By Zia Mian, October 23, 2001

PRINCETON, New Jersey - Even before September 11, South Asia's problems were already legion: a population of more than a billion people, most of them desperately poor; a history of war and violent conflicts; rising religious militancy in Pakistan and India; newly tested nuclear weapons and a get-tough mood. Now, the region is also the frontline of the US war against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.

South Asia may not be able to take the strain.

Therefore, the United States must ensure it does nothing to worsen the many crises in South Asia. Washington must think long-term about its policies in the region.

The US bombing campaign against Afghanistan has opened wide the door for Pakistan's Islamist groups, with their history of anti-Americanism and strong ties to the Taliban. Hoping to mobilize the widespread public resentment and anger at the hopelessness of everyday life in Pakistan, these groups have taken to the streets to challenge the military government of President Pervez Musharraf and his decision to support the U.S.-led campaign. The longer the United States bombs Afghanistan, the more organized and dangerous the Islamists' challenge.

There are obvious steps the United States chould take in the present crisis that would also serve to strengthen Musharaff's hand against the militants. One would be to suspend the bombing campaign to allow relief supplies to reach the more than seven million Afghans in direst need. Similarly, Washington could further acknowledge the vital role of the United Nations by inviting Secretary General Kofi Annan to mediate with the Taliban for a hand-over of Osama bin Laden for trial.

Meanwhile, Washington must work to prevent India and Pakistan from using the situation to gain strategic advantage over the other. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, India offered political and military support to the United States in its fight with the Taliban and urged it to include Pakistani-supported Islamic militants fighting in Kashmir as targets of the U.S. assault on terrorism. Pakistan, under enormous pressure from the Washington, eventually decided to turn a liability into an asset and sought to cash in on its location and its leverage over the Taliban.

Seeing Pakistan win Washington to its side, India is now trying another more dangerous gambit. It has threatened to follow the American example and attack Kashmiri guerrilla training camps and bases in Pakistan. In an ominous development, India has ended a 10-month long cease-fire and started shelling Pakistani forces across the border that divides Kashmir.

The United States must press Pakistan to end its support for the guerrillas, restrain India from actions that may trigger a South Asian war, and get serious in working with the international community to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

A longer term danger is that of nuclear weapons in South Asia. India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests prompted the United States to impose sanctions that were meant to signal its refusal to accept new nuclear weapons states. But, in its search for support in the region, the Bush administration has now abandoned American non-proliferation efforts in South Asia. Washington is lifting its sanctions against India and Pakistan and offering both countries economic and military assistance.

Fuelled by American military aid, India and Pakistan may return with renewed vigour to their conventional and nuclear arms race. India seeks American arms to add to its $4 billion arms deal with Russia and $2 billion deal with Israel. With the army in charge in Pakistan, any resources freed by a blanket lifting of sanctions may go to catching up with India. And with political and economic pressures eased, both sides may speed deployment of their nuclear warheads. South Asia may escape the frying pan of terrorism, only to fall into the nuclear fire.

While military aid will make things worse, economic aid can play an important role. There is no doubt that South Asia's poor need support. But this will be an empty gesture if the money is simply handed over to the very governments which have for so long neglected their people.

Resources must be directed to where the people are and in ways that they can usefully manage to improve the conditions of their daily lives. The Americans, the international community and institutions like World Bank would do well to heed Gandhi's advice: Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny?

Another long-term concern is democracy. Musharraf's new status as ally should not serve as a license to abandon his pledges to restore democracy. The two previous Pakistani generals who seized power each kept it for the better part of a decade. Civil society withered both times.

The United States should encourage Musharraf to keep his promise to hold elections by next October. Elections may be just what it takes to mobilize the majority of Pakistanis in the battle against radical Islam. Whenever Pakistanis have been allowed to choose who should govern them in the past, they have decisively rejected Islamic political parties. They would do so again now. The small crowds on the streets supporting the Islamist groups are testament to that. But the prtospect of another decade without democracy may change their minds.

Zia Mian researches South Asian security issues at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He is the co-editor of "Out of The Nuclear Shadow", a collection of the best South Asian writing on nuclear disarmament.