May 27, 2002 © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved.


Each Nuclear Warhead Destroyed Adds to U.S. Security
No matter which side anyone was on in the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the bad guys for almost everyone
 

By John Spykerman
 

Don’t be fooled when President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands at their Moscow summit in Moscow week and sell their nuclear weapons reduction treaty as the official end of the Cold War. As with typical horror film clichés, the bad guys are rarely vanquished on the first try. The heroes sit back and relax, thinking they’ve saved the day, but the villains always return to wreak havoc in sequel after sequel.
No matter which side anyone was on in the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the bad guys for almost everyone. Their destructive power threatened the entire world with annihilation and sparked a costly arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States.
This week, Bush and Putin are proud to think they’ve eliminated the bloated nuclear forces maintained by both sides long after they were of any strategic value. But with the current war on terrorism, we have found our sequel. Americans should demand that the cuts claimed by Bush in this treaty are real and that such weapons don’t show up in the hands of real-life villains such as al-Qaeda terrorists.
This new treaty commits the United States to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons force to under 2,200 actively deployed warheads by 2012—down from the 6,000 warheads officials and most journalists claim constitute the current force. Russia, which can hardly afford to maintain and secure anything resembling its current arsenal, will make similar reductions.
But neither of these figures comes close to capturing the full nuclear arsenals, which are roughly 10,000 warheads in the United States—and most likely more in Russia. That’s because many thousands of tactical nuclear weapons on each side have never been addressed, and remain unaddressed by this treaty—just one of several mistakes ignored by Bush and Putin.
As it stands, the progress so praised by supporters of this treaty is a sham in important ways. By failing to address the true and complex threats to U.S. security, this treaty leaves Russia and the United States worse off by creating a false sense of security in half-measures and baby steps. Warhead reductions look good on paper, but they mean nothing until those warheads are destroyed. Under this treaty, at the insistence of the Bush administration, the strategic warheads "eliminated" over the next decade will not be dismantled, but stored as a hedge against future threats and able to be redeployed on a moment’s notice.
Many experts say the storage-instead-of-destruction plan is a very dangerous strategy. That’s because the greatest threat to us isn’t a nuclear attack launched by Russia, but one launched by terrorists groups or other would-be nuclear states, using stolen or lost materials from Russia’s programs involving weapons of mass destruction.
For years, Russia has not been able to guarantee control over its biological, chemical and nuclear materials. And there is no doubt that if this material falls into the hands of al Qaeda or like-minded organizations, they will not hesitate to use these weapons against American targets. No policy and no National Missile Defense system would stop terrorists from detonating a radiological bomb in New York or Washington. President Bush knows this is a serious threat—the "shadow government" established after September 11th wasn’t due to fear of a Russian nuclear attack. He must now do more to ensure that Russia’s unstable nuclear forces are reduced and destroyed by committing both sides to warhead destruction, not storage.
To prevent a Cold War sequel of catastrophic terrorism, Presidents Bush and Putin need to go farther than the announced cuts in this treaty. The Cold War is now more than a decade past, but its legacy remains in the form of thousands of unneeded and dangerous nuclear weapons, which will remain with us regardless of this new treaty’s accounting gimmicks.
In future negotiations, President Bush must stop viewing each destroyed warheads as one fewer in our nuclear arsenal in case of some unforeseeable emergency. Instead, he should view it as another warhead that won’t fall into the wrong hands and be used against U.S. citizens.
Until nuclear weapons are out of the reach of terrorists and verifiably dismantled, Americans should be careful not to buy into any argument that sells them a false sense of security.
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John Spykerman is coordinator of the Program on Global Security and Disarmament at the University of Maryland.

 

 

© 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/.

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