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India and Pakistan: A Post-Election Status Report

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By David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo*
Global Beat Issue Brief 15 - May 1996

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India's recent national elections have given impetus to a harder-line nuclear policy in New Delhi. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which gained the largest block of votes, has openly declared that India "must be nuclear." The country's nuclear policy is likely to continue in this direction, even though the Hindu nationalist government quickly resigned and a new coalition government is taking shape without the BJP.

 

This Issue Brief, based on a unique, just published study of Indian elite public opinion edited by the authors (see end), provides an overview of nuclear thinking and policy in India; a review of India's nuclear program and capabilities; and a brief discussion of U.S. policy.

 

 

 

The Hardening of Indian Nuclear Policy

 

Officially, Indian policy remains one of nuclear ambiguity: that is, India will maintain its ability to produce advanced weapons while it advocates global disarmament and denies it has nuclear status. Yet this posture is gradually eroding in favor of a more hard-line stance, and it is increasingly doubtful that India will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty when and if negotiations are completed later this year.

 

The hardening in Indian nuclear policy predates the elections, stimulated in part by the May 1995 extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). New Delhi viewed the treaty's indefinite extension with great disappointment because it was accompanied by no firm commitments for disarmament on the part of the five declared nuclear states.

 

Following the NPT's extension, Indian strategic thinkers reiterated their denunciations of the treaty's discriminatory features and began to question India's traditional posture of nuclear ambiguity. Former Secretary of Defence for Production, K. Subrahmanyam, India's most prominent nuclear advocate, called on New Delhi to reverse its long-held support for a nuclear test ban and a cutoff on the production of fissile material. Subrahmanyam and others criticized these bans as limited nonproliferation measures designed to maintain the monopoly of the declared nuclear powers.

 

In September 1995, two of India's most influential think tanks reiterated this challenge at a joint seminar on nuclear policy,. They urged New Delhi to oppose both the test ban and fissile material cutoff, unless these are explicitly linked to a time-bound global nuclear ban (i.e., disarmament within a specified time frame). The seminar participants also warned ominously that India's "present position of keeping the nuclear option open has become meaningless" and urged discussions on "how best to translate this into effective deterrence."

 

Nuclear Capabilities

 

India is one of only three de facto nuclear weapons states that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the other two being Pakistan and Israel. India's highly sophisticated nuclear establishment encompasses both a considerable civilian nuclear energy program and substantial military production capabilities. Moreover, India's nuclear estate is almost entirely outside international safeguards. There are few protections or guarantees against the diversion of civilian nuclear activities to military purposes. Only four of India's ten operating or commissioned nuclear power reactors are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. None of the eight reactors under construction are safeguarded. Neither are the country's eight research reactors, including one fast breeder test reactor, or India's two uranium-enrichment plants and eight heavy-water production facilities.

 

India tested its first crude nuclear device at Pokhran over a decade ago, in 1974. Since then India has not conducted any tests but has maintained an active nuclear program. Current estimates give India enough weapons-grade plutonium to make 60 to 80 nuclear weapons. Whether India has fashioned this material into deployable weapons is unknown but the country certainly possesses the capability to assemble at least a few nuclear weapons on relatively short notice.

 

India has a substantial number of fixed-wing aircraft that could be modified to deliver nuclear weapons. These include the Anglo-French Jaguar, the Mirage 2000, and the Soviet-supplied MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29. According to some sources, the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation has perfected nuclear bombing techniques using the MiG-23 and MiG-27. In addition, India has made significant advances in ballistic missile technology. The Prithvi, with a range of 150 to 250 km has been tested 14 times, most recently in January, although it has not been actively deployed. The medium-range Agni, with an intended range of 2,000 km, is also under development and was successfully tested in 1994.

 

According to most specialists, India has not developed thermonuclear weapons and would require a new nuclear test to do so. In December 1995, The New York Times reported that U.S. spy satellites had recorded scientific and technical activities at the Pokhran test site in the great Indian desert, suggesting preparations for a second nuclear test. The circumstances surrounding this report are unclear, however, and most specialists doubt that India will conduct a second nuclear test or that it will go nuclear overtly in the very near future.

 

The Evolution of India's Nuclear Program

 

The factors motivating India's nuclear program are complex and sometimes contradictory. When the nuclear industry was born in the 1950s, it was based on two assumptions: 1) nuclear power would be an essential part of India's economic development, and 2) India would use the atom exclusively for peaceful purposes. Then-prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, reflecting Gandhi's moral influence, declared that India would never use nuclear power for military purposes. Nehru also launched an international crusade to persuade the nuclear powers to negotiate and disarm.

 

Many in the West dismiss India's disarmament position as propaganda, but it has deep historical roots. India was the first to propose a nuclear freeze or "Standstill Agreement" in 1954, and it advocated a nuclear test ban in 1956. Under Nehru, India pioneered proposals for a nondiscriminatory nonproliferation treaty in 1965. Over the years, New Delhi has presented a dozen major disarmament initiatives to the United Nations, including Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon Free World in 1988.

 

Following India's 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese army and the 1964 Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor, however, security considerations began to influence Indian nuclear policy. Since then, the need for a deterrent capability against its giant neighbor to the north has been a crucial factor in Indian strategic thinking. The desire for international prestige and political influence have also motivated India's nuclear program. Observing the nuclear-weapons status of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and aspiring to similar greatness, many Indians began to view nuclear weapons as the currency of international prestige.

 

In recent years, Pakistan has loomed larger in Indian strategic thinking. A 1994 study of elite public opinion conducted by the U.S.-based Kroc Institute found the potential nuclear threat from Pakistan to be a major factor motivating support for India's nuclear option (see Appendix). The long-term geopolitical threat and rivalry with China remains important in government thinking, but the survey revealed much more concern about Pakistan's nuclear program.

 

It is tragically ironic that the nuclear arms competition in South Asia has thus become self-perpetuating. New Delhi created a nuclear capability in response to Beijing's program. This prompted Islamabad to match India's effort, which now motivates New Delhi to maintain its program.

 

Few conflicts in the world appear as intractable or threatening to global security as the hydra-headed hostility between India and Pakistan. The last forty-nine years have witnessed three major wars between these nuclear-capable adversaries and many incidents of heightened tension. Since 1989, a bitter proxy war in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir has taken more than 10,000 lives and forced 300,000 residents to flee.

 

Today, diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan are at a low ebb, with no official talks since January 1994. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director John Holum has said that the risk of nuclear conflict is "greater in South Asia than anywhere else in the world."

 

U.S. Policy

 

American policy toward South Asia, on nonproliferation and other issues, has suffered from inconsistency and a perception of excessive heavy-handedness. Until the 1960s, the U.S. provided substantial foreign aid to India, but when the latter condemned the U.S. war in Indochina, the Johnson administration imposed sanctions against New Delhi and halted food aid and other foreign assistance. After India conducted a nuclear test in 1974, Canada, the United States, and other countries imposed additional sanctions, including restrictions on technology transfer. Relations between Washington and New Delhi remained strained until after the Cold War.

 

In recent years, the U.S. has initiated a limited program of military cooperation and exchanges. In addition, the new Emerging Markets strategy has increased the U.S. commitment to commercial engagement and private investment. The U.S. has become India's largest source of foreign investment and trade.

 

Similarly, although the U.S. previously placed great emphasis on gaining India's assent to the nonproliferation treaty, Washington began to adopt a lower-key approach in the months prior to the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty conference. At the conference, the U.S. did not insist upon India's signing the NPT agreement, while New Delhi refrained from undermining the U.S. goal of indefinite extension. Instead, Washington increasingly has focused on obtaining Indian-and Pakistani-support for a comprehensive test ban and a cutoff of fissile material production, although the hardening of Indian attitudes toward the test ban has complicated these efforts.

 

The 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act could significantly influence nuclear policy in South Asia. The 1994 act requires Washington to terminate all assistance and loans to any non-nuclear state, including India or Pakistan, that conducts a nuclear test or engages in overt nuclear weapons activities. Moreover, the act would prohibit U.S. banks from providing credit. These sanctions could halt several of India's most important economic development projects.

Some Indian analysts believe that these provisions of the 1994 act-what could be called the "shadow of sanctions"-serve as an effective deterrent against a second Indian nuclear test, but recent U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan have had the opposite impact. The October 1995 Brown amendment, and the Clinton administration's resulting approval of a $368 million arms package to Pakistan, prompted loud denunciations from New Delhi and pledges that India would acquire an equivalent package of weapons. The arms package was an American attempt to settle an old debt with Pakistan and encourage Islamabad's role as a moderate Islamic state in central Asia, but these carrots for Pakistan were seen as sticks in India.

For the future, some U.S. policy experts propose a "grand bargain" on proliferation and a closer partnership with India. The U.S. would accept the de facto nuclear status of India and Pakistan in exchange for a cap on each country's further nuclear development. The U.S. would lift sanctions required under the Glenn, Symington, and Pressler amendments and offer incentives to encourage Indian and Pakistani nuclear restraint and adherence to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime and related nonproliferation regimes.

 

Other experts object that acceptance of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs would undermine global nonproliferation efforts. They argue that preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction depends on progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world, as specified in Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. They propose that the United States should make greater efforts toward deep reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons leading to their eventual total elimination.

 

Appendix: Public Opinion and the Bomb

 

In November 1994, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame conducted an extensive survey of elite public opinion that offers the most in-depth look at Indian attitudes on nuclear weapons. In nearly 1,000 interviews, the study probed what educated elites in seven cities thought about the issues, why they had such attitudes, and what might change their opinions.

 

A majority of respondents (57 percent) supported New Delhi's policy of nuclear ambiguity. Thirty-three percent favored an overt nuclear capability, with only 8 percent opposed.

When asked what could justify India developing nuclear weapons, 48 percent of the supporters of the current policy said a Pakistani nuclear test. By contrast, only 17 percent cited a possible deterioration in relations with China. Among nuclear advocates, 54 percent considered the threat from a nuclear Pakistan as the primary concern. The other major justification for the nuclear option was a desire to enhance India's international status and political influence.

 

One of the survey's most significant results was both the overwhelming support for a "time-bound" plan for global nuclear disarmament and the influence such an agreement could have in convincing people to renounce the nuclear option. Among all respondents, 92 percent expressed total or partial support for an international ban on nuclear weapons. Even 42 percent of nuclear advocates cited a global ban as a reason for renouncing the nuclear option.

 

A December 1995 poll by the New Delhi-based news magazine, India Today, indicated even higher levels of support for the nuclear option. However, this survey was unscientific, involving person-in-the-street interviews with 2,000 adults of varying backgrounds. Asked the question, "To develop its nuclear weapon capability, if India were to explode an atomic bomb today would you approve or disapprove?" 62 percent approved.

 

Although nuclear policy in India ranks lower than such concerns as communal violence and poverty, the recent shift in public opinion toward a harder-line nuclear policy is clear. Support for the nuclear option would likely grow if the United States and other nuclear powers were to exert coercive pressures on India. Conversely, the polls suggest that a more substantial commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the major powers could be a significant factor in reducing public support for the nuclear option.

 

 

* David Cortright is President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and Visiting Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University. Amitabh Mattoo is Associate Professor at the School for International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.

 

This Issue Brief is based on India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, 1996), co-edited by Cortright and Mattoo.

 

 

 

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