 1866 to Seward republished in House of Representatives Executive Document, *Revolution in Candia*, 7-8, 13. On Morris and Stillman, see also Repousis, “Greek-American Foreign Relations from Monroe to Truman,” 186-230; May, “Crete and the United States,” 289-91. A.S. York, the American consul on the Greek island of Zante, and a Mr. Rousseau, the American minister to Austria expressed similar sentiments, see, A.S. York to William Seward, Jan. 11, 1867, Despatches from Zante, General Records of the State Department, RG 59; and “Foreign,” *Daily Memphis Avalanche*, Jan. 17, 1867, p. 2. U.S. naval officers visiting Greece also demonstrated “American” sympathy, see James E. Montgomery, *Our Admiral’s Flag Abroad. The Cruise of Admiral D.G. Farragut, Commanding the European Squadron in 1867-68, in the Flag-Ship Franklin* (New York, 1869), 412-14, 432-3; and May, “Crete and the United States, 1866-1869,” 292.

39 “The War in Crete,” 68-9; see also “Home and Foreign Gossip,” *Harper’s Weekly*, June 6, 1868, p. 363. Stillman’s formal account of the attack on Arkadi to Seward is available in State Department, *Despatches from Crete*, No. 33, November 26, 1866 and No. 34, December 3, 1866, available in Arnakis, *Articles and Despatches from Crete*, 50-1,56-7. Stillman’s account in *The Nation* is similar to that of *Harper’s Weekly*; see “The Arkadi Tragedy,” *The Nation*, Jan. 24, 1867, pp. 76, also available in Arnakis, *Articles and Despatches from Crete*, 57-60. For a brief statement that describes the decision as more impulsive, see “A Cretan Blockade-Runner,” *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1867, p. 4.

40 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Miscellaneous Documents, *Sympathy for the Greek: Concurrent Resolution of the Legislature of New York, expressive of Sympathy for the Greeks, who are now struggling for freedom*, no. 58, 39 Cong., 2 sess. See also the similar statement from the Maine legislature, *ibid., Resolutions of the legislature of Maine expressing sympathy for the Cretans in their struggle for independence*, no. 9, 40 Cong., 2 sess.


“The Cretan Question,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, Oct. 12, 1867, p. 50. As a similar testament to the extent of interest, one writer claimed that “It is not too much to say that a greater degree of interest has been awakened in behalf of struggling Crete, than for our oppressed and priest-ridden neighbor [Mexico].” See, “Mexico and the United States,” Putnam’s Monthly Magazine, May 1869, pp. 618-21.


The Subjugated Nationalities of European Turkey,” 1. See also, “The Cretan Refugees and their American Helpers,” 2-3; Edward J. Morris’s diplomatic dispatch to Secretary of State Seward, Sept. 29, 1866, reprinted in House of Representatives Executive Documents, Revolution in Candia, 10-11; and Stillman, Cretan Insurrection, p. 19. Interpreting the word “race” in Republican writings on the insurrection requires some care. Republicans certainly evinced disdain for “Asiatic” people, but they also often used the term “race” interchangeably with “nation” when discussing people within southeastern Europe. On this point, in addition to those cited above, see also, J. S. C. Abbott, “The Eastern Question,” Putnam’s Magazine, April 1869, p. 563. But this is not to claim that racism was absent from Republican writings. Stillman, for example, once distinguished the Greek Orthodox by referring to them as “white.” See Stillman, Cretan Insurrection, p. 56.

“Intervention,” 2. See also, “Actual Condition of the Cretan Struggle,” The Cretan, May 1868, p. 3; and “The Greek Race,” July 1868, p. 3. For a similar sentiment, see also Edward J. Morris’s diplomatic dispatch to Secretary of State Seward, Sept. 29, 1866, in House of Representatives Executive Documents, Revolution in Candia, 10-11.

The Subjugated Nationalities of European Turkey,” 1.


“The Clouds Accumulating—Turkey About to Fall to Pieces,” New York Times, January 31, 1867, p. 4. On the image of the ideal free laborer, see Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction, pp. 7-8. German émigré Karl Blind, who was critical of the Republican commentary, asserted after the insurrection that the Turkish farmers on Crete were “industrious cultivators of the soil.” See Karl Blind, “Hellenic Nationality in the East,” Putnam’s Magazine, Nov. 1869, p. 568.
66 William J. Stillman to Seward, Dec. 29, 1866 Despatches from Crete, General Records of the Department of State.
72 “American Influences Abroad,” The Cretan, Nov. 1868, p. 3.
74 On border crossing analogies, see also Gemme, Domesticating Foreign Struggles, 116-24.
75 William J. Stillman to Seward, Dec. 29, 1866 Despatches from Crete, General Records of the Department of State. Similarly, A.A. Lawrence told the owners of 400 rifles originally purchased for Union soldiers that, with the war over, the best thing to do was send them to Greece. There, “they will go to be aimed against Turks by Christians instead of being turned against American rebels by their loyal Northern fellow countrymen.” See A.A. Lawrence to the subscribers for the Green rifles, Feb. 22, 1867 – which, as Lawrence noted, was “The Birthday of Washington” – box 21, 1867, Papers of Amos A. Lawrence.
80 “Prospectus of the Cretan,” The Cretan, Aug. 1868, p. 4.
81 “The Cretan Refugees and their American Helpers,” 3. References to other oppressed nationalities, including the Polish, the Irish, Hungarians, and nationalist heroes like Giuseppe Garibaldi were also commonplace in Republican writings. For just two examples, see “The Revolution of the Greek Christians in Turkey,” New York Times, Dec. 30, 1866, p. 4; and “Schuyler Colfax and His Fenian Friends,” New York Times, May 8, 1867, p. 5.
82 “American Influences Abroad,” 3.
83 The pamphlet is available in Charles Keating Tuckerman to Frederick William Seward, Jul. 1, 1867, William Henry Seward Papers, University of Rochester, Rush Rhees Library; for a brief discussion of the post-bellum Republican embrace of expansionism, see Foner, Reconstruction, 495.
85 “Foreign versus Home Philanthropy,” 2.
86 ibid.
87 “Canting Sympathies,” 2.


"Foreign versus Home Philanthropy," 2. The Howes had addressed what they saw to be the superficial claim that supporting the Cretan rebels undercut criticism of southern secession. Diplomatic recognition of "a community waging war in behalf of slavery is a *crime,*" claimed *The Cretan*, while recognition "of a people struggling in behalf of liberty is a *duty.*" See "Cretan Liberty and Cretan Commerce," 6.


"Work for the Cretan Committee," 4.

