Global Beat: Unified Supreme Command Of Strategic Deterrence Forces Is A Source Of Contradictions In The Russian Ministry Of Defense

Unified Supreme Command Of Strategic Deterrence Forces Is A Source Of Contradictions In The Russian Ministry Of Defense PIR Arms Control Letters, Letter Of February 1999, øPIR Center. February 25, 1999 (reprinted with the permission of the PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia) Preparation of this Letter has become possible thanks to the support of the Ploughshares Fund. Due to objective and subjective political reasons - above all, a lack of finances and the political will to enhance combat capability and readiness of sub-divisions and units - military reform within the Russian Armed Forces primarily followed a path of restructuring the chain of command, inherently posing the danger of a number of contradictions within the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. In late 1998 a serious scandal took place within the Ministry of Defense. In which Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev got President and Commander-in-Chief Boris Yeltsin to sign a document establishing the Unified Supreme Command of Strategic Deterrence Forces in 1999. As has been established, Sergeyev got the presidential stamp of approval on such a serious document by circumventing procedures required in such circumstances. It should have been first discussed by the Board of the Russian MOD, submitted for consideration by Chief of the General Staff General of the Army (GA) Anatoly Kvashnin, and studied at a meeting of the Security Council. Sergeyev also managed to avoid what would seem to be reasonable consultations with Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Sergeyev's use of such a sophisticated bureaucratic trick apparently stemmed from two premises: first, the high degree of preoccupation with economic matters by a large part of political elite which made structural changes in the MOD appear of little importance in comparison; second, Sergeyev's close relationship with the President and the latter's obvious inability and unwillingness to make any changes in the MOD leadership. Apparently, both conclusions were not entirely correct and didn't allow for the growing legislative interest in national security issues and for the relative weakness of structures of the presidential administration after apparently losing face in connection with their inability to influence US policy towards Iraq and Serbia. As a result, the scandal involving arbitrary changes in the system of strategic forces command and control spilt in the press, where proponents and opponents of the idea of unified command publicly accused each other of destroying the coherent system of Russian nuclear security. Marshal Igor Sergeyev's plan called for setting up a single structure for Russian nuclear forces during the course of 1999 from the Strategic Missile Forces, nuclear components of the Navy, Strategic Air Force units, and the 12th GUMO (the Main Directorate of the MOD in charge of all nuclear munitions of the Armed Forces). According to the minister's plan, the new body should be headed by the current Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev, who would be promoted to First Deputy Defense Minister/Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Deterrence Forces as part of his new duties and as a result become one of the main contenders for the position of Defense Minister. This tactical move would also sharply strengthen the position of Igor Sergeyev in his rivalry with the Chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin. In suggesting the creation of the Strategic Deterrence Forces, Igor Sergeyev leaned on materials developed during the Soviet era. In 1991 the Chief of the General Staff received a proposal envisaging unification of all branches in charge of the use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single command. A similar structure had already been set up in the USA by that time. However, the idea was put off. In the first place, the problem of merging such diverse branches of the Armed Forces was very complicated and contained a number of organizational and bureaucratic difficulties. Secondly, interest in the military sphere was relatively small in political circles, resulting in a vulgar understanding of the idea of an absolute diminishing of the military and, in particular, strategic nuclear threat for the USSR, which was reiterated in an even more exaggerated manner by the Russian political establishment. Moreover, on a purely bureaucratic level the General Staff leadership already understood perfectly well that in the process of merging the nuclear triad they could lose one of their most serious peacetime missions, i.e., planning for the use of the nuclear weapons. That would diminish their strategic importance in the view of political leaders and indirectly deprive them of the opportunity to contend for the post of Defense Minister. So consideration and implementation of the document were postponed, calling the concept of the creation of a unified command premature and incomplete. Igor Sergeyev's interest in the given project is explained by two basic motivations. One of them is rather banal. The Defense Minister has fulfilled the established term for military service and must retire in 1999 due to age requirements. In this situation he needs a successor able to secure him suitable retirement (pension and privileges, dacha and personal automobile at the state expense, access to military resorts and hospitals). What's more, this successor should shield his predecessor from possible accusations in case of detailed examination of mistakes made in the course of military reform, which in fact was started by Igor Sergeyev. This is extremely important for the minister, since his measures permanently affected the interests of such influential groups as the Air Force and the Army and offended many who could seek revenge after his retirement. The only successor for the minister could be Vladimir Yakovlev, who replaced Sergeyev as Commander-in-Chief of the SMF. This is quite natural since both officers have been making military career together, and Yakovlev has always been replacing Sergeyev at command positions, starting at the division level. It is clear that it would be advantageous for Igor Sergeyev to have a well-known and predictable person as his replacement. The second reason why Sergeyev insists on unification is more serious and is connected with principles of national security. The thing is that all Armed Services of the Armed Forces cannot survive under the present level of financing. To put it simply, the largest share of the Department of Defense budget will go to that service from which the new minister comes. Yevgeny Shaposhnikov ensured the prosperity of the Air Force, Pavel Grachev - the airborne troops, and Igor Sergeyev - the Strategic Missile Forces. Theoretically, the project of a unified command set forth by Sergeyev should put an end to this sort of perverted bureaucratic nepotism and regulate the allocation of budgetary funding on developing all components of the nuclear triad within the framework of a coherent state policy. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances (depending on the specific implementation process) the plan may lead to simple legalization of existing lobbying of local departmental interests. That is why the project did not raise too many objections or questions by Naval and Air Force chiefs since establishing the unified command will not mean limiting their command and control functions over the naval and air forces but only shifting responsibility for planning and employing nuclear weapons on the Supreme Staff of the Unified Command, an idea to which the General Staff and the 12th GUMO strongly object. The General Staff's problem lies in the fact that taking away its primary peacetime function - the planning for the use of nuclear weapons - sharply decreases the status of its leadership. It is clear that General Kvashnin intended on becoming Defense Minister after Sergeyev's retirement. But if the plan for the unified command is realized, the General Staff will only control ground, naval and air forces that have been seriously weakened without strategic missiles and military and paramilitary units of other agencies like the Ministry of Emergency, the Ministry of Interior and the Frontier Guard. Although in this case the Chief of the General Staff will not lose hope of getting the ministerial post, his chances will depend mostly on enhancing combat capabilities and readiness of conventional forces (mainly, the ground forces) and succeeding in forming new large units. Obviously we cannot expect any major breakthrough in this area given the background of insufficient funding for the Armed Forces and the top priority given to social benefits for servicemen and women. There is one more person who is displeased with coming changes. It is First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Mikhailov, a civilian in charge of coordinating defense contracts. Nowadays the state budget provides only for funds to produce the Topol-M ballistic missile system for the SMF. And if Mikhailov loses influence in this area his role in the MOD naturally comes into question. However, despite the lack of an appropriate decree by the Commander-in-Chief (i.e. Boris Yeltsin), first steps reportedly will be taken to establish the unified command in 1999 - the 12th GUMO will move from downtown Moscow to the suburbs. Assignment of the nuclear components of the Navy and the Air Force to the unified command is postponed until the completion of a detailed study of their possible mission within the new structure and until an appropriate Presidential Decree initiating the budgetary financing of the next stage of military reform. According to officials of the SMF Supreme Staff, merging all land-, air- and sea-launched nuclear missiles, their warheads and nuclear munitions, as well as the development, maintenance and control of nuclear weapons, and establishing the Unified Command of the Strategic Deterrence Forces will enhance the combat potential of the country. If at present we do not have adequate financial means for reform and cannot provide for the maintenance costs of the Armed Forces on the whole, then we should focus in one major direction. Nowadays the SMF is the only Armed Service that ensures effective protection against aggression while remaining an instrument of political influence. In 1997 on the basis of the SMF the first stage of establishing the would-be command was carried out. A unified command was set up for the SMF, the Aerospace Forces, and the System of Space Defense and Early Warning of Missile Attack. This single measure decreased the maintenance costs of the missile forces from 19.5% to 15% of the defense budget. In 1998 the MOD got 30 billion rubles, four billion of which were allocated to the SMF. The SMF managed to find some money for launching a number of new satellites for the early warning system. Thanks to these satellites, capabilities were enhanced so that the time of blindness in which the system could not track the launch and the flight of ballistic missiles of some states (South Korea in particular) was decreased from nearly eight hours to just several hours. The money was also enough to carry out tests and to commission 10 Topol-M ballistic missiles. This regiment will become the backbone of the Russian strategic deterrence forces in the next century. The decision to develop a new ballistic missile for use by both the Navy and the Army is being fulfilled within the framework of the strategic deterrence forces unification as well. This approach will enable the MOD to cut down spending on research and development of new equipment. According to some estimates, concentration of all research and development programs on land-, sea- and air-based equipment and weapon systems in a single research center will economize not less than 25% of today's costs. Operational costs of the Unified Command of the SDF will be even lower. If the 12th GUMO withdraws from the General Staff and is assigned to the Unified Command, the structure will be streamlined and some superfluous command and control bodies will be eliminated - i.e. about 1600 established posts, 1300 of which are taken by commissioned officers and generals. Thus, about 27 million rubles will be saved per year. If we add to it reduced expenditures on transport, free and ready-to-use buildings and other infrastructure, this figure will amount to 200 million rubles. It will not be necessary to set up a new system of command and control over strategic submarines and bombers. It already exists in the SMF structure. Moreover, if any difficulties of organizational character arise, they can be solved by attaching officers of the Naval and Strategic Air Force Command Posts to the General Command Post of the Unified Command of the SDF to ensure interaction and coordination of activities of the nuclear triad. There is a problem with the missions of the unified command, or let's say its manifest destiny. First, despite all political declarations about the importance of tactical nuclear weapons for containing NATO superiority in conventional arms, the core of the MOD strategy continues to be strategic nuclear deterrence (which can be used only against the USA and China). As a result, there is a lesser chance of resorting to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the MOD leadership at different levels attaches too much importance to the development and financing of this very sector of military construction. Therefore, de facto the MOD still bases its military planning on the expectation of global conflict, though under new doctrine its primary task is to be able to counteract the menace of regional and local conflicts. However, after Boris Yeltsin returned from Barvikha, where he had been receiving medical treatment for stomach ulcer, the argument between generals got its logical progression. President Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the commission that would study the problem of setting up the SDF Unified Supreme Command. Naturally, it is Marshal Igor Sergeyev who will head this advisory board. Of course, that does not mean that a final decision has been made. But bearing in mind Sergeyev's interest in taking the first step toward establishing the unified command this very year, we can presume that the Marshal's plans will be realized even though the defense budget for 1999 does not provide for expenditures on that. According to our information sources in the State Duma, at present the military is doing its best to convince the legislature on the necessity of financing such a measure important to the cause of military reform. And in accordance with assessments of the Duma experts, the military has a great chance of success. At the same time it may happen that the current internal struggle for bureaucratic power within the MOD will only theoretically influence the race for the ministerial post. Obviously, if the President leaves office (either prior to or following the completion of the constitutional term of office), most of the commitments made previously will make no sense. Moreover, there is a chance for the Armed Forces to carry out their principal duties and to have lesser impact on domestic politics due to aggravation of the national security situation (US enforcement actions, instability in Chechnya, NATO expansion to the east). Under these circumstances there will be a need for changes in the ministerial staff that may close the door to the post of Defense Minister on the current contenders, who have become accustomed to working in the rather peaceful conditions of the transitional period. PIR - Center for Policy Studies in Russia P.O. 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