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Beyond the Tests: Assessing the South Asian Nuclear Crisis
Global Beat Tip Sheet
May 29, 1998
Compiled by Robert Leavitt and David Horowitz
 
Following Pakistan's nuclear tests yesterday, the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media canvassed a number of nuclear and South Asia specialists to identify critical questions that policy makers, the news media, and the public should explore in the days, weeks, and months ahead. Although India's nuclear tests took official Washington by surprise, experts on have long warned of the dangers of inattention to South Asia.
 
The questions below are based on responses from a diverse group of specialists, and are presented in three categories: the immediate crisis, the view from South Asia, and global nonproliferation policy. Links to contact information for the experts is provided following the text.
 
- Robert Leavitt, Associate Director
 
 
I. The Immediate Crisis
 
1) Flashpoint in Kashmir: As tensions rise in India and Pakistan, the ongoing conflict over Kashmir is the most likely source of military confrontation that could rapidly escalate into another war, with the new possibility of rapid introduction of nuclear weapons. How can the two sides, and outside powers, minimize the risks of all-out confrontation?
 
2) Carrots and Sticks: The recent debate in Washington on positive and negative inducements to prevent a Pakistani test is now moot. Beyond the required U.S. sanctions now levied on both sides, what policy tools exist for halting an escalating arms race? What happens next, if either side conducts additional nuclear or missile flight tests, and/or deploys nuclear-armed missiles? Can additional pressures be brought to bear by the US and the international community that are effective in lessening the crisis? Are there positive inducements or incentives that might help?
 
3) Effective intervention: Which countries or international institutions can effectively intervene to ease the crisis? Have U.S. sanctions on both sides left Washington without any real influence in the region? Can the U.S. construct an effective international coalition? What about China's role -- and interests? Can the U.S. work effectively with China to dampen tensions? Might the non-nuclear economic powers (e.g., Japan, Germany) be able to step in constructively? Is there a role for the UN? What about the IMF?
 
4) Expanding arms race: How far might India and Pakistan go in weaponizing their nuclear capabilities? What are their actual capabilities? What nuclear strategies might be adopted? What is the decision making process on each side? Is there reliable command and control? How serious a threat do the missiles on both sides pose? What about conventional forces buildups, or mobilizations? Are there plausible measures to constrain further steps toward an arms race, and/or build confidence? Should the U.S. or other countries offer technical assistance in areas such as monitoring each side's forces, strengthening command and control capabilities, constructing a hot line, or other aspects of a nuclear deterrence infrastructure?
 
II. The View from South Asia
 
1) Domestic politics and policy: How committed is each country to nuclear power status? How deeply rooted are the nuclear programs in politics, the military, the economy? How hard will the sanctions bite? Will a popular backlash emerge? Pakistan's tests came just as opposition leaders and others in India began to question the wisdom of India's tests. Has Islamabad pushed Indian politics back toward the all-out nationalism of the last two weeks? Has the BJP gained yet more political strength? In Pakistan, does the newly declared state of emergency eliminate any near-term possibility of democratic debate? The state of emergency, combined existing economic problems and the new sanctions puts extreme stress on the social and political environment. Can journalists or civil society organizations even discuss policy alternatives and the risks of escalating confrontation with India? How will the military react?
 
2) Regional dynamics: To what extent has each country accomplished its stated objectives: India being taken seriously as a major world power and deterring China; Pakistan maintaining adequate deterrence against India? What are the current threat assessments and strategic priorities in New Delhi and Islamabad? How do the tests affect broader Asian politics and regional relations? To what extent does China become a much more influential actor in South Asia? How does the new "Islamic bomb" affect South Asia, and the international community generally?
 
III. Global Nonproliferation Policy
 
1) Expanding the club: Do the nuclear powers have to accept India and Pakistan as new "members" of the club? Is it plausible that either country will renounce its nuclear status (as South Africa did)? Under what circumstances? Might acceptance of the two as nuclear powers facilitate other measures that lessen the South Asian confrontation? How would this affect other nuclear aspirants?
 
2) Arms control and disarmament: What inducements might bring India and Pakistan into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and/or other arms control agreements such as a fissile materials production cutoff? How important is a "No First Use" agreement in South Asia -- and how likely? Should the U.S. Senate ratify the CTBT? Should the U.S. and the other nuclear powers move more aggressively toward nuclear disarmament themselves, and explore seriously the idea of nuclear abolition?
3) Proliferation prospects: Are the nuclear floodgates now open, or are these two countries special cases (neither of which signed the NPT)? What is the impact on other potential proliferators? Is the case for building missile defenses now stronger? How effective are sanctions? What new priorities or initiatives are needed to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime? Has U.S. nonproliferation strategy focused too much on generic threats and sanctions, and paid too little attention to national and regional politics and security concerns?
 
4) Washington politics: Can the Clinton Administration craft a policy that works in Congress as well as in New Delhi and in Islamabad? What will Washington need in order to lift the sanctions? How does the crisis affect US-China relations, including the upcoming Clinton trip to Beijing? What about relations with Iran? The nuclear deal with North Korea?
 
 
Expert Sources
 
Useful Links
 
Background Documents

For more information, contact Robert Leavitt at the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media's Boston office, at 617-497-7377, or by e-mail at robert.leavitt@nyu.edu.

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