Overthrowing Saddam Hussein would satisfy much of the world, but containing him is still more prudent.
By Philip H. Gordon and Michael E. O’Hanlon
December 4, 2001
WASHINGTON -- Should the United States go to war against Saddam Hussein? With President Bush warning that Saddam will "find out" what will happen if he doesn’t allow United Nations weapons inspectors back into Iraq, this question is becoming the hottest debate in the war on terrorism.
Conservatives, most of them Republicans, argue for taking advantage of this opportunity to rid the world of a terrible despot. Moderates from both the Democratic and Republican parties argue the lack of evidence implicating Saddam in the events of September 11 and the resulting lack of international support for attacking him preclude the option for now.
Each side in this debate tends to make a central mistake. Moderates are correct to note the lack of international support for attacking Saddam at present. But most go too far in suggesting that the international coalition against terrorism would be shattered if the United States went to war alone. They often forget that, in dealing with Saddam, nothing succeeds like success.
If the United States really overthrew him, most countries would rejoice. Russia and France could resume their trade with Iraq and recoup billions of dollars. Many Arab nations would be glad to see the lifting of sanctions that have hurt the innocent Iraqi people. And most countries around the world would be relieved at the prospect of a more dependable flow of Persian Gulf oil.
Conservatives are right that there is a strong case for ridding the world of Saddam. He has chemical and biological weapons, nuclear-weapons ambitions and a record of ruthless aggression against his own people and several neighbors. Saddam also has a lust for vengeance - as evidenced in the 1993 attempted assassination of former President George Bush.
There is also evidence that terrorists have been trained in Iraq in the past, even if they are not necessarily part of the al-Qaeda network. Although Saddam and Osama bin Laden are adversaries in many ways, it is not difficult to imagine them forming an alliance of convenience for the purpose of attacking the United States. The meetings in Prague between Iraqi intelligence officials and Mohammed Atta, the September 11 hijacker, in 2000 and 2001, show that a certain contact has already occurred.
But advocates of a change of regime understate the costs and risks. Those who believe a palace coup could be easily induced by a few days of bombing, or that an Iraqi opposition could be quickly mobilized and armed to lead a march on Baghdad, are living in a fantasy world. Their ideas could lead to the very types of military half-measures that could leave the Arab world even angrier with U.S policy without unseating Saddam.
The Iraqi leader has proved his ability to survive in power. He retains 100,000 troops in his Special Republican Guard and Republican Guard. Furthermore, his overall armed forces of 400,000 are roughly 10 times the size of the Taliban's. The Iraqi opposition is splintered and weak. If Saddam is to be overthrown - the only appropriate objective for a future war against Iraq - the United States would have to do it alone.
What would that take? Perhaps not Desert Storm II, with 500,000 American troops deployed to the Arabian peninsula. But at least half that number would be required to march through the Tigris-Euphrates valley, fight in the streets of Baghdad, convince Iraqi soldiers to defect and occupy the country for a time once the military victory was won.
Moreover, American casualties surely would be much higher than in Desert Storm, given the nature of the fighting. Casualties would be even higher if Saddam resorted to chemical or biological attacks against invading U.S. troops, as he very well could knowing his back was to the wall. America's own actions could produce the very outcome they were designed to prevent.
The real question, then, is whether Saddam can be deterred. At present, most evidence suggests that he can. After Desert Storm, he never took steps that precipitated American military action capable of imperiling his hold on power. He is a monster, but also someone who clearly wants to stay alive and in power.
Future evidence may require Washington to revise this assessment. If, for example, Saddam is implicated in the events of September 11, or is providing weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda, the United States will have no choice but to overthrow him - whether the rest of the world agrees or not. President Bush should say so, making explicit a doctrine on regime change that his administration already has hinted at. For now, however, the costs of containment appear lower than those of attempting to overthrow Saddam.
Philip H. Gordon and Michael E. O’Hanlon are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.