The QDR and the NDP In May 1997 the U.S. Department of Defense published its first Quadrennial Review (QDR) of US defense posture. This review which had been mandated by Congress, sought to chart the course of US defense policy for the next eight years and set guidelines for the investment of more than $2 trillion in defense expenditures. It also aimed to fashion a broad and resilient post-Cold War consensus on national security policy as the nation enters the 21st century. Congress also mandated the creation of an independent nonpartisan National Defense Panel (NDP) with the mission of conducting a comprehensive assessment of the QDR and alternative force structures through the year 2010, examining a broad range of potential threats, and making policy recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on December 1, 1997 and to Congress by December 15th.
The Context of Present Security Policy World events of the past few years constitute a change in America's geostrategic environment as profound as any in the nation's history. Rarely has a strategic threat of great dimension dissolved without war, and never before has a strategic rival of great significance for the U.S. ceased to exist as a state entity. Considering this, the post-Cold War revisions in US security policy are modest in scope -- far less significant, certainly, than the bold steps that inaugurated the Cold War era in the late 1940's. Overall, America's "new era" posture seems a version of its Cold War posture writ somewhat smaller. The structure, doctrine, and arsenal of America's Armed Forces have changed little. Continuity largely characterizes the new era posture with regard both to armed forces roles and missions and the division of labor between the active and reserve components. The most notable change is in the aggregate size of the US military and defense budget -- although even this seems modest in context. As of FY 1997 national defense expenditures (outlays) had fallen by 30 percent since their pre-1990 peak. However, when measured against the average for the post-Vietnam War years 1975-1990 the decrease is less than 16 percent. Spending will continue to fall in real terms through FY 2001 when it "bottoms out" at 77 percent of the recent Cold War average. However, it is slated to rise once again beginning in 2002 as major investments are made in weapons systems and equipment in order to modernize the stock purchased in the 1980's. If current trends continue it is likely that annual US national defense outlays will average between 255 and 260 billion dollars (1998 USD) during the first fifteen years of the next century -- an expenditure 80 percent as large as the average for the Cold War. Throughout the recent period of military retrenchment the Pentagon's principal goals have been to control and minimize cuts to force structure -- that is, people in uniform -- and to preserve the long-standing distribution of roles and mission (and resources) among the services. The present administration, perceiving itself vulnerable on issues of national security, has accommodated these Pentagon goals. Regarding the reduction of military personnel, for instance, the Clinton White House has ventured only a seven percent reduction -- approximately 100,000 troops -- beyond the targets set by the Bush administration. Thus, although troop levels have fallen by 36 percent from the recent Cold War high, two thirds of this reduction was planned by a Republican president. The FY 1997 budget is less than two percent below the projections of the Bush administration. The Pentagon policy consensus reflected in the QDR rests on a body of official and semi-official policy statements, studies, and guidance documents that are the product of a concerted and continuing process of policy re-evaluation begun by the Pentagon and its service schools, analytical departments, and contracted think tanks in the aftermath of the 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe and the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. These policy reviews embrace a variety of framework assumptions that collectively shape and limit debate. These include the assertions that:
Briefing Book Contents Taken together, the foregoing framework assumptions determine much of the reasoning that underlies the security posture favored by the QDR -- any evaluation and analysis of the QDR and NDP recommendations should include their interrogation. Many of the articles and documents in this briefing book include discussion of these assumptions; we have included a version of the table of contents organized by subject corresponding to the assumptions and referencing sections of the articles. Following a brief overview of the book's contents are two summaries: one of relevant political and policy developments since the release of the QDR and the second covers the likely contents of the NDP report due to be released on the 15th of December. There are five sections in this book. Following this introductory section the Strategic Background section has four pieces that bare on the starting point of national security planning -- threat assessment. While much attention was devoted to this subject during the Cold War, threat assessment has been down played by the Pentagon since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The selected pieces provide several perspectives on this critical context for the 1997 defense reviews. The section on Frameworks for Defense Planning in the New Era includes articles that address the key assumptions underlying the QDR and planning guidelines for defense planning. In "Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework," three RAND analysts detail a framework for defense planning, many aspects of which have found there way into the QDR. A substantial excerpt from the Joint Chief of Staff's Joint Vision 2010 is included. This document has been specifically cited by the QDR and the NDP as providing a worthwhile blueprint for future forces. The implementation plan found in the last chapter of Joint Vision 2010 represents a challenge to the individual services and is a likely battleground over the increasing influence the JCS has acquired in setting service priorities for weaponry and structure. Articles by Senator Charles S. Robb and by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight offer differing critiques of the Pentagon's planning framework and suggestions for alternative approaches. Senator Charles S. Robb calls for a new strategic planning paradigm and raises a challenge to key assumptions regarding force projection timing and the degree of available allied support. Conetta and Knight offer a "framework for evaluating the QDR" which also applies to forthcoming NDP recommendations. They raise questions about proposed military requirements related to preparation for regional conflicts and for the revolution in military affairs. The Quadrennial Defense Review section begins with a concise summary of policy initiatives found in the QDR, followed by three commentaries. Lawrence Korb lambasts the Pentagon for squandering the opportunity to reshape the military for the 21st Century; Maj. Gen. Francis Greenlief (Ret.) argues for more reliance on the National Guard; and James Der Derian of U. Mass. discusses the QDR as "theater" of war. The next two selections are excerpts from GAO reports (cited in the "From the QDR to the NDP" summary) which address key aspects of the policy debates since the release of the QDR. These include a base closure cost/savings analysis and an evaluation of the likelihood of the 1998 Future Years Defense Program meeting its budget targets. Michael O'Hanlon offers a balanced menu of specific changes that would "redress th[e] looming shortfall [in procurement budgets] without abandoning U.S. friends or interests." The National Defense Panel section includes the three documents published by the NDP prior to its release of the its final report 15 December 1997. These are Chairman Philip Odeen's opening testimony before the National Security Committee of Congress, the NDP's assessment of the QDR, and a short article by the NDP that appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly and which provides a likely foreshadowing of the NDP's report. Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
