December 2, 2003 © New York University. All Rights Reserved. Slaying the Iraqi Hydra By Mark Burgess Global Beat Syndicate (KRT) WASHINGTON —In Greek mythology, one of the labors of Hercules was to slay the Hydra, a nine-headed beast that plagued the countryside and could only be destroyed by lopping off the correct one of its heads. Cutting off any of the others simply caused two more to spring forth in their places. The United States seems to be engaged in a similar undertaking in Iraq, frantically seeking to determine who exactly is behind the growing resistance to coalition troops in the hope that eliminating this or that key faction or personality will cause such resistance to wither. To mix metaphors, we should not assume any such silver bullet exists. And if too much force is used to counter Iraqi insurgency, U.S. troops might find themselves facing more resistance, not less. This does not mean that killing or capturing certain key enemy players would not be useful. Taking out Sadaam Hussein would give the coalition an obvious psychological victory -- even if the former Iraqi leader is probably too busy evading capture to direct the ongoing insurgency himself. Such direction is more likely to be coming from someone like Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, who is number six on America's most wanted Iraqis list and believed by U.S. officials to be involved in attacks on coalition troops. Given their past military ineffectiveness and the evolving and ad hoc nature of the insurgency, any former Iraqi regime forces involved in the fighting are probably under some degree of central control rather than conducting pre-planned offensives themselves. Thus, eliminating their leadership could help curb anti-coalition attacks. But these attacks appear to be coming several groups, not one. According to U.S. commanders on the ground, former regime loyalists, foreign terrorists, street gangs, unemployed youths fighting for bounty, and -- if reports of a recent CIA analysis are true -- ordinary Iraqis who are increasingly concluding that America is the losing side, are all contributing to the insurgency. The Iraqi hydra, unlike its mythical counterpart, may not have a vulnerable head. Meanwhile, in their urgency to identify and eliminate the insurgency's center of gravity, American forces may cause even more Iraqis to take up arms against them. Without question, Allied offensive operations are crucial if U.S. forces are to maintain their morale and regain the initiative. They are also essential in underlining Washington's determination to prevail in Iraq, something that must be demonstrated to Americans and Iraqis alike if it is to have any hope of being realized. The danger arises in using too much force. The sight of women and children being evacuated from their homes before they are destroyed -- even if they are also the homes of those responsible for U.S. deaths -- does not go down well with Iraqis or internationally. The war in Iraq is not analogous with Vietnam. But, inevitably, such scenes will recall instances in Vietnam when a previous generation of American troops used comparable tactics -- albeit using Zippo lighters rather than the heavy weapons deployed in Iraq. Similarities with Israel's tactics in the West Bank and Gaza have already been raised by Iraqis, and remarked upon by Western and Arab media, which have began to question whether American troops are consciously seeking to emulate their Israeli counterparts. Such analogies risk further inflaming opinion, not only in Iraq, but throughout the Middle East. Such similarities as do exist might just as easily have been noted, to varying degree, of Russian operations in Chechnya or early British tactics in Northern Ireland. But that matters little -- perceptions are everything and comparisons to Israeli methods harm U.S. images. Comparisons aside, recent escalations in U.S. military operations in Iraq are dangerous in themselves. Unless a balance is reached between too much and too little force, more insurgents will be created. Some Iraqis will be antagonized the new military policy; the trick is to make fewer enemies than are eliminated. Otherwise a popular uprising can be inadvertently provoked. Those behind the Iraqi insurgency know all about "hearts and minds" issues. Those directing the U.S.-led effort must stay focused on this also, and on the fact that the insurgency they are facing has more than one center of gravity. Otherwise, coalition forces will find themselves performing not a Herculean task, but one assigned Sisyphus -- the Corinthian king condemned by the gods to endlessly roll a boulder up a hill only to have it tumble back down as it neared the top. ABOUT THE WRITER Mark Burgess directs the Terrorism Project at the Center for Defense Information, an independent think tank in Washington, D.C. © 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, provides editors with commentary and perspective articles on critical global issues from contributors around the world. For more information, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/. Home | About Archives | Advisors | Staff