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September 4, 2002 © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved.

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By Husain Haqqani -- Global Beat Syndicate
Washington -- Pakistan’s October 10 parliamentary elections are likely to be neither free nor fair. General Pervez Musharraf has already decreed 29 amendments to the constitution, giving him absolute power – including the power to further amend the constitution.
The names of several hundred thousand eligible voters have not been included in the voters’ lists. Ten million eligible voters have not been issued a national identity card, which is mandatory for registered voters wanting to exercise their franchise. Leaders of the two major political parties – former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif – have been excluded from the electoral process, also by decree.
If all that was not enough, General Musharraf is using state machinery to prop up an alliance of minor pro-Musharraf groups.
Ever since his one-sided referendum in April that asked for a mandate to continue ruling, the credibility of Musharraf’s pledges to restore democracy has steadily declined. April’s referendum was marred by massive fraud. It confirmed the fears of critics who said the general’s administration was not very different from Pakistan’s previous military regimes. Given the many ways he has corrupted the process, the October elections are highly unlikely to add to Pakistan’s prestige and certainly will not confer the legitimacy he seeks.
The Bush administration has failed to condemn Musharraf’s recent moves, arguing that his support is crucial for the war against terrorism. Apologists for military rule claim that, given Pakistan’s troubled history with democracy, Musharraf has little alternative except to manipulate the political process. But in reality, there is no justification for denying democracy to Pakistan. General Musharraf could go back to being the military leader with a difference that he set out to be. That would require him to hold an honest election and to accept its results. Alternatively, he could take the risk of becoming a politician and run for office himself, creating a political party to oppose the politicians he despises.
Military regimes in Pakistan have tried fixing elections before. Their machinations failed to decisively change Pakistan’s politics. Instead of redefining democracy, Pakistan’s military has pre-empted it every few years, never allowing time for Pakistan to practice it, or for democratic institutions to take solid roots.
Musharraf has relentlessly persecuted the leaders of the country’s mainstream political parties, charging them with corruption. Opposition to military rule has brought Bhutto’s social democratic Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Sharif’s conservative Pakistan Muslim League (PML) closer than ever before. In the past, failure of the two parties to cooperate paved the way for the military’s intervention in politics.
Public support for politicians diminishes but does not die because of corruption allegations. The government’s inability to secure court convictions any on substantive charges despite years of "accountability" has taken the sting out of these allegations. Sharif and Bhutto continue to enjoy strong support from their core groups of political workers, which creates a no-win situation for the military regime.
If the current manipulation of the electoral process, described by the PPP as pre-poll rigging, succeeds, the new parliament will have little respect or credibility. If, instead, the PPP and PML emerge as the major winners in the election despite all the maneuvers against them, Musharraf will face a parliament dominated by his critics and opponents.
The Bush administration feels it owes General Musharraf a debt of gratitude for his support since September 11. One way to repay this debt would be to advise him against self-destructive actions. A fixed or flawed election will only destabilize Pakistan and undermine its ability to confront terrorists. A regime that draws power from the military, and not from a popular mandate, could be rendered ineffective at any stage.
For more than half of its 55 years of existence, military leaders have governed Pakistan. But this Islamic nation of 145 million continues to yearn for democratic governance. The United States has supported each of Pakistan’s four military regimes for strategic reasons. But this time Washington should insist that the Pakistani military chart a different course. General Musharraf should be told that the United States will not be able to support him if he does not support Pakistan’s constitution. Twenty-seven amendments to the U.S. constitution have been made over two centuries. A U.S. ally should not be given a wink and a nod to arbitrarily distort his country’s constitution with 29 amendments in one go.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C. He has served as adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka.

 

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© 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/.

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