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September 4, 2002 © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved.

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By Antonin Rusek
Selinsgrove, PA – Amidst the steady drumbeat for the war against Iraq, President Bush would do well to remember the famous dictum of Karl von Clausewitz, the father of the modern strategic thinking,: "War is a continuation of policy by different means." War is just a tool, it is not the policy itself.
As a global power, our policies must be global, and promoting economic and political globalization is in our interest. While populations touched by globalization generally enjoy the benefits of free markets and greater freedoms, the elites in traditional, regimented hierarchical societies are loosing their power, wealth and social status due to that same trend. They see the United States as the source of all changes, and hence, the major enemy. And some of these elites are involved in trying to hit us back.
Our global presence in so many spheres of life, and our heavy dependence on fast-evolving new technologies, make us increasingly vulnerable to paralyzing attacks against our key institutions and installations. Anti-American terrorist groups, too often backed by these fearful or angry elites around the globe, try to target these vulnerabilities, hoping this will force us to pull back from our many global roles, restricting changes to America. Some disenfranchised elites, hoping to regain their power and privilege, see shadowy transnational terrorist organizations as their perfect tool.
Faced with these new threats and challenges, U.S. national security policy must, without question, shift from our traditional reliance on overwhelming and decisive retaliation to a strategy of prevention and, in some cases, preemption.
But each potential threat is unique. In the case of Iraq, the real threat is not intercontinental missiles or state-sponsored terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, but rather the danger of a sudden weakening or collapse of the Iraqi state. The resulting power vacuum would most likely deliver chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction, or their components, into the hands of "asymmetric warriors," the transnational terrorist groups – assuming Iraq has any to deliver.
Moreover, as we learned in Afghanistan, it is the weak and failed states that are most likely to provide command and training infrastructure, or at least safe haven and a "blind eye," to terrorist groups. With this in mind, U.S. strategy for Iraq must focus on two goals: the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, and, more difficult, measures that transform Iraq into a stable, secular Arab state.
Using force of arms to achieve the first goal, eliminating Iraqi weapon programs, requires overwhelming force and swift victory – days, not weeks – to prevent the transfer of biological agents to terrorists, or the situation will be worse than it is today. Given Saddam Hussein’s plan to defend Iraq with street-by-street urban fighting, and given what we know – and do not know – about the size and whereabouts of Iraqi weapons programs, swift U.S. victory in Iraq is unlikely.
Nor does a massive military invasion ensure a stable, secular Iraqi society. Eliminating the Saddam Hussein regime by no means guarantees that its replacement will be any better – or even that a successor will emerge at all. The resulting vacuum, or weak, unstable state is an engraved invitation for terrorists to step in. Preventing either alternative will commit us to long-term occupation and the costly and complex task of nation building in Iraq. Meantime, many regional experts say a weak and unstable Iraq will likely lead to destabilization of other Arab regimes, and a new round of anti-American sentiment – two more opportunities for terrorists.
Instead of relying on military force, unilateral or otherwise, our overall interests are far better served by using a different strategic instrument: overwhelming pressure on Iraq to re-admit U.N.-sponsored weapons inspectors, with all the powers specified under U.N. resolutions and 1991 cease-fire agreement. Such a measure would steadily degrade Iraqi weapons programs at a tiny fraction of the cost and without the loss of a single life on either side. At the same time, we should work with allies and concerned Arab states to establish new policies within the sanctions regime to induce Iraqis to introduce gradual political reforms. This would preserve the stability and peaceful transformation of Iraq.
At present, using war to achieve our ends in Iraq is more likely to hinder our goals than to advance them, and only complicates the war on terror.
In addition to Clauziwitz, Mr. Bush and his planners would also do well to note that wars always have unintended consequences, but seldom desirable ones.
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Antonin Rusek, an associate professor of economics at Susquehanna University in Selinsgrove, PA, has been an economic consultant in The Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey.

 

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© 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/.

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