February 27, 2001
WASHINGTON -- Plans by the United States to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense system are testing the strength of the nation's security relationship with Europe. Unless Americans and Europeans engage in more extensive consultations on this issue, both within NATO and in other forums as well, their respective strategic outlooks are likely to continue to diverge, threatening the future of their relationship.
The United States sees NMD as a way to protect its homeland from ballistic missile attacks, especially from such states as Iran or North Korea. In recent weeks, while European officials have publicly stressed that the decision on whether to proceed with NMD rests solely with the United States, they privately remain very concerned about how such a system could affect them and the Atlantic alliance.
European concerns about the consequences of NMD on arms control, relations with Russia and China and their own security are well known. Ever since the idea of ballistic missile defense was revived in the late 1990's, European government officials and private analysts have frequently expressed their misgivings about the plan. They note, for example, that it has yet to be proven that NMD is even technologically feasible, especially after the failure of the most recent test of a land-based system last year.
In addition, most European officials do not share the U.S.'s assessment of the likelihood of a missile attack by so-called rogue states. They argue that chemical and biological weapons, very small nuclear weapons, and cyber-crime are more imminent security threats. NMD is obviously powerless against such threats to transatlantic security.
So far, Washington has yet to provide many specifics about its plans. While members of the Bush administration have made crystal clear their unbridled enthusiasm for missile defense, both during last year's presidential campaign and since entering office, these officials have yet to precisely answer such questions as what kind of system they favor (a land, sea or space-based one or some combination), or whom they intend to protect.
The new administration has begun floating the idea of developing a broader missile defense umbrella --not NMD per se but a system designed to protect the United States and its key allies in Europe and Asia. There's even talk of a global system.
These ideas are intended to address European fears that a shield exclusively defending the United States would make them potential targets for missile attacks and nuclear blackmail. Of course, even if such scenarios took place, the United States would be bound to defend its allies under Article V of the treaty that established NATO, which states that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all.
The Bush administration has also sought to calm European worries by beginning to engage them in consultations on these matters, something many thought the Clinton administration failed to do adequately. It's also a positive strategy to win European support for the U.S. plan.
But for this approach to ultimately succeed, the Bush administration needs to give Europe a greater role in shaping a missile defense policy. Any such transatlantic dialogue must be based on mutual trust and an effort to understand and address each other's security concerns.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who this week attends
his first NATO meeting in Brussels, will be a key player in mending
transatlantic fences over missile defense. He is as highly admired
in Europe as he is in the U.S. and is perceived as a moderate
in an administration whose other senior officials are considered
to be more hard-line, particularly on missile
defense.
The Bush administration and European governments have a full plate of pressing international security policy issues, not to mention a plethora of trade issues also on their agenda. Such issues include the European Union's efforts to develop its own defense force and the Bush administration's stated intention to reduce or end American participation in Balkan peacekeeping efforts.
But at present, it's NMD that poses the greatest challenge to the transatlantic alliance. The keys to solving this dilemma are for the United States to articulate its missile defense plan with specificity, exchange information with its European allies, and welcome a European role in the development and implementation of the plan. For their part, Europeans need to avoid reflexively opposing the emerging American program.
Louis R. Golino is a Washington-based defense and foreign
policy analyst.