March 1, 2004 © New York University. All Rights Reserved. Disarming North Korea's nukes: prospects for the 6-party talks By Ralph A. Cossa Global Beat Syndicate HONOLULU—Prospects for success for the second round of Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, now scheduled to begin in Beijing on Feb 25, depend a good deal on how you define “success.” Expectations are currently running so low that many will call the meeting a success if the North Koreans merely show up, or if they do not walk out once the United States begins speaking. Others are defining success as the parties agreeing to meet again, even if nothing else is accomplished beyond a further vetting of positions and grievances. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, the chief U.S. negotiator at the talks, did nothing to raise the bar, saying “we expect that the round will result in further progress toward a permanent solution, even if the progress may not be readily apparent.” Despite U.S. admonitions that Pyongyang should follow “the Libya model,” few, if any, are predicting that the North Koreans will come clean and acknowledge its uranium-based weapons program, developed through the clandestine purchase of technology and equipment from Pakistan, despite the confession by the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, that he arranged the transfer. (Pyongyang has been flaunting its plutonium-based program but still denies having a uranium enrichment program). To make matters worse, only Washington and Tokyo seem willing to press Pyongyang on the uranium issue. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the others seem willing to give Pyongyang the benefit of the doubt, at least initially, in order not to impede progress. But merely agreeing to sit and talk hardly constitutes real progress. Accepting “no apparent progress” as progress does not help much either. Nor does pretending that a central part of the problem does not even exist. Certainly, getting all six parties to the table represents a significant diplomatic achievement; if all agree to institutionalize the talks on a regularly scheduled basis—rather than at North Korea’s whim—it would also be an important breakthrough. In fact, if Beijing were smart, it would announce at the conclusion of this round that all parties have been invited back in six weeks and regularly at six week intervals beyond that; an offer the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Russia would readily accept. This would pressure North Korea to show up rather than putting the burden on the others—primarily China—to somehow get Pyongyang to these meetings. While Washington may be fuzzy on what constitutes “further progress,” it has been crystal clear about what constitutes ultimate success: “the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.” About such an objective, most experts seem to agree on two points: that it is “essential,” and that it is “unachievable.” The point is, no arms control agreement has ever been “irreversible”; nor can any verification regime achieve (or even come anywhere close to) 100 percent reliability. Setting the short term bar too low and the final hurdle too high hardly sounds like a realistic formula for “success,” regardless of how that term is defined. Instead, the first objective of all the parties should be to stop making matters worse. If, at the end of this meeting, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs (uranium- and plutonium-based) are continuing unabated, this round of talks must be labelled a failure. North Korea has offered to freeze its nuclear weapons (and even its nuclear energy) efforts. Pyongyang’s demands in return—to “delist” it “as a sponsor of terrorism, lift (U.S.) political, economic and military sanctions and blockade . . . [and] supply heavy oil, power and other energy resources to the DPRK in return for its freeze of nuclear activities”—are politically impossible for Washington to accept. Because Pyongyang claims that its nuclear deterrent program is in response to Washington’s “aggressive behavior,” Washington (in concert with the other four participants) should instead challenge Pyongyang to agree to a complete nuclear freeze in return for multilateral security assurances. These would commit all parties (North Korea included) to refrain from aggressive actions or behavior against all other participants as long as the talks are proceeding in good faith. Phase one would entail a “words for words” commitment—a formulation put forth (but never fully defined) by Pyongyang—while study groups are created under the six-party framework to discuss and develop verification procedures and the form and substance of security guarantees. This agreement to not make matters worse while trying to figure out how to make them better would at least create the proper atmosphere for genuine progress over the longer term. ABOUT THE WRITER Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research and non-partisan institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is reflecting his own opinions, separate from his work for CSIS.   © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/. Home | About | Archives | Advisors | Staff