July 19, 2001
By Stephen Young
WASHINGTON -- Both supporters and opponents of U.S. plans to building a national missile defense system often focus their debate on the tremendous technical hurdles that would need to be overcome before such a system could be operational.
What frequently gets overlooked, unfortunately, are some of the unintended consequences that could be caused by such a system.
Would it, for example, become the basis for a new arms race? Would other nations see our "defensive" system as an offensive weapon? Would our allies feel themselves less secure? What would the international community think?
Here, at a glance, are the likely reactions by some major international players:
Russia
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's vast nuclear arsenal has fallen into decline. While arms-control treaties have led to the verifiable reduction of U.S. and Russian deployed arsenals by half, the unilateral deployment of a U.S. missile defenses could destroy that process.
Russia's current economic woes may prevent it from increasing its arsenal, but it could be expected to take any or all of the following steps:
-- Withdraw from the START process that currently verifies reductions in its nuclear arsenal;
-- Maintain a greater percentage of its large nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, thereby increasing the risk of an accidental or mistaken launch;
-- Equip the ten to 20 new missiles it builds each year with multiple warheads;
-- Assist North Korea, Iran or other countries with missile, nuclear, or other threatening technologies. This could include technology to defeat or completely evade missile defenses;
-- Enhance military cooperation with China;
-- Find asymmetrical responses to NMD, such as redeploying short-range and tactical nuclear weapons to threaten Europe.
China
China's small arsenal of roughly 20 long-range, single-warhead missiles has not grown for some time. But it has an ongoing missile development program that could vastly increase the size and capabilities of its arsenal. According to reports by the U.S. intelligence community, China, in response to U.S. missile defenses, could:
-- Increase the size of its arsenal by ten-fold;
-- Deploy more accurate missiles on mobile launchers or submarines, possibly with multiple warheads. China has had these capabilities for a decade, but has not utilized them to date;
-- Use decoys and other countermeasures that could thwart U.S. defenses;
-- Provide such countermeasure technology to North Korea or other countries;
-- Develop anti-satellite weapons to attack vulnerable U.S. communications and defense assets in space;
-- Pursue asymmetrical responses to NMD, such as providing missile technology and raw materials to countries like Pakistan, Iran, and Libya.
Europe and NATO
Almost all of the America's allies in Europe have voiced strong criticism or significant concern about the Bush administration's national missile defense plans. In January 2001, French President Jacques Chirac said that U.S. missile defense "cannot fail [but] to relaunch the arms race in the world."
Should the U.S. proceed with with NMD, the implications for Europe include:
-- The potential for increased threats from medium and short-range nuclear missiles from Russia, especially if Moscow withdraws from the U.S.-Russian treaty banning intermediate-range missiles;
-- A split between the "protected" United States and "undefended" Europe on involvement in regional crises;
-- Further strained relations between the U.S. military and its NATO allies. The U.S. defense budget is already larger than the defense budgets of all other NATO countries combined;
-- Heightened global tensions, because the United States, believing it is protected, becomes more confrontational in international crises.
North Korea
North Korea has never tested a missile capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear warhead. Under an agreement with the Clinton administration, North Korea's missile development program has not conducted a flight test since 1998. The Bush administration could pursue similar negotiations which could end the program entirely, along with North Korea's profitable short-range missile exports business.
However, if instead the United States builds a missile defense, North Korea could:
-- Resume its missile flight test program;
-- Develop and deploy countermeasures that could defeat US missile defenses, and seek assistance from China or Russia in doing so.
-- Focus on delivering weapons of mass destruction by ship, plane, or cruise missile -- methods that are both more reliable and provide no "return address" the way a long-range missile does;
-- Increase its exports of medium- and short-range missiles to countries that could threaten U.S. troops and allies overseas.
The Non-Proliferation Regime
A U.S. missile defenses system could destroy not only the bilateral arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia, but also harm the international nuclear non-proliferation regime around the globe.
Under that regime, that vast majority of the world's nations have committed to neither develop nor deploy nuclear weapons. In return, countries with nuclear weapons pledged to reduce and eliminate their arsenals. But NMD could disrupt the current delicate balance between nations with the following possible results:
-- If China increases its nuclear arsenal, India could use that potential threat as a rationale to expand its own growing nuclear weapons and missile program;
-- Pakistan might then feel the need to enlarge its own nuclear program, accelerating the on-going regional arms race;
-- If North Korea becomes more threatening, Japan could feel pressure to develop nuclear weapons;
-- Countries like Egypt and Indonesia, which renounced nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the United States and other nuclear powers to give up their arsenals, could seek to build their own atomic bombs;
-- As the non-proliferation regime erodes, countries may begin secret weapons programs to hedge against the possibility that their neighbors will build nuclear weapons.
Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst for the Union of Concerned
Scientists. (Copyright 2001, Global Beat Syndicate, 418 Lafayette
Street, Suite 554, New York, NY 10003 http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate).