Statement for the Record to the Senate Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services, February 9, 2000
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss, in an open session, the
Intelligence Community's recent National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on the ballistic missile threat to the United States through
the year 2015, as well as to discuss the methodologies we used
to develop our projections. You have copies of the unclassified
paper that summarizes our Estimate. It can also be found on CIA's
web site at www.cia.gov. Following my comments, I will try to
answer questions without providing important information to countries
seeking to hide weapons developments from us. They do not need
any more help. Thus, you'll understand that if I cannot answer
a question more fully, it's not that I do not want to. In such
cases, I could provide a classified answer for the record if
you would like.
That said, I am a proponent of unclassified intelligence papers
for the public; I have written several. Such papers provide our
public important insight into the Intelligence Community and
its work. After all, the American public is one of our primary
customers, although in most cases only their Congressional representatives
view the work we perform in the their behalf. Thus, I value these
opportunities. We need the general populace to understand how
important intelligence work is to our national security and to
our personal safety and security. That necessity did not end
with the Cold War. In some ways, it is more important today.
Intelligence is essential for dealing with the intentions of
hostile nations and for combating terrorism, weapons proliferation,
and narcotics trafficking. Indeed, significant intelligence work
goes on each day to make our lives safer and more secure.
My Statement for the Record does not cover all the important
material published in our recent unclassified paper on this subject.
Moreover, in the interest of time I would like to summarize my
statement verbally, so I would like to submit both the unclassified
paper and my written statement for the record.
Congress has requested that the Intelligence Community produce
annual reports on ballistic missile developments worldwide. We
produced the first report in March 1998 and an update memorandum
in October 1998 on the August North Korean launch of its Taepo
Dong-1 space launch vehicle. Our September 1999 report is a classified
National Intelligence Estimate, but we summarized it in the unclassified
paper I just mentioned.
Our approach for this year's report differs with past efforts
in three major ways.
- First, we projected missiles through the year 2015; previous
reports went to 2010. Thus, we have included five important years
for development.
- Second, with expertise inside and outside the Intelligence
Community, we examined when a country could acquire an
ICBM and assessed when they would likely do so. Earlier
intelligence reports focused on scenarios judged as most likely;
the Rumsfeld report focused only on what a country could do.
We decided an honest, thorough analysis would need to include
both judgments. As expected, we found greater uncertainty and
differences in projecting when countries would likely test an
ICBM; more variables are involved.
- Third, because countries could threaten to use ballistic
missiles following limited flight-testing and before a missile
is deployed in the traditional sense, we use the first
successful flight test to indicate an "initial threat availability."
Emerging long-range missile powers do not appear to rely on robust
test programs to ensure a missile's accuracy and reliability
nor will they necessarily deploy a large number of long-range
missiles to dedicated, long-term sites. A nation may decide that
the ability to threaten with one or two missiles is sufficient.
With shorter flight test programs—perhaps only one test—and
potentially simple deployment schemes, the time between the initial
flight test and the availability of a missile for military use
is likely to be shortened. Using the date of the first projected
flight test as the initial indicator of the threat recognizes
that an adversary armed with even a single missile capable of
delivering a weapon of mass destruction may consider it threatening.
Using the first flight test also results in threat projections
a few years earlier than those based on traditional definitions
of deployment.
I should note that our projections are based largely on limited
information and engineering judgment. Adding to our uncertainty
is that many countries surround their ballistic missile programs
with secrecy, and some employ deception. Although some key milestones
are difficult to hide, we may miss others, at least until flight
testing; recall that we did not know until its launch that North
Korea had acquired a third stage for its Taepo Dong-1.
I should also note that we incorporated the results of several
expert, academic and contractor efforts, including the recommendations
of former members of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States, assistance from politico-economic
experts to help examine future environments that might foster
ICBM sales, and the expertise of missile contractors to help
postulate potential ICBM configurations countries could pursue.
Worldwide missile proliferation has continued to evolve during
the past 18 months. Missile capabilities are growing, as demonstrated
by North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 launch. The number of missiles
is increasing; medium- and short-range ballistic missile systems
already pose a significant threat to US interests, forces, and
allies overseas. We have seen increased trade and cooperation
among countries that have been recipients of missile technologies.
Finally, some countries continue to work toward longer-range
systems, including ICBMs.
The missile threats that we see develop over the next fifteen
years will depend heavily on our changing relations with foreign
countries, the political and economic situation in those countries,
and other factors we cannot predict with confidence.
- For example, 15 years ago the United States and Soviet Union
were superpower adversaries in the midst of the Cold War, posturing
military forces opposite each other in Europe and competing for
global power.
- Fifteen years ago Iraq shared common interests with the United
States.
- Finally, we do not know whether some of the countries of
concern will exist in 15 years.
Recognizing these uncertainties, we project that during the
next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats
from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and
possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat, although significantly
reduced, will continue to be the most robust and lethal, considerably
more than China's, and orders of magnitude more than that potentially
posed by the others, whose missiles are likely to be fewer in
number, constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable and
accurate.
The new missile threats are far different from the Cold War
threat, which involved accurate, survivable, and reliable missiles
deployed in large numbers. By contrast, the new missile threats
involve significantly less capable forces. Even so, they are
threatening, but in different ways.
- First, although the majority of systems today are short-
or medium-range ballistic missiles, North Korea's three-stage
Taepo Dong-1 space launch vehicle launch heightened sensitivities
and moved earlier projections of the threat from hypothetical
to real. If flown on a ballistic trajectory with an operable
third stage and reentry vehicle, the TD-1 could indeed deliver
a small biological or chemical payload to the United States,
albeit with significant inaccuracy.
- Second, many countries probably assess that the threat
of longer-range missile use would complicate US decision-making.
Over the last decade, the world has observed that missiles less
capable than modern ICBMs can affect another nation's decision-making
process
- Third, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass
destruction will be used against US forces or interests is higher
today than during most of the Cold War, and will continue to
grow. More nations have them, and recall that ballistic missiles
were used against US forces during the Gulf war. Some of the
regimes controlling these missiles have exhibited a willingness
to use weapons of mass destruction with other delivery means.
In addition, some non-state entities are seeking weapons of mass
destruction.
- In fact, we project that in the coming years, US territory
is probably more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction
from non-missile delivery means (most likely from non-state entities)
than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means
are less costly and more reliable and accurate. They can also
be used without attribution.
Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue to grow, in
part because they have become important regional weapons in numerous
countries' arsenals. Moreover, missiles provide a level of prestige,
coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile means do
not.
Thus, acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with a
weapon of mass destruction probably will enable weaker countries
to do three things that they otherwise might not be able to do:
deter, constrain, and harm the United States. To achieve these
objectives, the missiles need not be deployed in large numbers;
with even a few such weapons, these countries would judge that
they had the capability to threaten at least politically significant
damage to the United States or its allies. They need not be highly
accurate; the ability to target a large urban area is sufficient.
They need not be highly reliable, because their strategic value
is derived primarily from the implicit or explicit threat of
their use, not the near certain outcome of such use. Some of
these systems may be intended for their political impact as potential
terror weapons, while others may be built to perform more specific
military missions, facing the United States with a broad spectrum
of motivations, development timelines, and resulting hostile
capabilities. In many ways, such weapons are not envisioned at
the outset as operational weapons of war, but primarily as strategic
weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The progress of countries toward acquiring longer-range ballistic
missiles has been dramatically demonstrated over the past 18
months:
- Most notably, North Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-1 SLV
has inherent, albeit limited, capabilities to deliver small payloads
to ICBM ranges. The much more capable Taepo Dong-2 could be flight
tested this year, unless North Korea maintains a freeze on flight
testing.
- Pakistan and Iran flight-tested their 1,300 km range Ghauri
and Shahab-3 missiles.
- India flight-tested its 2,000 km range Agni II MRBM.
- In addition, China conduced the first flight test of its
8,000 km range DF-31 mobile ICBM.
Against this backdrop, let's turn to our projections of the
potential ICBM threats to the United States through the year
2015. Instead of discussing those threats country-by-country—as
you have seen in the unclassified paper—I will array the
projections into five-year periods.
Let's start with where we stand today:
- The proliferation of MRBMs—driven primarily by North
Korean No Dong sales—has created an immediate, serious,
and growing threat to US forces, interests, and allies in
the Middle East and Asia, and has significantly altered the strategic
balances in the regions. As alarming as the long-range missile
threat is, it should not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness
of the threat from shorter-range missiles.
- For example, Iran has tested its 1,300 km-range Shahab-3,
which can reach most of Turkey.
- Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs from China and Ghauri MRBMs from
North Korea; India has Prithvi I SRBMs and recently began testing
the Agni II MRBM; we assess these may have nuclear roles.
- Countries developing missiles view their regional concerns
as one of the primary factors in tailoring their programs—to
provide deterrents and force-multipliers.
- Furthermore, with an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle
capable of surviving ICBM flight, North Korea's Taepo Dong-1
could be converted into an ICBM that could deliver a light
payload to the United States—probably constrained to a biological
or chemical warfare agent. Most believe such a conversion is
unlikely, especially with the much more capable Taepo
Dong-2, which could be readied for testing at any time.
- A two-stage Taepo Dong-2 would be capable of delivering a
several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a
lighter payload to the western half of the United States.
- A three-stage Taepo Dong-2 would be capable of delivering
deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United
States.
- Russia currently has about 1,000 strategic ballistic missiles
with 4,500 warheads. Russia's forces are experiencing serious
budget constraints but will remain the cornerstone of its military
power.
- We judge that an unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian
strategic missile is highly unlikely so long as current technical
and procedural safeguards are in place.
- Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a survivable
long-range missile force that can hold a significant portion
of the US population at risk in a retaliatory strike. China's
current force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs can reach targets in all
of the United States, although Beijing almost certainly considers
its silos to be vulnerable.
- China conducted the first flight test of the mobile DF-31
ICBM last August; we judge it will have a range of about 8,000
km and will be targeted primarily against Russia and Asia.
- We assess that an unauthorized launch of a Chinese strategic
missile is highly unlikely.
During the 2001-2005 period:
- North Korea, Iran, and Iraq could test ICBMs of varying
capabilities—some capable of delivering several-hundred
kilogram payloads to the United States.
- Most believe that non-flight-testing aspects of the Taepo
Dong-2 program are continuing and that North Korea is likely
to test the system as a space launch vehicle unless it continues
the freeze. If flight testing resumes, the capabilities would
increase.
- Some believe Iran is likely to test some ICBM capabilities
in the next few years, most likely as a Taepo Dong-type space
launch vehicle.
- Iraq is not likely to test an ICBM capable of threatening
the United States during this period.
- Russia will maintain as many strategic missiles and associated
nuclear warheads as it believes it can afford, but its force
size will continue to decrease below START limitations.
- We expect China to test a longer-range mobile ICBM in the
next several years and the JL-2 SLBM within the next decade.
Both will be able to target the United States.
- China could use a DF-31-type RV for a multiple-RV
payload for the CSS-4 in a few years.
- China is also significantly improving its theater missile
capabilities and will increase the number of SRBMs deployed opposite
Taiwan.
Let's turn our attention to 2005-2010:
- North Korea, Iran and Iraq could test ICBMs capable
of delivering several-hundred kilogram payloads to the United
States during this period.
- North Korean capabilities to test and threaten would likely
remain the same in many respects with a freeze in place, although
non-flight-testing aspects of the program are likely to
continue, at least covertly.
- Iran is likely to test a space launch vehicle by 2010
that could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a
several-hundred kilogram payload.
- Some believe Iran is likely to test an ICBM that could
threaten the United States before 2010; others believe there
is no more than an even chance of an Iranian test by 2010;
a few believe there is less than an even chance before
2010.
- Some believe that if Iraq received significant foreign assistance
it would be likely to test an ICBM capable of delivering
a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States during
this period.
- Russia will maintain strategic missiles and nuclear warheads,
but the numbers will continue to fall below START I or II limitations.
- We expect China to continue testing a longer-range mobile
ICBM and the JL-2 SLBM; both will be able to target the United
States.
Finally, 2010-2015:
- North Korea, Iran and Iraq could test more capable
ICBMs that could deliver several-hundred kilogram payloads to
the United States during this period.
- Most believe Iran is likely to test a US-threatening
ICBM before 2015, some view it as very likely; a few believe
there is less than an even chance by 2015.
- Most believe Iraq's first flight test of a US-threatening
ICBM is unlikely before 2015; some believe it is likely
before 2015, possibly before 2010 with foreign assistance.
- If Russia ratifies START II—with its ban on multiple
warhead-ICBMs—it would probably be able to maintain only
about half of the weapons it could maintain without the ban.
- By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted
against the United States, having added a few tens of more survivable
land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads—in
part influenced by US technology gained through espionage.
- We expect Chinese MIRVing of a future mobile missile would
be many years off.
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects
on missile advances around the world. Russian and Chinese missile
assistance continues to be significant; North Korea may expand
sales; and some recipients are now sharing more with others and
are pursuing cooperative missile ventures. Moreover, changes
in the regional and international security environment—in
particular, Iran's Shahab-3 missile test and the Indian and Pakistani
missile and nuclear tests—probably will fuel regional interests
in missiles and perhaps weapons of mass destruction.
Sales of ICBMs or space launch vehicles, which have inherent
ICBM capabilities, could further increase the number of countries
that will be able to threaten us. North Korea continues to demonstrate
a willingness to sell its missiles. Projecting the likelihood
of a Russian or Chinese ICBM transfer 15 years into the future
is very uncertain, driven in part by unpredictable future economic
conditions, how Moscow will perceive its position vis-à-vis
the West, and future Russian and Chinese perceptions of US ballistic
missile defenses. Nevertheless, we continue to judge it unlikely
that Moscow or Beijing would sell a complete ICBM, SLV, or the
technologies tantamount to a complete ICBM during the next 15
years. That said, I note that in evaluating the risks involved,
this likelihood is weighed with the consequences
of even one such sale.
I know that Congress is interested in our ability to provide
warning, which depends on our collection capabilities from one
country to another. Our monitoring and warning about North Korea's
efforts to achieve an ICBM capability constitute an important
case study on warning. Six years ago, we warned that North Korea
was trying to acquire an ICBM capability. In hindsight, however,
we had overestimated that North Korea would begin flight testing
the Taepo Dong missiles years earlier than turned out to be the
case; we projected correctly the timing of a North Korean missile
with the potential to deliver payloads to an ICBM range; but
we underestimated the capabilities of the Taepo Dong-1 by failing
to anticipate the use of the third stage. In other words, North
Korea demonstrated intercontinental-range booster capabilities
roughly on the timetable we projected in 1994, but with a completely
unanticipated vehicle configuration. The important point here
is that detecting or suspecting a missile development
program and projecting the timing of the emerging threat
are easier than forecasting the vehicle's configuration or
performance.
Furthermore, countries practice denial and deception to hide
or mask their intentions—for example, testing an ICBM as
a space launch vehicle. We continue to judge that we may not
be able to provide much warning if a country purchased an ICBM
or if a country already had an space launch capability. Nevertheless,
the initiation of an space launch vehicle program is an indicator
of a potential ICBM program. We also judge that we may not be
able to provide much, if any, warning of a forward-based ballistic
missile or land-attack cruise missile (LACM) threat to the United
States. Moreover, LACM development can draw upon dual-use technologies.
We expect to see acquisition of LACMs by many countries to meet
regional military requirements.
Nations with space launch vehicles could convert them into
ICBMs relatively quickly with little or no chance of detection
before the first flight test. Such a conversion would include
the development of a reentry vehicle (RV).
- If the country had Russian or Chinese assistance in a covert
development effort, it could have relatively high confidence
that a covertly-developed RV would survive and function properly.
- If a country developed an untested RV without foreign assistance,
its confidence would diminish, but we could not be confident
it would fail. Significant amounts of information about reentry
vehicles are available in open sources. The developing country
could have some confidence that the system would survive reentry,
although confidence in its proper delivery of the weapon would
be lower without testing.
Several other means to deliver weapons of mass destruction
to the United States have probably been devised, some more reliable
than ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation
programs. The goal of an adversary would be to move the weapon
within striking distance without a long-range ICBM. Most of these
means, however, do not provide the same prestige and degree of
deterrence or coercive diplomacy associated with long-range missiles,
but they might be the means of choice for terrorists.
- Several countries are capable of using a forward-based ship
or other platform to launch SRBMs and MRBMs, or land-attack cruise
missiles against the United States. If the attacking country
were willing to accept significantly reduced accuracy for the
missile, such a launch would not be a major technical hurdle.
The reduced accuracy in such a case, however, would probably
be better than that of some early ICBMs.
Although non-missile means of delivering weapons of mass destruction
do not provide the same prestige or degree of deterrence and
coercive diplomacy associated with an ICBM, such options are
of significant concern. Most are less expensive than ICBMs; can
be covertly developed and employed; probably would be more reliable,
accurate, and effective for disseminating biological warfare
agent; and would avoid missile defenses. Foreign non-state actors,
including some terrorist or extremist groups, have used, possessed,
or are interested in weapons of mass destruction. Most of these
groups have threatened the United States or its interests. We
cannot count on obtaining warning of all planned terrorist attacks,
despite the high priority we assign to this goal.
Recent trends suggest the likelihood is increasing that a
foreign group or individual will conduct a terrorist attack against
US interests using chemical agents or toxic industrial chemicals
in an attempt to produce a significant number of casualties,
damage infrastructure, or create fear among a population. Past
terrorist events, such as the World Trade Center bombing and
the Aum Shinrikyo chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system,
demonstrated the feasibility and willingness to undertake an
attack capable of producing massive casualties.
We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would
also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses.
Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures
and probably are willing to sell some technologies.
- Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably
would rely initially on readily available technology —including
separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar
absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power jammers,
chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—to develop penetration
aids and countermeasures.
- These countries could develop countermeasures based on these
technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.
Finally, we assess that foreign espionage and other collection
efforts are likely to increase. I led an interagency team last
year to examine China's collection and espionage efforts against
US nuclear information. We have since assessed that China, Iran,
and others probably are targeting US missile information as well.
That concludes my opening statement and I am prepared to take
your questions.
Click here for the Central
Intelligence Agency's web site
