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Atomic Diplomacy at the Clinton-Jiang Summit Jennifer Weeks, October 1997 Global Beat Issue Brief No. 22 On October 29, President Jiang Zemin is scheduled to arrive in Washington for the first state visit by a Chinese leader in eight years. As a prominent symbol of President Clinton's policy of "strategic engagement" with China, the summit is sure to prove controversial. Critics charge that the policy amounts to an uncritical embrace, and the administration is under pressure to show results at the summit on trade, human rights, and other problem issues. One US-China topic that has received only sporadic attention, nuclear proliferation, is likely to be a centerpiece of the October meeting. During Jiang's visit Clinton may announce that he plans to certify to Congress that China's nuclear arms control policies have improved sufficiently for the United States to begin selling nuclear reactors and fuel to China. U.S. officials are looking for an issue on which they can announce tangible progress with China at the summit, and have spoken optimistically about China's progress in the nuclear area. U.S. and Chinese officials are negotiating intensively in an effort to make certification possible by the time of Jiang's visit. Background China has been a nuclear weapon state since 1964, but is a latecomer to arms control. It rejected the concept of nonproliferation for several decades, and supplied materials, technology, and expertise to clandestine nuclear weapons programs in countries including Pakistan, Argentina, and South Africa. Since the early 1980s, China has gradually shifted from international isolation to engagement, and has softened its criticisms of arms control. Recently, it has signed or endorsed a number of international treaties and agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China also helped promote the 1994 agreement under which North Korea agreed to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, and is participating in negotiations toward a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula. But China has not fully embraced arms control, and this issue still causes friction between Washington and Beijing. Chinese exports, particularly to Pakistan and Iran, are widely perceived in the U.S. to be a major problem; Pakistan is capable of assembling a small nuclear arsenal; Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. China imposed export controls on nuclear weapon-related goods only last month. The Clinton administration has been working for several years to persuade China to stop supporting clandestine nuclear weapons programs and to develop effective export controls. As a positive incentive, President Clinton is considering implementing an agreement for peaceful nuclear trade with China, which was negotiated by the Reagan administration in 1985 but has been suspended since that time for lack of presidential certification that China has an adequate nonproliferation policy. A Summit Decision? As the summit approaches, the U.S. nuclear industry is lobbying hard for the Clinton Administration to certify China, and to implement the agreement. Nonproliferation and other critics have similarly stepped up their arguments that China has not met U.S. legal requirements for certification. Presidential certification will not end the controversy. This step will trigger a congressional review period before U.S. companies can bid for contracts. Congress has already held hearings on the issue earlier this month, and may consider legislation late this fall or early in 1998 to block U.S. nuclear sales to China. China is central to international efforts to control weapons of mass destruction. The key question for the Clinton administration is whether to reward China now for the steps it has taken, or hold back on certification and push for still more progress. If the United States is perceived to be softening its arms control standards in order to improve political and trade relations with China, the damage could outweigh any commercial benefits. Jennifer Weeks is executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. This Issue Brief is drawn from her more detailed analysis, "Sino-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation at a Crossroads," Arms Control Today (June/July 1996).
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