U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security Proliferation and Federal Services Hearing on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Question and Answer Period of Mr. Spurgeon Keeny and Dr. Kathleen Bailey and Conclusion of Hearing COCHRAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Bailey and Mr. Keeny. One question I have is, if NPT signatory nations like Iran, North Korea or Iraq is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons, in what way would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty make the acquisition more difficult? Mr. Keeny. KEENY: Let me say, as has been pointed out before, that if the CTB were in effect, and they signed it, they would be forced back into developing weapons without testing, which as we've recognized is certainly a possibility. If they don't sign it, if they don't ratify it and become a party, they certainly have the legal right to test. But if the test ban has become really an international norm, it puts tremendous pressure on them. And as an example of that, it is interesting that in the past, several countries that have pursued nuclear weapons, with the exception of India's test in 1974, Pakistan and Israel and South Africa did not conduct nuclear tests. COCHRAN: Dr. Bailey... KEENY: Even though they legally would have been permitted to do so. Presumably, they felt for their own particular political reasons considerable pressure from the even more informal norm that this would be ill advised of them to do it. COCHRAN: Dr. Bailey? BAILEY: Senator, there is already an international norm against the development of nuclear weapons. There's even a treaty. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty already accomplishes that. Iran and Iraq are both signatories. Iraq broke the treaty, and Iran is suspected to be doing it. The CTB doesn't do anything that the NPT doesn't do. And there is no technical barrier that the CTB presents. COCHRAN: I have a question, and then I'm going to yield to my friend from Alaska. Do you think there is any legitimate reason for a declared nuclear power to develop more advanced nuclear weapons? Mr. Keeny? KEENY: No, I don't. And presumably, that is a decision that the military and the laboratories have agreed to, that our present arsenal meets our present nuclear requirements, and there are no major new ideas pressing to be explored. And it was interesting when the congressional legislation led to a moratorium on testing, and the question came up where there's some tests that had to be pursued, they had great difficulty pulling together a handful of tests that would be given consideration. We have a very mature nuclear stockpile, and no clear demands to change it, to elaborate on it, while we have a real interest in not seeing the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China, moving to catch up or possibly introducing new ideas that might destabilize a very satisfactory deterrent posture in which we find ourselves now in the post-Cold War environment. So, I fail to see any pressing need on our part. And I'm encouraged that the other nuclear weapons states were willing to go along with the test ban, suggesting that they, too, are satisfied with their general nuclear posture. COCHRAN: Dr. Bailey? BAILEY: Absolutely. We need to maintain the flexibility to have nuclear weapons designs. There may be new threats, for example, chemical, biological. What if we need to have a nuclear weapon that would detonate and burn up the biological agent in a particular bunker? We can't do that conventionally, we can do it nuclear. What if we needed a small tailor-made nuclear weapon to do that? We may discover new safety measures, we would need to do new designs then. Additionally, new technologies by Russia or China in terms of defending against our nuclear arsenal, our nuclear deterrent, could cause us to have to re-tailor our arsenal. We need to maintain the flexibility to do that. COCHRAN: Thank you. Well, Senator Stevens. STEVENS: Mr. Keeny, do you think our nuclear deterrent is credible if we do ratify this treaty? KEENY: I think there's no question about it. We have an overwhelming nuclear deterrent. And with the new policy enunciated that we are focusing on a nuclear deterrent posture that goes through a protracted warfighting concept, we have a numerically and qualitatively, our stockpile is an overwhelming deterrent. And it could clearly+it would continue to be one at a much lower level. And there's no reason to think it could be any stronger as you modified the stockpile in any way whatsoever. STEVENS: Well then, let's turn it over. Do you think it's credible if we maintain the full compliment of our testing staff, and maintain at a hundred percent of capability or testing facilities, do you think it's credible for us to say we're not going to test? KEENY: I understand... STEVENS: You know the budget before us now, says we're going to keep everything we've got. All the testing facilities will be maintained a hundred percent. All the staff will be kept to 100 percent. All of the readiness of tests be kept hundred percent. But we'll also have over here a whole new group that will perform all of the functions that have been outlined for a country that doesn't test. Now, is that credible, too? KEENY: Well, it may not be necessary, but it's certainly credible in the eyes of the rest of the world. I think that you must have a stewardship program of some sort, the ability to keep track of the status of the existing weapons, and to, as necessary, refabricate components in the weapons, or the entire weapon. I think the present stewardship program is extremely generous, and it is an insurance policy of extremely generous proportions. I think no one should have any concerns with this amount of effort that we are in a position to maintain the reliability and safety of the stockpile and would be in a position to very quickly accelerate our efforts if the regime does break down. So, I would say I think the activity could be successfully done on a more modest level. But, if the Congress is prepared to fund the program at this level, and it gives additional reinsurance, I would certainly support it. I think other countries will do it on a much less ambitious level. KEENY: I mean, apparently, the Russian approach to stockpile reliability is based more on periodic refabrication of the weapons. We, by our science-based stewardship program, will monitor it extremely closely, and be in a position to make minor modifications more frequently, and presumably have to do a complete refabrication on a much longer time scale. Clearly, a lot of the funding of this program is based in maintaining the laboratories to have an interesting and detailed program to attract and maintain competent people in the business, and this is a legitimate insurance policy. How much you're prepared to spend on this is a national decision that should take into account your other security requirements. BAILEY: Mr. Stevens, may I comment on your question? STEVENS: Doctor, yes. BAILEY: The Nevada test site cannot be maintained in ready condition absent some level of nuclear testing. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Director Bruce Tartar (ph) has already said that we are two years away from conducting a nuclear test right now. You can't keep the good people, the skills levels up and so forth, absent some kind of testing. So even with Safeguard F (ph), for example, the national security were determined that we needed to have a test, we would still be two years away from a test. So I think that your question, which is a good one, does the maintenance of a test site not signal our ability to have a strong deterrent, the is answer no, because we won't be able to keep that test site ready to go. STEVENS: Well, I don't think it will be maintained either, but the beginning part of the program indicates that we would keep both up, at a cost I might add, of something like 20 C-17's (ph) a year. The duplication in cost would build us 20 C-17s. I have some real questions about this treaty now, that I didn't have before when I'd seen the quantification of what it's going to cost to maintain this dual track in this program, and that's why I came up here today. I serious question this program now. BAILEY: The big fear of people at my laboratory, the designers particularly, is that what we'll get is the worst of both worlds. That is that the stockpile stewardship, the lukewarm advocacy of it by arms control advocates, will completely fade once the CTB, if it is ratified, is ratified, and then we won't have either testing or a stockpile stewardship program. STEVENS: Well, I just feel that successive congresses will edge and cut both sides of this program. Neither one of them will be creditable after a series of years, and that will mean we will be forced to rebuild our conventional systems at a much higher rate to maintain our credibility as the superpower. I really think this needs to be rethought, and I hope that you will continue your hearings, Senator. COCHRAN: Thank you very much Senator Stevens. Let me ask a question, Mr. Keeny, about the alternatives that might be available+feasible+to a ban on testing. First of all, what's the harm of testing? Is there any measurable realistic harm to the environment or the health and safety of American citizens for a low-level testing program to ensure reliability of weapons? KEENY: Well, the harm is international politics. I would agree I would say that unless one is extremely careless or incompetent, there is little danger to the health and safety of American people from underground testing properly conducted. The danger of this is that we're going to persuade the rest of the world that we're not really interested in+we are interested in preventing them from having nuclear capabilities, but we have no intention ourselves to in any way constrain our own programs. And not only will we insist on indefinite continuation of nuclear armaments, but we will insist on continuing to improve and make them, at least in the eyes of the rest of the world, more dangerous to international security. And I think this is the problem we have in dealing with the international community. We would like to be in a place+a position -- that we can get maximum support from the international community when situations such as Iraq or North Korea or whatever happens next come along, that they will support sanctions, they will support our leadership role in assuring there will be not be further nuclear proliferation, because that could be dangerous to the health of our friends and allies abroad, and eventually to ourselves as well. And that is the argument for the comprehensive test ban. One can imagine that if the whole regime collapses and testing becomes much more general and goes above ground, and we have atmospheric testing, that that would be a+endanger American citizens' health and well being. But I think that's unlikely, or at least for the foreseeable future. So this should be looked on in terms of our broader international objectives to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries that we consider rouge countries, or simply to countries+if the regime breaks down, and many countries become nuclear capable, it will be very, very frightening world. And I remember in my earlier days in this, wise men generally were saying in the 60's that there was going to be scores of+or many dozens of nuclear weapons states by the end of the 70's, which was now a long time ago. They were wrong, and we were very fortunate. But I think if we found most of the industrialized states taking and developing nuclear capabilities, which they could very easily, or many other countries developing more modest, but capabilities that might be used, it would just be an extremely dangerous world. And if things+if conflicts emerged as they almost certainly will in the future, you have an increasing probability that there would actually be use of nuclear weapons, and could well be in situations into which the United States would be drawn, and that would be very dangerous to the health of American citizens, in the military and otherwise. COCHRAN: Dr. Bailey, what is the alternative to the comprehensive test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty, both of which now we've had, Republican and Democrat administrations, alike supporting one in form of another, and rely upon more and more as a way to ensure a norm of behavior that's consistent with the goal and hope that Mr. Keeney has expressed? COCHRAN: What is the alternative? BAILEY: Let's take each treaty separately, if you don't mind. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is adhered to by states because they see it in their security interest to do so. They want to prevent nuclear proliferation in their regions and so forth. It's not because they're afraid of U.S. nuclear weapons or to declare nuclear weapons state. So, I think that there isn't an alternative. States will continue to support the NPT because it's in their security interest to do so. And what's the alternative to the Comprehensive Test Ban? I would suggest that we go back and reconsider what previous presidents, all presidents prior to President Clinton, considered, and that is a limitation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that they would allow us to conduct some level of nuclear tests to keep our deterrents strong.Clinton was the first one that came out zero yield. So the treaty is very different today than the one that we've been talking about for 40 years. I think that we will continue to need some level of nuclear testing, not only to, if we choose to support stockpile stewardship, we need to be able to calibrate the stockpile stewardship. Or if we choose to do rebuilds, we need to be able to prove the processes by which we will do the nuclear rebuilds. So testing is integral there. So, the alternative, if you really want a CPB, is to revisit it, go back and make it what previous presidents were doing. That is, a time-limited treaty with some level of testing that will allow us to keep our deterrents strong. COCHRAN: Mr. Keeny, what's your reaction to that? KEENY: Well, I would like to say a word about the statements that have been made a number of times here about previous presidents. I think it's simply not correct. When Eisenhower started, initiated the treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons, it was for a comprehensive test ban. That was his intention, and that was what the formulation was. Now, it is true that agreement was not reached, or never got to the point of defining what is a nuclear explosion. But the thinking about it was in terms of a de minimus definition initially. As problems developed, various other formulations were considered. One to deal differently with underground testing, which, of course, at that time, there had only been a single test, or a near test. So, it was a new phenomenon. But+and then subsequently, there was thought given to a threshold, various types of threshold test bans. But both Eisenhower and Kennedy had addressed the proposition of a comprehensive test ban. But, of course, there was never agreement reached, and certainly nothing signed. And under President Carter, the pursuit was of a comprehensive test ban. Although, there again, the negotiation, although it went quite far in some regards, never came to a question of the definition of a nuclear explosion. There was never an agreed U.S. position, and there was nothing agreed to with the Soviet Union. So, I think one should be very careful of this thing, this is a unique approach that was never conceived of. I do think it true that when Clinton came up and made a formal statement that+having a zero yield, there had been without specifically defining it. But, you can say this went a step further than had been achieved in the previous negotiations. But, I think you misread the objectives of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Carter when you suggest that really the notion there was to continue testing at a level such that it would have any relevance to your deterrence. And to go it another point, is on the testing that took place during the moratorium. Actually, this was indirectly involved because George Kistiakowsky (ph) who was Eisenhower's second science adviser was a key person, and the decision as to whether to go ahead with these very small yield tests, and concluded this would be a reasonable thing to do, which+and they were limited to a few pounds of yield. And it related to some very specific safety problems that existed at the time. But this, you must remember, these were unilateral moratoriums that each side interpreted as they saw fit. And it was interesting how strict Eisenhower was in constraining any testing that was to be allowed under the moratorium. COCHRAN: Thank you very much for that information and that perspective. That's very helpful. Dr. Bailey, are there any other comments or observations that you would like to make? BAILEY: I would like to observe that that is not technically accurate. First of all, previous presidents called in the directors of national laboratories when this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was being considered. And they heard briefings, and previous presidents decided that the United States did need to maintain some yield of testing. President Clinton was the first president that did not call in the laboratory directors and personally hear the briefing. Instead, it was done at the secretary of energy level. Briefings that took place about why we need testing were heard by Secretary O'Leary, and it was decided at that level, not at the presidential level. It's very important to realize that in previous negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban, it was assumed that there would be some level of testing to enable the United States to keep its deterrent strong, safe and reliable. And that is just a fact. It can be documented in history. KEENY: Well, I just don't know how you can say something you just+a fact. The kind of testing that some people were discussing had little to do with having, maintaining our deterrent. The suggestion that's made so frequently, that a country with 12,000 nuclear weapons, and strategic weapons, and highly sophisticated and competent delivery systems is going to lose its deterrent capability overnight, and because of some possible problem with certain weapons, is simply shows no comprehension of what deterrence is about. To suggest that any of these developments would suddenly have left the United States impotent and obsolete would be, is simply way off the mark. And I think when Eisenhower was pursuing the nuclear test ban, it was with the intention of stopping the development of nuclear weapons, which he saw as a threat to the survival of the United States and to the international community. I think a person it would be very useful for you to talk would be Andy Goodpastor (ph), who as you know, was... COCHRAN: (OFF-MIKE) KEENY: ... Eisenhower's personal military aide, and very close to him personally. And I think he would, he would say that at the beginning, Eisenhower thought nuclear weapons were just another much more powerful and dangerous type of weapon, military armament. But that with the rapid escalation during his term in the introduction of thermonuclear weapons, a sort of open-ended expansion that seemed available, he was deeply seized with the danger of the situation and really sought very sincerely at an early date to try to stop the development of further, of nuclear weapons, and saw the one handle on it at that time seemed to be through testing. KEENY: Because everyone felt that nothing, with the increasingly high yield weapons, the tests were indispensable to continue this progress. But I would strongly suggest that you talk with Andy Goodfaster (ph). Because I think he's one of the few people who are still around who can reflect what Eisenhower's actual concerns about these matters were. Now, I think it's true, the laboratory directors always passed and basically opposed the test ban, and I think most of them would be frank to say so. Their job is to make nuclear weapons, and they wanted, they had ideas and they wanted to continue to improve them. COCHRAN: Do you suppose that the generosity of this stockpile stewardship program may be the price that we pay for the support of the laboratory directors now for the comprehensive test ban treaty? KEENY: Well, I wouldn't want to put it that way... (LAUGHTER) I think the more generous... QUESTION: I didn't put it that way either. I asked the question.
Well, I think it did. But I think it is the price for their support. But to put it in a little more generous terms, I think it met their concerns about this narrow question of stockpile reliability and safety. That, not just+I think it's unfair to say they just did it because they wanted to maintain a large and expensive establishment. I think the program, it did find their support in that it answered the question that they were seized with: How can I, as a responsible manager of the scientific program, say, these weapons are reliable, safe, unless I have a lot of tools at my disposal? And having received them, I think they are clearly satisfied. And I think this is the first time that there's been clear support of all of the laboratory directors for the test ban. And it reflects, on the one hand, the stewardship program. But it also reflects an honest man's assessment of the fact that we have a very mature stockpile. We have a very secure deterrent. And we are not faced with an opponent of uncertain dimensions such as the Soviet Union was at the height of the Cold War. So, I acknowledge that these laboratory directors have done a responsible and honest appraisal of the situation, and have decided that their responsibilities can be met without continuing an aggressive development program. Thank you. COCHRAN: Senator Glenn. GLENN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, and apologize to our witnesses today that I had to be in and out so much. But, been out more than in, I guess, today. But, I had some other things that I couldn't avoid so I'm sorry I wasn't here. I've been impressed with the fact that+with what you just mentioned+that the head of our three major labs involved with this: Lawrence and Sandia and Los Alamos, all who are certainly highly technically competent people, favor this so long as the safeguard+so long as the program is underway, the safeguard program to make sure that everything is still in working order if we happen to need it. We also have the statements by four of the former Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shalikashvili, Powell, Crowe (ph) and Jones, and they certainly are people with+who look at the technical background of this thing and are very happy with it. So I've+I just think that this is the way we ought to go, and I don't+I'm sorry I wasn't here for all the discussions previously. But I just wanted to make sure that my views were on that+brought forward on that. I noted in particular, the statement by Dr. Tarter (ph) at Lawrence Livermore. His statement was that we have maintained a nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing since 1992 when the United States entered into a nuclear test moratorium. President Clinton has since signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty aimed at ending nuclear explosive testing on a worldwide basis. Three important factors have enabled us to meet the challenge to date. First, the weapons intended for the enduring stockpile all have good pedigrees. They went into the stockpile with blue chip credentials. To date, we have seen no signs of catastrophic aging. However, vigilance is required because nuclear weapons age in a very dynamic, not necessarily predictable ways. Both the difficult task of assessing an ever-older stockpile and the new challenge of certifying refurbished weapons increased the complexity of stockpile stewardship as time passes. So, his first point. Second, we have been able to meet the challenge because of the expertise residing in the technical staff. Hands-on nuclear design, engineering and test experience accumulated to the development of weapons now in the stockpile. But that experience base is also aging. So we are taking important steps to archive that experience and make prudent use of it while we have it. That includes working with the next generation of scientists and engineers to tend to the current needs of the stockpile, and lay the foundation for the long-term program for stockpile stewardship. Third point. We have worked closely with Assistant Secretary Vic Reese (ph) and others in defense programs to design the overall program and provide the technical bases for its ambitious goals. We achieved what capabilities the program needs by and when+by when, and worked throughout the 1990s to achieve, enabling scientific and engineering advances. Steady technical progress on a number of fronts moves us closer to the long-term goals of the stockpile stewardship program. So, the points he makes, and certainly there's no one more experienced in nuclear matters than the Lawrence Laboratory out there and the head of, the Director of it, Dr. Tarter. So I think when we have that and the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs+former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I've come down to the side that I think it's safe to go ahead with this. And I don't ask that as a question, obviously. It's more a statement than anything else. But I want to get my views on record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. COCHRAN: Thank you, Senator Glenn. QUESTION: Dr. Bailey, we were talking about the twin programs of maintaining a testing capability at the same time we have the stockpile stewardship program and the attendant costs that that is going to require. As Appropriations Committee members and others to deal with, Senator Stevens made a very compelling statement about the seriousness of that as the dilemma. What is your reaction to the situation in terms of trying to design a program for maintaining the deterrent that we have to have in view of the facts that we find existing around the world in terms of nuclear threats, that threaten our security interests? Are we getting into a position where we are overreacting to the threat, or to the possible deterioration of our deterrent by spending these huge sums of money? COCHRAN: I don't know whether you've looked into the program that's outlined, but it's a very costly program at the laboratories. And I didn't realize that, as Senator Stevens said, we were also going to be maintaining the same kind of capability of testing and having the people in place and all of that, facilities, as if there were no test ban in effect. Is all of that necessary? BAILEY: The laboratory directors agreed with the statement that Senator Glenn has set out, on the basis that there would be a stockpile stewardship program and, equally if not more important, that there would be Safeguard S. That is, the national security clause escape clause that would allow us to conduct a nuclear test if we needed to. They said at the same time, that this would not be as good, technically, as nuclear weapons testing. It would never give you the kind of confidence in the reliability and safety of your weapons that testing would, but that we could make do with it. It would be sufficient, in other words. If you take away either of those two points, either the stockpile stewardship or the ability to test in an emergency, I think that you would lose the laboratory directors' support. You would have an unacceptable level of an erosion in our confidence in the stockpiles. Now, if your question is, do we need to have confidence in the stockpile, I would say yes, for two basic reasons. We still face a capability in Russia, and emerging in China, that is extremely powerful. So, while intent matters a great deal, capability matters even more. And as we've heard today, Russia is actually increasing its reliance on nuclear deterrents and increasing, I would add, its nuclear weapons capabilities. And I could go into that, if you wish. The other part of it, is that there are proliferant nations developing, or having already acquired weapons of mass destruction, against which our nuclear deterrent may be the only effective response. So, yes, we still need the deterrent because the threats are there. The technical directors of the technical laboratories have said we either need to test or at a bare minimum, we need to have the escape testing clause coupled with the stockpile stewardship program. Having said all that, my personal view is that stopping testing is a political imperative. It is not something that is technically driven. If we need to test in order to prove stockpile stewardship or to maintain our deterrent, it seems to me that we need to do a good scrub on the cost versus benefits of that political imperative. And if it's going to be extremely costly in terms of our deterrence and in terms of finances, is it really worth the political gain that you would get by satisfying the worldwide clamor for us to cease testing? I come down that it's not. Simply because the nonproliferation goals that this administration has set out for this treaty cannot and will not be accomplished. And I think that's the key. We need to keep our eye on the key. And the key is that you can't meet the nonproliferation goals of this treaty.
Conclusion by Senator Cochran COCHRAN: Well, I think this has been a very helpful and certainly informative hearing. I have learned a lot, and I know that the others who've had an opportunity to come hear the testimony and the questions and answers have learned a great deal as well. While it's not a requirement of nongovernment witnesses to respond to questions that are submitted after a hearing, I have been told that there may be senators on the subcommittee that would like to have the opportunity to submit questions to this panel. And if you have the opportunity to receive those questions, I hope you could respond, if you can. Can't require you to, but that has been a request I've received, and I submit that to you for your consideration. This concludes this hearing. We appreciate so much the participation of our outstanding witnesses who have testified today. We will continue to review the implications for nonproliferation with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other issues in this subcommittee during the balance of the year. For the time being, though, the hearing will be in recess.
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