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This is an edited transcript of a telephonic press briefing organized by the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media on June 1, 2000. See bottom for list of participants. Also available: Full Audio (RealAudio format)
William HARTUNG of the World Policy Institute, an authority on the economics and politics of missile defense, last week released research detailing millions in defense lobby money funneled to National Missile Defense (NMD) supporters in Congress. Tangled Web: The Marketing Of Missile Defense, 1994-2000, concludes that the political pace of the NMD Program is being accelerated by an alliance of "conservative true believers" and right-wing Foundations centered around Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy. "Given the serious technical, cost, and arms control problems plaguing the proposed NMD system, the most convincing explanation for the undue haste with which this issue is being decided is that both the Clinton administration and its conservative adversaries in Congress and the Bush campaign are playing politics with the missile defense issue." Frank GAFFNEY, Director of the Center for Security Policy, responded to Mr. Hartung's analysis. Mr. Gaffney formerly acted as the Assistant Secretary of Defense of International Security Policy during the Reagan Administration following four years of service as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy. Previously, Mr. Gaffney was a Professional Staff Member on the Senate Armed Services Committee under the chairmanship of the late Senator John Tower. Mr. Gaffney is currently the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the "Coalition to Protect Americans Now!". Richard Halloran: We have thirteen journalists lined up, a rather diverse international group, and some are long-time colleagues. They are Jeff Allan of the CBC, Malcolm Brown of Feature Story News, Lewis Dolinsky of the San Francisco Chronicle, John Diamond of the Chicago Tribune, Yoichi Kato of the Asahi Shimbun of Japan, Norman Kempster of the Los Angeles Times, George Lewinski of KQED/FM San Francisco, Jamie McIntyre of CNN, Gopal Ratman of Defense News, Jonathan Schell of The Nation, Peter Tautfest of the Tagezeitung of Berlin, Marsha Vande Berg of The World Report in San Francisco, and Jim Wolf late of Honolulu and now with Reuters. The subject of a national missile defense has been around for a couple of decades. We were talking before about how this goes back to the debates over the ABM Treaty. It is now back in the news as a most controversial issue. It may well be an issue of debate in the forthcoming presidential campaign. During the remarks I would like to ask both speakers to address several fundamental questions which are, "what is the missile threat to the U.S. and its interests and its allies?". "Is the technology ready or attainable for a realistic missile defense?" "Is this the most cost effective way to defend the U.S. against missiles?" And most of all "who advocates a national missile defense, who opposes it, and why?". I would ask each of the speakers to present his case in five minutes. I will give each two minutes for rebuttal, and then we will open the questioning by the journalists. If you are all ready gentlemen, Mr. Hartung, please go ahead. William Hartung: Well, from my perspective --I've been a long time supporter of arms control -- the fact that we are even debating this now is incredible to me. Not only that there is a debate, but that the official debate in Washington is not about whether to do this but how to do it and when to do it. And I think that it is hard to understand on any kind of ground of merit. It is unnecessary to build an NMD system now, and it is certainly unnecessary to make a hasty decision before the November elections. Recently the analyst who is working on a new National Intelligence Estimate gave an interview to the LA Times where he pointed out that, first of all, North Korea's program has been frozen for almost two years. Second of all, Iran has done very little during that time period. Thirdly, Robert Walpole has testified earlier this year that a ballistic missile is the least likely way that a foreign power or terrorist group would use to deliver a nuclear missile, a nuclear weapon, or a weapon of mass destruction to U.S. soil because the problem with that form of delivery is that it has a return address on it. Basically you know who to devastate in return. Furthermore, it is not ready. There have been only three of the twenty-one tests of this current version of the system. The most recent one failed, the one before was essentially rigged by using a large balloon as a beacon to get the thing close enough to the warhead. Ted Postol at MIT has looked at some data from one of the tests in question, and has argued that there is no technology currently available that can discriminate between a warhead and a decoy soon enough to make a difference, and to avoid being overwhelmed. And then finally, we have the same old problem that we had every other time that we've debated this. Which is that it is much cheaper to build decoys, to build systems to overwhelm a missile defense than it is to extend the defensive system. And there is this great mythology that Star Wars scared the Soviet Union to death, or convinced them to negotiate in good faith on arms control, etc. That is nonsense. Frances Fitzgerald's new book shows that once Sakharov told Gorbachev that he had nothing to fear from a U.S. system, Gorbachev sat down with Reagan and said point blank, "if you want to build this thing, fine, and we will respond however we have to, but let's get on with reducing missiles". Furthermore, there has been a CIA analysis from that time that points out that at the time they knew that Russia's main response was not going to be to blow billions of dollars on their own Star Wars system, but rather to try to negotiate over the issue. Finally, if you look at the issue of what a deployment decision will do. Again, this forthcoming national intelligence estimate on the effects of a national missile defense system says basically if you are going to push China to deploy more medium and long range missiles, likewise with India and Pakistan, and you will probably provoke more transfers of nuclear technology to the Middle East. And so basically, you are going to create precisely the kind of proliferation that the system is meant to defend against. And the cost is going to range anywhere from $60 billion to three to four times that, depending on whether you use a limited ground-based Clinton/Gore system, or the elaborate Reaganesque triad of space-based, land-based, and sea-based assets that George W. Bush seems to be thinking about. And so the question becomes "well if we don't need it, and it is not affordable, and it doesn't work, why are we doing it?". Partly because it is America and we do what we feel like, but I think that the other reason is politics. There is a conservative strain of this which Mr. Gaffney has been one of the most effective members of, which has basically tried to hold the flame of Reaganism high ever since Reagan left office. But I would argue that they are supporting the wrong Ronald Reagan. They are supporting the Ronald Reagan of the early years who wanted this unworkable Star Wars defense, not the Ronald Reagan who agreed to Intermediate Nuclear Forces reductions in Europe, who set the outlines of the START Treaty which were the first reductions to nuclear weapons in our modern era. But nonetheless, Mr. Gaffney and his network, which includes foundations like Heritage, and Empower America, companies like Lockheed Martin which are represented on his board and give money to his organization, members of Congress like Jon Kyl who helped kill the CTB, like Curt Weldon who helped to create the Rumsfeld Commission which is one of the most skewed views of the missile threat in modern history and parlance. You know, if it wasn't for the Republican takeover in 1994, Mr. Gaffney and his friends would be sort of a relic of the cold war. But once he convinced Gingrich to put it in the Contract with America. Once Weldon used the Rumsfeld Commission as a stalking-horse to try to whip up the threat, with some cooperation from North Korea, with that absurd missile test that they fired off in 1998, and the basic cowardice of Bill Clinton who, throughout his term, when in doubt, has thrown money at the Pentagon in hopes of covering up his own limits as a Commander and Chief. And I think that was his plan on the missile defense system. He was going to throw money at it. He was going to keep delaying the deployment decision. And he was hoping to make it all the way through his Administration without having to make a decision on this. And so basically he has dumped this problem in the lap of Al Gore who, as we know, is not one of the more innovative and creative political figures of our era. And so you've got Clintonian cowardice or co-optation in trying to take over this Republican issue. You've got this strong, focused conservative push which is a very impressive, I think political element of this. And then you've got corporate influence. You've got companies like Lockheed Martin, TRW, Boeing, all of whom contribute to Mr. Gaffney's group, who are the major contractors here. And although they will not make money immediately on this, they are looking at this for medium to long-term profits. And these companies have basically mismanaged what they've been given in terms of these subsidized mergers, this sort of commanding control of the U.S. defense industry to the point where they've had major technical failures, their stock failures have been cut by more than half. And one of the few things that they can point to is something exciting, glitzy, and new that they are doing is national missile defense. And they have wonderful graphics to demonstrate what they could do for all of us if only we would throw a few more tens of billions of dollars their way. And so I think that those three factors, and I think really the conservative almost religious belief in missile defense is the strongest factor. The Clintonian compromise second, and then the corporate influence third. I think that is why we are debating this issue now. Not because there is some urgent national threat that demands that we do so. And even if there were such a threat there would be many better ways to deal with it than spending money on basically a failed system, which has failed repeatedly every time it has been tried over the past three decades. Halloran: All right, Mr. Gaffney, I think you have a lot to chew on there. Please go ahead. Mr. Gaffney: It sounds like Bill doesn't like anybody very much. And I guess that I am high in the pantheon of those who are being condemnedI wouldn't say praised, but I will take it for what it is worth. In fact, I am deeply flattered by the extraordinary tribute that you've paid me in terms of the influence that I am exercising over all of these myriad forces. But let me talk to the points that Richard asked us to address, and then as time permits and questions we can go back and forth on the right wing conspiracy and so on. As to the threat, you know, I've never heard anybody, certainly
nobody who I think enjoys much esteem in the national security
community say that Rumsfeld's commission was one of the most
skewed views of the missile situation that has come out so far.
I think by and large, particularly the presence of three people
who very much subscribe generally to the kinds of line that Bill
has just laid out -- Former General Lee Butler who wants to ban
all nuclear weapons; Richard Garwin who has never seen a missile
defense system, or for that matter any other defense system that
he likes very much; and Barry Blechman; people who were frankly
appointed to that panel by the Democratic majority in the Congress
in the expectation that they would never agree to anything that
the Republican appointees on the panel agree to in terms of the
threat but who nonetheless did so. And they didn't do so because I told Don Rumsfeld that they had to do so, for God's sake. They did so because (and I think this is a credit to them, I don't often agree with them, but I think that it is to their credit) they looked very hard and very seriously at all of the information that was available to them; not only to them, but to the United States Government --the most classified analyses and information available, as well as a great deal of insights and analysis provided by Republican and Democratic experts, in and out of government. And they came up with a very sobering analysis. They concluded that it was entirely possible, indeed, in their judgment I think likely, that within five years of a decision to do so countries like North Korea and Iran could have long range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction capable of reaching this country. And the problem that they pointed out was that despite all of our intelligence we didn't know whether they had taken that decision already. And if so, how far along in that five-year clock we might actually be. Accordingly, they concluded that there was a real threat of missile attack from the sorts of people that Bill tends to dismiss. It obviously discomfited him a bit, but what he called the "absurd North Korean missile launch" which took place within a month of the publication of the Rumsfeld Commission, fully in my judgment at least, and I think a great many other people, validating the assessment demonstrating, and it was not skewed at all, it was very realistic and proved that we had a problem. Now it is of some comfort that the missile that is on the pad right now is deemed to be a Taep'o-dong II, assessed to be capable of reaching this country, has not been, as best I can tell, further modified or prepared for launch. But to be truthful with you, I don't take a great deal of comfort from the fact that a missile on the pad is in the hands of North Korea, that could reach this country. Especially as we now see North Korea selling missile technology to other people, notably Iran. There have been some reports by Bill Safire and others about Sudan. Certainly there are new SCUD missiles going into Syria. It is almost certainly the case that at the first moment they will find their way into Iraq, Libya, and who knows where all else. The Chinese are helping their clients, as well, and some of them in the same countries, but also Pakistan. And the Russians are making technology available to all manner of people. And so I don't think really among serious people that there is any longer a dispute that we've entered a new era. An era in which we no longer need fear only the possibility of an attack with long range missiles from Russia, but it could come from a lot of other quarters. And the question then is "do we pretend that is not a problem, do we do nothing more about it than sort of maintain a hobby shop missile defense research and development program, or do we begin to address the reality that it is a problem by building and deploying defenses that are capable of at least dealing with the sorts of threats that North Korea and its friends could represent?". And then you get into the question that Dick asked us to address of "so what do you do about it?". And my view is that the Clinton option for a ground based missile defense in Alaska will take longer to deploy than we are likely to have. At the earliest it will be available in 2005, more likely 2007, and maybe later. It will not cover all 50 states, even though the Administration maintained that. As a practical matter it can't. Certainly against the kind of sea launched-missiles that are within the possible ambit of some of these countries. Even SCUD missiles, border tramp steamers, could be a ballistic missile threat that an Alaska site -- if it works -- could not deal with. It will not protect our allies and our forces overseas. A fact that I think is quite understandably animating, at least in part, the hostility that President Clinton experienced yesterday and we've been hearing a lot about lately, from some of our allies. They would like, I believe, to be defended too. And the Alaska system won't do that. And unfortunately it is, if not the most costly, it is about as costly an approach to building missile defense as you could find. Especially for the relatively small number of these systems that are involved. And let's be clear. The reason that Bill Clinton is favoring this approach, to the extent that he is, has to do with one reason and one reason alone: he thinks that it represents a mini departure from the ABN Treaty which he is determined to preserve if at all possible. I believe instead what we should be doing is a sea-based approach, at least initially. It may be that you want to complement it with ground-based. You certainly want ultimately to have space-based capabilities. But a sea-based system utilizing adapted Aegis nuclear defense systems, starting to do what we can do as quickly as possible, working towards boost phase, intercepts from the sea, is so much, I believe, quicker an approach, so much more flexible, so much more militarily effective, and so much more cost-effective an approach, thanks to the $50 billion plus that we've already invested in it, that for a fraction, a tiny fraction of the costs that Bill is citing for CBO and others for this ground-based system, you could have a global missile defense capability that would begin providing this country an alternative to its present vulnerability. Who is in favor of this, you asked Richard? Halloran: Yes. Mr. Gaffney: Among others, we have lately heard from
such august people as Harold Brown, Bill Perry, John Deutsch,
John White, and even Joe Biden, talking rather positively about
a modified Aegis approach as a way to get missile defenses deployed
and do the job better than this ground based system. I am a very strong believer that we will have a missile defense. In fact, I will bet good money that we will have a missile defense. The question is not whether, it is a question of whether we will have it before we need it or whether we will build it afterwards. Halloran: Mr. Hartung, you have two minutes for a rebuttal, please. Mr. Hartung: But I do think that it is odd that an organization that postures as being objective analysts of this gets 25% of its revenues over its lifetime from corporations, many of which will profit from the systems that he proposes, rarely has to address that question. I think that that is a failure of journalism to some extent, not to point out that his is a partisan, self-interested organization even though he, himself, clearly believes what he is saying, his supporters have a special interest in this matter. As for whether we need it, the Rumsfeld Commission was very cleverly crafted. But if you read the unclassified summary, all it really says is it if countries like China or others help North Korea up to and including the possibility of giving them a completed missile, they will get missiles faster than if we don't. but at the same time that the Rumsfeld Commission was being put together (which by the way Richard Garwin denounced within two weeks, saying that he was alarmed at how those results were being used to pump, and push the missile defense issue, and that was not at all what he had intended in signing off on that report), at the same time there was an effort underway to analyze how we gather intelligence on missile threats, and how we coordinate intelligence, how could India blow off a nuclear test which their government told us they were planning to do and we'd been caught napping. And that panel was going to look at how to coordinate intelligence, how to get better information. Republicans in Congress including Newt Gingrich tried to de-fund that panel. And the reason that they tried to de-fund it was because it was going to be chaired by that great radical, Brent Scowcroft, who recently was standing behind Mr. Bush when he made his schizophrenic statement about demolishing arms control at the same time that he is going to cut nuclear weapons. And so I don't think that the threat has been demonstrated. I think to the extent that we do have to deal with these rogue states, that it is going to be in the nature of theatre missiles that can be used against U.S. troops, and that is a serious issue. The most effective way to deal with this issue is first of all meet our obligations under the framework agreement with North Korea to put a cap on their nuclear missile programs. Secondly, to do things like Nunn Lugar to help dismantle actual nuclear weapons that could be aimed at us, and to not distract ourselves with these exaggerated fears and pie in the sky schemes for missile defense, which I think has great resonance in the American psyche, but have very little to do with the biggest security problems that we face in the world today. Halloran: Mr. Gaffney, two minutes for rebuttal, please. Mr. Gaffney: Well, again I will defer to questions if you wish to sort of the characterization of my influence and my friends. But let me address something that Bill said which I find really striking. He was decrying the religious belief in missile defense. And I would just suggest that there are few belief systems to which people adhere more assiduously with less reason than that of arms control. And most especially the ABM Treaty. We have, and let's recall here, a treaty that was signed in 1972 with another power, with unique characteristics and capabilities, that went out of business nine years ago. By action of its successors, it was dismantled. A great many people, legal analysts, Jim Woolsy most notably among them, have looked hard at the international legal practice and precedent and say that treaty had to have lapsed when the other party went out of the business". It had to by virtue of the fact that the Russians could not, neither they themselves nor with the Kazakhs, and the Belorussians, and the Ukrainians, reconstitute what we had initially had made the deal with. But more to the point, the world has changed. The world has changed, I would suggest, in precisely the ways, if there was any meaning to the words at all of Article XV of the ABM treaty, i.e., that if a country's supreme interests are jeopardized, that country, that party, has the right to exercise a withdrawal upon six months notice. This is the kind of world in which that notice has to be served if you in fact think the treaty is still legally binding, apart from the political attachment to it with the President. But the point that I think that is also missing here is the absurdity of being hectored by the Russians about our efforts to defend ourselves, and in any way to depart from the ABM Treaty when they themselves have systematically violated this treaty from the get-go. Mr. Hartung: How can you violate a treaty that you are not a party to any more? Mr. Gaffney: They continue to assert Mr. Hartung: It is not binding on them. Mr. Gaffney: Let me finish my time, if I may. They, I understand, continue to assert that the treaty is not only politically binding but legally valid. And in accordance with that they would presumably be obliged to abide by its constraints. They have not. They have not with respect to the Moscow site which is legal, and they have not with respect to the radars around the periphery, some of which are now outside of its borders. But also with respect to thousands of surface-to-air missiles that were designed for the purpose of providing defense. Now that comes on top of a systematic effort that was not limited by the treaty, to provide other forms of defenses, passive defenses, air defenses, leadership defenses, and so on. And there is, in other words, a very profound, longstanding, and abiding commitment on the part of Russia to defense. The defense they don't want is ours. And in the kind of world in which we are today, in the experience we've had with any number of countries, including most of these bad guys, violating agreements, every one of which I believe has been violated, and that includes by the way Russia and China, as well as the North Koreans, the Iranians, the Iranians and so on. It is folly in the extreme to believe that remaining defenseless against this particular threat is a wise course of action let alone a safe one. Halloran: Thank you both very much for stating your positions rather clearly, and there is much to chew on here. I would like now to open the session to questions. The first question will go to Jeff Allan of the CBC. Allan: Thanks very much. I have a diplomatic question for both panelists. If no major breakthrough is expected on NMD this weekend at the Summit in Moscow, and some U.S. officials are hinting at this now, what areas of the ABM could be examined by the two leaders? And in other words, will there be any grounds for a substantive discussion with a view to amending the treaty at all? Mr. Gaffney: I would venture to guess that nobody knows. I think that there will be discussion of it simply because I believe that the President is invested in this, is determined to try to get a legacy, believes that this is the way ahead. Whether that will be a two-way discussion or whether it will amount to a substantive discussion I think depends very largely on whether or what Putin and his spokesmen have been doing in terms of positioning Russia as what you might call the "hell no we won't let you go" mode, and it remains to be seen. Mr. Hartung: Both sides have been posturing in advance of the negotiations. My understanding in the Clinton camp is that one of the reasons that they've been so firm on NMD is that they want to put as much pressure on the Russians as possible to conclude some sort of deal that Clinton can point to. On the Russian side there have been a few murmurs that they might consider limited revisions but they've been pretty much shouted down by strong statements emphatically suggesting that any change in the ABM Treaty would lead them to pull out of all U.S./Russian arms agreements. And so I think that a lot depends on what happens when Clinton and Putin get together, and what Clinton has to offer Putin. And since Clinton is not looking like he is going to have, at least at this point in time, his sidekick Al Gore succeeding him, he would have to offer, in my mind, some kind of short-term benefits to Putin. Be it help with the IMF or unrelated matters, for him to agree to a deal. Unless Putin decides that just bringing the U.S. to the table and hammering out even a tentative accord will somehow put him in good stead at home, and sort of contrast it to Yeltsin who was supposed to be the great friend of the United States but couldn't really raise a finger against NATO expansion, the bombing of Kosovo, and various other matters that were of great concern to the Russian elites and in some cases to the mass of the Russian people. And so I think that there is going to be a lot of symbolism around that, and whether or not anything comes of that we will just have to see. Halloran: Malcolm Brown. Brown: This one is probably more for Frank Gaffney, and I am interested to know as a Brit whether or what role he would foresee for other NATO members in participating in some of the remote sensing that will be necessary to establish a kind of effective missile defense system.. Would you see a role for all of them, and in return what could all of those NATO members expect by way of protection? Mr. Gaffney: It is obviously a very topical question at the moment. I believe that the best remote sensing that we can get is from space. That we ought to be moving as aggressively as we can to put up what has been called a space based infrared sensor system that would augment the defense satellite program that is currently in place, giving much more precise tracking information to hand off to weapons systems, whether they are based on the ground, sea, or space. I happen to believe, however, that as I indicated, that the right answer here is to deploy sensors and weapons aboard ships as the first step towards trying to provide a defensive system for both our friends overseas, our forces on their territory, and our own people here at home. I think that would go a long way to alleviating the pressure campaign that is currently being mounted against any kind of ground based sensors in the U.K. or elsewhere, and address more to the point the not unreasonable concern that allies feel that we are setting off to protect ourselves and leaving them high and dry. Again, this is the byproduct of a program that has been designed by arms controllers, not by sensible strategic planning. Halloran: Mr. Hartung, do you have a comment? Mr. Hartung: I think that it is a misreading to put it mildly, to think that the main objection in Europe is that we are not going to protect them with this unworkable system. There is an article in today's International Herald Tribune by William Pfaff who points out that a lot of the defense officials in Europe basically think that Cohen's notion that they will face a threat from North Korean missiles in five to ten years would be enough to label him certifiable were he to seriously believe it. A lot of them are concerned about how it is going to affect relations with Russia. How it will affect nuclear proliferation. Whether it is just another example of the United States wanting to go it alone. The beauty of a sea based system, presuming that it can be made to work, which I don't believe that it could, is that you can put it in and you can take it out. And so basically, much like the Bush policy that says that the United States will unilaterally decide its needs, will abolish arms control agreements, will do basically whatever it feels like whenever it feels like, is understandably not comforting to members who thought that they were part of an alliance which discusses these matters. And, of course, this was sprung on the Europeans without a lot of notice. They've been visibly unimpressed with Secretary Cohen's presentation of a threat, and so to the extent that there is some concern that if there is a defense that they be part of it, that is far down the list of the concerns of most of the major European leaders on this issue. Halloran: Louis Dolinsky. Dolinsky: This is a question for Mr. Gaffney. If I understand it correctly, the only treaty that has been questioned in legal terms that we've made with the Soviet Union is the ABM Treaty. In other words, for all other treaties, we assume that Russia stands in for the Soviet Union. But on this one we don't. Why would that be? Mr. Gaffney: I think that it is for the very simple reason that arrangements were agreed upon between the two governments and submitted to the Senate and approved by the Senate for its advice and consent and it effected formally that change. And that has not been done to date with the ABM Treaty. And the Administration refuses, by the way, to submit to the Senate the agreement that it did arrive at in September of 1997, I believe, in which it added to the successors, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. We don't hear much about them as successors. But in any event, that agreement under our constitution does not have standing because it has not been confirmed by two-thirds of the Senate. And it won't be, and that is why it hasn't been submitted. And that is why I believe that President Clinton is hoping to get some new package that would have arms control reductions and some new deal that actually does allow for the deployment of a limited defense, albeit it not a very effective one and a hugely costly one, and one that will take too long to get, in the hopes that that might actually be more attractive to senators if not in this session then in the next. Mr. Hartung: On that point, that is where we veer off into the realm of at leat quasi-religious belief. It is a commonly understood principle of international law that a nation that composes the bulk of a nation that has broken up into constituent parts is the successor nation for purposes of various treaties. And as the questioner pointed out, I don't hear anyone saying "oh gee, Russia is not bound by anti-terrorism treaties, Russia is not bound by public health treaties", and I think that this is basically an ad hoc argument that was ginned up. And the reason that Clinton is wary of it is because it has support in the Senate. The same Senate led by Jessie Helms and Jon Kyl, a board member of Mr. Gaffney's organization, that has refuse to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And so it is a political reason that he is not doing it. It is not a legal reason. And I think that if Mr. Gaffney thinks that a large number of people believe this he needs to get out more, and he needs to talk to a broader range of people. Because the majority of international legal scholars would scoff at that entire presentation that he just made about the status of that treaty. Halloran: John Diamond. Diamond: Yes, I would like Frank Gaffney to provide his reaction to this apparently upcoming NIE on the international affects of NMD. And I would like Mr. Hartung to answer the very basic question, which I think is one of the underlying foundations of the pro NMD argument, and that is " if it can be done why shouldn't it be done" in terms of building a national missile defense, even if we accept that the chances of an attack are remote. But first, Frank, if you would answer the question. Mr. Gaffney: Actually I would like, if he is getting a question let him go first and then I can respond to some of the things that he is saying. Mr. Hartung: If it can be done, in my opinion, it should not be done, because it is ill advised. If you could come up with a system that could block tens of North Korean missiles, that same system could block tens of Chinese missiles. And currently China has approximately eighteen to twenty single warhead missiles that can reach U.S. soil. And so their logical response to that is going to be to increase their missile force, either by MIRVing their warheads or expanding the numbers. That is going to cause all kinds of ripple effects throughout Asia, on over into India and Pakistan. Remember that one of Indian's justifications for getting into the nuclear business was looking over its shoulder at China. Furthermore, to the extent that it undermines relations with Russia and China, they are likely to get back into the business of exporting nuclear technology on a much more aggressive basis, both to the Middle East and to places like North Korea, which is one of the most isolated countries in the world now. It is big news that the leader of North Korea after six years took an overnight train trip to China. He is probably the only person on earth that has a narrower view on this than Mr. Gaffney. He needs to get out into the sunlight and get some more advice on exactly what he is up to. But so I think that even if it could be made to work, its strategic ramifications would mean that it is not worth the costs. It is not worth the costs in terms of how other countries will react to it. It is not worth the costs in terms of ratcheting up the nuclear arms at a time when we have the prospect of deep reductions and the only two arsenals that really count in terms of our basic core security at the moment, which are the Russian and the U.S. arsenals. Diamond: Just on that though, what about the argument that China is going to expand their missile arsenal anyway? Mr. Hartung: Well, that is an interesting argument, but it has been pretty steady for several decades. And so the fact that they are suddenly going to do it just doesn't hold up to me. I mean that we have to decide is China a market or is China a menace. If we are going to be trading with them, interacting with them, selling them advanced technology then we can't turn around and say they are untrustworthy and we need to build this huge defense against them. Even though their nuclear force essentially since they developed it has been in a minimum deterrent posture vis-à-vis the United States. Halloran: Mr. Gaffney. Mr. Gaffney: Let me work back to that, if I could, because there are so many points here that Bill has mentioned that I would like to cover. I think that a rigorous analysis of what is going on in the world makes it clear that North Koreans are getting out a lot. It may be news that the lunatic who runs the country has only seen fit to go to China today for the first time in quite a while. But their salesmen are all over the planet, and they are getting contracts. And they are selling missiles, and probably weapons of mass destruction technology for either cash or energy which they desperately need. The legal argument, I'm not an international lawyer and I don't think that Bill is either. But I would urge people to take a look if you are interested in this debate, at what I regard as the definitive, legal study of the subject by a colleague of mine. Here we go with the conspiracy again. A colleague of mine, Doug Feith, and the Chairman of my Board, George Myron. And to this date it has not been refuted. It has not been challenged. It has not been taken apart. Mr. Hartung: I would be glad to send you something after we get off the phone. Mr. Gaffney: By all means, but in the meantime I hope that those of you who are listening to this will appreciate that actual international legal practice is very different than the way that Bill has just described it in important cases. And that certainly is true of the ABM Treaty. Now, as to the question of what is going on with the allies. It is very much the same thing as what is going on here. Bill is absolutely right. The defense elite, the defense officials I think that he called it, in Europe, like the high priests of arms control in this country. And let's remember, this is not the same group of political leaders in Europe who overcame the last great effort to divide the United States from its allies, mainly the INF deployment. And I would actually say, Bill, for what it is worth, that I don't think that Star Wars, as you call it, brought down the Soviet Union. I think that it may have helped to exacerbate its problems. But I think that what began the process of unravel was the success that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and conservative leaders throughout Europe had in holding the line and proceeding with the INF deployments, and yes, the early part of the Reagan Administration which made possible the deal that Ronald Reagan struck in the latter part in 1987 to remove those and the SS20's that they were putting in to counterbalance. Now, European officials today are largely constituted of the appointees or the elected people who at the time in the early 1980's were opposing the INF deployment. This is without exception in Europe, and I would argue in this country as well, sort of a socialist-minded group of people who have never approved of U.S. military power, and most especially have long held the arms control no matter how flawed, no matter how systematically violated, no matter how it has proven actually not to serve the purpose that it is intended to serve, is supreme, and should be at all costs placed above any effort to build defenses, particularly missile defenses. Now I am of the view that you will hear a lot more keening and wailing about the ABM Treaty partly because the Russians and the Chinese find it expedient to promote that. But at the end of the day, there, in Europe and certainly in Japan, certainly in Taiwan, certainly in South Korea, as in the United States of America, you get outside of this elite circle, this fraternity of arms control zealots, and you find that most people have more sense than that, common sense. And they think that it makes eminent sense to build a missile defense and to hear Bill say that he wouldn't build it even if we could, even if it would work, even if it were affordable. Because he is afraid that the Chinese are going to build up their missile force -- I have some bad news for you Bill, old bean, if you are going to get out a little bit check out what the Chinese are doing right now. Even the Clinton administration acknowledges that the Chinese, thanks to American technology, have options to MIRV their forces, have options to build more reliable ballistic missiles on land and at sea. And they are doing it whether we build a missile defense or not. Don't forget that they prefer us to not have a missile defense, absolutely. And so to come to the NIE, I suggest that the NIE that is coming out is likely to be fully as politicized as the 1995 NIE that prompted, yes, my friend Curt Weldon and a great many others in Congress to seek a second opinion. To seek from Don Rumsfeld and a bipartisan team, including a guy by the name of Dick Garwin who to my knowledge repeatedly testified with Don Rumsfeld and others before, shortly after he submitted his report and long after, to the quality of that report. And we will need a second opinion here again I'm afraid, because in this case it isn't enough to just look at what are the press releases and what are the public statements of the socialists running many of our allies' governments at the moment. We need to find out what the people of these countries want, and I believe that it is to be defended just as the American people want to be. Halloran: Yoichi Kato of the Asahi Shimbun. Kato: About sea based systems, and this is a question for Mr. Gaffney, is a sea based national missile different from the Navy theatre-wide missile system that Japan has started joint research with the United States on? And Mr. Bacon, the spokesman of the DoD just said yesterday at a press conference that sea based system costs more and takes more time to develop. How do you see it is possible for the United States Government to change the choice of the system? Mr. Gaffney: On your first question, the Navy theatre wide system has been dumbed down so as to minimize any chance that somebody like Bill might complain that it violates the ABM Treaty. It is not as competent system as it could be made even for theatre purposes. And it will need to be improved considerably to make it capable of shooting down longer range, faster flying ballistic missiles. But there is nothing inherent in the missile defense system that the Navy is building, or the Aegis infrastructure on which it is based, that would preclude it from being adapted quickly into a strategic or a long range or indeed global missile defense system. And that is one of the points that is being made in a report that the Clinton administration's political appointees in the Pentagon refuse to let get out of the Pentagon, and it is requested by Congress on the 15th of March. They will not let it get up there because I think that it would show the folly of President Clinton's effort to try to negotiate away sea based missile defenses in this summit in Moscow. As to the second question, it is simply laughable to have somebody tell you that when you have the ships, therefore the platforms, the launchers -- we are putting missiles shortly into the fleet that would lend themselves to this, we have sensors that can be adapted for this purpose, we have communications systems, we even have the people to operate them -- that it will take longer to make relatively minor changes to that infrastructure than it will be to start from scratch in a very inhospitable environment in Alaska to build something that even the administration says will take at least five years to get constructed. It just doesn't compute. And so the short answer is I believe we will have a sea based missile defense. I pray that we will have it in place before Japan needs it and before our own people need it because we will certainly have it afterwards because it is the most sensible, the most straightforward, and I think the most cost effective way to get a missile defense. Halloran: Mr. Hartung. Mr. Hartung: Sea based defense is the latest version of the Holy Grail. Every system that fails, the supporters come up with a new system. The missile that they are talking about doesn't exist. The Pentagon has said even a minimal system of this sort could cost $19 billion. All of the relevant technical officials in the Pentagon have said that it would take longer and cost more to deploy such a system. What it would be effective in doing is destroying the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. And I think that is really Mr. Gaffney's primary target, and for that I applaud him for choosing an effective vehicle. Halloran: Norman Kempster. Kempster: In the event that Clinton and Putin are unable to settle the dispute over ABM and missile defenses, what will the impact on future negotiations between the United States and Russia on offensive weapons, START III? And if this brings START III down, is this anything that anyone ought to worry about? Gaffney: Go ahead Bill, that is your question. Mr. Hartung: Well, I think that a lot of it has to do with how other countries interpret the U.S. and Russian actions. I mean that if they don't come to an agreement now -- there are several times over the summer through September where they will try to meet to discuss these issues again --my guess is that if they don't come to an agreement that it will mean that the START process will be on hold. But it will be on hold until the next president, so that is not the end of the world. But I think that the question then will be, is Clinton going to give the go-ahead to deployment in the fall? And if I had to guess knowing Bill Clinton, he will fudge the matter. He will say something like "well, we will do long lead-time procurement, we will start construction, but it is our considered legal opinion that doing so will not violate the ABM Treaty, and therefore we will stay on course to be ready to deploy but we will do some more tests and some more discussions with the Russians." And, of course, if George W. Bush comes to office then the whole nature of the discussion will change. And so I think that the best that Clinton can hope for is to lay out one possible framework of a limited NMD with cuts which would then have to be most likely ratified by his successor. And so in terms of the great ebb and flow of this issue, it is an opportunity and so it is not the be all or end all. Mr. Gaffney: I happen to agree with that. I don't think it is by any means that it is the end all and be all. I don't think that it will, in fact, in the great ebb and flow as he says, of history that it will matter one wit. In fact, I think what will happen is that the Russians will wind up reducing their nuclear forces anyway because they cannot afford to maintain them. They will modernize them, and let's be clear. They are modernizing. They will continue to modernize their forces because this is something that Putin places a priority on. But the nut number is assuredly going to decline, and probably decline dramatically. And I would encourage everybody to take a look at the lead editorial in today's Washington Post. I don't have it in front of me, but it says something to the effect that with respect to President's Clinton's determination to try to get a deal at the Summit on missile defense and strategic forces, they hope, says the Post, that the efforts to downplay expectations are genuine an not just trying to exercise spin control. And they think, the editorial for the Post thinks, that if the basis upon which the President is seeking an agreement is that the Russians can get a better deal from the Americans under Clinton than under Bush, that that is not a sound basis for lame duck diplomacy. And I couldn't agree more. Halloran: Thank you very much. If both the speakers agree -- this is a very rich exchange --I would like to extend the time that we had to put in an extra fifteen or twenty minutes if that is all right. Because I would like to get everyone in to ask questions. Mr. Hartung: That would be great. Mr. Gaffney: That is all right with me. Halloran: Gopal Ratman from Defense News? Ratman: I have a question for Mr. Frank Gaffney. I wanted to ask you: do you support a new defense agreement or different pact with Russia? Or are you just in favor of completely scrapping the existing ABM and getting on with the missile defense deployment? And the second question that I have is about and this was again asked earlier, the sea based system. I was in a conference recently, and a Navy admiral said that the sea based system that your organization and you have been promoting is not inexpensive and not as easy to develop as it is being made out. And if you have any further comments on that? Mr. Gaffney: Sure. On the first question, I personally believe that the experiment that we started in 1972 on the untested theory that the world would be a safer place if we were completely vulnerable has run its course. And that re-upping to a modified ABM Treaty that continues to impose limits on missile defenses is ill advised. I would not recommend doing it. And I hope that we won't do it. I think that to the extent that we can acknowledge, we can recognize that the Russians have, in fact, pursued missile defenses systematically and that they feel that that is a perfectly legitimate function even to the extent that one believes the ABM Treaty continues to be in violation of the treaty -- certainly during the period that everybody agrees that existed they were violating the treaty -- then presumably it should clear the way for us to have a defense of our own of our territory, not unlike though different in some of the particulars of the kind that they have deployed. As to the question of missile defense at sea. Look, the Navy is in a very difficult position at the moment. The policy of the United States Government, we operate under a system of civilian control, is that there will be no missile defenses that violate or frankly even could be arguably near posing a violation of the ABM Treaty. This has resulted in the dumbing down of the system that they are currently working on, as I mentioned the theatre wide system that has foreclosed even much serious planning on a strategic or global sea based system for defense against longer range missiles. I don't believe that that will be the case very much longer. In fact, there was an article in the Washington Times, Bill Gertz, that talked about senior Navy official describing steps that are now being taken to start the thinking about doing a more competent defense at sea. You know, you can definitely run the numbers up on building a sea based missile defense. If you decide that you need to have a whole series of dedicated ships, for example, you have to factor in the cost of building the ships. Bill is absolutely right, the missile that you would ideally like to have for national missile defense at sea does not exist today. You have to go and build that missile, and you have to provide it in quantity and deploy it. But let's be clear, if you are going to do this as I believe we should, on a crash basis -- because I believe that we are in an emergency situation. We are at risk of missile attack right now. Two months ago, and let us recall, the Communist Chinese threatened a nuclear attack against this country. They did it in the context of coming to blows over Taiwan and if the United States interferes we will attack you with nuclear weapons. And Bill and others can sort of write that off. He is absolutely right, we are talking about trade with them. I would suggest to you that we are talking about trade with a country that is arming itself to do us harm. And their doctrine and their policies point in that direction, and we ignored that at our peril too. But we can have a sea based missile defense I believe, in the near term, of modest capability to be sure, but using largely existing assets and easily modified equipment for a very small fraction of the cost of building a new missile defense. If you decide that you don't want to use the Navy that you have and you want to go out and build a new Navy to field that thing on a permanent basis then yes, it will cost you more. But I believe that we will have to start with the Navy that we do have, and that is the sensible way to proceed. Halloran: Mr. Hartung. Mr. Hartung: I think that this is sort of a good time for some perspective. Mr. Gaffney and his supporters, colleagues like Jon Kyl, like to talk about how they would rather have peace through strength than peace through paper. And Mr. Gaffney himself, you know, sort of modifying the old Will Rogers comment has never met an arms control treaty that he didn't dislike. He is against the anti personnel land mines treaty, he is against the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, he is against obviously the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty. And they've got it almost precisely backwards because the proposals that they consider to represent strength are mostly on paper. Like this non-existent missile. Whereas these treaties actually have an infrastructure for intelligence gathering, for information sharing, for adjudication which actually put the United States in a stronger position both to monitor what other countries are doing and to preserve our superiority across the spectrum of military capabilities. And so to me instead of Al Gore worrying about being soft on defense, to me it is the conservative position that is soft. Basically if you look at the analysis of Joe Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has done, which is on their web site (ceip.org), he does a very convincing analysis that says we are at less threat from foreign missiles today than we were ten years ago, if you look at the reductions of the Russian force, China treading water, the number of countries that have gotten out of the missile business all together, a more realistic assessment of when a country like North Korea might get a useable missile, and the conditions under which they would consider using it against the United States. The threat is probably as low as it has ever been. The only use of missile defense militarily is in the context of intervening against some of the likes of Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong-Il where you don't want them to use a SCUD-like device against your troops. And that is a serious issue that has to be dealt with. But the notion that we need some sort of global floating crap game to deal with missiles is just beyond the pale. It makes no sense in terms of how the world is laying itself out now in the strategic sense. Halloran: If we could move along please. Jonathan Schell. Schell: Yes. I have a question for Frank Gaffney. Obviously one of the chief concerns which we've heard here about defenses is that other countries looking at this overall increase in U.S. capability, if that should turn out to work and be the case would respond by developing offensive arms. Now the originator of the whole Strategic Defense Initiative was Ronald Reagan. He had the idea that if defenses were developed then the offenses could go down to zero, and you would in effect abolish nuclear weapons behind a defensive shield. And Bush has not gone that far, but he did talk about going down to the lowest possible number and something far below what the START talks would yield but he didn't identify a number. But my question would be to Frank Gaffney, does he follow in the footsteps of Ronald Reagan in thinking that the offensive could go down to zero if these defenses are permitted? Or does he want to hold on to offensive nuclear weapons as well? And if so, what kind of a world would that be? Mr. Gaffney: Well, let me address a point which is sort of implicit in that question first, Jonathan. I think that it is worth at least some discussion of whether when you are dealing with countries that in many cases are extremely poor, a missile defense on the part of the United States, which could render their investment in missiles, as Ronald Reagan used to say "impotent and obsolete", may prompt them not to build more missiles but to get out of the game. I think that is at least as likely an outcome as a country deciding "oh the hell with it, we are going to redouble, triple, quadruple our investment in a system and go toe-to-toe with American high technology". If we have a missile defense I think that could, in fact, produce a real curb on proliferation. The kind that despite the endless extolling of the virtues of arms control by people like Bill, it just doesn't measure up. Again, he talks about how the world is laying itself out. How the world is laying itself out is that there are biologic weapons all over the planet despite a biological weapons ban. There are chemical weapons all over the planet despite a chemical weapons ban. There are missiles being proliferated all over the planet. And I have to tell you Joe Cirincione doesn't know what he is talking about. We are in a more dangerous situation today because the countries that we are concerned about which we are not sure that we can deter, and this comes to your question, Jonathan, we are not sure that we can deter with offensive forces. We were, I believe, relatively secure. This was again a contrarian view because the arms controllers were horrified at the impending Armageddon of the cold war, but it was actually a rather stable balance of terror. It was the theory that they like so much now, applied in practice. And at least it seemed to work. I believe that we are at far greater risk today because countries that we may not be able to deter, countries that we cannot figure out exactly what makes them tick, are getting their hands on weapons that they could use against us and if they may for their own reasons decide to do so. I believe for the time being, Jonathan, at least, and it certainly is true. We don't have a missile defense at this point. I believe for the time being at least we need offensive forces. I think that we should have modern offensive forces. I think that they should be as safe and reliable as we can make them, and that is why the Senate of the United States in its wisdom decided to ensure that we had the option to continue testing nuclear weapons, because for the foreseeable future, as the Clinton administration says and I think most other sensible people say, we will need to have a reliable deterrent as well, I hope, as defensive capabilities. Schell: And so you don't buy into the Reagan idea of going to zero nuclear weapons? Mr. Gaffney: Reagan didn't buy into the Reagan idea in anything like the near to medium term. Reagan was thinking about a world far distant and under very different circumstances. If that world arrives I will be among those that will say "hosanna, and let's get rid of our nukes". Halloran: Peter Tautfest. Tautfest: Thank you. My question is to Mr. Gaffney. I wondered whether you could address the issue that the national missile defense system will ultimately not work, the technology is not in place, nor will it ever be? And even if it were in place it could easily be undercut by short range missiles or by terrorist attacks? Mr. Gaffney: Sure. I think it is absolutely certifiable that we can build a missile defense that will destroy not only incoming reentry vehicles but decoys and all manner of other chaff and things intended to ensure that the warheads penetrate. The way that you would do that is anathema to a great many people. It is the way that we decided initially to build a missile defense. It is the way that the Russians currently have their missile defense deployed around Moscow. And there is reason to believe among their surface to air missiles elsewhere around the country. And that is by putting a nuclear weapon on the front end. Now we have tried very hard because for a lot of people, including people who don't want us to test nuclear weapons or have them, the idea of having a missile defense that includes nuclear weaponry is, as I say, anathema. I am not advocating it. I would very much like to have hit-to-kill interceptors with the discrimination capability that would be able with very high reliability, especially using a layered approach, to stop incoming ballistic missiles without having to resort to it. But nobody should be kidding themselves. If we have to, we can absolutely, certifiably destroy incoming ballistic missiles by putting a small nuclear weapon on the front end. And it may come to this. Again, I am quite confident that if a city in this country is destroyed by a ballistic missile, we will build a missile defense. And I believe that the American people will be very happy to have it have nuclear weapons on board if it needs to. But I hope that we don't have to. I hope that the kind of work that we've been doing can proceed. If we have problems with testing we should be redoubling the testing effort. We should be adding to the number of tests that we do. We should not be slowing it down, stretching it out, standing it down. But that is what we are currently doing, and that is part of why we have had a difficult test program that hasn't overcome those difficulties more quickly. Mr. Hartung: I need to speak briefly to that. I don't know if his position is certifiable, but if that is what he believes I think that Mr. Gaffney is certifiable. The idea that the missile defense program is a sort of hobby shop when we are spending over $5 billion this year, more than we are spending on any real system that is being built, when we have spent $70 billion since Reagan gave his speech, when the only system that was ever deployed when his pal, Mr. Rumsfeld, was the Secretary of Defense, was in place for approximately three months before the Pentagon discarded it as useless, and it turned out costing, if you look at how long it was deployed for, $194 million a day. The notion that we just need to do a little more, spend a little more, and jigger it a little more, and if worse comes to worst we will just use nuclear weapons, is evidence of what I've been saying: there is kind of a fixation on this subject given all of the other problems that we have to deal with from terrorism, from regional conflict, from the state of our conventional forces, and the training of our troops, to put this kind of resources into this kind of a system which is directed at a threat that even our own leading intelligence person on this in the U.S. Government says it is the least likely way that nuclear weapons will be delivered to our soil, to me is just crazy. And if you want to see exactly how crazy it is go to the web site of the Coalition To Protect Americans Now, which Mr. Gaffney is some sort of Honorary Chairman. Because if you go there and punch in your zip code you find out that if you are living in Los Angeles that you are supposed to be cowering in the corner because of these non-existent North Korean missiles, that if they are lucky on a good day might reach the outskirts of Hawaii. And so Mr. Halloran should certainly be concerned. And if you are on the East Coast they talk about Iranian missiles that can't even make it out of Europe. And so it is basically this notion that the American public wants to be defended is based on a misinformation campaign. We are defended because no country is going to defend us and be destroyed in return. And dictators are not that hard to figure out. They like to hold power, they like to survive. They can understand that if they were to launch a missile on U.S. soil they will be destroyed. The reason that they are getting those missiles as bargaining chips, as in the case of North Korea, is because they have no friends. The Russians aren't their friends. The Chinese aren't their friends. Their economy is going down the tubes. The only way to get the United States to pay attention to them is to do a missile test. Countries like Iraq want weapons and mass destruction basically to prevent another Desert Storm where they get rolled over by the United States. Now that is a serious concern, but it is not the same as them launching a missile that is going to land in somebody's bathtub in Omaha. And to suggest that it is, is the height of deceptive advertising. And I think that is a lot of what this whole campaign is all about. It is kind of confusing the issues and trying to create a scare campaign which frankly I don't think is going to work. I would be very surprised, and I would say 60/40 that we will not deploy a missile defense of the type that Mr. Gaffney advocates. The question is how much damage we do to our reputation in the world and to the regime of arms control while our politicians and defense officials are going around the world mouthing this crazy doctrine. Which basically I think has people scratching their heads and saying "well, the United States has finally lost it here, they finally kind of turned inward enough that they really don't understand what is going on in the world anymore". Halloran: Marsha Vande Berg. Vande Berg: The problem with being a "V" is that all of the questions get answered by the time that you get to me. I would just make one really quick comment though. In mid April I had an opportunity to interview Secretary Perry. At that time, at least, he said that he had very mixed feelings about NMD, and so I will just put that out. Thank you. Halloran: Jim Wolf. Wolf: Aloha Dick. Frank Gaffney, I would like to follow-up on Mr. Hartung's charge that your Center for Security Policy receives roughly 25% of its annual revenue from corporate sponsors, virtually all of them arms manufacturers. Is that accurate? Mr. Gaffney: No. Wolf: What is the right percentage? Mr. Gaffney: Last year it was about 9% from companies that are involved in aerospace or defense. It has varied from year-to-year, and it has sometimes been as high as I think 10% to 15%. We do receive larger percentages from corporate sponsors, but not all of them are in the defense and aerospace business. But I find this as sort of an unfortunate angle of attack because we could go into the sources of funding for Bill Hartung's operation World Policy Institute. We could go into the sources of funding for the Center. Mr. Hartung: I would be glad to do that. It is on the second page of every report that I put out. I think that you should do the same. Mr. Gaffney: It is absolutely. And some of them Mr. Hartung: I think you should put that list on every report that you put out. Mr. Gaffney: Some of them are foundations that have an extremely radical anti-nuclear agenda. Mr. Hartung: Give me an example. Mr. Gaffney: Ploughshares, for example. Mr. Hartung: Do you consider the MacArthur Foundation, W. Alton Jones . Mr. Gaffney: I would certainly consider the MacArthur Foundation. These are foundations that have a very strong interest in de-nuclearization and in anti military campaigns. And Bill is actively involved in running one, but he is entitled to do that. And anybody who knows me, and I think that Bill in his own way has acknowledged that I am a person who has believed since I worked in the Reagan administration in the principle that the country needs to be defended against an emerging threat. I believed it then, I believed it now, and people who believe as I do have supported me. I don't do what I do, I don't say what I do, and I don't write what I do because somebody gives me money. They give me money because I am doing things that they believe are important, just as people give Bill money because they think that he is doing things that are important. We just happen to disagree as to what is important. And as to the question of what is really the heart of this debate, if you think that it is crazy for people to want to be protected against attack then you subscribe to the sort of group think that has dominated this debate for a decade. If you think that informing the public that that is, in fact, the policy of the United States Government and that they are being less vulnerable largely without their knowledge because of a policy that says that you are better off being vulnerable, then you subscribe to the group think. And you are entitled to subscribe to it. I just happen to think that that is crazy. And we are not trying to scare people, we are trying to educate them about the facts. And if it is, as I believe, the case that China has told the people of Los Angeles that it is prepared to incinerate them if the United States interferes with Taiwan, and China's efforts to coerce it into submission, that is a relevant piece of information not just for the people of Los Angeles but for others around this country. If, as you say, North Korea is using its ability to threaten the United States, an incipient capability but one that I believe is arriving shortly, you will appreciate that what they are getting for that bargaining chip is the largest amount of foreign aid from any country on the planet at the moment from the United States of America. We are rewarding people who are getting these kinds of capabilities and we are doing so because we are not able to say you cannot use that threat to blackmail us or intimidate us. Mr. Hartung: The question isn't "should we be defended?", the question is "why blow billions of dollars on the least likely threat to our national interests?". That is the point. Mr. Gaffney: And the answer is "people attacked us in Pearl Harbor, and we couldn't figure out why they would do it". We thought that we understood dictators. We thought that they wanted to survive. We couldn't imagine that they thought that they could survive a mortal blow against the United States. Mr. Hartung: That was a failure of intelligence, it wasn't a failure of technology. Mr. Gaffney: Bill, they did it because in their judgment it was a sensible thing to do. It was a strategic move that they thought would pay dividends. It was a terrible miscalculation. It cost them a country. And the capability of people capable of making the same kind of miscalculation to do orders of magnitude more damage to us the next time around, with capabilities that I hope you are right that they don't have just yet. That is why I want to build a missile defense, is before they get it, not after. And certainly not after they use it against us. Halloran: As one who lives just within 20 miles of Pearl Harbor, I would love to have this go on but I will cut it off so that we can give Clay Jones of the Christian Science Monitor a chance for a very quick question. Jones: Just one question for Mr. Hartung. If I ask a big "if" question. If there is a hostile nation out there with a reliable missile and a warhead, what defense do you propose? Is it assured destruction, or is it something else? Mr. Hartung: If there is a nation with a warhead and a missile, or a few warheads and a missile, I believe that the likelihood of them launching attack on the continental United States is extremely remote, and that the first line of defense is deterrence, to let them know that they will be obliterated in return for any even threat to these such missiles. But furthermore, you don't have to wait that long. Our current conventional capabilities, as Lee Butler, who Mr. Gaffney cited earlier as a great authority, has pointed out, our conventional capability would be enough to take out the factorie, to destroy their production capability, were it necessary to take those extreme measures. In the meantime, as far as I am concerned if you could spend a few billion dollars as we did in the Nunn Lugar program, and eliminate thousands of real nuclear warheads I think you should do it. He can call this agreement with North Korea "bribery." But if we can push through a verifiable cap on their missile and nuclear programs and the price is a small amount of aid relative to our foreign aid budget much less our national resources for energy resources, why on earth why wouldn't you want to try that? Why would you not want to see that through? Why would you not want to wait and try to provoke them into proceeding with that missile program as Mr. Gaffney seems to want to do? Mr. Gaffney: I know that that is a rhetorical question, but the answer is because we've had hard experience with the North Koreans that they do not honor agreements. And they will not honor this one I believe any more than they've honored the last. Mr. Hartung: We are not giving them a good conduct medal. We are trying to figure out whether they can hurt us. And at the moment they can't hurt us. Mr. Gaffney: We are rewarding them for building capabilities with which to threaten us. Mr. Hartung: Fine, give them a bad report card, but don't send the foreign policy down the tubes. Mr. Gaffney: Let me answer your question. Far from flushing foreign policy down the tubes, I am hoping that we will have a foreign policy that people can have confidence in and that will be sufficient to protect both us and our allies, especially in situations like you yourself have indicated we may have to deal with in the future where somebody, for whatever reason, decides to initiate an attack. Whether it is Sudan Hussein, the North Koreans, or somebody else. Not necessarily against us but against our forces overseas or our allies. Under those circumstances we agree that we have to have a missile defense, I think. We agree, I believe, that it would be very nice if we could get these guys to simply go away. If we could take out their base of control of their population, that would be very nice. It would be very nice if the moon were made out of blue cheese. Mr. Hartung: Yes, but you are talking about theatre defense and not national defense. Mr. Gaffney: The world in which we live today is a world in which I believe arms control has failed dismally to prevent bad things from happening and bad guys from getting the capability to make worse things from happening. And to continue to invest in it as though "well the next agreement will work better" or "if we just try harder". Or more to the point and I listen to you talking about nuclear deterrence and it makes me laugh. You and many of your friends are the people who are actively promoting getting rid of our nuclear arms . But the point is that in this instance you have to have as credible a deterrent against people that you can deter, and you had better damn well be building an insurance policy against people you may not be able to deter. There is an increasing number of those in the world in which we live, and I encourage you to get out in it and see it, Bill. Mr. Hartung: I will gladly put the last thirty years of arms control, starting with the ABM Treaty which was negotiated by Richard Nixon, with the START agreements that Ronald Reagan put together, and you show me how thirty years of wasting money on missile defense has accomplished more than thirty years of arms control, much of which was put together by Republican administrations which you alleged to have supported.
Halloran:
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