By Julianne SMITH and Tom McDONALD
September 15, 1999
LONDON -- For the past ten years, the United States has been calling on its European allies to acquire the high-tech military equipment necessary to close the gaps that are supposedly hinder them from playing a greater role in providing for their own security.
The crisis in Kosovo only served to increase the intensity and frequency of such cries. Recently, U.S. Senator Jon Kyl (R- AZ) stated that "allied armed forces are slipping from one to two generations behind American forces in critical new technologies." Meanwhile, Europeans themselves are increasingly anxious for greater independence from U.S policy on military issues.
There is no argument on either side of the Atlantic that Europeans do indeed need to take on more responsibility for international and regional security, particularly in regions as close as Southeastern Europe. But taking on more responsibility does not automatically require increased defense spending to buy the latest weapon produced by U.S. defense manufacturers.
If the European Union wants to shed its image as a military "dwarf" while avoiding large increases in defense spending, put the brakes on U.S. unilateralism and deal with the real threats to its security, it would be well advised to invest in the creation of civilian intervention units.
The precision-guided military assets used in Kosovo proved to be blunt instruments when it came to performing the delicate task of reducing ethnic tensions and encouraging the recognition of human rights. Once the war ended, KFOR found itself facing a wide variety of civil, social and military duties for which it was poorly equipped.
Forces currently deployed in Kosovo continue to experience great difficulty in stopping looting and killings. Serbs and Roma civilians, convinced that NATO is either unable or unwilling to protect them, have left the province in droves.
Indeed, KFOR's experiences are similar to those faced in recent years by peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The international community has failed to grasp that many of these tasks are simply not suitable for a military force. Nor should the world expect professional soldiers to take on new administrative and judicial roles while grappling with huge population flows, de-mining and aid distribution.
Meanwhile, "softer" security organizations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have also failed to adequately address the security needs in Kosovo.
Last year, in response to UN Security Council resolutions, it deployed the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Its mandate was to supervise elections, verify cease-fire obligations and provide unbiased information about the conflict. Its presence not only provided better intelligence on the situation in the region but also demonstrated the international community's commitment to the Yugoslav authorities.
But the slow and grudging manner in which OSCE member states made personnel available for the KVM undermined the mission and its message. By the beginning of this year, only 600 unarmed monitors had been deployed from the 2000 originally envisaged. Still, by its mere presence, the mission did enjoy some success in halting the fighting, at least until the peace talks collapsed earlier this year. Among the lessons learned by this experience is that future verifiers will have to be better trained, more swiftly deployed and better supported by participating governments.
Now is the time to harness the EU's current momentum towards bolstering its military capabilities to create civilian intervention units which would fill the gap between the military might of NATO and experienced but ill- supported soft-security organizations like the OSCE.
These units could shoulder the burdens of "soft-security" tasks, such as civil administration, policing and election supervision and enable military forces to concentrate on military tasks. With personnel trained in human rights monitoring, civil administration, policing, conflict resolution, election supervision, media monitoring and local languages, the units could be placed on permanent standby for swift deployment whenever they might be required.
Like their military counterparts in the Rapid Reaction Forces, their ability to be deployed "in theater" quickly would be an important part of their effectiveness. Some of these units could be recruited from existing EU police forces, including lightly armed forces such as the Italian carabinieri and the French CRS. And if the EU agreed to organize and finance the units, while granting the OSCE the responsibility for their training, both organizations could be significantly strengthened.
Such a force ultimately will be the best way to implement political settlements and resolve future crises. It would also allow European states to achieve what they have long believed to be their key security requirement for the 21st century: a non-military alternate to coping with regional conflicts.
Julianne Smith and Tom McDonald are analysts with the British American Security Information
Council, an independent research organization.