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Peter Rodman's piece on "The Coming Brawl With Europe Over Missile Defense" greatly misreads or misrepresents the real debate over national missile defense, both here and in Europe. Rodman is wrong from the get-go. First, he claims President Clinton is required by law to make a deployment decision this year. This is categorically false. Clinton has announced he will decide this year, while last year Congress passed (and Clinton signed) a resolution making it the policy of the United States to deploy an effective national missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. However, the resolution also noted Congress needs to find funds for missile defense before the program can go ahead, and made it the policy of the United States to seek reductions in Russia's nuclear arsenal. Each of these factors will be weighed in a decision on missile defense, for which there is no deadline. Rodman also claims we have arrived at a national consensus to proceed on national missile defense. Also categorically untrue. We may get close to a consensus if specific criteria are met, on the technical feasibility, the cost, the threat, and the impact on arms control. That has not happened, and may never happen, despite the fervent beliefs of missile defense supporters, who line the halls of Congress far more deeply than in the Pentagon. For our allies, contrary to Rodman's statements, the vast majority of Europeans do not fear being left out of a defense. Rodman is closer to the truth when he says they fear destabilization. French, German, and other allies have clearly stated their fear that U.S. missile defense will ignite a new arms race. In fact, although they are much closer to a growing threat, mid-range missiles from Iran or Iraq, most still believe missile defense a fool's approach, seeking a technological solution to problems much better addressed by threat reduction, tough diplomacy, and international action. Rodmam claims that the U.S.-Russian strategic balance is "stable and benign." The current balance is fairly stable, though whether it is benign is highly questionable. However, Russia has made extremely clear that U.S. deployment of national missile defense could fundamentally alter that balance. In fact, the sub-text to most missile defense supporters' arguments is that Russia's nuclear arsenal is declining, with the related assumption that it will do so for economic reasons even without arms control agreements. If the balance is maintained, Russia's arsenal will decline, to perhaps 1,000 warheads or less. But if the U.S. blunders ahead with a national missile defense, Russia could maintain an arsenal of 2,500 warheads or more, largely on accurate, multi-warhead missiles equipped with countermeasures to defeat any defense. While discounting the latent threat from Russia, Rodman asserts that the U.S. now faces new threats, from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea (then throws in China for good measure) that require a missile defense. Again, wrong. For the first three, there is a POTENTIAL threat. In 1998, North Korea conducted its first and only test launch of a three-stage missile that might be able to hit parts of Alaska or Hawaii with small, non-nuclear payloads. It failed. A second, longer-range version has never been tested. The U.S. and North Korea are currently holding talks about ending the Korean missile program, and while those discussions proceed, North Korea has agreed to halt its flight test program. Iran and Iraq are much further away from even North Korea's nascent capability, and only acquiring a missile from elsewhere is likely to give them an arsenal any time soon. (In fact, it is probably U.S. missile defenses that would do most to encourage potential missile exporters North Korea, China, and Russia to expand their sales abroad.) China is the biggest question mark in the security question. At present, as it has for decades, China has a small, relatively antiquated force of 20 or so land-based long-range missiles that could deliver a devastating blow to the United States. However, pushed by U.S. pursuit of missile defense, they have already stepped up their modest modernization program, and may deploy more accurate, multi-warhead missiles on land and at sea. Rodman goes on to say the Russian Ministry of Defense agrees about the new threat. As quoted in the February 1, 2000 New York Times, Secretary of State Madeline Albright's deputy, in Moscow with the Secretary for talks with their Russian counterparts, begged to differ: "We're not at the stage where we and the Russians agree on the nature of the threat, or what to do about it." Rodman caps his case by stating that the Clinton Administration "worships" the ABM Treaty above all else. In fact, if anything, what the Clinton Administration "worships" is American security. The greatest missile threat to the United States comes from Russia, and Moscow has made clear that maintaining the ABM Treaty is required for the verified reductions in Russia's nuclear arsenal to continue. Thus, contrary to what Rodman implies, the Clinton Administration is pursuing talks with Russia on modifying the Treaty to allow the limited national missile defense the U.S. now envisions. Rodman asserts agreement is likely, and the results of this weeks meeting between Albright and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are encouraging, but agreement is far from assured. Even further, rather than missile attack, what is far more frightening is the more likely possibility that a terrorist group or rogue state might obtain a nuclear weapon and float it into New York harbor or drive it over the border. What is the most likely source of the material for that weapon? Russia, which has tons of poorly guarded uranium and plutonium, a stockpile the U.S. is slowly helping to bring under control. Moscow should not dictate U.S. security decisions. But when cooperation with Russia is the safest and most effective way to reduce the threat to the United States, that is the way to go. Finally, Rodman never discusses why deterrence, which has apparently handled the very real and very much larger threat from Russia and China over the last 40 years, will not continue to hold. North Korea's leaders, as well as those in Iran and Iraq, have never knowingly pursued any action that would weaken their hold on power. Why would they launch what could only be a suicidal attack on the United States? It makes sense to continue to research missile defense, as well as to pursue with Russia initiatives that could increase our mutual security. However, to rush ahead with unproven missiles defenses, against a threat that may never emerge, when doing so risks intensifying the real and much greater current threat, makes no sense at all. Stephen Young is the Deputy Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. The views are his own.
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