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East Asian Security

June 17, 1998
By Mark Hibbs

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India Made "About 25 Bomb Cores" Since First Test in 1974

 

Since its first nuclear test at Pokaran in 1974, India has made about 25 plutonium metal cores for nuclear bombs, according to data obtained by Nucleonics Week from sources inside India's nuclear weapons development program.

 

This figure corresponds with some of the lower range estimates cited publicly in recent weeks. But it is much lower than figures of 60-80 or even higher that have also been published erroneously.

 

Bomb cores, the actual explosive devices, should not to be equated automatically with militarily usable weapons (e.g., bombs for aircraft or warheads for missiles). It is not known how many of the cores have been incorporated into actual weapons, if any.

 

Other data obtained from Indian weapons program sources indicate the following:

• India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) began producing the bomb cores soon after the 1974 test, as ordered by the Prime Minister's Office. During the last two decades, there has been only one pause in otherwise steady production of the cores. The timing and duration of that pause is not known.
• Most of the plutonium for the bomb cores was produced by the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Institute (BARC). Production has taken place at BARC's secret radiometallurgy laboratory.
• The cores are spherically shaped for use in implosion nuclear bombs. Most or all of the cores are identical or very similar to that exploded by India in 1974 at the Pokaran test site. The cores were manufactured at BARC for a "reference design" which is very close or identical to that tested in 1974.
• This plutonium weapon design, with at most minor modifications, was apparently re-tested at Pokaran last month, in an effort to get more information about it which could be used as a data base in case India follows through on its announced intention to agree to a test ban.
• The "reference design" would be a "medium-sized" nuclear bomb, smaller than a bomb India tested last month which used at least a small amount of thermonuclear material. As has been widely reported, India also tested several much smaller devices last month.
• The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which makes India's plutonium, and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), are now analyzing the results of India's May test series. Depending on the results, India may recast the plutonium bomb cores it has already made for the "reference design" bomb and use the metal for production of the newer, freshly-tested devices.
• All the bomb cores are in the hands of the DAE. None of them, and no plutonium, have been turned over to the Indian Ministry of Defense. Western officials confirm that this statement is consistent with their assumptions that India, as yet, has no official military deployment strategy for use of nuclear weapons. Indian sources have stated that Defense Minister George Fernandes himself only found out about the nuclear tests two days before they were conducted.

 

Critical questions regarding India's nuclear capabilities remain

unanswered. Among them:

 

1) How much plutonium does India have for its bomb program?

 

The Indian sources would not say how much plutonium was required for a device of the "reference" type. Western analysts estimate that the amount required is likely between five and ten kilograms, depending on design efficiency and production losses. This suggests that the cores India has made account for between 125 and 250 kilograms of plutonium. This would account for somewhere between close to half and three-quarters of DAE's

total inventory of weapon-grade plutonium, which amounts to roughly 300 kilograms.

 

2) How much plutonium is being added to India's current stockpile?

 

The primary source for India's weapons material stockpile is the 100-MW (thermal) Dhruva reactor, a modern, well-maintained facility that stands outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and monitoring. Assuming the facility is operating between 60% and 70% of the time -- as it was during a 1993 tour by the author, and little has changed since -- Dhruva would be producing about 20 kilograms to 25 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year. That would be enough for

between three and five more bombs of the "reference" type each year.

 

India's other main source for the weapons program, the Cirus unit it imported from Canada in 1955, is capable of producing up to 10 kilograms weapons-grade plutonium more to this stockpile per year. However, the Cirus reactor has been shut down now, and for the foreseeable future due to ongoing problems, and must be rebuilt first. It may be at least 18 months before it could resume operation for plutonium production.

 

For more information on India's nuclear program, and on the South Asian nuclear crisis in general, check out the GlobalBeat's special section.

Nuclear Watch is written exclusively for Global Beat. Mark Hibbs is European Editor of Nucleonics Week and Nuclear Fuel, leading specialist newsletters on international nuclear affairs, published by McGraw-Hill, Inc. Hibbs, based in Bonn, Germany, covers nuclear energy and proliferation problems in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Asia.

Mark Hibbs' coordinates:
Tel: x49-228-215051
Fax: x49-228-218849
E-mail: mhibb@mh.com

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