Global Beat: GRN Publications--Now What?: U.S. Policy After The Bombing

Global Reporting Network Publications Now What?: U.S. Policy After The Bombing Global Beat Issue Brief No. 48 By Robert A. Manning, Global Beat Issue Brief No. 48, January 11, 1999 Now that Saddam Hussein has upped the ante by challenging the "no-fly" zones over portions of Iraq, it is time to ponder the predicament facing Clinton administration in the aftermath of the December Iraq strikes. In hindsight, the recent limited air strikes appear to have been Bill Clinton's attempt to prove he's no Charlie Brown. Every fall, the Peanuts cartoon features that mean old Lucy promising that this time she will not pull the football away at the last moment when gullible Charlie Brown tries to kick it. After Saddam's countless promises to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors, each time, failing, and managing to conceal his deadly weapons, as Clinton said, "Iraq has abused its final chance." In his remarks announcing the bombing, Clinton clearly was determined not to be made a fool of again: If the U.S. turned its back, Clinton explained, "the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed." Indeed. What the administration's use of military force did manage to accomplish -- even the oddly Clintonian antiseptic, cruise missiles mini- strikes variety -- was introduce a new unpredictability into what in many respects had been a "spin loudly and carry a wet noodle" foreign policy: It is possible that even Clinton will use military force if pushed too far. After a parade of idle threats made against Saddam, Serbia's Milosovic, and the North Koreans, demonstrating a seriousness about weapons proliferation is likely to have policy dividends for the U.S. beyond Iraq. That said, however, some large questions remains. What's next for U.S. policy in the Gulf? Will Saddam's new provocations and Russian, Chinese, and French opposition to the US/British strikes lead to an erosion of U.N. sanctions? Are we better off without even an ineffective UNSCOM, and will the strikes plus recent allegations of U.S. intelligence involvement in UNSCOM spell the end of UN inspections? The unfortunate reality is that there has been a lack of candor on both sides of the Iraq debate. The administration argues that Saddam's track record, lingering ambitions, and determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the U.S. and to the stability of a vital region. But the administration, fearing conservative criticism, has, until recently, been afraid to reveal the core assumption behind its policy: the best we can do is a kind of "containment plus" of Saddam. Like the limited strikes, "hard liners," view this as an unwise half- measures. In their view, U.S. policy must be to get rid of Saddam soon and help foster a new, more democratic regime in Baghdad. In an unusually candid statement, Clinton's National Security Advisor Sandy Berger revealed the administration's point of view. "The only sure way for us to effect his departure now," Berger argued in an important yet barely noticed Dec. 23 policy speech, "would be to commit hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight on the ground inside Iraq. I do not believe that the costs of such a campaign would be sustainable at home or abroad. And the reward of success would be an American military occupation that could last years." For their part, "hard liners" have been shy about acknowledging the risks such a course would entail. Obviously, ridding the world of Saddam's regime is a noble goal. But the various schemes that have been suggested -- backing Kurds in the north, and Shia Muslims in the South, creating sanctuaries supported with U.S. air power, perhaps even committing a small ground force -- are unrealistic and raise a host of new dangers. Like many colonial-engineered states, Iraq is an artificial creation of half a dozen British Arabists after World War I. In a volatile region, maintaining its territorial integrity is a U.S. policy goal, lest we unleash destabilizing forces. You might get lucky, but that can not be the basis for a policy. Berger accurately summed up the risks that a pro-active policy to get rid of Saddam now must address forthrightly. Berger dismissed such an approach as "not a strategy." But if one is willing to pay that price, removal may be a valid option. The question should be the topic of a national debate. The administration may have the better argument: That political realities mean that "containment plus" is the best the international community can do under the circumstances. But it may also be an effort at time buying that could backfire. Saddam has played a bad hand exceedingly well. Could there be a larger risk that sanctions could erode as the administration's approach plays out? So long as Saddam lacks control over his oil revenues, he is indeed, in a box. But if he breaks out, if he manages to obtain the fissile material for his nuclear weapons, is that a danger we can live with? At the end of the day, these are questions of political judgment. But the stakes involved suggest that rather than spin and cheap rhetoric, the national interest - and that of the international community - would be well served by a thoughtful national conversation on U.S. policy in the Gulf. * Robert A. Manning, a former State Dept. Advisor for Policy (1989-93) is a Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Note: This article was published by the Washington Times and is available to subscribers of the Knight Ridder Tribune News Service. Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | Experts Directory | Links Directory | About the GRN |