As week three of the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo begins, it is
painfully clear that using air strikes to force Slobodan Milosevic to accept
autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians has been a dismal failure. The bombings
may or may not be "degrading" Milosevic's forces, but they have
certainly degraded the standing of the United States as a world leader.
So far, the main achievement of the NATO air attacks has been to provide
Milosevic's forces with an open field upon which to drive the Albanian
population out of Kosovo at gunpoint. Since human rights monitors and humanitarian
organizations evacuated the area prior to the bombing, there has been no
one in Kosovo to document the crimes of the Serbian forces, much less try
to stop them.
The current bombing campaign underscores the weakness of the "Clinton
Doctrine," which involves calling in the cruise missiles to deal with
any and every security threat -- from weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
to terrorist bombings in Africa to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.
During this decade, the United States has degenerated from the world's
sole superpower to its designated bomber. U.S. policy makers need to develop
some other options besides ignoring deadly conflicts, as we did in Rwanda,
or sending in the B-52s, as we are now doing in Kosovo.
The first step toward a more effective policy is to abandon the notion
that the U.S. and its top NATO allies can "go it alone." Last
December's U.S./U.K. air raids on Iraq and this month's NATO strikes in
Kosovo were both based on this dangerous delusion. In Kosovo, the use of
NATO forces to intervene in an internal conflict without UN approval has
raised anxieties
not only in Russia, but in other major powers such as India and China
which face their own internal ethnic and territorial disputes.
If the United States wants Russian cooperation on pressing issues like
the control of that country's decaying nuclear arsenal, our government
must do a better job of consulting Russia on major security operations
like the air strikes in Kosovo.
To repair the damage that has already been done to U.S.-Russian relations
and to increase its chances of bringing the killing in Kosovo to an end,
the Clinton Administration should move forward aggressively on its recent
overtures towards restoring Moscow to its role as a full partner in crafting
a peace agreement. U.S. policy makers should also take up the suggestion
of Jonathan Dean, a former U.S. ambassador to Germany, that any peacekeeping
forces introduced into Kosovo be under United Nations auspices, rather
than a NATO-only contingent.
In the long-term, the best option for dealing with ethnic tensions
is to strengthen the United Nations' peacekeeping capabilities, and to
come up with clearer ground rules for delegating peace keeping and conflict
prevention duties to broad-based regional organizations such as the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
But without a substantial increase in its paltry administrative budget
of $52 million per year -- roughly the price of a few days of bombing raids
on Belgrade -- OSCE will have limited capabilities to monitor and deter
conflicts.
And until it sheds its role as a UN deadbeat, the United States will
have little political or moral standing to promote a comprehensive plan
for sharing the burdens of peacekeeping with key allies and regional organizations.
The United States could pay its $2 billion in outstanding UN dues for less
than the price of just one of the costly B-2 bombers that have been put
on display in the Kosovo crisis.
Looking to the future, U.S. policy should emphasize measures that can
prevent violence, such as a strong international criminal tribunal; a global
Code of Conduct on arms transfers that would restrict arms sales to despots
and dictators; and a step-by-step plan for abolishing nuclear weapons modeled
on the "Middle Powers Initiative" that has been tabled at the
United Nations.
So far, the Clinton Administration has opposed all of these measures,
relying instead on its preferred policy of episodic air strikes and unenforceable
threats.
If nothing else, the current fiasco in Kosovo may provide an incentive
to at least consider initiating a more cooperative approach to stemming
the tide of global violence. It's long past time for the Clinton administration
to acknowledge that our current strategy just isn't working.
*William D. Hartung is the President's Fellow at the World Policy
Institute at the New School and the author of The Military Industrial Complex
Revisited.