Global Beat: GRN Publications -- The Cheju Shuffle: Clinton and Korea

Global Reporting Network Publications The Cheju Shuffle: Clinton and Korea By Stephen Noerper, Global Beat Issue Brief 14, April 1996 President Clinton arrives on Cheju Island April 16 for a mini-summit with South Korean President Kim Young-Sam. The South Korean stopover will be brief, but has taken on expanded importance following recent DPRK incursions into the DMZ. Although the dialogue will take place on Korea's southernmost point, eyes will focus northward in light of the recent round of difficulties. North Korean efforts to dismantle the armistice agreement through a series of incursions into the joint security area at Panmunjom will be at the top of the Clinton-Kim agenda. The DPRK maneuvers were met by increased South Korean watchfulness - the highest state of alert in fifteen years. Leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and Moscow all expressed cautious dismay at the efforts and encouraged Pyongyang to check any further violations and to observe the armistice provisions. Washington was measured in its response and has treated the moves as a desperate political act designed to draw the US back to the negotiating table for discussion of an interim peace mechanism to replace the armistice. Indeed, the maneuvers were simply the latest in a series of efforts by the DPRK to discredit the armistice. The DPRK has expelled members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), DPRK forces have failed to wear MAC armbands or to observe other protocols. Although designed as political theater, the DPRK moves introduce a heightened possibility that events might spin out of control. Pyongyang may view replacement of the armistice as a necessary precursor for continued progress on the diplomatic front. Bringing Washington to the bargaining table could bring rewards, as it did in Geneva in October 1994. It would antagonize Seoul - always attractive for Pyongyang. The events at the DMZ could also provide a convenient bogeyman for a regime seeking to distract its public from the effects of flooding and failed economic policies, namely the food crisis gripping the DPRK. Finally, the incursions may be designed to threaten Seoul in an effort to make South Korea return to a fourth round of food aid talks in Beijing. The North's DMZ incursions are all the more puzzling given the quiet positive movement by the North on all other fronts: acceptance of US-DPRK talks on missiles in Berlin; resumption of a second round of US-DPRK talks on POW-MIA issues; the possible resumption of discussions on the exchange of liaison offices between Washington and Pyongyang; the initiation of new discussions on normalization between Japan and the DPRK; a North Korean proposal to resume North-South dialogue in Beijing, and a decision to allow a second international appeal for food aid for North Korea. Given the range of issues in play with North Korea, the need for US-ROK coordination at the highest levels is all the more needed. The beleaguered North does not have many cards left in its hand. Resources are slim to none, and a display of prowess along the DMZ is perhaps an unintended sign of weakness. Intelligence estimates suggest that little fuel exists for tank or aircraft training operations, and that DPRK fighter pilots have little or no ability to fly test runs. Having a few hundred troops without proper insignias conduct illegal exercises in the joint security area may be all that is viable. Whatever the rationale or means, the DPRK actions are dangerous for the peninsula and region. Tensions escalate rapidly between the two Koreas and are particularly worrisome along the most heavily-fortified border in the world. The chance of a miscue is real, and the South Korean shoot-to-kill order in the event of a North Korean incursion into the Southern side of the DMZ increases the chances for a crisis. Calmer heads must prevail, and in the end, all the parties must understand the fundamental need for expanded senior-military level contacts across the DMZ. This was the lesson of the December 1994 helicopter incident and is all the more significant now, but it remains to be seen whether Presidents Clinton and Kim are prepared to deal head-on with this fundamental issue. The DPRK incursions were also symbolic in terms of their timing shortly before the Clinton visit and South Korean parliamentary elections. Perhaps the North Koreans opted to take a page from China's Taiwan playbook - figuring that belligerence impedes the democratic process. If so, the North failed to grasp the fundamental failure of China's effort. The threat of force against Taiwan bolstered the then-lagging popularity of the incumbent chastised by Beijing. Similarly, the DPRK incursions may boost the sagging persona of Kim Young Sam and breath fresh life into the demoralized New Korea party. Opposition candidates vehemently voiced these concerns in the wake of the incursions. Ironically, the North may aid the political forces it has so stridently condemned, and inhibit the emergence of more progressive forces in the South. The issue of food aid to the DPRK will also be on the Cheju agenda. The North Koreans approved a new UN appeal for assistance in late March - only weeks after backing away from further campaigns. The World Food Program and private aid missions have testified to the existence of malnutrition and lack of adequate housing and foodstuffs. Debate exists over the scope of the disaster and the appropriate reply, and this disagreement has significant implications from both humanitarian and security perspectives. The specter of starvation and death is complemented by the threat of an outflow of refugees that could prove a costly and logistical nightmare for China and/or South Korea. Moreover, anything that suggests a sudden and total collapse in the North obviously has far-reaching implications for the South and Korea's Asian neighbors. Clinton and Kim may well turn to other issues involving the DPRK, including execution of the Agreed Framework and the functioning of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), DPRK missile development, conventional force issues, and the resumption of North-South dialogue. But what must be discussed most urgently, and will no doubt receive short shrift, is the current state of ROK-US relations. Bilateral trade and security issues abound. Of fundamental importance in the medium and long-term is the issue of a continued US military presence in South Korea. One foreign daily suggested that the DPRK incursions provide Clinton with a much-needed rationale with which to approach the US Congress for the maintenance of US forces on the peninsula. Congressional funding aside, however, what of the sentiments of the Korean populace? ROK media polls reveal widespread public concerns about US forces. Last year's sensational coverage of US troop behavior after a misunderstanding and scuffle on a Seoul subway suggests how sensitive incidents can escalate, as they did on Okinawa. Ultimately, President Clinton will depart Cheju nine hours after his arrival having reiterated the US commitment to help maintain peace and stability on the peninsula. Clinton also will make some amends for missing last fall's Osaka APEC summit in the height of Washington's budgetary crisis and second government shutdown. He even may score a bit of political capital in an election year. President Kim will return to Seoul feeling reassured and with a political feather in his cap -- a useful follow-up to the April 11 elections no matter how they turn out. But what is at stake and what will undoubtedly go overlooked is a host of critical issues concerning South Korea and the United States. No doubt, North Korea will be the top card dealt. One hopes Clinton returns to the table to finish the game at hand. - Dr. Noerper is a research fellow for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. He is based in Washington and Honolulu and is author of The Tiger's Leap: The South Korean Drive for National Prestige and Emergence in the International Arena (Sofia University Press, May 1996). He may be contacted at (808) 921-0426, e-mail: aloha@ichange.com or nautilusdc@igc.apc.org Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | Balkan Conflicts | East Asian Security | EU Integration & Enlargement | Middle East | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | South Asian Security | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | Experts Directory | Links Directory | Archive | Search | About the GRN |