For purposes of fiscal planning, the QDR projected stable annual defense budgets of roughly $250 billion in constant FY 1997 dollars. Table of Contents
Summary of QDR Policy Issues and Politics Since May 1997 1 Despite the wishes of the congressional backers of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that it be driven by strategic requirements and not by budget considerations, it is clear from the QDR itself that consensus within the Pentagon formed around a budget target. For the exercise of exploring alternative postures, "each of which reflects a somewhat different 'path' toward meeting the challenges of the projected security environment," 2 the budget was held as a constant and details of the posture were varied. A strategic approach would construct alternative postures that can carry out national strategy at similar levels of risk. Extremely expensive posture options might be eliminated as unrealistic and wasteful, but options below, at, and somewhat above current expenditure levels would certainly all be relevant. These options were absent from the QDR. This is important partly because QDR recommendations driven by budget targets has impacted the way in which the debate about the QDR has unfolded since. The most persistent criticism of the QDR's predecessor, the Bottom Up Review (BUR), was that its budget levels did not adequately support its force posture. This criticism became more compelling as time went on and savings were harder to collect from using the surplus equipment of the large Cold War force instead of procuring new items. The QDR's principle answer to the growing budget pressure was to reduce end strength by 5% and find additional savings from base closings and O&M reforms such as out-sourcing and privatization of depot work. In that way the Pentagon hoped to relieve the budget pressure on a posture that remains essentially the same (excepting the modest adjustment in size) as that of the BUR before it. "The QDR's recommendations look to preserve many of the programs dear to the military services (and industry) and recommends considerable reductions in Reserve Component force structure and additional base closings -- a surefire recipe for heartburn among legislators."
Reductions in the Reserve Components After the release of the QDR on May 19, 1997 the first strong response was from the National Guard which felt it had not been consulted adequately in the QDR process and had been blind-sided by the size of the cut they were asked to take (Army reserve components were reduced by 45,000 -- a 7.8% cut.) Even before the QDR was released Major General Edward J. Philbin (Ret.) of the National Guard Association was writing that: "The Army made not even a pretense of obtaining expert input from the Army Guard...the final analysis was nothing more than a numbers game, devoid of national strategy and rife with ancient Army bias against -- and animus toward -- the Army Guard." 3 Leaders of the Guard protested that they were asked to take much deeper cuts than the active component which had not yet been reduced to its planned minimum end strength. Secretary Cohen responded May 27th to "the evidence of discord" 4 within the Army by ordering an "Off-site" meeting to resolve internal disputes. On May 29th Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Sara Lister weighed in with a complaint that the proposed cut of 33,700 civilians from the Army structure had not been discussed with her. A National Guard source said civilian cuts were favored by the Army because cuts to the active and reserve components had already been discounted by the Congressional budgeting process and would save no money (the Army had been given a target of saving $2 billion from personnel.) 5 When the "Off-site" ended on June 4th there was agreement that the reserve components would be cut 20,000 by FY-02, civilian personnel would be reduced by 17,400 by FY-06, and 15,000 would be cut from active forces by FY-99. The remaining 25,000 in cuts to the reserve components would be postponed until after FY-02, giving both sides of the issue time to work the political process. It was also agreed that the National Guard's 15 enhanced brigades would have slightly lower "manning" levels, but the Guard extracted a pledge that these brigades would be kept at a 90% level of readiness. Left unresolved was an Army proposal to convert heavy National Guard divisions to a light configuration requiring fewer soldiers. The active/reserve/civilian tensions and disputes did not end with the June "Off-site" meeting. On 9 September Assistant Secretary Sara Lister and Army Vice Chief of Staff General Ronald Griffith issued a memo summarizing the "Off-site" agreement. This memo brought sharp rebuke by Guard and Reserve leaders on 23 September. The Guard complained that eleven principles governing active Army support of the National Guard which the ARNG had pressed for and won at the "Off-site" had been downgraded to "goals" by DoD and that force structure reductions were being insinuated by DoD when only end strength reductions were agreed upon. The Army Reserve leaders complained that reductions in active military technicians must be compensated by increased full time support to Reserve units -- language in the memo suggested to them the possibility of DoD reneging on this commitment. 6 In response to a question about his views on the "Off-site" agreement, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer, whose self-stated responsibility is to the Total Force, said, "...ultimately this boils down to resources...I think if you are not getting enough resources to do all the things that they want done in the 11 principles, then you have to have a funding philosophy that, basically, centers around the first-to-fight units." 7 Summary">"emphasis must be placed on stealth, precision, range and mobility." The Panel may endorse the concept of a "budget wedge" of development funding for priority capabilities and technologies that could be expanded in the future to meet threats as they arise. On October 9, 1997 Inside the Pentagon reported
Speaking at a symposium in Washington on October 13th Philip Odeen stressed that part of the "transformation strategy" that the Panel favors is "increase[d] experimentation as a way of hedging against the unknown of the future..." He identified a "general need to devote increased resources to research and development, advanced concept technology demonstrations, prototyping new weapon systems, and conducting major experiments in future warfighting..." Odeen said that DoD may need $10 billion a year, starting in four or five years, to underwrite the transformation. 21 Inside the Pentagon's October 16, 1997 report on the Odeen briefing includes the following list of topics "emphasized" in the upcoming report:
Transformation challenges
Enablers/barriers
The apparent decision of the NDP to not specify areas or programs to cut from the QDR plans has already elicited Congressional criticism. Inside the Pentagon quotes one Senate staffer as saying, "...any real transition strategy must involve some recognition of a need for disinvestment as well as investment." Congressional aides expressed concern that the NDP would default the hard choices back to the Pentagon, "to a bureaucratic process specifically aimed at not alienating any of the services..." 22 "... the Panel believes that its greatest contribution lies in setting directions for the future and in identifying paths to meet them. We do not intend to propose specific numbers of systems or organizations that should make up future forces."
Footnote: 1 Principal sources for this summary are: Defense News, Army Times Publishing Co., 6883 Commercial Dr., Springfield, VA 22159-0400, subscription - $99; Inside the Pentagon, P.O. Box 7167, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044, subscription - $795; and Armed Forces Journal International, 8201 Greensboro Drive, Suite 611, McLean, VA 22102, subscription - $38. Footnote: 2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p 19. Footnote: 3 Edward Philbin, "We Don't Like It and We Won't Take It," National Guard Magazine, June 1997. Footnote: 4 See "Cohen Memo to Army on End strength Reductions" in Inside the Pentagon, 29 May 1997. Footnote: 5 See "Army Civilians Struggle with Military to Set 'Offsite' Agenda," Inside the Pentagon, 5 June 1997. Footnote: 6 See "Guard, Reserve Leaders Issue Memos Rejecting Army 'Offsite' Summary," Inside the Pentagon, 25 September 1997. Footnote: 7 John G. Roos, "View from the Top," AFJI, October, 1997, p 24. Footnote: 8 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 15 May 1997, p 54. Footnote: 9 See "Lawmakers Eye Various Concepts for Revising Base Closure Process," Inside the Pentagon, 5 June 1997. Footnote: 10 See "Without BRAC Authority, USAF's QDR End strength Cuts Limited," Inside the Pentagon, 12 June 1997. Footnote: 11 See "Two Services Cannot Achieve Full QDR Personnel Cuts Without BRAC," Inside the Pentagon, 21 August 1997. Footnote: 12 See "GAO Lists Lessons Learned for Future Base Closure Rounds," Inside the Pentagon, 31 July 1997. Footnote: 13 Jason Sherman, "QDR Lays Difficult Recommendations At Congress's Feet," AFJI, July 1997, p 6. Footnote: 14 Jason Sherman, "The Depot Dilemma," AFJI, October 1997, p 10. Footnote: 15 "Depot Maintenance Compromise Under Review by Congress, Pentagon," Inside the Pentagon, 16 October 1997, p 4. Footnote: 16 Miriam Pemberton and Martha Honey, "Military Peer Review," The Nation, 26 May 1997, p 24. Footnote: 17 The National Defense Panel, "Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review," May, 1997. Footnote: 18 "NDP Chairman: Russia Unable to Act as 'Serious Military Competitor'," Inside the Pentagon, 14 August 1997, p 22. Footnote: 19 Jeff Erlich, "NDP Report Will Focus on Threats, Not Cuts," Defense News, 22-28 September 1997, p 3. Footnote: 20 "NDP May Suggest Security Policy Shake-up Instead of Specific Force Cuts," Inside the Pentagon, 9 October 1997, p 8. Footnote: 21 "NDP's Proposed 'Transformation Strategy' Could Cost $10 Billion," Inside the Pentagon, 16 October 1997, p 1. Footnote: 22 "National Defense Panel Draws Sharp Criticism for Skirting Specifics," Inside the Pentagon, 23 October 1997, p. 1. © Commonwealth Institute, 1997 Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
