The traditional perception of first wave Russian émigré autobiographical writing is that émigrés used these texts to keep alive memories of a world they had lost after the October Revolution in 1917. A general assumption has been made even beyond the Russian context that the exile only lives in the past, denying the present. ¹ Russian émigrés, at least in China and Africa, were also engaged in a different mission: primarily to record the memories, past and present, of their life in exile. Educated and semi-educated Russian emigres prepared elaborate histories—from scrapbooks to biographical dictionaries, which recorded the achievements of their emigration, to records of their day to day existence. This conscious attempt to record their lives in exile was part of creating a new type of nation, an “imagined community” which linked Russian émigrés throughout the world through institutions and printed culture, the concept of nation that Marc Raeff redefined in *Russia Abroad.*² Yet just as their mission in Russia Abroad was to preserve pre-revolutionary culture which could then be transmitted to help rebuild a post-Bolshevik Russia, they felt that their lives in different countries, under varied political systems, amongst different nationalities and surrounded by new cultures, could be of use to a new Russia, particularly regarding international and market relations.³ Be it that Russia should or should not replicate this or that that they were exposed to, there was a political purpose to what amounts in
some cases to ethnographic studies of the “exotic” lands to which they were exiled in their personal texts. Many may not have voluntarily interacted with “foreigners” (after all, they weren’t abroad by choice), but once exchanges occurred, they tried to learn from them. They never forgot where they were and amongst whom they were living, especially when they lived amongst a different race and in a non-European setting.

China borders Russia, and its geographic proximity appealed to many first wave émigrés confident that they would soon be returning home to a Bolshevik-free Russia. There was also already a substantial Russian presence in China before 1917 in Manchuria. In 1915 there were over 55,000 Russian citizens living in Harbin alone, the city created by the Russian state in 1898, and until the late 1920s the Russian language dominated the city educationally and institutionally. After 1917, as refugees poured into Harbin, the number of Russians swelled to as high as 200,000. As many as 25,000 Russians were living in Shanghai in the 1930s; several other cities and towns in China were populated by several thousand Russians. The emigration to China was not purely an urban phenomenon. Tens of thousands of Russian peasants also settled into the border regions of China as late as Stalin’s collectivization drive; entire villages in this region were populated by Cossacks. At least a thousand Russians served as mercenaries in the Chinese armies in the 1920s. In the countryside and towns of China, and to some degree in Harbin, Russians engaged in manual labor. It was possible for Russians in Harbin to get by without ever learning another language; in Shanghai, where it was not accepted for white people to do manual labor, Russians mainly worked for foreign companies, served in the English or French concession police, or worked as bodyguards for wealthy businessmen, including the Chinese. The social composition of the emigration to China was different than the emigration to Europe; it was dominated by Siberians and contained far more peasants, workers and soldiers, and far less aristocrats.
In the case of Africa, White Russian navy personnel and their families, numbering several thousand, were stranded in Egypt and Tunisia in 1920. Most chose to stay in Africa, and moved to various cities where their economic position gradually improved. Many worked as chauffeurs and bank tellers, and some joined the foreign legion; their wives often served as nannies, tutors or private nurses. A second group of Russian emigres who were economic migrants came mainly from France and Belgium throughout the 20s and 30s. These were Russian professionals-doctors, engineers, dentists and surveyors. The French colonies in Africa offered them employment within their specialty, accepting their Russian diplomas, and higher pay. They usually signed a contract before leaving Europe, and consequently lived wherever their companies sent them. Russian colonies were formed throughout cities in Africa, but they never numbered more than several hundred. Individual Russians or Russian families also lived in isolation, on farms they ran or in the jungles where they worked.

Because of the colonization of Africa, and the colonial presence in China, Russian emigre narratives of China and Africa are as much ethnographic portraits of other Europeans as they are of indigenous peoples. I’ll begin this paper by noting their impressions of Africa and indigenous peoples in Africa, then discuss their views of China and the Chinese. I’ll conclude by examining their views of the two dominant European nationalities in these regions, the French and English. I should note that my findings are based mainly on unpublished sources: on two dozen memoirs of Africa, the letters of approximately three dozen Russians from Africa to Europe; approximately 50 memoirs about China, and a half dozen oral interviews, several diaries, and letters from dozens of Russians in China. This paper is part of a book-length project I am beginning entitled, “The Colonial World Through Russian Eyes,” which will focus on Russians who traveled to, worked in, or migrated/emigrated to China, Africa and Latin America, from 1860 to 1941.
Although most émigrés complained about the climate and the high mortality rate of Russians in Africa, Africa often emerges as their oasis from the material deprivation and humiliation of refugee life in Europe, and that is its main, and often only, attraction to them. In some cases, life in colonial Africa allowed emigres to recreate the lifestyle of pre-emancipation noble Russia. Writing in 1936 to an émigré friend in Belgium, one woman, who had just arrived in the mountains of the Congo, where her husband had an official post with a Belgian company, wrote how “life here is wonderful.” Since they employed numerous servants, she wrote: “I live here like a barin’s daughter, I don’t do any manual labor.” Her daughter frolicked with the natives’ children. She had never imagined in Europe that it would be this nice in Africa. In her memoir published in 1939, another Russian woman living in the Congo invoked the image of serfdom more directly by describing how at end of the day she and her husband would sit on their veranda and settle disputes between farm hands. She expressed surprise when one of her servants quit after she caught him washing his feet in the water bucket and pouring the water over his head. Throughout her memoir she described the natives with whom she came into contact as lazy, dirty and noisy, just as many other émigrés and Western European colonialists did. Whereas this woman was bored to tears on her estate, another émigré, in a letter to Europe written in 1930 from Morocco, confessed that he loved his new life since he had always dreamed of living in a colony; the pay was always good and the work was never demanding.

More in depth assessments of indigenous African peoples ranges from the evil, dangerous savages, to the unknowable, unmalleable “other”; from the noble savage to the victims of colonization. One émigré, writing from the countryside of Morocco in 1931, described how single white men often took black “wives” out of necessity after first arriving. Later, when their salaries increased, they would marry white women and attempt to send their black wives and children back to the wives’ native villages. Although he claimed these women were amply
supported financially, he alleged that many of them would then poison their “husbands”-not
because they resented losing their civilized life among whites, or were fond of their “husbands”-but because they were angry they would be receiving less presents. From the Congo, another émigré wrote in 1931 that the “negroes” live in the forest in a wild state, very stubbornly fighting civilization. They were a dangerous people, both clever and evil, who clearly did not like white people.

Whereas a few émigrés refused to write about the indigenous peoples (because they were so “uncultured”) those who commented on native cultures either objected to them being altered or argued that altering them was useless. Describing Africa in a memoir written in the 1960s, one émigré pointed out that each tribe had its own ancient customs and religions, and that since a black could never fully understand a white (or vice versa), European missionary work was both futile and wrong. Our émigré writing from his farm in Morocco in 1931 praised local missionaries for opening schools, but then went on to argue that you can’t really convert natives. Converted natives go to church, pray, cross themselves, and then behind the church sin more than usual. Worse still, a convert becomes arrogant, thinking himself equal to the white man. Another émigré, writing in 1929, bemoaned the loss of ancient customs in Algeria.

The trope of the “noble savage” also is present in émigré narratives. A doctor serving in Dahomey wrote in his account-published in Paris in 1934-that once you live in Africa you begin to realize that blacks are not completely different. They can be sent to study in Europe, and do well in business and music. But rather than favoring assimilating them into European culture, he begins to wonder what is better: civilization or their primitive lifestyle, which resembles that of Adam and Eve. Fondness for indigenous people could even develop over time amongst those who initially had thought they were wild animals, intent on ripping one to shreds upon the first encounter. This was the case of a noble woman, stranded in Egypt in 1920. After having noted
“No one could possibly ever have the urge to stroke such a child. One can stroke a donkey, sheep or camel but not the small being that is an Arab child,” she went on to note that when she moved, she kissed her Arab landlords’ daughters, “who loved me so.” They were “wonderful girls”, despite the fact that they were too dirty to ever be let them into her home.14

An émigré’s political orientation, profession and social orientation in his former life naturally dictated how he reacted to living in Africa. It isn’t surprising that the one émigré I’ve found who had the most sympathy for the indigenous people of Africa had been a Zemstvo (limited local self-government established by the Great Reforms of the 1860s) doctor in pre-revolutionary Russia. Unlike noble émigrés who might wish to exploit the natives, much as they had the peasants in Russia, he sought, true to the populist mission that characterized Zemstvo professionals, to save them. He was amongst the first group of Russian doctors sent over to Central Africa by the French government in 1924. He wrote in 1931 that he liked living with the natives, whom he insisted on calling by their tribal names rather than as negroes, which he stated they disliked. He argued that each tribe had its own morals, cultures and particular physiognomies, just as different nations in Europe did. How Europeans were treated by them depended on how much contact the tribes had had with Europeans, and how the Europeans treated them. The tribe he was closest to, the Tuzemtsy, were very hospitable people whose particular wild dances reminded him of the persecuted Russian sectarian Khlysty. Finding a Russian equivalent for his new friends helped render them familiar, and his familiarity with them was so great that now that he could afford a camera, he had no desire to take any pictures of the Tuzemsty, since their lifestyle wasn’t exotic at all to him.15 He bemoaned that “we Europeans” did one good thing by coming to Africa, and only one-stopping wars between tribes. He argued that “we” had brought disorder to Africa, from changing marital and divorce patterns through the introduction of a cash economy, to “our” greatest sin: destroying the ability and need for natives
to think by bringing ready-made industry to peoples who would have learned a great deal by coming up with it themselves. He concluded: “we make out of big kids potential hooligans.” Since émigrés selectively referred to themselves in these narratives as Europeans, Russians or Whites, he could have disassociated himself from the evils of colonization, as we will see many Russians did in the case of China. His decision to identify with the colonizers, albeit the anti-conquest colonizers, is indicative of just how foreign Africa, unlike China, was to Russians.

Because it was Eastern Orthodox, albeit, a form of Orthodoxy not in canonical union with Russian Orthodoxy, Abyssinia was less foreign to émigrés than the rest of Africa. In letters written in 1929 and 1932, one émigré expressed his view of the Ethiopian Orthodox church: “the church is strange in terms of its rites for us, but I respect it very much.” He elaborated: “it has a varied, completely mystical life, pagan rites and customs” and described the blood sacrifice their ceremonies involved. Although they were theologically heretics, he concluded: “But from my point of view they are more Orthodox Christians than we are.” His contact with the Church was not purely superficial; he became good friends with an Ethiopian Bishop. Nevertheless, he disliked living there intensely and wished he had never migrated from Egypt. It wasn’t the simple, “pious “people he disliked; it was the rich Abyssians, who drank whiskey and beer, became Protestant or Catholic, and became philistines just like the Europeans and Russians in Ethiopia. As long as indigenous people stayed traditional, émigrés who were willing to respect them, would. At a time when Russia was so drastically changing under the Soviet State, emigrés were distrustful of rapid change and ambivalent about European civilization. For as the émigré editor of an émigré autobiography of Africa published in 1969 stated in the preface, colonialism— which he claimed, despite nineteenth century overt Russian colonization of Central Asia, was completely foreign to the modest spirit of self-sacrificing Russians—was linked to the origins of the Russian revolution, which stemmed from Russians’ belief that “abroad is better”.

16
17
Unlike Africa, Russian émigrés were united in their belief that China had a civilization. Respect for China’s ancient history, culture and religion was widespread in émigré narratives. Father Ioann Seryshev, a scholar of Japanese before 1917 and one of the founders of the International Esperanto movement, argued in his memoir, written in Australia in the 1950s, that the West underestimated “old man China.” China is superior to his beloved Japan, he wrote, as it has a great tradition of philosophy and literature, an enormous population, and unlimited potential. The Chinese were assimilating European cultures while retaining the best of their traditions. The “yellow peril” the philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev had warned about in the late nineteenth century was very real Seryshev concluded, as his admiration for the Chinese (now communist) turned into fear.\(^{18}\) In response to a query from an emigre friend in Europe about his life and those of his fellow compatriots in Shanghai, one nobleman felt obligated to begin his response, written in 1930, with a twenty-five page history of “the most ancient nation in the world.” In his history he expressed nostalgia for a distinct Chinese past he had not known, when no one locked their doors and dynasties ruled. He, like Seryshev, bemoaned the influence of European culture, stating “now China is not what it was.” Only the closed city in Peking offered entrance into China’s rich past. The predominant Western view in the early Twentieth Century was that China had to adopt Western ways or perish; this was not the consensus among émigrés. Like Soviet Russia, China was being devastated by rapid change, a point our nobleman in Shanghai indirectly made by comparing the Bolshevik revolution to the Chinese revolution of 1911.\(^{19}\)

Unlike their compatriots in Africa, most émigrés found some other similarities to Russia in China. Living in Tientsin, the émigré Ivan Serebrennikov prophesied in a 1932 diary entry that capitalism would develop later in both Russia and China, but that once it did, the two nations would dominate industry.\(^{20}\) Another émigré, a Professor and official, spent his years living in
Harbin studying Chinese religions and writing about the many similarities between old Russian and Chinese law and ethics. Emigres also found similar character traits between their characterization of themselves and the Chinese, such as industriousness, which émigrés in Africa also universally attributed to the Russian emigration (but not the non-Russians) there. And if the people in China were not familiar, then the landscape, which bordered Russia, most certainly was. A virtual cult of the nature of China exists in émigré narratives, with some recent memoirs devoted entirely to the landscape and time spent enjoying it. A common phrase in émigré memoirs of Manchuria is that it had the “most beautiful nature in the world,” perhaps only more beautiful than its look-alike Russia because it was relatively Bolshevik-free.

Just as Russians in Africa were aware of the advantages and disadvantages of their lives vis à vis their European brethren, Russians in China contrasted themselves to Russians in Europe, and their assessments reveal their perceptions of China, Russia and Western Europe. In comparing her experience to that of émigrés in Europe, one Russian, born to émigré parents in Harbin, argued in the 1990s that she and her compatriots in China had a much easier time, and not only because of the pre-existence of a Russian colony before 1917. She argued that whereas Russians in Europe lived in a foreign and narrow atmosphere, where they didn’t have the psychological spaciousness and informality they were used to, the Chinese allowed them to be amazingly outgoing, simple-hearted, and accessible. Ivan Serebrennikov, writing in his diary without hindsight, was less enthusiastic. Whereas he realized that he would never be able to afford such an inexpensive servant if he lived in Europe, he envied the cultured and peaceful world Russians lived in in Europe.

Émigré appraisals of the character traits of the Chinese are much less uniform than they are of African natives. Positive appraisals of the Chinese include describing them as trusting, sympathetic, determined, calm, philosophical, polite, intelligent, dignified and possessing a
strong family unit. Several memoirists recalled with tremendous gratitude how Chinese vendors
extended their families and other impoverished refugees unlimited credit. Such vendors never
yelled at their delinquent clients or threatened them in any way. Without them refugees would
have starved. In the words of one memoirist “the kindness they showed us Russians will
probably never be repeated anywhere again.”26 Others recalled how former Chinese students
assisted their former Russian teachers in times of need.27 In a brief section of a book length
memoir of Harbin, entitled “About the Chinese Character” the author sums up their character as
innately superior: “life loving, sober, not suffering from personality breakdowns, and not
tortured by all sorts of doubts, which in the western world so often lead to tragic results.”28

Chinese were also portrayed as respectful of others’ religions. An émigré who worked for the
French police in Shanghai explained that when an Orthodox church was violated he knew it
couldn’t have been done by a Chinese person; the culprits ended up being two teenagers, one
half-Russian, half-Chinese and one a Bolshevik adherent from Harbin.29 Yet positive appraisals
that exist in contemporaneous sources are sometimes more revealing of prejudice. In her diary
Aleksandra Serebrennikova is shocked that Chinese kids are so good at math; in his diary her
husband Ivan is shocked that Chinese soldiers are capable of displaying any courage.30 Clearly
the Chinese were not so familiar to Russians, and almost all of the positive traits they attributed
to the Chinese emphasized uniqueness, and thus only contributed to the othering of them. It is
important to note that several of the positive characteristics Russians assigned to the Chinese
contradict Western European nineteenth century imperial discourse on China, which depicted the
Chinese as indifferent to the suffering of others and condemned their family structure, and only
one-politeness—was a trait both émigrés and Western Europeans and Americans attributed to the
Chinese. Western discourse on the Chinese, of course, was being modified in the first half of the
twentieth century, but not along the lines of the émigrés’ representations.
Almost every negative trait that émigrés attributed to the Chinese—with the exception of stubbornness and cleverness—was part of Western imperial discourse. One can find ample portrayals of the Chinese as dirty, avaricious, cruel, dishonest, corrupt and deceptive in émigré narratives, as well as horrific tales of torture and executions. I have only found one passing reference to infanticide, which played such a prominent role in the Western imagination regarding China, and it is in the memoir of the rare émigré who converted to Catholicism and wrote her memoir in English.31 The brutality of the Chinese toward animals is a theme which crops up as shocking in many memoirs. Legendary tales of Chinese barbarism did circulate, at least to some extent, in Russian schools in Harbin. One pupil recalled in his 1959 memoir how one teacher had told them that he once saw a live Chinese woman put into a coffin and buried.32 A Shanghai émigré pharmacist, who prided himself in an oral interview in the 1960s as having employed Chinese, and claimed that “we treated them as equals and they treated us as equals,” nevertheless betrayed his view of the Chinese as inferior by lamenting that alcoholism became so rampant amongst the Russian refugees in Shanghai that “they would die frequently right on the streets, dropping themselves completely to the level of the Chinese and worse.”33 Yet in an oral interview also recorded in the 1960s, another émigré, who served as a soldier in the Chinese army, stopped himself from attributing the absence of nerves, which Westerners had long associated with the Chinese, to a man whom he saw put to death. The lack of expression on the condemned man’s face, he surmised, was probably actually due to paralysis from fear, and anyone of any nationality in that situation would look that way.34 The Chinese were, after all, human. And for the émigrés, unlike the Western colonists, there was a creature they were more eager to dehumanize: the Bolsheviks. In a long tirade against Chinese bribe taking, Ivan Serebrennikov dealt the final blow to the Chinese by stating that only a Soviet bureaucrat could
be as corrupt. And yet because the Soviets could never really be an “other” (they were, after all, their own people), this comparison only rendered the Chinese more familiar.

When examining émigré views of other countries, it is necessary to keep in mind that none of them wanted to be abroad. And their involuntary exile could not but effect their judgment of their new surroundings negatively. Even Serebrennikov—a Siberian non-noble socialist intellectual, who had spent the early 1920s visiting historical monuments in his new home, who had taken up studying and writing about Chinese religion and history, who wrote a great deal in his diary about the Chinese official he tutored, and wondered whether Chinese intellectuals (he was more than well aware they existed) read, or ignored, the articles Russians wrote about them in émigré ethnographic journals—by 1932 declared in his diary that the émigrés and Chinese had tired of one another. He elaborated: “the Chinese cease to garner sympathy towards them after you’ve had time to get accustomed to them.” As was the case with their attitude toward Russia, émigrés could admire China’s rich past, but not its present state. He was sick of their mercantilism. He accused Chinese generals of making money off of Chinese civil wars. He rallied against Chinese bandits who cut off the ears of the victims they kidnapped. But most importantly, Serebrennikov—like other émigrés—felt vulnerable. He accused the Chinese of exploiting stateless Russian émigrés, and cited the higher taxes emigres living in the countryside paid. Although he mentioned no instances where he had been humiliated, he argued that émigrés were at the mercy of the Chinese, which was theoretically true. Because he believed the Chinese were bullies, always humiliating the weak, and because Russians had gone from being an Imperial power in China to living as guests under its power, Serebrennikov’s fear was palpable.

How do instances of interethnic conflict between Russians and Chinese figure into émigré narratives? First, I’ve found only one émigré who claimed in his 1992 memoirs that the
relations between the Russians and Chinese was akin to race relations in South Africa. I’ve found only one emigre who acknowledged in his memoir that the Chinese held racist views of Russians (as opposed to some who argue that the Chinese hated all White people), views which Chinese texts are indeed full of. By assigning hegemony for racism to the Russians, other émigrés continue to see the Russians as having the upper hand they had before 1917. Third, émigrés who addressed the issue (and few did) presented their families or the cities where they were living as exceptions. Father Seryshev recounted how his wife would yell at émigré women she frequently witnessed deceiving and exploiting trusting Chinese venders in Harbin in the early 1920s. But he then compared her compassion for the Chinese to when she saved mistreated animals in Siberia. Our pharmacist in Shanghai assured that the Chinese did not take advantage of émigré’s statelessness, but that they also did not tolerate being treated the way Russians who were in Manchuria were used to treating the Chinese there.

The Chinese who figure most frequently in émigré narratives are servants and service workers. Brief memoirs exist entirely devoted to a beloved servant among Harbin memoirists. Not all servants in Harbin were Chinese; Father Seryshev’s wife worked for a Russian family as a servant for years, and the Serebrennikovs employed a Russian servant in Harbin who, unlike their subsequent Chinese servants, stole from them. But whereas their Russian servant had a name, their Chinese cook in Tientsin does not, and in letters written between the spouses he is always referred to as “boy”, just as émigrés in Africa referred to their servants. Their cook, with whom they communicated in rudimentary Chinese, serves as Ivan Serebrennikov’s barometer of the political crisis in China. When their cook appears shaken by riots and military skirmishes in the streets, Serebrennikov knows it is serious, and he pities the innocent, simple Chinese people (like their servant) who will be the victims of this crisis. Ivan exudes sympathy for Chinese servants when he states, regarding a Chinese servant who killed his mistress, the Jewish wife of a
Siberian merchant, that such unpremeditated murders are sometimes justified. Although the victim’s ethnicity, given widespread anti-Semitism amongst Russians in China, including Serebrennikov, may be the key here, recording this incident in his diary allowed Ivan to pontificate on how one should relate to the Chinese. The Russian Jews, he explained, were either too gentle or too harsh with Chinese servants. “A Chinese likes to be treated consistently and calmly” and they are very obedient, he concluded, even if asked to do a lot, but only if asked correctly. 41 A 1982 memoir on Harbin summed up how important the image of Chinese serving them was to émigrés, who had seemingly lost everything in 1917, and how, as in Africa, pre-emancipation Russia could be resurrected in the colonial world:

“old” china was for us tied to the smiling faces of our cooks, venders, caterers, laundresses, dressmakers and shoe-makers. All those Chzhany, Suny and Li served us tea in our separate furnished, European style offices; they always succeeded in bringing to us in time a lighted match for our cigarettes…they never were late to bring us breakfast directly to our apartments…They were the best servants in the world in their white and blue paper robes… 42

Interrus between Chinese and Russians was not common, but did exist. It was most common in border regions, between Cossack women and Chinese men, and thousands of their descendants still live in those regions in China today. Intermarriage is a difficult topic for memoirists, and one which they do not often broach. On the one hand, most memoirists insist the Chinese and Russians got along famously; on the other, émigrés had clear racial stereotypes about the Chinese. Intermarriage also implies assimilation, which the first wave of émigrés, believing they would soon return home, fought tooth and nail. In fact, the cult of Harbin, which I will discuss below, exists in part because émigrés from China are thankful that the differences between races meant that assimilation did not occur. When intermarriage is mentioned, authors often contradict themselves. One émigré who was raised in and near Kul’dzhe, near the border with the U.S.S.R., claimed in her memoir that such intermarriages were unheard of. Yet she then
noted how surprised she was when she enrolled in school and found that the children of such marriages studied as well as the full-blooded Russian kids. She recalled that once the mass exodus of Russians out of China following 1949 occurred, Soviet propagandists tried to frighten émigrés in her region to return “home” by telling them that if they stayed in China there wouldn’t be enough Russians left for all their children to marry.43 A Cossack who grew up in a village in the Three River’s region claimed that some Chinese forced beautiful Russian girls into marriage (but not in his village).44 An émigré who grew up in Harbin (and again, atypically wrote her memoir in English), claimed that intermarriages between working class Russians and Chinese were not infrequent, and that the children of such marriages were hated by White Russian children (like herself) as much as Jewish children were.45 The attitude of most émigrés toward mixed marriages appears to be that they entailed a cultural clash, and one that involved race more than nationality; one Shanghai emigre described the inevitable divorce that resulted from a marriage between a French woman and a Chinese man. The two had met when he was studying in Paris, but once they moved to live with his family in Shanghai, the wife could not accustom herself to life with a Chinese family, even though it was a very wealthy one.46

Emigres were reluctant to see “Old China” modernize along Western lines, but they were not against russifying the Chinese. In their minds, this was not necessarily contradictory, since Russian civilization and European civilization were not always synonymous. Hence they usually do not refer to themselves as “foreigners” in China; the foreigners were the English, French and Americans. They even often differentiated between the “Europeans” and themselves, with race not being their primary self-definition (which it was in Africa). One memoir, written in 1973, of a Chinese railroad official and his family is indicative of this continuation of the pre-revolutionary mission to russify Manchuria. The author lavished praise on the father, a member of the Chinese intelligentsia: he was the first Chinese in Harbin who did not bind the feet of his
daughters; he cut off not only his braid, but forcibly did a friend a favor by cutting off his as well; and lastly, he sent his children to Russian schools, even though it meant they had to leave home and live with Russian families to quickly learn the language. His daughter later married another russified Chinese, and their children spoke Russian perfectly.\textsuperscript{47} Having lost their homeland, why not try and recreate Imperial Russia? And wasn’t Harbin, a “Russian” city outside Soviet Russia, the logical place to do it? Such a mission was no longer a matter of garnering pride or competing with other nations with empires; it was a matter of survival.

In the last four decades the children of Harbin émigrés have created a virtual nostalgia community centered on their native city. In the pages of their many alumni journals, one finds little or no reference to the myriad of problems that plagued Russians in Harbin, and which the emigre press, diaries and letters cite: poverty or financial instability; fear of Soviet encroachment; the rise of Chinese nationalism; invasion and occupation by the Japanese; danger from rampant criminal gangs; lack of legal status rendering them subject to Chinese courts; a completely uncertain future. Instead they read as alumni journals read anywhere: beloved teachers, excursions into the countryside, cultural events. But they do not limit themselves to the schools themselves. The journals-and now the websites out of Russia-celebrate the city of Harbin, presented as a “pure Russian city”.\textsuperscript{48} In fact, Harbin is presented as more Russian than Russia. I have yet to find a single account by a Russian who lived in Harbin that does not overestimates the number of Russians in Harbin and underestimate the number of Chinese.\textsuperscript{49} The single article devoted entirely to the Chinese residents of Harbin in one journal published from 1975-1999 in Australia, begins: “Speaking of the life of Russians in Harbin, it isn’t possible to be silent about the Chinese, who were so closely tied to the Russian population, who so nicely entered into out Russian daily life, that to not bring them up at least briefly is simply not possible.”\textsuperscript{50} Criticism of the tendency to russify what was a multi-national city has been raised
by several Harbintsy, but not in regard to the exclusion of the Chinese; instead, these alumni-all returnees to their respective homelands-lament that the many national minority groups from the Russian empire who also populated Harbin are ignored.\textsuperscript{51} On the other hand, these journals contain articles about Chinese religions and holidays, and memoirists express their pride concerning their teachers and fellow students who were not ethnic Chinese, but who spoke Chinese well.\textsuperscript{52} Its geographic location in China is what made Harbin unique among émigré centers, and they are proud of it.

This concept of a Russian Harbin is not only a product of nostalgia following the loss of “Russian” Harbin to the Chinese. An idealized portrait is already present in a 1935 newspaper article entitled aptly “The Last Oasis of Russian Life.” The author argued in it that Harbin was the last place where many Orthodox Russian traditions, long gone from Soviet Russia, were preserved. The Russians in Harbin lived a “full-blooded” Russian life unknown by other Russians abroad, complete with typical Russian peasants, visiting from the surrounding countryside, wandering its streets.\textsuperscript{53}

Not only is the idea that “Russian” Harbin was a paradise not new, it is also shared by at least a few russified Chinese. Chinese alumni of Harbin’s Russian Institutes also contribute to alumni journals, albeit infrequently, and hold reunions in Peking. In 1998 one Chinese alumnus traveled to Russia with his family and stayed with various former friends in different cities.\textsuperscript{54} In his memoir of Harbin published recently in an alumni journal, one Chinese recalled, as have countless Russians, how his native city looked like nothing else on earth. Its flowers were such that at night one would get drunk from their aroma. Sorrowfully, he recalled the beauty of the main Russian Orthodox cathedral that was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{55} An alumnus, himself the product of a mixed Chinese-Russian marriage, argued in 2000 more vehemently than any Russian émigré that the Chinese in Harbin were influenced by
Russians, not the other way around. The Chinese in Harbin wanted to speak Russian and become Orthodox, and to this day, he claimed, those given Russian names by their employers or school administrators proudly still use them. He contrasted Russians in Manchuria to Russians in Japan, France and North and South America, arguing that only in Manchuria did the natives become, without any external pressure, “reeducated” in the Russian manner. He claimed that unlike the Chinese intelligentsia in the south of China, who lived under Anglo-Saxon influence, many of the Chinese intelligentsia in Harbin didn’t even speak Chinese. Many of them married Russian women, and he listed Chinese official after official at the Chinese Eastern Railroad among them. He concluded that the Russians and Chinese had a great deal in common, including honesty, stubbornness, broad-natures, industriousness, capacity for work, incredible hospitality, the ability to get close to others, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.  

Nostalgia among émigrés is not limited to Harbin either. Emigres in other cities in China do not express such sentiment, but some Russians who lived in Russian enclaves in the countryside do. Oral interviews of Old Believers who relocated from China to Oregon in the 1960s include statements such as “I love China. The people there are too good.” Respondents also voiced a desire to return: “I was born there. That is the life I like. We lived by ourselves. In China there were fields, open fields of space. Not like it is here.” The assimilation that threatened their community in Oregon had not threatened them in China. The belief that Russians in China preserved a Russian culture that was destroyed in Soviet Russia, rendering them the “real” Russians, is also voiced by a Cossack interviewed in 2007 from his home in Siberia, to where he returned in the 1960s. Ninety-five years old, he seemed to find some of the questions his Soviet born interviewer asked him ridiculous. In reply to the question to whether he, resident of a purely Cossack village, had spoken Chinese or celebrated Chinese holidays, he laughed at great length, and tried to explain the nuances of their traditional Cossack Orthodox
lifestyle to his Soviet born and raised interviewer.” The only contact they had with the Chinese, he stated, was when they paid taxes. To the question, “did you like living in China?” he answered: “of course, the landscape was good.” And, he added, they had freedom. Why then did he leave, he was next asked. Only because the Chinese kicked him out, he answered.58

There are a number of reasons for this nostalgia for China and Harbin in particular, one of which, minimal assimilation by the Russian population, has already been cited. A second reason that émigrés cite is the Siberian dimension of the émigré population. The myth of Siberia cultivated in the late nineteenth century professed that Siberia was more Russian than Russia, so it is not surprising that the regional make-up of the emigration to Manchuria has shared become part of this myth. Third, the preponderance of the lower classes in Harbin is also cited as spawning its greater Russian character. Four, the Chinese revolution in 1949, followed by the forced exile of the last remnants of the Harbin Russian colony by the early 1960s, has meant that their second rodina [motherland]-and émigrés and children of émigrés refer to it often as their “rodina”-was taken away from them, just as their first was, compounding the trauma of 1917. And some memoirists who tackle the subject of the Chinese revolution show as little understanding of it as many noble memoirists displayed regarding 1917. Like 1917, the 1949 revolution is presented as a spell that was cast upon the population; the masses were suddenly transformed overnight from smiling individuals into a horrible collective mass.59 And just as in the Russian Civil War, families were once again torn apart, seemingly never to see each other again, as half the Russians in China returned to USSR, and half went to San Francisco, Australia, and Latin America. And unlike in post-war communist Eastern Europe, the Chinese revolution entailed, as had the Bolshevik revolution, the iconoclastic destruction of Orthodox Churches and the obliteration from the written record of a history of a people. And whereas émigrés have been free to travel now to their first rodina for several decades now, their trips to Harbin-and they do
go-are even more bittersweet than their trips to Russia, since the population of Russia still at least speaks Russian. Since Russian Harbin has been obliterated, émigrés how refer to it as Kitezh, the mythical underground Russian city, or as the Russian Atlantis, not coincidently the name of a journal published now by Harbintsy (Russian Harbiners) in Cheliabinsk, Russia. Fifth, like Riga, Warsaw, Vilnius and Tallinn, Harbin had been administered by the Russian Imperial State before 1917, but unlike these other cities, it remained somewhat in Russian hands-even émigré hands-for several years after the revolution due to the political instability in Manchuria.

A final reason for the myth of Harbin as the most Russian of cities may be that unlike other cities in China, there were far fewer westerners in Harbin than there were Russians. Throughout Africa and in other cities in China, where Russians were the minority among foreigners, émigrés were uncertain about their status as Europeans, and not just because of Russia’s geographic location on the border of Europe. Writing from Shanghai in 1929, one émigré explained that legally they were “second class foreigners”; they lacked consul representation and most lived in poverty. In Africa the color of their skin guaranteed them acceptance regardless of nationality, and many intermarried with French, particularly in Morocco. But whether Western Europeans accepted them was not always the issue. Most, as we’ve seen, did not want to assimilate; exile was to be a transitory state. But émigrés in Africa and China, unlike their brethren in major émigré centers in Europe, did not ignore the local populations. Humiliated by exile, and aware that many Western Europeans looked down on them, their sense of national particularism (referring to the nations where they now lived) became a source of superiority for émigrés, as it had been for many Russian Slavophile-orientated intellectuals before the revolution. They were superior to other Europeans, so superior that even in the colonial world, where race was the dividing line, many preferred to consider
themselves Russians rather than Europeans. And the existence of native populations, upon whom everyone was projecting this or that, allowed them to prove this superiority.

Ivan Serebrennikov’s diary captures the ambivalence—so typical of pre-revolutionary educated Russians attitudes—of émigrés toward Western Europeans. Writing in 1930, he commented on an article in the local Tientsin paper about a Russian woman who had killed her common-law Russian husband for not marrying her. He was shocked by the brutality of the crime (she killed him with a knife), but also because this woman had previously been married to an Englishman (who killed himself) and “a Russian woman who had spent so much time with foreigners should be more cultured.” Yet this “culture” that should have prevented this woman from her crime was not something he wanted for Russian youths in Tientsin. He complained that because of the lack of Russian secondary schools in the city, Russian youths all spoke English and graduated from college half-English, having been born imbued with the “foreign English spirit” of the city, which was permeated with the carefree lifestyle of a colony. Acknowledging how much English charities had helped Russian refugees, he nevertheless accused English doctors of letting a twelve year old Russian boy die in their hospital due to negligence. He was further distressed by articles about drunken Russians in local English newspapers, and angry that the monuments wealthy Russian merchants had given the city in the late nineteenth century had been forgotten. He countered his sad musings about the fates of Russian prostitutes in China, beaten regularly by their foreign clients, with expressions of pride about those Russians who, unlike Westernizers, had come to China without a penny in 1918 and without the assistance of credit had built up financial empires. But his greatest source of pride—one that all other émigrés shared—was when foreigners came to Russian cultural events and watched their Easter processions in large numbers.
Émigré narratives of Africa and China are filled with instances of Russians being slighted by Western Europeans. On a boat to Algeria in the 1920s, a Russian noble émigré met an Englishman who told him that the best resolution for Russia would be if England took her over as a colony. Stunned, the émigré didn’t know if he could say anything in Russia’s defense; history didn’t help him, nor philosophy, nor even common sense. He only felt better after he met on the boat another Englishman, a socialist, who made fun of the provincial backwater the other Englishman was from in England. A greater humiliation in Shanghai was the scores of Russian women who left their Russian husbands to marry foreigners of all kinds, and even “half-breeds”. One way to wrest victory from this humiliation was for emigres to argue that Russian women were more beautiful than other women, and made far better wives.

Their treatment in refugee camps in the early 1920s in Africa was also a source of anger. Being taken care of by foreign powers—let alone in countries not native to those foreign powers—was not something émigrés relished. One woman described the English nurses in Egypt as “vulgar, badly brought up women” and described a near gang rape of the segregated refugee women by Arabs and Turks unleashed on them by a corrupt English sergeant. The author of a 1920 letter about the camps presented a more positive view. He appeared pleased to discover that the English shared the “Russian” trait of disorganization. Although he was thankful to the English for saving them, he resented that information was withheld from them and that they were kept in the desert. Confident that Imperial Russia would be restored, he felt that English were blundering in international relations by treating Russians in this manner. In a handwritten camp newspaper circulated in Tunisia in 1922, cartoons depicting Russians as starving and badly dressed were contrasted with caricatures of plumb and well dressed Frenchmen. A short story in the newspaper, “Tunisia in 2000,” depicted a future Tunisia where Russians lived on the best streets. The Russian language was spoken everywhere, and all the restaurants were Russian.
Russians had replaced the French as the colonizing power, and evidently quite quickly: house museums were erected where the contemporary generation’s grandfathers had lived.  

Emigres appear to have preferred the French to the English. Remarking that “the English are a cold people,” our Shanghai émigré pharmacist nevertheless claimed “the British did not treat us with contempt or nastiness. There were only very rare cases of such behavior by them, only from a few English drunkards.” But in those cases, Russians took the upper hand, by getting together and beating up such Englishmen. Violence, in the form of challenging the offender to a duel, was also the solution an émigré policeman in Shanghai whose French co-worker made smutty jokes about Tsarina Aleksandra and Rasputin chose. He had previously also been insulted by his French boss, who had the gall to say something very rude to him in front of a Russian lady who understood French (which made the insult ten times worse). In that case, he tried to quit. What he couldn’t understand was that it appeared the French had forgotten that the Russian saved Paris. Otherwise, how could they insult Russians?

The greatest insult to émigrés, however, came from within. Emigres who changed their citizenship were looked down upon, but the existence of Russians who changed their names, or pretended to be foreigners, was appalling to them.

Émigrés’ greatest victory over other foreigners was their claim that the indigenous populations preferred them. In her memoirs, written in the 1960s, one émigré from a noble family in Harbin stated: “there is no question that China, and more especially the Chinese people, were much closer to the Russian population than to any other nationality. Our homes were taken care of by the Chinese servants, who would become affectionate members of the household, with loyalties, duties and interests closely connected with our own.” Numerous letters from émigrés in Shanghai and other cities written in the 1920s state explicitly that the
Chinese population related better to Russians than to other foreigners. An émigré in Tsindao, writing in 1928, argued that this was because the Chinese pitied people without a homeland. But most émigrès argued that it was because Russians treated indigenous populations better than foreigners did. Rosemary Quested argued in her study of pre-revolutionary Manchuria that Russian-Chinese relations were less coercive and involved more co-operation than characterized Chinese contact with foreigners. Emigres, whom we’ve seen generally downplayed their prejudices, argued that such treatment continued after 1917, and made direct comparisons between themselves and other foreigners to gain a sense of moral superiority. A Russian professor, describing Shanghai, stated that the Russians “did not treat the natives so haughtily as the Englishman did…but it is also very important that Russians not only came later but also were neighbors of Chinese and had some old connections with the Chinese nation and people.” He despised seeing foreigners putting their legs on the shoulders of “men-horses” (rickshas), and watching these foreigners pay their “men-horses” by throwing money on the sidewalk. He contrasted this to his own behavior, when he paid a ricksha driver the full fare after insisting the driver stop well before the destination when it was clear he was close to suffocation. A “foreigner” would never have done the same. In her 1965 memoir, an émigré who lived in South Africa claimed “Russians usually treated their servants very well.” They paid them well, fed them, never over worked them and even spoiled them and helped their families. They never humiliated their servants the way the Afrikaners and even English did.

Emigré narratives are not united on whether colonialism was a positive or negative phenomenon, and few comment on it. Some argued from hindsight that foreign colonists did more good than harm (and they always bring up the harm); some argued at the time that such economic exploitation would lead to communism. Colonialism is about dominance, about power over millions of “uncivilized” peoples of “inferior races”. But what was European
colonialism about for Russians who were themselves homeless and powerless? For some, their race allowed them to overcome their humiliation and play the role of colonizer. Yet at the same time, some of them were questioning the European civilizing mission and felt themselves to be persecuted by the very powers that were colonizing the natives. In either case, they appear to have regarded indigenous people as educated Russians had treated Russian peasants before 1917; they were to be either exploited or rescued. Cut off from their homeland in the European colonial world, anti-Bolshevik educated Russians found the would be constituents they had lost in 1917 among other races.


3 This is precisely what some post-Soviet scholars of the emigration prepare to do with the émigré experience in China. B.L. “Nasha emigratsiia v Kitaе” in V.V. Levitskii (ed.), “Pristan’ na sungari” (Khar’kov, 1998), 2 vols., 1:18.

4 Hoover Institute Archive (hereafter, HILA), 57-14 (N. Kofodkova to Mariia Vrangel, 4.11.1936). For another example, see HILA, 57-11 (M. Gavrilov to Mariia Vrangel’, 20.3.1928).

5 Mariia Sazonovich-Ko zhina, “Pis’ma russkoi emigrantki iz Bel’giiskogo Kongo,” Illustrirovannaia Rossiia 718 (February 11, 1939), no.8.

6 HILA, 57-19 (P. Gotosetvenii to M. Vrangel, 25.05.1930).

7 HILA, 56-19 (Mark to Mariia Vrangel, 29.11.1931).


9 For example, see HILA, 57-19 (P. Gotosetvenii to M. Vrangel, 25.05.1930).


11 HILA, 56-19 (Mark to Mariia Vrangel, 29.11.1931).

12 HILA, 57-12 (Aleksandr Kolenko to M. Vrangel’, 22.09.1929).


16 HILA, 57-11 (M. Gavrilov To M. Vrangel’, 20.3.1928, 29.1.1932).

17 Iskry zhizni

18 HILA, Seryshev collection (memoir on China).

19 HILA, 56-2 (A. Klibukov to M. Vrangel’, 2.11.1930).

20 HILA, Ivan Serebrennikov diary, 201.

21 Oral Interview with G. Guins, Bancroft Library, Berkeley.

22 For one example among the emigration in Africa, see A.A. Shirinskaia, Bizerta. Posledniaia stoianka (Moscow, 1999), 168.

23 For one example see V.V. Kamenev, “Man’chzhurskie byli. Okrestnosti Barima,” posted July 14, 2004 on the on-line Vladivostok journal Russkaia atlantida (www.russianharbin.com).


25 HILA, Ivan Serebrennikov diary, 185, 215.


27 For examples, see HILA, Khabart, Komm. Uchilishche collection, 1;11 (N.P. Avtonomov, “Uchashchiesia kitaitsy i kitaianki v kharbinskikh kommercheskich uchilishchakh KBzhD,” 1973, no.11; HILA, Von Arnold collection (Dora von Arnold memoir).

28 Rachinskaia, Pereletnye pittsy (San Francisco, 1982), 102.

29 HILA, Luknitskii memoir.

30 HILA, Serebrennikov diaries, 141, 161.

31 HILA, Olga Karmilof memoir.

Fedoulenko Oral interview, Bancroft Library, Berkeley.

Boris Shebeko Oral Interview, Bancroft Library, Berkeley.

HILA, Ivan Serebrennikov diary, 156

HILA, Ivan Serebrennikov diary, 233, passim.

Konstantin Kluge, Sol’ zemli (Moscow, 1992), 13, 30. He lived in both Harbin and Shanghai as a child.


HILA, 11/8 (“Opisanie zhizni matushki”).

Fedoulenko oral interview.

HILA, Serberennikov collection, 8:1 (A. Serebrennikova to I. Serebrennikov, 26.12.1932); Ivan Serebrennikov diary, 85, 170, 188-189.

Rachinskaia, 92.

Ekaterina Sofronova, Gde ty, moia rodina? (Moscow, 1999), 122.


Tania Manooiloff Cosman, My Heritage with Morning Glories ((Washington, D.C., 1995), 56.

HILA, Luknitskii memoir.


For one example, see letter to the editor from Khotkovskii from Tiumen, Russia in HILA, Alexeff archive, Druz’iam ot druzej, 1998, 49.

For one example, see HILA, Alexeff archive (Mikhail Il’ves, “Kharbin” Druz’iam ot druzej, 1998, no.39, 25-26.


Sungari, 2:160, 163; HILA, Alexeff archive (letter to the editor from Edgar Kattai, Druz’iam, 2000, no.52:60-61.

HILA, Kharbinskoe kommercheskoe ushilishche collection (E.A. Parintskaia, “Moi


54 HILA, Alexeff Archive (Vera Dun, “Kratiie svedeniia o Pekinetsk-KhSML,” Druz’iam ot druzei, 1999, no.50:33-34.)

55 HILA, Alexeff archive (Sun liu-nan, “Kharbin-Gorod moego detstva,” Druz’iam or druzei, 53 (December 2000), 34-35.)


57 Quoted in Praise Old Believers, 173, 194.


59 For one example, see Rachinskaia.

60 HILA, 56-2 (N.A. Ivanov to M. Vrangel’, 1929).

61 For two examples, see Zinaida Shakhovskaia, “Kongo,” in Afrika glazami emigrantov (Moscow, 2002); I. “Zhizn’ v Dagomee,” in Ibid, 34.


64 HILA, 56-2 (P. Cherkez to M. Vrangel’ 31.3.1928).

65 For one example, see Fedoulenko interview.

66 BAR, Susuchinskaia memoir.


68 Zhili-Byli, 1922, no.2 (NYPL).

69 Fedoulenko oral interview.

70 HILA, Luknitskii memoir.

71 HILA, See letters from Prince Trubetskoi and Cherkez to Vrangel; Vladimir Tkachev, “V Belgiiskom Kongo,” Vozrozhdenie, no.1466 (June 7, 1929).

72 HILA, von Arnold archive (memoirs of Dora von Arnold, 21).

73 HILA, 56-2 (A.A. Purin to M.Ia. Domracheev, 8.03.1928).
R.K.I. Quested, “Matey” Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria, 1895-1917 (Hong Kong, 1982).

Guins interview, 277.

BAR, E.L. Miller, “Russkie v Iuzhnoi Afrike.”

See Guins interview and Shakhovskaia.