Global Beat: The U.S., China, and Taiwan

Global Reporting Network Publications The U.S., China, and Taiwan By Richard Halloran Global Beat Issue Brief No. 11, March 1996 Copyright 1996*, Center for War, Peace and the News Media President Clinton is being confronted by a question of war or peace with China over the fate of Taiwan. How he handles this matter will shape America's role as a power in Asia and the Pacific, affect the security of other Asian nations, and influence his chances for reelection next fall. A turning point will occur shortly after March 23, when Taiwan holds its presidential election. For President Clinton, the billowing conflict with China over the fate of Taiwan has become a far more demanding foreign policy issue than any he has encountered before, with the outcome to determine United States security posture in Asia and to affect the security of every Asian nation for decades. The most critical question is what the President will do if Beijing launches an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. If he decides to help defend Taiwan, he risks a war with China that could easily engage other nations in East Asia. If the President fails to respond, he risks losing the confidence of U.S. allies in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and elsewhere across Asia. More generally, the Administration's policy toward China, and especially his stance on Taiwan, could easily become a crucial point of contention during the presidential and Congressional election campaigns next fall. Republican leaders have already staked out positions opposed to those of Mr. Clinton, including calls for an explicit U.S commitment to the defense of Taiwan. Because the quarrel over Taiwan could escalate into hostilities, it overshadows earlier issues in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and even North Korea. Moreover, American differences with China over human rights, trade, intellectual property, and arms sales do not include the threat of war, which thus makes them pale in contrast to the Taiwan question. In sum, this conflict is becoming an old-fashioned confrontation in power politics, a collision of national interests, even a clash of empire. It is not in the realm of what Michael Mandelbaum, of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, has called "foreign policy as social work" among small, poor, weak nations. Until now, Mandelbaum contends, President Clinton has attended only to issues on "the international periphery." A critical time will come after the March 23 presidential election on Taiwan, the first time in 5000 years of Chinese history that a head of government will be elected by popular vote, and the next logical step in the emergence of democracy on Taiwan. After that, much will depend on whether the new government continues to seek greater international recognition and even acceptance as an independent nation. Taiwan has assiduously cultivated nations around the world, starting in the U.S, with trade, air travel and telecommunications, and effective lobbying. That effort accelerated last June when President Lee Teng-hui was permitted by the U.S. to visit Cornell University. Taiwan's arch rivals on mainland China, which considers Taiwan to be Chinese territory, have repeatedly asserted they will use military force to prevent further moves toward independence. In the coming election on Taiwan, the four presidential candidates are: * Lee Teng-hui, the incumbent and nominee of the Kuomintang that has ruled Taiwan since the Nationalist Chinese under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek fled the mainland in 1949. He seeks wider recognition for Taiwan and a seat in the United Nations. * Peng Ming-min, longtime advocate of independence for Taiwan and nominee of the Democratic Progressive Party. He has asserted that the people of Taiwan should have the right to decide the island's future. * Lin Yang-kang, an independent who was expelled from the Kuomintang in a policy dispute and has the support of the opposition New Party. He claims to represent the "orthodox" Kuomintang position that would eventually see Taiwan united with China. * Chen Li-an, another independent who broke with the Kuomintang. He has concentrated on domestic issues and said that he would seek new negotiations with Beijing over relations between Taiwan and the mainland. Beijing's motives in trying to intimidate Taiwan seem focused less on which candidates wins and more on the attitude toward independence adopted by the new government in Taipei. Many observers assert that the driving force behind Beijing's posturing on Taiwan is a nationalism spawned in 150 years of humiliation by the West and, later, Japan that included losses of territory and unequal treaties giving foreigners special privileges in China. They agree that the most influential people in making Chinese external policy today are the leaders of the People's Liberation Army, who are less open to compromise than civilian leaders. Indeed, intelligence reports hold that some leaders of the PLA think now is the time to strike before Taiwan begins taking delivery of American F-16 fighter planes and French Mirage fighter-bombers later this year. The PLA has been maneuvering land, sea, and air forces opposite Taiwan and has fired missiles to points within fifty miles of Taiwan. Taiwan has countered by putting its forces on alert and the U.S. has deployed naval forces near the Taiwan Strait. The chances for miscalculations go up with every mile those forces close on one another. A former Chinese military officer now in the U.S. warns that the determination of leaders in the PLA is not to be underestimated. "If Taiwan declares independence," he said, "the PLA will attack at whatever risk, at whatever price, because their face will be lost if they don't. Win or lose, China cannot stand aside." The Minister of Defense in Taipei, Chiang Chung-lin, has said in rebuttal: "If the trespass into our territorial waters, of course we will fight back." An American scholar who visited China recently said he found a more aggressive attitude among middle ranking officials than he had seen before. "They are feeling more powerful," the American said. "They see governments all around them with weak leaders and, on the Taiwan issue, there is no question in Chinese minds that they would win." Under pressure from the PLA, China's civilian leaders such as President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng cannot appear to be "soft" on Taiwan because adversaries in the competition to succeed the aging leader, Deng Xiaoping, would cut their political throats. The Chinese have been sending three messages that can be discerned among the frequent outbursts from Beijing and the maneuvers of Chinese armed forces. To Taiwan, Beijing has made clear that moves intended to keep the island separate from the mainland will be countered with armed force in ways yet unspecified. To Washington, Beijing has confirmed that it wants the U.S. to withdraw from the Western Pacific because there is no room there for both Chinese and American power in Asia. To other nations in Asia, Beijing is signaling that China seeks to return to its historic place as the Middle Kingdom and the region's dominant power to which other Asian capitals must pay court. At stake for the U.S. in this confrontation with China are vital U.S. national interests even though Washington does not have diplomatic relations with Taipei. Taiwan has become an embryonic democracy in the past ten years with a great leap forward in protecting human rights, a priority in President Clinton's foreign policy. Taiwan is also a good-sized trading partner; in the first eleven months of 1995, it took $19 billion worth of American products while selling $24 billion, leaving the U.S. with a $5 billion deficit. In contrast, China took $12 billion in U.S. exports for the entire year but sold $47 worth, leaving the U.S. with a $35 billion deficit. Strategically, the island nation sits like a stationary aircraft carrier alongside the sea lanes that are among the world's busiest trade routes, running between the industrial powerhouses of South Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Equally important will be the image of the U.S. in the eyes of Asian leaders; many already doubt that the U.S., given its economic problems and trend toward isolation, will stay the course as a Pacific power. Many fear the U.S. will withdraw to leave Asians to fend for themselves. Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. is obliged to view with "grave concern" an attack on Taiwan. The law does not commit the U.S. to defend Taiwan if Taipei provokes a Chinese attack. The act, however, does place a political obligation on Washington to act if Taiwan is the victim of Chinese aggression. Many Asians and Europeans are alarmed over the prospects for Taiwan. A recent U.S. Information Agency report said: "A majority of observers joined in a voluminous outpouring of concern cutting a wide swath across Europe and Asia about the troubled waters in the Taiwan Strait." Despite the storm clouds, President Clinton has so far shown no coherent policy toward Asia. Insiders in Washington lay some blame on the National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, for not pulling together various strands of thought coming from the State and Defense Departments, from the Congress and private citizens knowledgeable about Asia. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called China recent military actions "reckless." He asserted they "smack of intimidation and coercion," adding that the U.S. has made clear to China the threats to Taiwan are a "grave matter to us" and that "we don't want any miscalculation on their part." Secretary of Defense William Perry has said the U.S. would seek better relations with China "but not at any price." The Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch, has warned that "the potential for hostility due to miscalculation or accident is great." Senator Sam Nunn, the Democrat's leading authority on military issues, has urged caution, noting that "Chinese leaders by their words and by their actions make it abundantly clear that any attempt by Taiwan to establish its independence from the mainland will result in a confrontation." On the other side, Speaker of the House Gingrich, and other Republicans have called for a clear statement that the U.S. will defense Taiwan if it is attacked. GOP Senator Frank Murkowski has said China would make "a great mistake" if it attacked Taiwan. Commenting on reports that China had broken international agreements not to sell nuclear materiel to Pakistan, another Republican, Senator Arlen Specter, has asserted: "Why not get really tough with China and really impose the maximum sanctions available to really show them we mean business?" Outside of government, a senior Defense Department official in President Bush's Administration, Charles Freeman, has cautioned that "Taiwan's miscalculation, China's emotional reactions, and the United States' inattention have created tensions that could escalate into combat." Similarly, a specialist on Chinese affairs, Gerrit Gong of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has warned: "Some officials in Taiwan may overestimate potential U.S. involvement in such a conflict (while) some Beijing leaders may underestimate U.S. resolve." Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, has been perhaps the most outspoken, asserting: "It is very serious business to give any slight encouragement to China to think that an attack would not be met." Lacking clear guidance from the White House, three schools of thought have appeared, cutting across party lines: * Accommodation: Advocates include Henry Kissinger, who was Secretary of State in the Republican Nixon and Ford Administrations, business executives who deal with China and and some Democrats and academic experts.. For example, Michel Oksenberg of Stanford has written: "The American objective should be to work with the government of China to facilitate its constructive participation in international and regional affairs." * Ambiguity: This strategy would keep the Chinese off balance by not disclosing what the U.S. would do in a crisis. The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Winston Lord, told the Senate recently: "The people of the United States feel strongly about the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their future peacefully." He said the U.S. had made clear to Beijing "the dangers of escalation" but he stopped short of promising an armed response to a Chinese attack. * Deterrence: Those favoring deterrence say the U.S. should make clear that an attack on Taiwan would trigger a military response; they applauded the sailing of the aircraft carrier Nimitz through the Taiwan Strait in December. James R. Lilley, onetime American ambassador to China and director of the U.S. quasi-embassy in Taiwan, testified to the Senate: "Credible deterrence must be in place, we must use our power convincingly and judiciously to rule out the [Chinese] use force." He said the Chinese "are more prudent where real power is engaged." The ability of the President to avoid war with China, whose leaders he called the "Butchers of Beijing" during the 1992 election campaign, while retaining the confidence of U.S. allies in Asia, may come into question when he campaigns for eelection next fall. The dispute started to take shape in early March when Senator Robert Dole, the likely Republican nominee, said: "I would support Taiwan having a seat in the U.N." Earlier, Speaker Gingrich has said he favored extending U.S. diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. The Clinton Administration has so far opposed both moves. Beyond power politics is an economic prize. At $91 billion, Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves are the world's second largest, after those of Japan. If those funds were under Chinese control, Beijing could buy a lot of fighter planes. Add Hong Kong's $55 billion to be deposited in Beijing's coffers in 1997 and the resulting $217 billion would be the world's largest reserve. In trade, Taiwan has so far been a better market for U.S. exports than China. Over the long term, the larger Chinese economy will most likely become a more lucrative market for American exporters and investors. Even so, the American economy would suffer if the market in Taiwan was lost. Beijing has not openly set a timetable for an attempt to capture Taiwan but one can be deduced from Chinese statements. Hong Kong is to revert from Britain to China in 1997 and Macao from Portugal in 1999. In its public statements, Beijing has linked the three entities, suggesting that it would seek to take over Taiwan early in the next century. Few observers expect China to launch an outright attack on Taiwan soon but look for "salami" tactics of one slice at a time. China's military maneuvers have already shaken the Taipei stock market. The Chinese are clearly seeking to influence Taiwan's presidential election, although their precise objective is uncertain. Intelligence assessments note that China could invade the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu; the latter is so close to the mainland shore that Chinese soldiers can be seen washing their underwear. President Lee of Taiwan and Premier Lien Chan underscored this threat by visiting troops on the two islands recently. The Penghu or Pescadores Islands in the Taiwan Strait might be the next targets. General John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said he doubts that China has the amphibious capability to invade Taiwan. The general said, however, the Chinese navy could impose a naval blockade, which would be an act of war under international law. So would launching missiles from the mainland to hit Taiwan. In sum, China's belligerence toward Taiwan and the U.S. has confronted President Clinton with difficult and possibly less-than-clearcut choices. For three years, the President has wavered in his policies toward China, taking stands on human rights, trade, and intellectual property only to shift later. Now the danger is that accommodation or ambuguity might no longer do. The President needs a steady hand on the tiller to navigate through the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. *Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times in Asia and Washington, writes about Asia from Honolulu. He is a consultant to the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, and a regular contributor to the Global Beat. For reprint rights, please contact him at tel: 808-395-0511, fax 808-396-4095, or e-mail: oranhall@compuserve.com Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | Experts Directory | Links Directory | About the GRN |