NATO's Credibility on the line in Macedonia
NATO needs to extend and broaden its mission in Macedonia if another Balkan war is to be averted.
By Robert Greenberg
Sept. 5, 2001
CHAPEL HILL, North Carolina -- NATO'S credibility in Macedonia is heading for a major set-back following the recent signing of an internationally-brokered political compromise between the country's Macedonian and Albanian communities.
Under the Aug. 13 agreement, the Macedonian government has agreed to provide the Albanian minority -- an estimated 30% of the population -- with broader participation in the police and recognition of Albanian as an official language in certain regions of the country. The government also has agreed to implement sweeping constitutional changes that will give ethnic Albanians greater rights in the country.
In return, tthe ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA, which now occupies approximately two dozen villages and towns , has committed itself to turn over 3,000, weapons. Some 4, 000 NATO troops have entered the volatile Macedonian arena on a 30-day mission to collect those arms from the NLA.
But NATO is collecting only those weapons that the NLA hands over voluntarily. The Macedonian government believes the Albanians have at least 85,000 weapons. This wide discrepancy threatens to derail the whole peace process and doom NATO's mission.
NATO's prospects for failure in Macedonia are further clouded by its loss of credibility with the Macedonian government.
NATO has played a major role in the region since 1999, when the U.S.-led alliance launched air strikes against Yugoslavia and vowed to reverse the Serb ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo. Macedonia's government was a willing and eager ally at that time, opening its territory and air space to NATO forces. Macedonia still hosts several military camps, which provide logistical support for the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
But Macedonia has received little in return for its support of NATO. The Skopje government blames NATO for failing to protect Macedonia's northern border with Kosovo, and has repeatedly documented the flow of arms and Albanian militants over the frontier. From a Macedonian point of view, NATO forces are now collecting the same weapons that slipped into Macedonia despite NATO's massive presence in Kosovo.
Cynics argue that NATO's interests lie in under-reporting the number of Albanian arms in Macedonia. After all, admitting that 85,000 arms had infiltrated into Macedonia would truly make NATO look bad. So the question comes down to this: Is NATO too concerned with its image, or is it sincere in its efforts to prevent a fourth Balkan war?
If NATO is serious about preventing another war, it must accept the reality that stability cannot be achieved if paramilitary forces and illegal weapons are tolerated either in Kosovo or in Macedonia.
NATO can still salvage its credibility in Macedonia by supporting the legitimate political leaders in Macedonia and their bold efforts to achieve a compromise agreement. It must also extend its mission in Macedonia until it can be absolutely certain that the peace process is irreversible and all sides are living up to their commitments. Lastly, NATO should deploy its forces along Macedonia's border with Kosovo and Albania, and guarantee Macedonia's territorial integrity for at least 12 months. Such moves would secure the cease-fire and avert a disastrous civil war.
The alternative is bleak. After the current mission ends in September, fighting in Macedonia could easily resume, eventually forcing NATO to return to occupy yet another region in the Balkans traumatized by yet another appalling ethnic war.
Robert Greenberg is an expert with Foreign Policy In Focus and an associate professor in Slavic languages, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He spent the last seven months in Macedonia as a Fulbright scholar. (Copyright 2001, Global Beat Syndicate, 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 554, New York, NY 10003 http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate).