July 7, 2003 © New York University. All Rights Reserved. Nuclear Diplomacy and Coercion By Nigel Chamberlain Global Beat Syndicate (KRT) LONDON—Viewed from here in Britain, it seems clear that neo-conservative U.S. policy makers have declared the consensual way of doing international business dead and buried. Instead, top U.S. officials have set about building a new consensus of muscular intervention based on the theory of "counter-proliferation." No more diplomatic niceties, no more Mr. Nice Guy with people they know just are not telling the truth, especially as it relates to nuclear non-proliferation: post-Cold War diplomacy has been replaced with public confrontation and threatening demands. Effective? Possibly. Dangerous? Undoubtedly. In a prepared statement at the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in Geneva in April, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told delegates that Iran posed "perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the NPT... and has been conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program." Mr. Wolf concluded that declaratory statements must be backed up with political resolve to confront those who undermine nuclear non-proliferation, and by direct action to strengthen the barriers against possible future offenders. He warned of "serious consequences for those who violate their NPT commitments." In essence, the United States is accusing Iran of failing to adhere to its commitments to "safeguard" parts of its declared nuclear generation program from being diverted to a covert nuclear weapons program and threatening intervention for this non-compliance. Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, brought the matter before the IAEA Board meeting in Vienna on June 16. He reported that extensive verification activities have been undertaken in Iran, that it had failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities and that corrective actions were being taken in cooperation with Iranian authorities. The IAEA is responsible for promoting the sharing of nuclear technology for power generation, while simultaneously functioning as the permanent inspection team to ensure that no country cheats on its treaty commitment to remain a non-nuclear weapon state. This dual role is highly complex, and many experts think it is also contradictory. At present, funding for IAEA monitoring and safeguards efforts is insufficient in real terms and in relation to its promotional role. The Bush administration is now pressing for a very welcome 25 percent increase in the IAEA's safeguards budget -- at a time when it is also pressing for muscular intervention in Iran. The question of which countries are faced with inspections for known or suspected weapons programs and which are not called to account remains unresolved. For example, Israel, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons but are not parties to the NPT, and thus are not subject to inspections, or to international opprobrium. As "declared" nuclear-weapon states under the specifications of the treaty, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China are not required to submit to safeguard inspections, although each of them has voluntary arrangements with the IAEA. That said, it is worth asking how well these five are adhering to their long-standing NPT commitments to divest themselves of nuclear weapons arsenals. The "clear and unambiguous" obligations of the NPT when it came into force in 1970 is now an increasingly complex "social contract" between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. European Union foreign ministers recently agreed a set of "Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" and to an "Action Plan" for their implementation. Because one of the principles envisages the possible use of "coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the UN Charter," this new strategy document seems at first glance to align the EU more closely with the U.S. position, as articulated in the U.S. strategy document released in Washington in December 2002. But in reality, the two approaches are as different as chalk and cheese: the EU remains "committed to the multilateral system" and is principally concerned with "containing proliferation while dealing with its underlying causes." The United States, meanwhile, arrogates to itself the right to use force whenever and wherever it believes a potential future threat warrants pre-emptive military action under its "counter-proliferation policy." Unquestionably, efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation need to be beefed up with more intrusive inspections and tougher penalties for those who wish to acquire nuclear weapons. But it is not clear that counter-proliferation will do the trick, particularly with the current double standards and much turning of "blind eyes" that also characterize U.S. nuclear policies and programs. ABOUT THE WRITER Nigel Chamberlain is an analyst and press officer for the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) based in the London office. © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/. Home | About | Archives | Advisors | Staff