Trust, But Codify
Nuclear arms reduction requires a treaty, not just a handshake
By William D. Hartung
November 16, 2001
NEW YORK -- The recent pledges by President Bush and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to cut their nations' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds represent a major step forward for arms control. If fully implemented, these reductions would make up for the lack of progress during the Clinton administration, when U.S. and Russian strategic forces remained stuck at unnecessarily high levels.
Unfortunately, Bush and Putin differ sharply on how their proposed arms cuts should be implemented. Bush has suggested moving to a "new strategic framework" based on trust, not formal agreements. Putin has argued in favor of codifying the commitment to reductions in treaty language, complete with verification procedures.
At first glance Bush's position seems reasonably compelling. Many experts believe that Moscow will be forced by economic circumstances to reduce the number of its deployed nuclear warheads from current levels of 5,800 to 1,500 or less by the end of this decade.
Bearing this in mind, Bush administration officials want the flexibility to build U.S. nuclear forces up or down as needed, rather than getting tied down by a strict arms control formula. And the Bush national security team certainly doesn't want to bargain away its plans a missile defense system in exchange for Russian nuclear reductions that are expected to occur in any case.
But Bush’s aversion to formal arms control is dangerously short-sighted. The proposed reductions in U.S. and Russian forces are intended to occur over a ten year period. That's a long time to rely on trust. Without a formal agreement, it will be far easier for one side or the other to bail out as soon as the political going gets tough.
What happens if Putin is replaced by a more hard-line leader, or has a change of heart once the United States takes definitive steps to deploy a missile defense system?
These questions are of particular importance because Russia still has a relatively inexpensive way to rebuild its nuclear forces: adding large numbers of independently targetable warheads to existing missiles. Since President Bush's new framework would abandon the limits on multiple warhead missiles that are set out in the START II treaty, Russia would have no legal obstacle to taking this course of action.
The nuclear force structure resulting from greater Russian reliance on multi-warhead missiles would be particularly destabilizing, since without an inspection regime it would be virtually impossible to tell how many warheads Russia possessed. The combination of a massive missile defense system on the U.S. side and a large number of multi-warhead missiles on the Russian side would put a premium on reacting quickly in a crisis, thereby increasing the prospects of an accidental launch or a preemptive strike.
A formal U.S.-Russian agreement to implement deep nuclear reductions would provide far more leverage in persuading other nuclear powers to reduce or eliminate their own arsenals. It would also make it easier for Washington to step up its support for the destruction of excess nuclear warheads and bomb-grade materials in Russia, which have been widely cited as posing a significant risk of diversion to terrorist networks. The fewer nuclear weapons there are, the harder it will be for a terror network to get its hands on nuclear materials and components.
Given the risks of relying on a handshake and a smile, President Bush should think twice before renouncing arms control agreements. To paraphrase Ronald Reagan, the president's nuclear credo should be "trust, but codify."
William D. Hartung, a military affairs advisor to Foreign Policy in Focus, is a Senior Research Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School in New York City.
Copyright 2001, Global Beat Syndicate, 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 554, New York, NY 10003 http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate.