The longer the war in Afghanistan lasts, the greater the danger of Pakistan’s instability

By Ahmad Faruqui

October 23, 2001

UNION CITY, California – In response to American pressure after the September 11 attacks, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf has made a 180-degree turn in his country’s long-standing policy toward Afghanistan. This sea of change was accomplished in less than 18 hours, after a marathon session with the army's senior commanders. Musharraf, a army general who seized power in a coup, made no attempt to consult the nation's opinion leaders. He simply "took the nation into confidence" during a short address on radio and television.

The change in foreign policy was followed a few weeks later by several changes in the military high command. First of all, Musharraf's tenure as army chief was extended indefinitely. Second, three generals who helped bring Musharraf to power two years ago but held pro-Taliban views were sidelined or retired. Musharaff replaced them with like-minded generals.

By eliminating dissent from within the military, Musharraf has consolidated his grip on power. In many ways, he is following in the footsteps of two previous military rulers: Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Zia ul Haq. Ayub Khan took over the presidency soon after taking over as the military ruler, introducing a basic form of democracy that Musharaff has emulated during the past year.

Musharraf is also following in the footsteps of Zia who also found it convenient to quickly dispatch the generals who were instrumental in bringing him to power in 1977. More important, Zia decided to avail himself of the opportunities presented by a war between neighboring Afghanistan and a superpower. Zia was the beneficiary of billions of dollars in U.S. economic and military aid, in return for letting Pakistan become a frontline state in the US battle against the occupying Soviet Union. Once an an international pariah who executed a democratically elected prime minister, Zia was transformed into a hero of the West.

The terrible legacy of that Afghan war -- gun-running, drug-trafficking and migration of refugees -- continues to haunt Pakistan today, more than a decade later.

However, General Musharraf is cozying up to the United States much more openly than Zia ever did, and his new friendship with the American military is fraught with even greater dangers. Zia, with all his weaknesses, was too shrewd a strategist to let the CIA openly supply arms to the Mujahideen. The weapons were transported through the Pakistani military -- which of course took its cut in the process. No U.S. warplanes flew over Pakistan; no planes were based there; and there was no question of ground troops being deployed in Pakistan to conduct raids against Soviet formations deployed in Afghanistan. Pakistani F-16 fighters patrolled the skies near Afghanistan, and were successful in shooting down several Soviet fighter pilots who had crossed the border in hot pursuit of Mujahideen fighters.

In contrast, Musharraf has dispensed with such niceties. Not only has he given the Americans access to Pakistani air space; he also has made at least two air bases available to them. In the near future, Pakistanis may wake up one day to discover that elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions are deployed along the frontier with Afghanistan, ready to strike across the border to fight the Taliban.

In choosing to side so openly with the Americans, Musharraf may well have strengthened his position in the short term. But whether that will help him -- or Pakistan -- in the long run is an open question.

Economic aid, even if it arrives immediately, cannot jump start an economy that has been moribund for more than a decade. Corruption is rampant, and national institutions have melted down. It will take years for Pakistan to become prosperous. Meanwhile, radical Islamists will have ample opportunity to alter the political geography of Pakistan.

They will point out that Saudi Arabia refused to allow the United States to exploit its air bases for attacks against a fellow Muslim country. These opponents also will note that Iran, which has significant religous and political differences with the Taliban, also has refused to join any coalition against Afghanistan and has openly condemned the U.S. bombing campaign. Anti-American Muslim demonstrations as far away as Malaysia and Indonesia will be mentioned. People will also draw attention to the U.S.-led sanctions against Iraq that have resulted in more than a million civilian deaths. They will talk about the lack of even-handedness in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In short, Musharraf’s opponents will use every argument they can muster to portray him as having sold out to the CIA and to discredit his standing not only in Pakistan but in the entire Muslim world.

Meanwhile, ethnic political dissent in the Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan is at an all-time high. These provinces, where ethnic Pathans dominate, always have felt that they have been taken for granted by the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani military. There are also signs of protest even in Sindh province, where the native Sindhis and Muhajirs have patched up their differences to take on the Punjabis over the allocation of water rights, even prior to the September 11 attacks.

The 180-degree switch in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy may push these three minority provinces over the edge. At some point, dissension cannot be ruled out within the military. While Musharraf may have deposed three pro-Taliban generals, there are dozens more in the wings.

If the Anglo-American campaign drags on -- and with every passing day there are statements to that effect from London and Washington -- Musharraf's domestic coalition within the military may crumble. That does not bode well for either Pakistan or the Anglo-American campaign against global terrorism.

Ahmad Faruqui is a Fellow at the American Institute of International Studies and author of the forthcoming book "Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan" (Ashgate Publishing, 2002).