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U.K. Defense Policy
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- The Revolution in Military Affairs and the UK
- By Gerrard Quille, International Security Information Service Briefing
No. 73, December 1998
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- Introduction
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- The purpose of this paper is to analyse the current debate on the revolution
in military affairs (RMA) and to consider some of the possible implications
for UK defence policy.
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- 1. Background
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- Historically, according to John Arquilla, the first application of
the term 'military revolution' dates at least from Michael Roberts' 1955
lecture on the Swedish adoption of massed volley rifle in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries: a military revolution that raised Sweden's international
status to a degree disproportionate to its demography and resources.
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- History is littered with further instances of major shifts in military
organisation and strategic rationale that resulted in substantial changes
in regional or international status and therefore which could be regarded
as 'military revolutions'. There have also been a number of developments
in the Twentieth-Century that have contributed significantly to the lexicon
of RMA. For example:
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- The German Blitzkrieg during WWII (see below).
- The Soviet Union's concept of a Revolution in Military-Technical Affairs
(RMTA), which in the 1960s foresaw the potential future application of
the nuclear revolution, and in the 1980s recognised the Strategic Defence
Initiative's (SDI) potential to exploit Soviet fears of their technological
and economic inadequacy vis-a-vis the US.
- The US Military Technical Revolution (MTR) - whereby overwhelming Soviet
conventional forces were to be off-set with 'technological' advances that
enabled NATO to strike deep and accurately at Soviet follow-on forces.
- Spin-offs from the nuclear and 'space-race' programmes, such as precision
guidance, ballistic missiles, electronic processing systems etc. These
have provided the basis of today's archetypal RMA technologies.
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- 2. Defining RMA in the present debate
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- RMAs have been defined as occurring:
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- ' when new technologies (internal combustion engines) are incorporated
into militarily significant number of systems (main battle tanks) which
are then combined with innovative operational concepts (Blitzkrieg tactic)
and new organisational adaptation (Panzer divisions) to produce quantum
improvements in military effectiveness. The twentieth-century is marked
by three military revolutions: mechanised warfare in the 1930s and 1940s;
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the 1950s and 1960s; and cybernetics
and automated troop control (information technology) beginning in the 1970s
and continuing into the twenty-first century.'
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- The absence of any one such characteristic could be the difference
between a technological or strategic development having a revolutionary
impact. For example, although the French tank divisions before WWII were
very good, they lacked the organisational capability that was the key to
the success of the German Blitzkrieg.
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- The acknowledgement that the present RMA stems from the 1970s and will
run into the Twenty-First Century raises the question whether this process
is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Whether we are in fact witnessing
revolutionary change socially and politically, let alone militarily, remains
a moot point.
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- 3. What is Information Warfare (IW)?
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- RMA technologies can be divided into two. First, the 'hard-technologies'
including 'smart-weapons' and sophisticated weapons platforms. Secondly,
the information technologies that enable the functioning and accuracy of
'smart-weapons' and the integration of Command, Control, Communications,
Computers and Intelligence (C4I) in sophisticated weapons platforms.
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- Undoubtedly, information has often had a significant impact on how
warfare is conducted and in shaping its outcome. For instance: (i) information
interception, such as that achieved at Bletchely Park during WWII; (ii)
information-manipulation, such as Bismark's use of William I's telegram
in the 'Dispatch of Ems' to unify support for war with France; and (iii)
information for action, such as Eisenhower's decision to commence with
D-Day based on his weather forecasters. Innovations in both technology
and process have allowed an increase in the use and accuracy of information
as a weapon of war.
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- 'One important form of information warfare is decision making warfare,
in which a defender or attacker uses information acquisition or processing
technology to complete their decision making cycle quicker than an opponent
can to maintain the initiative in the battle.'
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- Disrupting or defending the decision-making process to achieve 'Information
Dominance' is the goal. Speed in processing decisions quicker than an adversary
is imperative. The 'real-time' aspect of this information acquisition and
processing technology 'is creating a revolution in the way military operations
are conducted'. However, agreement over the exact form of this revolution
remains contentious.
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- In its purest sense, IW involves a radical shift away from the traditional
confrontation of mass armies to conflict 'behind the lines', aimed principally
at the adversary's infrastructure and leadership. However, this is far
from the present reality. For example, the Gulf War (1991) was a hybrid
version of a conventional military operation in which IW was used as a
partial, but not the sole, means of achieving military objectives.
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- 4. RMA and the US debate
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- In the US the RMA appears to have become the most significant driving-force
for defence policy, such that we see:
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- ' the executive and legislative branches eagerly, even if at times
ignorantly, urging on a military already driven by its own inexorable organisational
impulses.'
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- The presentation of future wars conducted from a distance with stand-off
weapons and satellite remote sensors, often associated with the RMA, must
be attractive to US political elites. As Steven Metz & James Kievit
argue:
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- 'Full of promise, it [RMA] seems to offer Americans an answer to many
enduring strategic dilemmas, whether intolerance of casualties, impatience,
or the shrinking military manpower base.'
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- It is a basic premise of RMA purists that information and its technologies
is the key to success in future warfare and great-power status. Although
information itself cannot win a battle it can influence whether or not
a confrontation takes place and where it takes place. This has fuelled
concern that the RMA may be elevated to the status of a doctrine.
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- 5. The 1991 Gulf War's revolutionary legacy
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- The Gulf War is essentially the departure point for advocates and detractors
of RMA alike. The speed, accuracy and lethality of the weaponry and the
management of the multi-dimensional battlefield, excited, impressed, and
astounded those watching real-time media despatches.
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- By incapacitating its communications the Allies rendered Iraq impotent,
we were told. Such was the apparent success of the new technologies and
disabling of Iraqi command and control, that Alan D. Campen (former Director
of Command and Control Policy in the US Defence Department), wrote that
in the Gulf War:
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- ' knowledge came to rival weapons and tactics in importance, giving
credence to the notion that an enemy might be brought to its knees principally
through destruction and disruption of the means for command and control.'
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- Information-domination was complemented by air-domination, resulting
in a quick and decisive land-campaign. These features are viewed as indicators
to how future wars will be conducted, i.e. in a three-dimensional conflict
zone, where traditional lines of conflict are replaced by multi-dimensional
real-time conflicts targeting an enemy's C4I in the rear as well as engaging
his troops with both long-range, precision-guided missiles (incapacitators)
and rapid, close counter-attacks. In the Gulf this was achieved with cruise
missiles, smart bombs and stealth technologies.
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- Some analysts claim that such technologies will allow future wars to
be fought from greater distances without the need for massing at theatre
entry points, thus removing the tell-tale signs of an impending strike
and thereby reducing the likelihood of casualties and collateral damage.
However, not everyone has been convinced that the Gulf War represents a
model for future conflict, or that it justifies elevating the RMA above
other factors.
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- 5.1 Which Technologies Worked?
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- In their summary report, 'Gulf War Air Power Survey', Thomas A. Keaney
and Eliot A. Cohen have assessed the following five technologies that characterised
the air campaign:
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- (i) Stealth\Low Observability: The stealth platforms' ability to operate
with minimal support whilst knocking-out Iraqi C3I was impressive. Although
the F-117 only flew 2% of the total attacks, it struck almost 40% of the
strategic targets. However, such technologies were 'less flexible and
considerably more expensive than most conventional systems.'
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- (ii) Laser-Guided Bombs: These proved to be most effective against
hardened shelters and Iraqi armour. However, the authors are cautious in
their assessment that their efficacy was greatly attributable to the neutralisation
of Iraqi air defences, and that ' overall, laser-guided bombs comprised
only a small fraction of the munitions expended in the war.' Other limitations
included vulnerability in adverse weather, and the necessity for aircraft
to remain within sight of the target until detonation.
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- (iii) Air Refuelling: refuelling between aircraft has been a normal
practice in the USAF since the 1950s. The Gulf War required more than
100 tankers over Atlantic and Pacific skies, in support of some 1,000 military
aircraft. (Between the US and the Gulf some aircraft demanded as many
as 17 refuellings.)
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- (iv) High-speed Anti-radiation Missile (HARM): 'The use of HARMs effectively
neutralised both elements of Iraqi ground-based defences -anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs)- by suppressing the
SAMs and thereby allowing Coalition aircraft to fly above the lethal range
of AAA.'
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- Consequently, only five Coalition aircraft were lost to SAMs (four
of which did not have HARM-equipped aircraft support).
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- (v) The Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III: STU IIIs facilitated secure
Coalition communications (field telephones and faxes) at critical strategic
moments leading up to the war and during ad hoc arrangements throughout
the war. STU IIIs enabled decision-makers to by-pass intermediate-theatre-level
organisations, which resulted in quicker decision-making and consultation
with communication centres in Riyadh and Washington.
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- However, in bypassing either operational or strategic planning levels
communications sometimes broke down and confusion resulted. When late targeting
changes came directly from Washington: '...adequate co-ordination with
tanker, electronic countermeasures, and reconnaissance aircraft was at
times omitted in these late targeting changes, with a resulting loss in
sorties and effectiveness.'
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- The inadequacy of computer-communications systems such as CAFMS (and
others) led the authors to warn:'While the American military led other
armed forces in its use of computers, the rapidity of technical change
had left many of its systems out of date even before they were fully developed.'
In fact their failure:'required even more extensive use of secure phones
to overcome efficiency breakdowns.'
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- This reality does not reflect well on RMA descriptions of integrated
computer communications systems, where the ordinary telephone proved more
reliable and effective.
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- The authors conclude by acknowledging that Iraqi ineptitude did not
require the Coalition to really test new technologies such as the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). However, the five technologies
assessed above led them to conclude: 'For the most part, these technologies
were not really new and were available in less sophisticated forms during
the Vietnam War.'
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- Their conclusions raise a serious question mark about the revolutionary
nature of the Gulf War, and subsequent careless assertions about revolutionary
doctrines based on the promise of technology. The RMA's influence was of
a hybrid rather than purist nature. After all:
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- ' some of the aspects of the war that seemed most dramatic at the time
appear less so than they did in the immediate afterglow of one of the most
one-sided campaigns in military history.'
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- 6. Asymmetrical Warfare
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- Arquilla warned of the 'diffusion effects' of imitation. Whilst the
present RMA-technologies represent a great challenge to would-be imitators,
it is not an insurmountable one. Yet, even if states outside the Transatlantic
community do develop limited RMA-type technologies, the strategic balance
will still reflect the US's dominant role as the sole superpower and it
is inconceivable that any state could seriously challenge the US's superiority
in a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) for the foreseeable future.
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- The costs associated with adopting large, technologically advanced
military platforms and integrating them with C4I systems, in order to counter
(or keep-up with) the US and its allies may prompt some states to conclude,
as an Indian General did, that the main lesson of the Gulf war was never
to fight the US without nuclear weapons. Whilst a nuclear programme is
not only challenging financially but technically, chemical and in particular
biological weapons are more affordable and less technically challenging
alternative weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
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- Future adversaries are more likely to pursue the current trend away
from the concept of a 'decisive battle'.
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- 7. RMA and WMD
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- The link between the RMA and WMD is detectable in US policy-making
circles. As the US National Defense Panel concluded:
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- 'WMD will require us to increase dramatically the means to project
lethal power from extended ranges we must provide a conventional, non-nuclear
deterrent capability against the use of weapons of mass destruction.'
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- Yet, RMA as a counter-force to WMD raises as many problems as it solves.
For example, during the recent stand-off between the US and Iraq it was
acknowledged that precision-guided smart bombs could not have targeted
and successfully destroyed all of Iraq's known biological capabilities.
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- Lawrence Freedman, who has examined RMA in the context of a 'Western
Way of War', acknowledges that there has been a shift away from the 'decisive
battle' to a 'process of destruction', and that:
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- 'The effort to reverse this tendency, so that war can again become
a fight, is the core theme of much of the strategic theory of the past
quarter-century, even in the nuclear sphere. The RMA represents the culmination
of these efforts.'
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- Nuclear weapons have had a major influence on shaping this situation.
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- 'From Central Europe to Kashmir, and from the Middle East to Korea,
nuclear weapons are making it impossible for large sovereign units, or
states, to fight each other in earnest without running the risk of mutual
suicide.'
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- Once we are reminded of Iraq's biological warfare programme and the
relative ease of development, production and storage without detection
by the international community, the RMA rationale for conventional war
appears very risky.
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- The pre-occupation of RMAs with MRCs also neglects current trends towards
intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts. As the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI's) annual Yearbook concluded:
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- 'All but one of the conflicts recorded for 1996 were internal, that
is, the incompatibility concerned control over the government or the territory
of one state.'
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- What then are the most likely conflict scenarios and what provisions
does RMA afford them?
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- 8. Conflict Short of War
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- Compared to MRCs, some analysts conclude that: 'With a few exceptions
the impact of the RMA on conflict short of war is far less clear'
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- Whatever the technological merits of large and expensive military hardware,
the fact remains that in many present operations involving US and UK troops,
such as UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the human element of troops
in the field is essential to their success. UN Peacekeepers on the ground
represent a visible, as well as political, commitment to resolve a conflict.
This would be very difficult to replace through force projection from long
distances. Once again, a balance is needed when integrating technological
advances into doctrines designed for such conflict scenarios as PSOs. Here,
the RMA is no substitute for doctrine.
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- Many analysts point out that weapons designed for High Intensity Conflicts
(HIC) can be equally effective in Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC), for example,
the value of the role of British Challenger Tanks in Bosnia. However, certain
capabilities bracketed with the RMA, such as stand-off precision weapons,
have had their value questioned in conflicts short of war.
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- 9. The Role of Technology in Conflict
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- The recent Carnegie Report on 'Preventing Deadly Conflict' acknowledged
the impact of technology in today's society and observed:
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- 'Historically, technological advances have resulted in social and economic
transformations on a vast scale. This is especially likely when fundamental
new technologies are unfolding across the entire frontier of scientific
and engineering research and are rapidly disseminated throughout the world.
The impact over the longer term has been positive. Along the way, there
have been massive dislocations. In this context, it is worth recalling
the severe disruptions of the industrial revolution; they had much to do
with the emergence of communism and fascism, especially the Nazi catastrophe.'
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- The main problem today, as the Carnegie Commission emphasises, is not
necessarily in identifying potential areas of conflict, but actually acting
on that information. Co-ordinating activities quickly and decisively could
minimise Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi-type conflicts degenerating to the levels
they did. The UK's armed forces have proved extremely capable (given workable
mandates) in such stressful environments.
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- Technological advances have played a part in peacekeeping situations,
such as the success of telemedicine in Bosnia, where Peacekeepers and civilians
benefited from the ' primary diagnosis of radiology exams performed by
radiologists stationed in Hungary and Germany.'
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- We must avoid adopting the slogan of the RMA in place of a doctrine,
because of a misplaced desire to enhance the credibility of expensive military
platforms that may not significantly contribute to probable future conflicts.
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- As Freedman warns:
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- 'It will, however, hardly be a revolution in military affairs if it
leads those who embrace it to avoid most contemporary conflicts, and only
take on those that promise certain and relatively painless victories.'
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- 10. The RMA and Implications for the UK
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- The RMA debate can be considered as a derivative of the US political
and defence identity. The combination of an inherited abhorrence of casualties,
along with a tradition of seeking major technological breakthroughs (specifically
military ones), has taken RMA beyond a concept and propelled it to doctrinal
heights.
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- However, NATO allies should have some concern about the implications
of the RMA debate in the US. If the US sees itself as the sole supplier
of heavy-lift capabilities (a reality at present) and certain command and
control systems including stand-off and precision-guided munitions (PGMs),
how does it perceive its allies' role vis-a-vis such technologies?
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- Do US policy-makers now envisage their forces remaining dislocated
from the potential bloody battlefield? Instead will the US facilitate allied
forces in the field, using its command and control systems backed up by
long-range surgical strikes, whilst the less technologically endowed allies
role up their sleeves and engage the adversary in the battle-zone? In other
words, the US playing an anaesthetic role with its allies doing the close-up
and/or clean-up operations. Allies are unlikely to regard such a division
of labour as politically acceptable.
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- 10.1 What does the SDR say about the RMA?
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- The SDR summarises the future technology problematique facing the UK
and its European Allies.
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- 'In military capability, we can look, for example, for much more precise
application of force as a result of improvements in intelligence gathering,
command and control and precision weapons. Equally, there is potential
for practical benefits in the way we train and support our forces.'
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- How the UK harnesses present and developing technologies both from
the military and civilian industrial sectors needs to be in response to
security demands from the Armed Forces, and not be a result of the 'push-factor'
from industry to sell a particular piece of technologically-advanced equipment.
The White Paper then acknowledges that further investigation is needed
because:
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- 'Such possibilities also raise difficult long-term questions. How
much should we invest in improving 'enabling' technologies at the expense
of weapon numbers? How can our equipment plans keep up with the pace of
change?'
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- Hopefully, the government's 'smart procurement' initiative will go
some way to improving the efficiency of equipment and systems integration.
However, large next generation weapons platforms still take some 15 years
between research and development (R&D) and delivery, sometimes rendering
them outdated before they enter service. The likely need, therefore, to
upgrade such platforms once in service, indicates the advantage in making
them as simple and cheap as possible in order to facilitate the affordability
of adding systems and hardware technology subsequently. The UK's international
responsibilities and its desire to 'punch above its weight' will equate
to a strong desire to harness 'enabling' technologies, especially in an
era of reducing defence budgets. The SDR acknowledges such and sets out
a formulaic desire for the MoD to develop a closer relationship with industry.
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- 10.2 Will a US-RMA leave its Allies behind?
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- The SDR also acknowledges the possibility of the US leaving its less
technologically endowed Allies behind by asking:
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- 'How do we and our Allies retain interoperability with US forces given
the radical changes they envisage?'
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- On the other hand, the US will not want to deploy any technological
systems or platforms that impair co-operating with its Allies.
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- 'And will technological changes also require radical changes in the
way our forces are organised and fight?'
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- The White Paper also offers thoughts on both the potential conflict
environments one might see the UK's Armed Forces engaged in, and the best
way of organising those forces. The continued commitment to joint-force
co-operation under a single command at Northwood reflects a significant
characteristic of this future organisation which has been the model for
many of its European Allies' restructuring.
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- On reflection there is much in the SDR that encourages one to assume
that any technological impact on the UK's Armed Forces will be driven by
military needs rather than from the technology itself. As well as the
advantages of technology as a force multiplier the SDR also recognises
that the benefits of the information technology revolution are accompanied
by potential new vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities.
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- Sensibly, the UK's approach incorporates all factors that might be
salient in the future including the application of technology and information
systems, whilst not neglecting important issues such as civil-military
relations in PSO environments, military education, terrorism, drugs (i.e.
security threats that the RMA tends to neglect).
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- 10.3 Recommendations and Parameters for a UK RMA Debate?
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- The RMA debate in the UK should take into account the following:
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- Whilst it cannot be isolated from international responsibilities and
Allies, debate should be based on the UK's own particular strategic and
security needs.
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- Beware of RMA prescriptions as panaceas for nebulous future conflict.
The RMA is a useful vehicle for debate and should not drive procurement,
doctrine, and decision-makers.
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- Other very important issues such as civil-military relations and other
approaches to conflicts i.e. conflict resolution and third party initiatives,
should not be ignored.
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- Debate should neither be so focussed on technology that other crucial
factors are forgotten, nor should it neglect the importance of key technologies
and their potential as force-multipliers (vital to UK 'punching above its
weight') - but again this must be 'function' driven not technology driven.
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- Avoid using the RMA debate as an excuse to throw money at industrial
re-development. This is not just the responsibility of MoD (with its declining
resources), but requires multi-departmental co-operation for redevelopment
including a broad range of UK and European economic regeneration projects.
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- Tri-service integration is a major feature of recent UK military thinking
and is an increasingly important part of NATO force structure planning.
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- ENDNOTES
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- Arquilla, J., 'The 'Velvet' Revolution in Military Affairs', World
Policy Journal, Winter 1997/1998, p.35.
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- The SDI project was based on the premise that new remote space-based
satellite technologies could be deployed to intercept and destroy nuclear
ballistic attacks against the US.
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- Spin-off should not be read as accidental and includes the deliberate
Research and Development (R&D) on military technology, stemming from
radar and the nuclear weapons research, which was significantly forcing
the pace of innovation.
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- Strategic Survey, Oxford University Press, IISS, 1995/1996, pp. 30-31.
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- Perusich, K., 'Information Warfare: Radar in World War II as a Historical
Example', International Symposium on Technology and Society 1997, IEEE,
20-21 June 1997, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK, p. 92.
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- Arquilla, J., op cit., p. 32.
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- Metz, S., & Kievit, J., 'The Revolution in Military Affairs and
Conflict Short of War', Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,
July 1994.
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- Toffler, A & H., War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the
Twenty-First Century, Warner Books, 1994, p.87.
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- Keaney, Thomas, A., & Cohen, Eliot, A., Gulf War Air Power Summary
Report, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 224.
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- Ibid., p. 225. Such as the cruise missiles which: ' had a smaller payload,
required a lengthy targeting process, and could not be re-targeted after
launch.'
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- Ibid., p. 225.
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- Ibid., p. 231.
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- Ibid., p. 232.
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- Ibid., p.233.
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- Ibid., p. 251.
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- Arquilla, op cit., p. 35.
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- Freedman, L., 'The Revolution in Strategic Affairs', Adelphi Paper
318, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University
Press, 1998, p. 45 quoting from: Manning, R. A., 'The Nuclear Age: The
Next Chapter', Foreign Policy, No. 109, Winter 1997-98, p. 71.
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- Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National
Security in the Twenty-first century, December 1997, p. 42.
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- Freedman, L., op cit., p.15 quoting from: Liddell Hart, Basil., The
Revolution in Warfare, London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1946.
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- Ibid., p. 15.
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- Ibid., p. 194
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- Sollenberg, M., & Wallensteen, P., 'Global patterns of major armed
conflicts, 1989-96', SIPRI Yearbook 1997:Armaments, Disarmament and International
Security, p. 17. Refer to the relevant chapter for their definitions and
parameters of 'a conflict'.
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- Metz, S., & Kievit, J., op cit.
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- Metz, S., & Kievit, J., op cit., p. 31.
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- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly
Conflict, Final Report, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1997,
pp. viii-ix.
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