The Bush administration may think that it has struck a blow for the Second Amendment by attempting to sabotage the recent United Nations conference on the illegal trade in small arms. But U.S. obstinacy has consequences in all the Americas, most notably Colombia and the surrounding region.
By Jeffrey Fields
Aug. 28, 2001
MONTEREY, Calif. -- They may be called small arms, but they're big business.
In Latin America, the problem of small arms trafficking extends from Mexico, where guns smuggled from the United States fetch prices three to five times higher on the black market than their original cost, to Colombia, embroiled in a long-running civil war, to Brazil, which has one of the highest gun homicide rates in the world.
Guns bought legally and smuggled across borders however, are only part of a larger problem. Since the end of the cold war, weapons left over from superpower aid to insurgents still circulate, and are found in the hands of guerrilla groups, street criminals, as well as civilians. These weapons add fuel to many of today's civil conflicts.
Colombia and the Andean region provide a window to examine the larger global arms problem. As a well-financed guerrilla struggle rages in Colombia, it is being fought using modern small arms and light weapons, from assault rifles and grenade launchers, to shoulder fired rockets. These weapons are not simply rusty relics of the cold war. According to news reports last year, Colombian guerrillas, working with the Russian Mafia, exchanged cocaine for weapons in a deal allegedly brokered by ex-Peruvian spy chief Vladimiro Montesinos.
Meanwhile, Former Argentine President Carlos Menem has been accused of shipping arms not only to Croatia in violation of a U.N. embargo, but also to Ecuador during that country's 1995 border dispute with Peru while Argentina served as a mediator.
Not only are post-cold war weapons readily available, but new, off-the-shelf small arms also are being added to the arsenals of guerrilla groups with the help of high-level brokers.
The ready availability of these weapons to the drug-dealing
guerrillas and paramilitaries in Colombia means that large quantities
of weapons abandoned, lost, sold, or stolen are used in street
crime and are
easily available on the black market. Surrounding areas are also
affected as weapons and drugs flow from Colombia into Central
America, where guerrillas venture to obtain more weapons on the
black market, often using drugs as payment.
At the U.N. conference, the United States opposed any language
in the program of action that prevented the sale of arms to non-state
actors. John R. Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms
control and international security affairs, flatly said that the
United States could not be part of an agreement that "would
preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending
itself from a genocidal government." While the United States
wants to keep the option open to aid insurgents battling oppressive
regimes around the world, this policy can adversely affect legitimate
governments battling
insurgencies.
The United States must also acknowledge its role in global arms trafficking. The United States is the largest producer of small arms in the world, with more than half of the world's producers based in the United States. Many arms traffickers buy relatively inexpensive firearms in the United States and resell them on the black market abroad because the penalties are relatively light compared with the penalties for smuggling drugs--and the profit margin is high. Arms brokers bypass regulatory norms and facilitate weapons transfers from states to non-state actors and buyers who could not otherwise obtain them.
The United States chooses to ignore the extent of this dynamic and sees any effort to address the matter as potential infringement on the rights of U.S. citizens to own firearms. At the U.N. conference, Bolton assured that "the United States will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures contrary to our constitutional right to keep and bear arms."
In the Americas, the consequences of ambivalence could be substantial. If and when peace comes to Colombia, thousands, if not millions of small arms and light weapons--many of U.S. origin--will need to be decommissioned before they filter throughout the region and overseas.
In pandering to the gun lobby, the Bush administration showed what little regard it has for strengthening international efforts to deal with trafficking in small arms. President Bush promised to elevate the status of the Americas in his foreign policy. If he intends to follow through on this promise, his administration must realize that the problem of illicit trafficking in small arms is more complex and serious than the attention it gave to it at the UN conference, and acknowledge the implications for the Americas.
Jeffrey Fields is a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in Monterey, California. (Copyright 2001, Global Beat Syndicate, 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 554, New York, NY 10003 http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate).