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With the Defense Authorization Act for FY2001 finally passed and signed (PL 106-398), all the cards on now on the table for the Pentagon's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While final closure came at the end of October, July actually was the month in which most of the QDR action took place. Much advice from Members of Congress, staffers, and retired military officers surfaced then and some of it became part of the bill. Heeding the call of many analysts, the Senate added to its version of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4205) provisions dealing with the creation of a National Defense Panel (NDP), an independent review body similar to the one that was part of the structure for the first QDR in 1997. The Senate bill both established the NDP for the FY2001 QDR and made it a permanent part of the ongoing QDR process. These provisions corrected an oversight in the FY2000 legislation in which Congress established the QDR for FY2001 and every fourth year thereafter but inexplicably omitted any reference to the NDP. These provisions did not survive the House-Senate conference and were not part of the bill that became law on October 30. July also saw the conservative Lexington Institute sponsor a conference in which the FY2001 QDR figured prominently. One suggestion heard frequently was the need for the QDR to anticipate and include some minimal assumptions about the frequency of contingency operations which, advocates said, diverted funding from modernization, future research, quality of life, and infrastructure maintenance. What is puzzling here is that contingency operations, by their very nature, are unpredictable in regard to their start, size, and duration. At best, once they begin, their anticipated costs can (and should) be included in the Defense Department's annual budget request so that supplemental appropriations are not needed. But since the start of operations never coincides with the U.S. fiscal year, the initial sums to pay for deployment and other start-up costs usually come from emergency supplemental bills. An alternative might be for Congress to create a contingency operations reserve which, via a presidential notice of intention to participate in a new mission, would automatically be released unless Congress blocked release through a simple majority in both Houses. At the same Lexington Institute conference Representative Joseph Pitts (R-PA) took up another well-publicized issue. He called for the QDR to review the Pentagon's shortfall of electronic warfare (EW) assets. He noted that during the Kosovo air campaign the Supreme Allied Commander Europe had to divert EW aircraft from their role in Operation Northern Watch (the air patrols over northern Iraq) to assist strike aircraft operating against the Yugoslavian air defenses. Representative Pitts pointed to the need for EW aircraft to accompany "stealth" planes, claiming that the F-117 fighter lost over Serbia was downed because it did not have EW support. But perhaps the most interesting calls for QDR action came from retired U.S. Air Force LtGen Michael Short who led the allied air campaign over Kosovo. General Short suggested that the U.S. may find it necessary -- given the "expectation" of the American people that in future wars there will not be American casualties -- to supply allies with high-tech equipment that brings them up to U.S. standards. He mentioned specifically the inability of allied pilots to communicate with their American counterparts via secure radio, which forced U.S. pilots to go to nonsecure transmissions that the Yugoslavs could intercept. Such seemingly extreme remedial measures would be almost mandatory for countries such as Poland, The Czech Republic, and Hungary (as well as those General Short referred to as "NATO-wannabees") which will need billions of dollars to achieve even minimum warfighting interoperability. By contrast, the House version of H.R. 4205 went in the opposite direction. It required the Secretary of Defense to report on the costs of munitions and fuel used in Allied Force, the reduced service life of U.S. equipment used in the operation, and "whether and how the United States is being compensated by other North Atlantic Treaty Organization member nations for the costs of Operation Allied Force." In other words, the House was most unreceptive to any suggestion that the U.S. support allies who are cutting forces and defense budgets in the face of U.S. exhortations to raise spending. Another theme that surfaced in legislation and at the Lexington Institute conference was the psychological influence of low casualty expectations. This was evident in the congressional direction that the QDR reexamine existing requirements for more precision guided weapons and more stand-off munitions. At the conference, again drawing from his 1998 experience, General Short called for the QDR to consider expanding the current roles for unmanned aerial vehicles (one of Senator John Warner's admonitions made during hearings in February 2000), to include delivering munitions and conducting electronic warfare missions. The latter role might help alleviate the demands for manned jamming platforms. The former, however, might well run afoul of the 1988 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which proscribes ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), whether similar in size to current manned aircraft or smaller drones carrying munitions, clearly are ground launched, and if they are not expected to return to "base," would seem to fall into the category of missiles. Regardless, both the Navy and Air Force are pressing ahead with technology demonstrations for UCAVs. Perhaps General Short's most controversial recommendation would empower the QDR to "explore how this nation does targeting." He suggested that a division of effort was required between the National Command Authority (NCA), which should designate "target sets," and the theater commander/air component commander who would select the actual targets. While this seems like a practical rule, it could hardly be strictly followed. In an era in which sub-national groups abound, fighters blend in with general populations, and the terrain of battle is increasingly urban, old distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable targets for military action have become blurred. In such an atmosphere, mistakes can have huge political ramifications, particularly when a conflict is being waged by a multinational coalition and without U.N. authorization. The Pentagon is already working on the QDR even though the formal process will not begin until January 2001. A study group at the National Defense University has set the stage. Its findings, being released November 8-9, should provide a better idea of the parameters within which the formal process will operate. (See "Preparatory Report for the Quadrennial Defense Review Released") But there is a wildcard -- there will be a new administration in town, and it could press for new priorities and new directions. All of the above, and many other thoughts and suggestions, may be undercut by the new group. Stay tuned.
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