November 18, 2003 © New York University. All Rights Reserved. North Korea Talks: Glimmers of Progress By Ralph A. Cossa Global Beat Syndicate (KRT) SEOUL —President Bush's recent offer to provide Pyongyang with written assurances that the U.S. does not intend to attack North Korea and Pyongyang's willingness "to consider" this offer provide the basis for a negotiated solution to the current nuclear stand-off on the Korean Peninsula -- however tentative and contentious the process might be. Even if North Korea returns to the bargaining table, the search for common ground between the two primary antagonists in this six-party drama will be difficult. The key to a successful outcome remains the willingness of the other four actors -- China Japan, Russia, and especially South Korea -- to stand firmly behind Washington's central demand: that Pyongyang "fully, verifiably, and irreversibly" abandon its nuclear weapons programs. While President Bush's offer shows some U.S. flexibility that was strikingly absent in the past, the end result remains non-negotiable: Washington's offer of multilateral security assurances remains "conditioned on verifiable progress" toward the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. The North's agreement "in principle" to return to the Six-Party Talks is also conditional, based upon the U.S. agreeing to "a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions." North Korea previously described these as follows: Pyongyang would "declare its will to scrap its nuclear program" in return for Washington signing a (bilateral) non-aggression pact and establishing diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. At that point, the two sides could then discuss verification measures (and an economic assistance package). Small wonder Washington has said that "'simultaneity' is not a word that we would use." In agreeing to "consider" the new U.S. proposal, North Korea has not dropped its demand for a "legally binding" bilateral Non-Aggression Pact. Nor has it agreed, in principle or otherwise, to accept multilateral security assurances as a substitute. Even Pyongyang's willingness to consider the Bush proposal was cast strictly in bilateral terms: a foreign ministry spokesman said, "We are ready to consider Bush's remarks on the Ôwritten assurances of non-aggression' if they are based on the intention to co-exist with the DPRKÉ.This stance is prompted by the expectation that the DPRK and the U.S. can build confidence and lay a foundation of co-existenceÉ[based] on the principle of simultaneous actions." Pyongyang's willingness to accept multilateral security assurances will be an important test of its sincerity and intentions. If its current position is driven by genuine security concerns, a multilateral security guarantee provides greater assurance than one from Washington alone. But this would require Pyongyang, finally, to recognize South Korea as a legitimate interlocutor on security matters, something it has steadfastly refused to do. The earlier Four-Party Talks broke down in 1999 in large part over Pyongyang's refusal to agree to Seoul being a signatory on any Peninsula peace accord. Ironically, North Korea has been more than willing to take the South's money (in the form of economic assistance and downright bribes), but on security issues, it demands to deal bilaterally (and exclusively) with Washington. President Bush's willingness to find "other ways" to deal with the nuclear crisis on the Peninsula is a first step in the right direction. It is now up to him to formulate an offer that Pyongyang can't refuse -- one that is crafted jointly with Seoul and Tokyo and vetted and improved in advance by Beijing and Moscow, before being tabled at the next round of talks. The five like-minded parties should offer the North verbal assurance that there will be no attempts to invade North Korea or to actively seek or support efforts aimed at "regime change," provided Pyongyang simultaneously declares a halt to its nuclear weapons programs (including further reprocessing of its spent fuel) and agrees to pursue six-party negotiations in good faith. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors must be allowed to return to North Korea to start the verification process, including the placing of spent fuel canisters (and any extracted plutonium) back under IAEA safeguards. Any significant economic assistance package, including a resumption of heavy fuel oil deliveries, would come only with the introduction of a more intrusive verification regime, with clear penalties spelled out for future non-compliance. Serious negotiations should also begin on a Peace Treaty to replace the 50-year old Korean War Armistice. But first, Pyongyang has to show up at the next meeting and accept multilateral security assurances in principle and practice, rather than a bilateral pact with Washington that cuts Seoul out of the security picture. ABOUT THE WRITER Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/. Home | About Archives | Advisors | Staff