Global Beat: A Plan to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

Global Reporting Network Publications A Plan to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons By Richard Butler, Australian Ambassador to the United Nations Global Beat Issue Brief 18, January 1997 Over the last several months, the idea of total abolition of nuclear weapons has edged its way into public debate as a number of prominent political, military and other leaders have issued public calls for abolition. Perhaps the most prominent and detailed presentation has come from the "Canberra Commission," a group of 17 diplomats, scientists, and retired military leaders from around the world convened by the Australian Government. Last November 8, Richard Butler, Australian Ambassador to the United Nations and Convenor of the Commission, addressed the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, which is comprised of 17 of America's largest and most active arms control groups, to outline the Commission's plan. This Issue Brief presents an edited transcript of his presentation. Click here for a copy of the full Canberra Commission report can be found on-line. The Australian government decided that there was a special opportunity and a special need to bring the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons back to the center of the international agenda. The opportunity was defined by both the end of the Cold War and the indefinite extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. The need was defined by increasingly disturbing reports of the leakage of nuclear materials and technology, principally as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. We were also very mindful that the NPT was extended under very specific conditions. The agreements through which we were able to give that utterly crucial treaty a permanent life mean what they say. And one of the things they say is that this is not a one-way street through which we restrain horizontal proliferation; it is a two-way street. The other side of that street is more nuclear disarmament. I want to emphasize that this is a recorded promise in law by all states that no one should have nuclear weapons. The terms of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty make it perfectly clear that the moral, legal, political norm of the world is that no one should have nuclear weapons. Those who do not have them should never get them and those that do have them should get rid of them. That is a promise, and it is not being kept. We know the reasons why it is not being kept. Let's not waste time hurling rocks at each other about who did what to whom and whether deterrence was a good idea or not. Let's look into the future. We have agreed among all nations that no one should have nuclear weapons. The only question is how to get from where we are to that point. The mandate under which the commission worked was to come up with practical proposals. That sounds quite simple, but that is very different from a lot of what is done in the business of looking to get rid of or control nuclear weapons. Our emphasis was very much on causing things to happen, rather than simply making declarations of desirable circumstances. The commission fulfilled its charge with a report that has two main parts. One part is why should we get rid of nuclear weapons and the other is how. As far as why is concerned, the commission addressed a lot of the arguments for the retention of nuclear weapons, and it did so respectfully, but in the end the commission advanced an elemental logic. These weapons constitute a unique danger to human beings and the environment. That they exist means that they will be used. That they haven't been used since Hiroshima is as much good luck as good management. Their continued existence in the hands of some makes it inevitable that others will also want to acquire them-that is the axiom of proliferation. We think the case against nuclear weapons is clear, but perhaps especially for the reasons to do with the unique threat they pose to people and this planet, the inevitability, by accident or design, of their use and the axiom of proliferation. So long as one state has them, others will seek to acquire them. For those reasons, we came to the conclusion that the only way to deal with this problem in the last analysis is to move to zero. We recognized that you could have the most persuasive arguments in the world for doing something, but the inevitable first question that any sensible person will ask is, can we do it? If you can't say it is doable, you might as well fold up your tent and go home. We propose that it begins with the nuclear weapon states committing themselves to keeping the promise they made in the NPT. We do not have in mind a negotiated declaration that would sound nice but not necessarily bring about action. The current commitments, even the NPT, have touches of ambiguity, with qualifications like "ultimate elimination" and "good faith negotiations." We call for the nuclear weapon states to make a new and unambiguous commitment to the world that their aim and policy is to eliminate nuclear weapons. We propose that the nuclear weapon states then take immediate steps to show that this commitment is real. Some of these things can be done in 24 hours. They are not disarmament as such, but they would be perfectly clear signals that the world is being made safer, that we have started down the path toward elimination. These are steps such as taking nuclear weapon systems off alert, removing the warheads from launch vehicles and putting them in a separate place, [and fully enacting] the comprehensive test ban treaty. The next thing is to try to bring into existence as soon as possible a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. And the next big step is for the Russians and the Americans to begin negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-START 3-to reach the next significantly lower level of nuclear forces. As the numbers of Russian and American nuclear weapons get lower, other weapon states would be brought in: China, the UK, France. They should come in when the numbers have come down to around their levels. Finally, a process would have to be found to bring clandestine nuclear weapon states into the negotiations. There would be a need for other structures to support this clearly in national and international agreements addressing terrorism, the leakage of nuclear materials, and so on. In this process, verification would be critical and verification machinery required to give confidence would have to be developed. That is why there is a relatively large annex on verification in the Commission report. We envisage that these steps would be taking seriatim, but we don't state a particular end date. We do not accept the idea that you have to have a time-bound framework. It is counterproductive to say this must be done by 2010. We say this must be done with all deliberate speed, that it will be done when it is done. We also point out that there are technological barriers. Sometimes, we don't have enough of the technology around to do this as quickly as we would like. Build it. It is there, just make more of it. It is not that expensive-it is nowhere near as expensive as maintaining the weapon systems. Nor do we accept a top-down approach that begins with a global treaty saying we will create a world without nuclear weapons and then try to fill in the building blocks. We think it is the other way around. You take concrete steps and build the architecture of a world without nuclear weapons, making it safe at each stage and accompanying it with appropriate security mechanisms. Maybe at the end, when you have built the house, you put a ribbon around it with a treaty that says we will maintain this forever. It may be that this will require a hard look at the enforcement powers of the UN Security Council to make quite clear that whenever there are breaches of this structure, there would be swift and certain action by the world community, such as if a terrorist group emerges with an atomic bomb. We would have to be certain that the world community would address that swiftly and certainly and deal with it by conventional means. That is the vision in the Canberra Commission Report. You may think there are better ways to eliminate nuclear weapons, and I readily concede that. But on the assumption that something like this is useful, the last question becomes, will anyone do it? That is what we are now: the business of implementation, of spreading the word, of reviving the consciousness of the problem and trying to create the political will to solve it. In that context, the commission was absolutely of one mind that there is one person who can start this: the President of the United States. This will not happen unless the United States agrees to it. If the United States decides to do it, it would be almost irresistible for others to take part. There is no substitute for that leadership. I will say that again both ways. Without the United States it won't happen; with the United States others would find it almost irresistible. The United States must take the first step in its commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and what would follow would be negotiated both multilaterally and bilaterally. It comes down to this newly elected president. It is not necessarily in his job description, but we assume he is thinking about his place in history. As a bridge to the twenty-first century and a secure landing on the other side, nothing beats this: eliminate nuclear weapons. The United States is uniquely placed to begin this process. Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | Experts Directory | Links Directory | About the GRN |