Introduction On January 1, 1999 eleven European Union (EU) states are scheduled to form the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and begin a three year process of replacing their national currencies with a common currency, the "euro." EMU is both the continuation of a half century long process of European economic and political integration and an effort to complete the single European market begun in the 1980's. It is also a unique undertaking with wide ranging and unforeseen implications and consequences both within and outside Europe. EMU and the euro represent the most ambitious regional economic union ever attempted. If EMU is sustained effectively over time, it will likely provide considerable stimulus to economic growth and competitiveness within those EU states that enter it, and enhance Europe's overall global economic position. The euro itself could also become an international reserve currency and a competitor to the dollar. One of the most critical issues is the relationship between EMU and structural economic reform in Europe. It remains unclear whether EMU will serve as a stimulus for such reforms, as its proponents maintain, or a diversion from them, as its opponents argue. A successful euro should strengthen transatlantic trade and investment and may encourage greater European foreign and security policy assertiveness and intergovernmental coordination. What follows is a brief overview of some key issues and implications raised by the euro and EMU on the eve of their planned start in May 1998, when EMU participants will be announced and their exchange rates with each other permanently fixed. First, the primer outlines the primary goals and the overall timetable for EMU. It then addresses a series of questions in four thematic areas, as follows:
1) What are the primary goals and planned timetable for EMU? The principal goal of EMU is to establish a single European currency called the euro which will replace the national currencies of those EU states that join it. At this writing it appears that eleven of the fifteen EU countries will join EMU in 1998-99: Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The other four EU states, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Greece, will not be joining EMU in 1998 (see questions 9 and 10). Both the European Commission and the European Monetary Institute will release reports on March 25, 1998, recommending which EU countries are qualified to enter EMU on the basis of the economic criteria contained in what is known as the stability and growth pact. The stability pact includes stringent economic requirements dealing with public deficits and debts, inflation rates and exchange rates. EMU has three stages. The first stage of EMU is the formal naming of which countries qualify to enter it. The second stage of EMU is the permanent fixing of exchange rates for EMU participants; exchange rates with non-participating countries will be announced later. The third stage of EMU is the introduction of euro notes and coins, which will probably begin on January 1, 2002. Both the first and second stages are scheduled to take place during a special EU summit on EMU in Brussels on May 2, 1998. The fixing of bilateral exchange rates for EMU states was previously planned for January 1999 but was moved up to May 1998 in order to prevent instability and currency speculation during the period between May and December 1998. The new European Central Bank (ECB), which will be at the heart of EMU, will come into being in June 1998 following the appointment of its executive board during the May summit in Brussels. The ECB will set monetary policy and interest rates for the entire "euro-zone," which refers to all countries in EMU. Beginning on January 1, 1999 the euro will exist as a banking currency; paper financial transactions between the ECB and commercial banks and foreign exchanges will be made in euros; and the euro will be compared to the dollar and yen on international currency markets. A three year transition phase will follow until euro notes and coins enter circulation in 2002. From July 1, 2002 only euros will be legal tender for EMU participants; national currencies will cease to exist from this date. Businesses are already beginning the process of transition from national currencies to euros, and governments are mounting public education campaigns.
I. Macro-Economic Impacts 2) Now that it is virtually certain that the EMU project will begin in 1999 as planned, what are the prospects for the euro's economic success? How can the euro's success be measured or assessed? Many economists in Europe and the U.S. are concerned that the drive for monetary union has contributed to the current economic slowdown in Europe. Budget austerity, for example, contributes to unemployment and makes it more difficult for Europeans to purchase American goods. However, European officials maintain that monetary union is encouraging EU states to make some of the painful economic choices which would need to be made in any case, but which are made more urgent by EMU. The generally presumed minimum requirements for a successful euro are: a European Central Bank that maintains strong anti-inflationary policies; budget discipline among member states; and more progress in reforming structural economic problems within EU states, such as labor market rigidity, corporatist relationships between business, government and labor, and expensive social welfare systems. EMU will also require that all participant states have a single monetary policy and interest rate, both of which may be difficult to sustain over time. Overall economic conditions in Europe will also shape the euro's near-term success, strength and credibility. These are generally favorable in all of the countries planning on entering EMU in 1999, with the important exception of high unemployment and structural unemployment across much of Europe. Difficulties may also arise as a result of significant variations in the economic strategies of these eleven countries when the ECB is setting one monetary and exchange rate policy for the entire euro-zone.
3) Is a successful euro likely to increase Europe's overall economic competitiveness compared that of the U.S. and Asia? In the event that EMU proceeds smoothly and the euro is introduced as planned, it is very likely that a successful euro will significantly increase Europe's competitiveness vis-a-vis the U.S. and Asia, especially if a successful euro promotes greater efforts to remove structural economic rigidities. Indeed, some economists argue that EMU can not be successful without major structural reform. All this would make Europe a more attractive trading partner and investment market. Europe's future competitiveness under a euro will also be affected by the relative value of the euro vis a vis the dollar and other currencies.
4) Is the euro likely to be a "hard" or "soft" currency? It is difficult to estimate whether the euro will be a "hard" or "soft" currency (which refers to its relative external value, or strength or weakness on international currency markets), but some observers predict that at least initially the euro will be a soft currency because of the positive impact a softer euro would have on EU trade with non-EU states. Others point out that the economic convergence criteria in the stability pact are intended to reassure markets and publics that the euro will be a relatively hard currency. Some also argue that the large currency reserves of EU member states and other factors may in themselves lead to a harder euro. Overall, the euro's strength will be determined by economic conditions within EMU states, EMU interest rate expectations and the credibility and priories of the ECB (see also question 15).
5) How is the euro likely to impact the world financial system? Does the euro project increase the potential for future international financial crises? EMU and the introduction of the euro will constitute the most important change in the global financial system since the late 1970s, when governments adopted flexible exchange rates. It is likely that the euro will become an international reserve currency given the combined size, strength, and foreign trade of the economies of EMU participants. A stable and successful euro may thus lead to major shifts in international investment from dollars to euros. However, EMU states will probably need to deregulate their capital markets to stimulate investment, growth and innovation during the euro transition period. The risk that EMU and the introduction of the euro could lead to regional or global financial crises is dependent primarily on how EMU states and the ECB manage this project from the start. If market investors perceive that the ECB is being subjected to political pressure, this could lead to currency speculation and increase the risks of financial crises. Overall, the principal determinant of market confidence in the euro will be the credibility of the ECB's commitment to maintain anti-inflationary policies. In addition, avoidance of financial crises will necessitate what C. Fred Bergsten referred to in the July/August 1997 issue of Foreign Affairs as "a quantum jump in transatlantic cooperation" in order "to handle both the transition to the new regime and its longer term prospects."
II. Intra-European Economics 6) What are the economic benefits and costs of EMU for the eleven EU member states that are expected to join EMU this year? The principal expected benefit of EMU is the lowering and simplification of transaction costs associated with currency conversion. This benefit would accrue to individuals, businesses, and banks, and should stimulate increased intra-European trade. Other potential benefits include eliminating exchange rate risk, facilitation of price comparison, and stimulation of cross-border competition, especially in financial markets. Increased market competition will also lead to a process of economic rationalization, however, in which certain countries, regions, and companies may well gain or lose compared to pre-euro conditions. The main cost is that each participant state loses the ability to use monetary and exchange rate policy on a national level to adjust to economic shocks. Countries in EMU would no longer be able to devalue their currencies to stimulate their economies. Moreover, fiscal policies would also be limited by the need to adhere to EMU's strict requirement of low budget deficits. Under the stability pact, a country that failed to adhere to these strict economic requirements would be subject to extremely large penalties.
7) Will a successful euro lead over time to harmonization of tax, fiscal and social policies to complement the monetary convergence of EMU? Many economists argue that EMU will require the harmonization of tax and social policies among participant member states. This is because without uniformity among EMU states with respect to taxes and social policies, there will be strong incentives for businesses to move to those countries with the lowest taxes and the least generous social benefits. The expected direction of tax and social policy harmonization is toward more structural reform, i.e., less government regulation and possibly reductions in worker benefits, which could produce social and economic tensions within EMU states. With respect to fiscal policies, the need to adhere to the stability pact requirements should increase the potential for convergence. Conversely, those who are against the euro because they see it as the wrong solution to Europe's economic problems argue that the lack of convergence in these areas will lead to financial crises and social unrest.
8) How might the EMU affect labor market flexibility in Europe? Labor market rigidities are primarily caused by corporatist structures and social welfare policies. Most EU states currently have low labor mobility, high structural unemployment, and relatively low wage flexibility. Proponents of EMU argue that it will encourage states to make the reforms needed to produce greater labor market flexibility. Similarly, European organized labor generally supports EMU and many labor leaders hope it will lead to European-wide collective bargaining and a stronger framework of good employment practices at the EU level. In addition, the need for labor market mobility should be mitigated by the absence of national currency shocks under EMU, and some economists argue that labor market flexibility is not a necessary precondition for economic growth. EMU critics such as Martin Feldstein maintain that EMU is a diversion from the structural reforms they see as a more significant determinant of Europe's economic future.
9) How has the prospect of EMU membership affected economic reform among current and prospective EU member states? The prospect of EMU membership has served as a catalyst for further economic reform among both current EU member states and EU applicants from Central and Eastern Europe. The most dramatic case within the EU is Italy, which in the last couple of years has made significant progress in reforming its welfare state and corporatist structures and reducing its public debts and deficits in order to prepare itself for EMU. Greece has also begun reforming its economy, and the drachma was admitted to the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) in March 1998 as a possible prelude to EMU membership. Greece will not join in the first round because it does not yet meet the economic criteria. In Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as well as in Estonia and Cyprus, prospective EU membership has also furthered extensive economic and social reforms, but analysts predict that these states would not be ready for EMU for at least ten years. This is also the case among the economies of other, longer-term EU aspirants, such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia.
10) How might not being in EMU affect the economies of those states that do not join? There will be strong pressures on EU countries that choose not to enter EMU in 1998, namely Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, to enter at some point. Such pressures will come from the fact that countries within the EMU or euro-zone will have strong incentives to trade more with each other, while countries outside of EMU will not have the benefits of such increased intra-EU trade. In addition, countries that do not join EMU will likely lose political influence within the EU. (See also question 16 below.)
III. Domestic and Intra-European Politics: 11) What is the present state of European public opinion on EMU? How do the views of European citizens differ from those of European elites, especially political and business leaders? How, in particular, do the German public and elites view EMU? According to the most recent Eurobarometer public opinion polls, support for the euro among EU citizens returned to above the 50% level in late 1997, after having dropping to 47% in early 1997. Opposition to the euro declined to below 40%. Between 1993-1996 support for the euro varied between 51-54%, and opposition ranged between 35-40%. Overall, government and businesses leaders within EU states are more supportive of the euro than the public because businessmen stand to gain the most immediate financial advantage from the euro, and politicians have invested great political capital in the project. German views on the euro have received considerable attention because approximately 60% of Germans do not want to give up the mark. However, overall support for the euro also increased in Germany in 1997 (from 32% to 40% between spring and autumn). In addition, not only is EMU viewed as Chancellor Kohl's project but most German political and business leaders strongly favor the euro. Prominent skeptics, however, include: Hans Tietmeyer, the head of the Bundesbank who is concerned about the ability of EMU countries to maintain the stability pact requirements over time; Edmund Stoiber, the Premier of Bavaria, who calls the euro "Esperanto money;" and Kurt Bidenkopf, the Premier of Eastern Saxony, who urged a delay of EMU on March 20, 1998. In addition, four academics filed a petition against the euro with Germany's highest court in January 1998, and a group of over 150 prominent economists sent a letter to the London Financial Times in February 1998 calling for the euro's postponement until the proper economic conditions are in place.
12) Is the euro project likely to increase Europe's democratic deficit? European integration since its origins in the 1940's has been "built from above," to a great extent, e.g., by politicians and bureaucrats rather than by citizens initiatives or interest. In the years since the Maastricht Treaty which paved the way for monetary union, some Europeans have questioned this approach, which they perceive, among other things, to lead to an excessive focus on fiscal and monetary policies to the neglect of employment policies. Critics such as British politician Michael Portillo state that the advent of monetary union greatly increases this democratic deficit vis a vis policy decisions. In an essay in the spring 1998 issue of the National Interest, Portillo argues that democracy has been the key factor shaping Europe's prosperity and security and that European integration in the form of EMU will further reduce democratic control because European electorates will not be able to vote on important aspects of the economic management of their own country. Further, as Timothy Garton Ash writes in the March/April 1998 issue of Foreign Affairs: "The minimal trust and solidarity between citizens that is the fragile treasure of the democratic nation-state does not, alas, yet exist between the citizens of Europe. For there is no European demos--only a European telos."
13) Is EMU likely to lead to some form of European political union? European political union, especially of a federal variety as in a United States of Europe, has always been one of the most controversial issues in the European integration debate. Critics of EMU often oppose it as a political project disguised as an economic one, likely designed to reduce or eliminate national sovereignty. Many proponents of EMU agree, stressing that monetary union is indeed a political undertaking intended to lead to the eventual establishment of a European political union. The functionalist logic of European integration holds that there is a spillover effect in one area of European integration into other areas. Proponents of political union argue that a common currency will lead to a common identity and that the need for fiscal policy coordination and greater democratic accountability will encourage the creation of political union. Overall, however, there is a virtual consensus among European observers that at least in the short-term the EU is not likely to establish a federal political entity even if the euro is completely successful. It is also quite possible that even a long-term successful EMU will not necessarily lead to political union and an autonomous military entity. The more likely scenario is greater economic policy coordination coupled with a continuation of the largely intergovernmental approach to certain policy areas, especially foreign and security policies.
14) How will EMU affect the EU's planned enlargement? Since the late 1980's some governments such as Britain's, have favored concentrating on "widening" the EU to include new members states, while others, especially France and Germany, argued for "deepening" the current EU institutional structure and delaying enlargement to the east. At the Maastricht summit in 1991, Germany essentially consented to the French goal of emphasizing deepening the EU through monetary union in exchange for France's acceptance of a unified Germany. The principal current obstacles to enlargement concern reforms of the EU's institutions and budget, especially reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural aid or assistance to poorer regions within existing EU states. While most member states and EU citizens favor enlargement in principal, no country wishes to increase its EU budget payments, so payments to farmers and poorer regions within existing EU members would have to be decreased in order to admit the new members. With respect to the CAP, a complicating factor is the fact that many of the prospective EU members are countries with large agricultural sectors. On March 18, 1998 the European Commission unveiled plans to reform the CAP and structural aid based on an Agenda 2000 plan for transfer payments to the prospective EU states announced in July 1997, but implementation of these reforms remains uncertain. Accession negotiations are set to begin on March 31, 1998 with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus, but EU enlargement is a process which could take decades to complete. The possible second wave of EU entrants includes Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. Sometime in the 21st century, the EU may have thirty or more members.
15) Who is likely to head the new European Central Bank, and what role will it play in managing EMU? A European Central Bank (ECB), modeled after the German Bundesbank which has a strong reputation for independence, will begin operations in June 1998 in Frankfurt. The ECB will head a system of European central banks and will control EMU monetary policy and interest rates. National central banks of EMU participants will implement the monetary policy decisions taken by the ECB's leaders; the central banks will also be responsible for printing euro notes and minting euro coins. Until France proposed in November 1997 that Jean-Claude Trichet should head the ECB, it was generally accepted that Wim Duisenberg, who is currently head of the ECB's forerunner, the European Monetary Institute, would hold the position. An additional debate surrounding the ECB concerns France's promotion of what it calls "economic government" to enable some national political influence on EMU monetary policy, as a counterweight to the wide ranging economic power of the ECB. Others, especially in Germany, are concerned that this will lead to the ECB's independence being compromised and to a weaker currency.
16) How will the euro-zone council known as euro-x affect relations between those EU states that joint EMU and those that do not? Will the euro-zone expand? In autumn 1997 the eleven countries which are expected to comprise the first round of EMU membership decided to establish a euro-zone council, known as euro-x, which will provide a forum for policy coordination and consultation of EMU states. Euro-x is in part a response to France's interest in ensuring that governments have a say in shaping monetary policies. There are concerns among those EU countries that are not joining EMU in 1999 (Britain, Denmark, and Sweden out of choice and Greece for not yet meeting the economic criteria) that euro-x will lead to their marginalization. Those states that enter EMU are called "ins," while those that do not join are called "outs." Britain argued in late 1997 in favor of being admitted into euro-x, but was rebuffed by the planned EMU members whose governments maintained that Britain could not join euro-x unless it entered EMU. Since any EU country that meets the stability pact economic criteria and wants to enter can enter EMU, it is likely that the euro-zone will expand over time. Greece is continuing its economic reforms and may enter in a few years. In Sweden and Denmark there is an ongoing debate about EMU which could move in the direction of joining monetary union at some point, especially if the euro is successful. (The British case is discussed in question 18, and EU applicant countries are discussed in question 9.)
17) How will EMU affect German's dominant role in the EU and the future of Franco-German relations? Since the end of World War II, Franco-German reconciliation has served as the "motor" or "engine" for European economic and political integration. Since the end of the Cold War, German unification and Germany's new position in Europe caused considerable strains in this unique bilateral relationship. Just as France and Germany have been the two most important architects of European integration since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community and the original EEC, it was primarily German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand who designed the monetary union established in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. Throughout the period since the end of the Cold War, French governments have maintained a strong franc policy even at a high cost in terms of higher interest rates and sustained unemployment. After the Socialist-led coalition won the legislative elections of June 1997 and Lionel Jospin became French Prime Minister, strains in the Franco-German relationship, particularly over EMU, became quite evident. Jospin had previously questioned the stability pact and its neglect of employment issues, but once in power he modified his stance, and EMU was put back on track by French and German leaders. An additional factor which helped revive EMU in the summer and fall of 1997 was the improving economic situation in Europe, especially with respect to exports. It is also likely that France and Germany will be the key actors within EMU and euro-x, on whose future rides the success of the whole European project. The German elections scheduled for September 1998 could lead to uncertainties in Franco-German relations, particularly if Chancellor Kohl is not re-elected.
18) Will Britain ever join the EMU? Can Britain be a leading player in Europe without joining EMU? British euro-skepticism is rooted in a combination of historical and cultural factors which cause the British to be more concerned about supra-nationalism and loss of sovereignty to the EU than other Europeans -- although these concerns do exist elsewhere within the EU. As a result, Britain's role in Europe has generally been a difficult and sometimes awkward one, and Britain only joined the European Economic Community in 1973. Britain's perspective on EMU is further shaped by its experience in 1992 when the pound was forced out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) because of currency speculation that led to a run on the pound. Some analysts in Britain also associate Britain's recent economic success in part to its absence from the ERM, although other factors are widely cited as well. Britain's EU allies have often been frustrated by what they perceive as British insularity on European matters. Immediately upon his arrival in office on May 2, 1997, Tony Blair set about trying to repair damage done to British-EU relations during the Thatcher and Major years (1979-1997). Blair, who is trying to restore Britain to a "leading role in a Europe of independent states," has taken a positive and cooperative stance toward Europe. However, the goal of increasing Britain's role in Europe is hampered by Britain's absence from initial EMU membership. In October 1997 British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown issued a statement indicating that Britain supports EMU but will not join it during the term of the current government. Brown and Blair argue that the British economy is not sufficiently convergent with those of continental Europe for Britain to join in the near future, and that much greater convergence will be required before Britain is ready to enter EMU. William Hague, the Tory party leader, has softened his stance on EMU several times since Brown's announcement, which is a sign of the continuing struggle over the European issue and EMU within the Conservative party. Ironically, since Britain currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU, Prime Minister Tony Blair will preside over the special EMU summit on May 1-3, 1998. Some European officials and observers argue that this will cause Britain to lose political and economic influence in Europe. For example, on March 22, 1998 French Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn said: "In my opinion the only way to be a leading country in Europe is to belong to the euro-zone."
IV. Transatlantic Politics and Economics 19) What is the U.S. government view of EMU? Officially, the Clinton administration supports EMU. In the words of Daniel Tarullo, Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy, the administration's premise is that it has "great interest in a strong Europe. To the extent that EMU helps this, we're in favor." But some officials have expressed reservations. Lawrence Summers, Deputy Treasury Secretary, has cautioned that EMU needs to "be a spur to structural change rather than a diversion from it. It's important that Europe not paper over internal conflict through external measures, or by using a weak currency as a competitive advantage." The administration favors the euro especially for its likely beneficial impact on the economies of EU states and transatlantic trade and investment. But if the euro does become a rival to the dollar, any U.S. government is likely to be concerned that America's dominant global role could be threatened by such a development. In addition, some administration officials have questioned whether Europe may become more insular because of its focus on EMU.
20) How will the Euro affect transatlantic economic relations? If the euro is successful, it should serve as a catalyst for increased U.S.-EU trade. The euro might facilitate transatlantic trade negotiations and make the EU a stronger trading partner and American ally in multilateral trade negotiations because of the potential for heightened U.S.-EU trade and investment. In March 1998 the U.S. and the EU reached agreement on a New Transatlantic Marketplace agreement which seeks to remove all industrial tariffs and barriers by 2010. However, the U.S. and the EU still face important transatlantic differences over such trade and agricultural trade issues as farm subsidies, the EU ban on hormone-treated meat, EU banana imports, and intellectual property rights.
21) How will the euro affect American business and investment and American consumers? A stable and successful euro should generate increased American business with and investment in Europe. According to press reports, some very large companies do not expect to see large effects from the euro, whereas some small and medium companies, especially in the financial services sector, expect significant gains. The combination of reduced transaction costs and greater transparency should have a broadly beneficial impact. However, as with any increased competition, some American companies will be adversely affected by the euro. If the euro is a relatively soft currency, this will lead to increased European exports to the U.S. which would hurt American exporters but lower prices for American consumers. In addition, American travelers to Europe would gain from a stronger dollar and weaker euro, and lose from the reverse situation.
22) How will the Euro affect the Atlantic partnership as a whole? How the euro will impact the transatlantic relationship as a whole is dependent primarily on whether the new currency is stable and successful, how it performs over time, and how it affects intra-European politics. If there are significant problems in establishing EMU, both transatlantic trade and political ties would probably suffer. Martin Feldstein, for example, argues that EMU will lead to regional conflicts and instability in Europe as well as a deterioration of the Atlantic partnership. If things go relatively smoothly with respect to the euro, the Atlantic relationship should remain fundamentally solid. But the fundamental nature of the political and economic changes within Europe resulting from EMU, and the many unforeseen circumstances which could arise, suggest that significantly increased consultation and coordination between the EU and the U.S. will be necessary.
23) Will a successful euro lead to greater European foreign and security policy assertiveness? Could it increase the prospects for a more effective EU CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and CDP (Common Defense Policy)? One would expect that a successful EMU will strengthen overall foreign and security policy coordination as well as the foreign and security policy assertiveness of those EU states that enter EMU. This may eventually include a more effective CFSP and the formation of a CDP, which are both essentially intergovernmental forms of policy coordination. Most observers do not expect in the short to medium term, if not longer, that EU states will create a federal political union or establish the EU as a unified military and foreign policy actor. EU states that are also NATO members (all EU members except Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) have indicated that their intention is to develop a European defense and security identity (ESDI) within the NATO framework and in cooperation with the U.S. Security analysts such as John Newhouse and Phillip Gordon argue that EU states have not developed the political will or military capabilities that would be required for a greater European role in world politics. Probably the most significant possible development for the medium term would be the enhancement of Europe's role in NATO, which is often referred to as NATO's European pillar, through greater French military participation in NATO, planning and coordination between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), and enhanced European armaments cooperation.
About the Author: Louis R. Golino is a Senior Public Affairs/Information Specialist with the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. He specializes in EU/NATO political, economic and military issues. He is currently a contributor to the Tocqueville Connection: The Insider's Web Source for French News and Analyses at www.adetocqueville.com, a reporter for the Library of Congress Gazette and a consultant for MSNBC and New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media. These are his own views and do not reflect the views of CRS, the Library of Congress or any of his other affiliations. Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
