Global Beat: GRN Publications: Building a Single Bosnian State After Dayton

Global Reporting Network Publications Building a Single Bosnian State After Dayton By Zoran Pajic Global Beat Issue Brief 10, November 1995 The end of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina means the end of the Bosnian state. Over the past three years, the international peace process for Bosnia has became synonymous with partitioning the country along ethnic lines imposed by war. There are few reasons now to believe the American's historic agreement is different. As early as March 1992, with the Lisbon accord, the European Community sought to agree on ethnically based regional cantons. Far from preventing war, the plan encouraged those who believed that ethnic partition was possible and fueled the appetites of national leaderships to map out their own ethnic territories. Subsequent peace plans followed suit. This is not to say that the Vance-Owen plan, the Contact Group proposals and the Washington Agreement were completely without value. But despite important provisions concerning the distribution of power, the state structure, the judiciary and human rights protection, on the ground all of them were read only as maps. The only issue was territory, and war and ethnic cleansing were the means. At Dayton, there were blunt reasons for all parties to sign: a deal buys time for everyone; any alternative would be worse; and the parties are exhausted. Yet the underlying explanation is that the deal finally ratifies the basis of all the preceding negotiations, namely partition. Like its predecessors, the American plan offers a solution based on ethnic borders and imagined national-group interests. This is exactly the outcome desired and predicted by the so-called realists and appeasers. It is exactly what was feared by the so-called moralists, who warned that an ethnic state is not compatible with human rights. More important, it is precisely the result hoped for by the same negotiators who began the story, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Dire predictions may be proved wrong. But the forceful seizure of territory will stand. Ethnic cleansing will not be reversed. And all evidence suggests that the only peace that Milosevic and Tudjman are interested in is a piece of Bosnia for each. After centuries of mixed living in Bosnia, and countless failed efforts at conquest by the stronger powers, the Serbo-Croat/Croato-Serb speaking area of the former Yugoslavia has finally been divided into two parts - Serbia and Croatia. Where this puts the Bosnian Muslims, forged by the war into a political nation as never before, is a mystery - and a political gamble. For short-term purposes, some may wish to see any agreement reached, Foreign Minister Mohammed Sacirbey, told Newsweek shortly before Dayton. But I'm really concerned that it is a disguised partition. More accurately, I'm concerned that what we're building is an infrastructure that will implode. Where this leaves those Bosnians who still refuse to accept ethnic/political identities is a tragedy. The agreement claims to provide for an internationally recognized and unified state, with a central Presidency, parliament and constitutional court based in Sarajevo. The issue of parallel special relationships with neighboring states, as noted in the Agreement on Basic Principles, is not yet clear. But the crux of the issue is the political recognition of Republika Srpska and the sealing of the front-lines by international forces. Power is so de-centralized that key requirements in international law for a sovereign state - namely, effective government jurisdiction over its territory and its population - are in doubt. The Croat-Bosnian Federation proves the point. While it has ended the Muslim-Croat war, there is little evidence it has played a role in preserving what is left of the multi-ethnic fabric of Bosnia. The Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna, far from being dismantled to facilitate the build-up of the Federation, has instead developed its own power structure, introduced Croatian currency, established the Croat University in Mostar, accepted Croat state emblems, and even provided for Diaspora seats in the Zagreb Sabor (parliament). With their votes in the October Croation elections, Bosnian Croats effectively excluded themselves from the constituency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croat leadership displayed its intention to use the Federation as a transitional vehicle to incorporate its piece of Bosnia into Croatia proper. There is every reason to doubt that the fine print of Dayton, which includes a renewed commitment to the Federation, will reverse these developments on the ground. In short, until the ethnic-based projects of Serbia and Croatia are abandoned, there can be no overall political or constitutional solution for a unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The war has fragmented the country in every possible sense. Politically, there is confusion between the national programs and pretended political diversity. Economically and culturally, it has become more provincial and remote than ever. Militarily, it lacks centralized command and has produced dozens of local strongmen and potential regional leaders. Broken communications have destroyed many communal values and what is left of the modest pre-war civil society in the region. The real power throughout the country is in the hands of the army, which is the biggest employer and can exercise decisive influence in all walks of life. Most tellingly, although the two highest officials of Republika Srpska have been indicted as war criminals, and thereby now formally barred from office, the very entity they have created through violence is now accepted as a legitimate part of the peace deal. Even as the documents are being finalized, are there ways to modify this grim picture? For now, the answer, paradoxically, is to slow down the peace process. While the US negotiators boast of a political settlement, there is every advantage for the moment in not trying to clarify many of the uncertain issues. And while such a settlement is seen in Washington as a prerequisite for troop deployments, there is every benefit in deploying troops quickly without certain constitutional structures. The best solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina for now is the one thing there which is actually working, namely a cease-fire. Indeed, that in itself is reason enough not to try anything else for the moment. More important, provided it is seriously imposed, as in the current peace, it will buy time. A long-term cease-fire, especially with internationally enforced demilitarization, will gradually allow the re-establishment of basic rationality. It is only in a demilitarized and gun-free environment that new political thinking can emerge freely. If the guns stay silent long enough, the broken links between people from different communities will inevitably be re-established. The flow of commerce and information will have a chance to expand. Investment and re-development will begin in earnest, halting the brain drain and perhaps even encouraging people to return. In some cases, this process could be supported by putting urban areas under some form of international civil administration. If nothing else, this would add to the credibility of efforts undertaken by the local communities. A sustained period of peace without political settlement could open the possibility for the national programs of the present leaders to be replaced by forces for political diversity. It is only then that a consistent constitutional deal could be negotiated and elections envisaged. All the rest, as even the Americans themselves know, is a fig-leaf for partition. The marathon negotiation in Dayton was certainly an impressive diplomatic feat. But only really new thinking in the region can build a single Bosnian state. - Zoran Pajic, formally a professor of international public law at Sarajevo University, is now a senior fellow at King's College in London and a trustee of The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). This article was originally written for the IWPR and a version of it will appear in the next issue of their Balkan WarReport. For more information concerning IWPR or the Balkan WarReport please contact the Center. 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