COLLEGE PARK, MD -- Taiwan's rejection of "one China" is likely to spark another round in the destructive action-reaction pattern of China-Taiwan relations. Each side incorrectly assumes that it gets to make the last move, thereby gaining some policy advantage.
History suggests instead that the Peoples' Republic of China will respond to Taiwan's decision with renewed threats of reunification through force, and perhaps a repeat of the 1996 missile exercises or further forward positioning of Chinese forces near Taiwan. Taiwan may then intensify its quest for advanced military capabilities, perhaps by participating in the U.S. theater missile defense effort in East Asia. And then it will be China's turn again.
There can be no winner in this process. It's time to abandon the illusion that a stable security environment can be attained this way.
The good news of the Taiwan-China security relationship is that both sides exist in an uneasy equilibrium with each other. Neither country has the capability to invade and control the other's territory. Each seems to recognize this delicate balance.
Despite this latest crisis in the relationship, there may be prospects for a better political relationship through cross-straits dialogue, assuming that China does not cancel this fall's planned visit to Taiwan by its cross-straits envoy Wang Daohan. While promising, however, the cross-straits dialogue is relatively new, and may easily be disrupted by disagreements on security or political issues such as Taiwan's latest initiative.
And there is more bad news than good. China maintains the nuclear weapons capability to destroy Taiwan. Each side still spends considerable human and monetary resources on military forces designed to deter or blunt attack. Neither side seems to have the political will or inclination to come to any final accommodation.
Most important, counterproductive military actions and policies continue to dominate the security side of the relationship.
Especially in the 1990s, the Taiwanese government has tried to meet its perceived security needs through weapons transfers and increased defense budgets. Yet each move has been countered by China, seemingly with relative ease.
As Taiwan moved to hold free elections, China deployed missiles directly across the straits. When Taiwan obtained advanced fighter aircraft, China negotiated purchases of its own, as well as access to the production lines necessary to make more.
China continues to challenge Taiwan's right to exist as anything other than a province of the mainland. During his May visit to the U.S., Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji made headlines by threatening to go to war to prevent Taiwan's independence. President Lincoln, Rongji said, had done the same thing to preserve the United States in the 1860s.
Despite doubling its defense budget in recent years and purchasing F-16 fighter aircraft, "Super Cobra" attack helicopters, and a variety of anti-aircraft, anti-armor, and anti-ship missiles, Taiwan remains undefended, and ultimately indefensible.
Each side argues that its actions are defensive. Yet China's missile deployments were a very aggressive move, clearly designed to intimidate the Taiwanese.
In turn, Taiwan has insisted for many years that it only purchases defensive equipment. But Taiwan's current and contemplated acquisitions of submarines, Aegis-class destroyers, and missile defense systems cover a wide range of missions. For example, the U.S. uses its Aegis-class destroyers for their battle management capabilities - not exclusively a defensive function. And defensive capabilities can be used by an aggressor to shield its forces while attacking an adversary, as well as in a "purely" defensive role.
Taiwan is currently requesting long-range early warning radar systems, and contemplating participating in the U.S. theater missile defense program planned for the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan understandably feels threatened by the Peoples' Republic of China. Yet while China has the capacity to destroy Taiwan with its nuclear weapons, China's ability to invade Taiwan is quite limited. In addition, the theater missile defense program in the Asia-Pacific suffers from many of the same problems as the national missile defense program in the United States, including poor definition of the threat, unproven technology, high cost, and high susceptibility to countermeasures.
Neither Taiwan nor China can spend its way out of its security dilemma. Each has the capacity to respond to the other's moves; each has shown a consistent will to do so. The answer, then, must lie elsewhere. Confidence-building measures can help reduce tensions and the perceived necessity for these weapons. But the first step has to be stopping the expensive, action-reaction downward spiral of weapons purchases and aggressive deployments.
*Dr. Natalie J. Goldring is Executive Director of the Program
on General Disarmament, which is based in the Department of Government
and Politics at the University of Maryland.