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Clinton and Northeast Asia: Promising Rhetoric, Uncertain Action Challenges in a Turbulent Region
By Richard Halloran
Global Beat Issue Brief 20, February 1997
 
Shortly after President Clinton was re-elected, he flew to Manila for the annual summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in an effort, the White House said, "to advance our strategic relationships with important leaders and to bring about the endorsement of important trade initiatives."
 
Just after his second inauguration, the President said in his State of the Union message: "America must look to the East no less than to the West. Our security demands it....Our prosperity requires it....We are helping to shape an Asian Pacific community of cooperation, not conflict." In particular, the President said: "We must pursue a deeper dialogue with China."
 
In her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that President Clinton had elevated Asia in the Administration's agenda: "I plan to devote much of my attention to its promise and perils....Our priorities here are to maintain the strength of our core alliances while successfully managing our multi-faceted relationship with China."
 
The new Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he intended to "give new focus to our security relations in the Asia-Pacific region" because they are "potentially jeopardized by the danger of instability and rivalry among major regional powers."
 
During the transition from the first to the second Clinton Administration, the new national security adviser, Samuel Berger, came out of a cabinet meeting to tick off six foreign policy priorities: the second, after improving relations with Europe, was "cementing America's role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asian-Pacific community."
 
The rhetoric sounded promising. Beyond the talk, however, the substance seemed thin. Nothing from the President or his senior advisers has suggested a recognition of the profound changes surging through Asia or much understanding of the postcolonial independence, national pride, political maturity, cultural renaissance, or expanding military power of Asia.
 
In style, moreover, none in the top echelon of the Second Clinton Administration has had much experience in negotiating with Asians. Those senior officials appear unaware that the manner with which one deals effectively with leaders across the Pacific differs greatly from that across the Atlantic. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Albright said: "We intend to be a very tough team." Friends of Albright say she can be abrasive; as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, she showed that she can be outspoken. Thus, the subtlety needed to settle disputes peaceably in Asia may be wanting.
 
Ad Hoc Responses
 
Most likely, then, Mr. Clinton's policy will continue to be made in response to crises, ad hoc, case-by-case. The president's new foreign policy team does not inspire much confidence that a new era in U.S. relations with Asia is on the horizon, with a comprehensive, cohesive policy toward Asia. The team could have some surprises but it would take a wrenching intellectual and political turnaround to make that happen. Even if the Administration appoints knowledgeable Asian hands to sub-cabinet positions, experience has shown they are not likely to have much influence if the top people are not interested.
 
Some politicians in both major parties and many scholars who specialize in Asia assert today that the long, wide arc stretching from Korea to Pakistan is stable, at peace, and becoming more interdependent. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that it is a turbulent region, disturbed by troubles within and among the nations in which half the world's people live.
 
China
 
Atop a pyramid of powers in East Asia sits a China in which uncertainty is pervasive; it will be the leading concern for the Clinton Administration in this region. The Chinese economy is thriving along the eastern coast and in the south but it lags inland. The gap between those who have benefited from nearly 20 years of economic reform and those left behind is widening. About 100 million people, or ten percent of the population, are said to be in motion from one place to another every day looking for work or better work. High-level corruption appears to be endemic.
 
China's political future awaits the death of the aging paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. President Jiang Zemin appears to be the heir but a struggle for power is entirely possible. There are splits among the People's Liberation Army, the Communist Party, and the government bureaucracy-and fissures within each. There are splits between the central government and local governments; between generations; and between mainstream (Han) Chinese and minorities-witness recent riots by Muslims in western China. The rule of law is weak and human rights are not observed by anyone's definition.
 
Internationally, China may be reasserting itself as the Middle Kingdom in which China once again seeks to become the dominant power of Asia, with vassal states in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Beijing clearly intends to exert influence on the world scene as well, including in the United Nations. China is a nuclear power and is modernizing its conventional military forces, building a blue water navy and acquiring advanced aircraft. It will be ten years or more, however, before China will be a military threat to U.S. interests in Asia.
 
The social and political order of China today is driven by a surging nationalism after 150 years of what the Chinese consider to have been humiliation by the West. The return of the British colony in Hong Kong to Chinese rule at midnight June 30 will undoubtedly loose a nationalistic spree. Some Chinese talk privately-and some not so privately-of taking revenge on the West and Japan. A book of essays criticizing the West has risen to the top of China's best-seller list. Written by scholars and journalists, China Can Say No contends that China has taken on too many Western values, should take its place as a global power, and must say "no" to America.
 
China is involved in a raft of contentious external issues: The future of Taiwan, which has been separated from mainland China for a century; the South China Sea, through which pass vital shipping lanes and may sit stop oil and gas reserves; and membership in the World Trade Organization, which is being blocked by the West until China is willing to observe its rules.
 
In 1997, the gauge of China's intentions as a rising international power will be the reversion of Hong Kong. Britain's Union Jack will be hauled down at midnight on June 30 and China's red banner with golden stars will be hoisted. Whether China lives up to its promise to permit Hong Kong a high level of autonomy in all but foreign affairs becomes more open to question with each passing day. Political rights have been proscribed, the press and freedom of expression have been curtailed, and intervention in Hong Kong's economy has become more blatant. China's credibility has suffered with each move and its Asian neighbors have become anxious.
 
Taiwan
 
The island nation of Taiwan so coveted by Beijing has a thriving new industrial economy, a rising middle class, and the beginnings of a sturdy democracy. Last spring, 76 percent of Taiwan's eligible voters turned out, despite missile threats from mainland China, to choose the first elected head of state in 4000 years of history among the Chinese-speaking peoples. The greatest threat to that democracy, outside potential military intimidation from mainland China, is corruption in high places.
 
Internationally, Taiwan is walking a razor's edge as Taipei seeks greater recognition from other nations and international economic, political, and social organizations-without provoking an attack by mainland China. It has strong economic and other non-diplomatic ties with many nations, including the U.S. and Japan, and relies on the U.S. for advanced arms and military equipment.
 
In the social order of Taiwan today, the driving element is self-determination. For the first time ever, the Taiwanese people have control of their own nation. For centuries, they were dominated by dynastic China, then by a half century of colonial rule by imperial Japan, and a half century of authoritarian rule by Chinese who fled from the mainland after Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was defeated by the Communists of Mao Zedong in 1949. Today, native Taiwanese, who are ethnically distinct, control politics, economics, government bureaucracy, the army, the universities and the press.
 
South Korea
 
If the China-Taiwan conflict is a long-term issue for the United States, the conflict on the Korean Peninsula is now. Like Taiwan, South Korea has fostered a thriving new industrial economy and a rising middle class. Democracy in Seoul, however, is in danger of backsliding to the authoritarian rule of 1945-1990. The critical issue this year is whether President Kim Young Sam will seek to overturn the constitution so that he can stay in office; he is limited to one term that expires in 1998. Widespread corruption also threatens to undermine political stability.
 
In international relations, Seoul seeks a strong voice in Asian affairs and, as a middle-ranked power, a say in the global arena. Seoul has cultivated relations with China and Russia at the same time its relations with Tokyo and Washington have become more strained. Koreans become emotional to the point of irrationality on every issue with Japan. They have increasingly become anti-American because of the long presence of US forces in Korea and what Seoul considers to be heavy-handed diplomatic and economic tactics by Washington.
 
Militarily, Seoul continues to trumpet the threat from North Korea, which is real enough but which has begun to lessen because South Korean forces, backed by US military power under a security treaty, have become comparatively stronger by the day. That does not make the North Koreans less dangerous, though, as they could launch a desperate attack even knowing it would end in their destruction.
 
Nationalism, sometimes bordering on the xenophobic, appears to drive much of South Koreas relations with the outside world. That nationalism includes an overwhelming desire to reunite the peninsula under South Korean rule, an eventuality that the North Koreans are equally fervent in averting. Among other nations engaged in the Korean question, none appears eager for reunification. The US gives lip service to unification but fears a miscalculation that could lead to war. Japan, also giving lip service to reunification, much prefers a separated and thus weaker Korea. Russia is preoccupied with internal problems. China would not like a united non-communist Korea on its border and is trying to keep North Korea afloat while expanding economic relations with Seoul.
 
North Korea
 
Across the 150-mile long, 4000-yard wide demilitarized zone that divides the peninsula, North Korea's economy has been in a 3-5 percent annual decline since 1989 because of poor management and natural disasters. Industry is operating far below capacity, trade is limited, and hunger is spreading. Even so, Great Leader Kim Jong-Il seems to be in control, at least until the apparent defection of a senior official, Hwang Jang-Yop, to the South Korean embassy in China. (At the time of writing, this situation was developing by the hour, with outcome and consequences unpredictable.)
 
Internationally, North Korea is nearly isolated. Longtime support from Russia has ended, help from China is minimal, antagonism toward Japan parallels that in South Korea, and only the oft-repeated threat of resuming its nuclear arms program keeps US diplomats talking to North Koreans. Pyongyang seems eager, not to say anxious, to open diplomatic relations with the US but can't seem to grasp the reality that it must live up to agreements first, notably a commitment to begin negotiations with South Korea to reduce the hostility between them. As noted, North Korea's armed forces have started a decline in capability because of Pyongyang's weak economy and lack of outside support.
 
Specialists in North Korea say its driving force is still the ideology of "Juche," usually translated as "self-reliance." In the world's most closed society, Juche has almost become a religion and guides everything from kindergarten education to steel production. Included is a steady barrage of vitriolic propaganda aimed at South Korea, Japan, the US and occasionally other nations.
 
The critical question for the foreseeable future: Will Kim Jong Il's regime survive and, if so, how and in what form? Or will it implode and tempt South Korea to take over? Or will it have what is known as a "soft landing" to effect a reconciliation with Seoul and eventual peaceful reunification? Or will Korea explode into flames?
 
Japan
 
Japan, once the stable ally of the U.S., is struggling. It is beginning to overcome a recession that lasted twice as long as predicted six years ago. The outlook is strong as Japan has the best economic indicators in the industrial world. Tokyo's foreign exchange reserves, for instance, stand at $215 billion, more than twice as much as those of China and well ahead of the $65 billion of the U.S.
 
But Japan is struggling to find a way out of political paralysis. Between the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989 and the fall of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's government in 1993, Japan ended its postwar era and the controls the postwar generation exercised through the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Since then, cabinets have come and gone as coalitions have been formed, tried to govern, and fallen apart to be followed by another fragile coalition. Many Japanese political analysts think it will take several more elections before Tokyo shakes off its stalemate and forms a government that can govern-and rid Japan of "money politics" and corrupt relations between big business and national politicians.
Japan is also struggling to find an international role commensurate with its economic power. The nation is still wrapped in a postwar cocoon that makes it unwilling to take risks or responsibility in the international arena for fear of getting on the wrong side of a trading supplier or customer. Tokyo's foreign and security policy has been passive for the most part, and reactive only when a response could not be avoided. Japan's military forces are the smallest of any leading power and will remain that way so long as Japan lacks the political will to exert influence beyond its shores. No signs of a resurgence of the Japanese militarism of the 1930's and 1940's have come over the horizon. Japan remains dependent on the U.S. for the larger part of its security.
 
Japan is struggling with insularity despite repeated calls for internationalization and despite its integration into the world economy and political order. Japan remains uncertain of its national identity. It has been striving to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council but that appears to be more for prestige than for digging into the issues confronting the council. The Japanese continue to resist confronting their responsibility for aggression before and during World War II and will be unable to determine their role in Asia until they come to grips with that emotional question. Japan's market is not so closed as many of its trading partners contend but it has only grudgingly removed the barriers about which other nations complain.
Russia
 
Russia, which Americans and other Westerners often overlook as an Asian nation, is trying to keep its hand in as a power in Asia but doesn't have much influence because Moscow is preoccupied with deep-seated problems at home. The economy is in shambles. Uncertainty prevails in politics. Moscow's international voice is muted. Russian military forces are in disarray, with soldiers unpaid, ships rusting at anchor, planes sitting on the ground.
Most students of Russia, however, say that Russia will recover and will again be an Asian power sometime in the next century. Russian nationalism remains a strong force, the economy has the potential to propel Russia into the top rank, Russian technology puts men and women into space, and Russia still has the world's second most powerful nuclear force. Internationally, Russia has wobbly but improved relations with the U.S., Western European, China, and even Japan.
 
Nearly fifty years ago, a Lebanese statesman, Charles Malik, said: "The challenges confronting the Western world are basically three: The challenge of Communism, the challenge of the rising East, and the challenge of the internal forces of decay." The West has met the first challenge. The second is clearly upon us, especially the U.S., but the Clinton Administration evinces little preparation to meet the challenge in that region of the East which is rising the fastest.
 
 
Richard Halloran, formerly a New York Times correspondent in Asia and at the Pentagon, writes about Asia from Honolulu.

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