Ancient China's famed strategist, Sun Tzu cautioned leaders of his day to take pains to avoid miscalculating the capabilities or intentions of potential adversaries lest disaster strike: "If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." In contrast, modern China's revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, brushed aside that warning: "All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful." Today, American defense officials are debating whether their Chinese counterparts will, in effect, heed Sun or Mao. Underlying the deliberations is a fear that the Chinese might miscalculate in thinking they could prevail over the armed forces of the United States in a regional conflict in Asia. Leading one school is Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, who commands U.S. forces in the Pacific; he says Chinese military leaders are "smart, pragmatic" officers who understand that the Peoples Liberation Army does not compare with U.S. forces "in any way." Influential Pentagon analysts, however, assert that Chinese leaders hold "dangerous misperceptions that may well cause serious political friction or even military conflict with the United States." For now, the argument appears tilted toward Admiral Prueher's point of view. The Chinese have not beaten the war drums for more than a year. Little at the recent National People's Congress suggested that China's leaders were eager to confront the U.S. even though sizable American naval forces have been shifted from the Pacific to the Arabian Sea in the dispute with Iraq. Indeed, the Far Eastern Economic Review has reported that Chinese leaders sought to please Washington by telling visiting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in mid-February that Beijing would no longer sell missiles to Islamabad. President Clinton, who plans to visit China within a few months, has given top priority to slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, a senior State Department official has told Congress that the Chinese were secretly negotiating with Iran to sell chemicals to enhance uranium so that it could be used for nuclear weapons. Only after strong U.S. protests did Beijing appear to halt the deal. None of this means, however, that the Chinese have retreated from their long-term ambition of making the PLA a world-class force and persuading or forcing the U.S. to withdraw from Asia. Two top generals, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, told the National People's Congress that a plan to dismiss 500,000 troops in favor of a more modern force would proceed on schedule over the next three years. Zhang said the PLA would "persevere in strengthening the army through the use of science and technology" while Chi pledged that officers "be qualified politically, competent militarily, sound in their style of work, well-disciplined, and assured of adequate logistical support." The American debate over China's strategic calculus appears to have begun two years ago after the Chinese conducted land, sea, and air maneuvers, plus missile firings, on the shores opposite the island of Taiwan, which Beijing considers to be a breakaway province. The U.S., which insists that the Taiwan question be resolved peacefully, dispatched two aircraft carriers to the waters east of Taiwan while the State Department sent vigorous warnings to Beijing. The Chinese backed down, partly because they lacked sufficient amphibious transport to cross the Taiwan Strait. Even so, General Chi stunned American officers in December 1996 by delivering what many considered to be a bellicose speech at the National Defense University in Washington. Since then, Americans have sought to dissuade the Chinese from miscalculating. General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cautioned PLA officers In Beijing in May 1997 that the Taiwan crisis might have had "unpredictable consequences." Three times he urged them to seek ways to "lessen the chances for miscalculation." Admiral Prueher told a similar audience in December that Sino-American military exchanges would "reduce the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation." Most recently, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen told the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing that the U.S. was open about its armed might because it served American interests. "Allowing others to see our peaceful intentions and our military capability," he said, "helps to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation resulting from either unfounded fear or misinformed folly." A critical element in the U.S. effort has been inviting more than 200 Chinese senior defense officials and military officers to see American soldiers drive tanks and fire their guns with stunning accuracy, aviators fly jet fighters in tight formations and hit simulated targets with precision, and sailors operate high-tech sensors that can detect and lock on to distant targets at sea. "I think," Admiral Prueher concluded in an interview at his headquarters in Hawaii, "the Chinese....understand the strength of our military forces." Analysts in the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment aren't so sure. In a report entitled "Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions," they pointed to a Chinese belief that the U.S. is a declining power and China is poised to leap frog over the U.S. as both strive to build technologically advanced armed forces. Those analysts, a small cluster who have access to all U.S. intelligence and report directly to the Secretary of Defense, argued that the Chinese believe weaker powers can often defeat stronger powers. Their report, disclosed by the Washington Post in mid-February, expressed concern that the Chinese think Americans lack the will to fight, which could contribute to a Beijing decision to attack Taiwan. Chinese military officers said the outlook of fellow officers depended on their generation. The old soldiers who fought alongside Mao against the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists have faded away. The PLA today is led by a Korean War generation that has done battle against the U.S., South Korea, India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, and has known defeat. Many have traveled abroad and seen other armies. In contrast, the young colonels who will lead the PLA in the 21st Century have not fought, have rarely gone abroad, and are considered by many Chinese and Westerners to be highly nationalistic and narrow-minded even as they recognize U.S. technological superiority. The U.S. is anxious to make contact with them but has so far been blocked by the Chinese high command for reasons unclear. *Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times in Asia and Washington, writes about Asia from Honolulu. He is a consultant to the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, and a regular contributor to the Global Beat. For reprint rights, please contact him at tel: 808-395-0511, fax 808-396-4095, or e-mail: oranhall@compuserve.com Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
