With the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP or Indian People's Party) all but certain to form India's next government in the coming days, we remain concerned over the party's recent public posturing on nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile program policies. For several years, the BJP has openly talked of fielding a nuclear weapons capability and deploying the Agni I, a 2,500 km/1,550 mile Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), as well as the Agni II, an unconfirmed 5,000 km/3,100 IRBM follow-on system. But now, with the party set to assume power, it is well-positioned to implement such policies to the detriment of regional stability and of India's relations with the West, particularly the United States.
Election Results The BJP's strong showing in recent national elections suggests it has substantial backing for its broad conservative agenda, which includes policies of economic and political self-reliance (under the concept of 'swadeshi') and potentially protectionist, 'India First' trade doctrines. The latest reporting indicates that the BJP and its allies captured 253 seats in the February-March 1998 voting, 20 seats short of majority control of the 545-member Lok Sabha, or lower House of Parliament. To gain power, the BJP will be required to enlist additional support. Some commentators have suggested that this coalition outcome will compel the BJP to moderate its more controversial platforms, although this remains to be seen.
BJP Nuclear and Missile Policies In its election manifesto, the BJP articulated a commitment to: 'Re-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons; [and] Expedite the development of the Agni series of ballistic missiles with a view to increasing their range and accuracy.' The phrase 'exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons' has been interpreted by some observers as a less-than-forceful statement that allows the party room to manoeuvre. But this interpretation is seemingly at odds with previous rhetoric consistently advocating a move to operationlise quickly India's nuclear weapons capability (see, for example, our Feb. 3 report Indian Opposition 'Would Develop Nuclear Weapons'). A more clear-cut description of the BJP's nuclear commitment can be found in a recent policy paper on nuclear issues posted on the party's World Wide Web site. This paper, authored by Drs. Krishna M. Bhatta and Mahesh Metha, states: 'The BJP shall not compromise on national sovereignty and security. The current situation and regional war politics demand us to have a nuclear weapons program in India and the BJP will take India to be a nuclear power. We do not wish to see India blown apart by Pakistan or China because we did not possess the deterrent nuclear power....The BJP does not want to keep anybody in the dark....With China and Pakistan having nuclear capabilities, India has to have nuclear weapons.' In addition to the need to counter China and Pakistan, likely BJP Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee also reportedly believes that India must have a capability to deter the United States. According to a report carried in the 3 March Delhi Jansatta publication, Vajpayee apparently sees the US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean as a platform from which it could potentially threaten India with nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Decision is Political, not Technical Underscoring that the country has the wherewithal to field nuclear weapons, the Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. R. Chidambaram, was quoted on 3 March by the Bangalore Deccan Herald (Internet version) as saying that India is 'technologically prepared to go nuclear, but it is for the policy makers to decide whether to go nuclear or keep the options open.' There is some uncertainty, however, over whether this technical capacity means that no new nuclear tests would be required or, if they are, whether the BJP would embrace a policy of nuclear testing given the severe international political fallout that would almost certainly be raised by such testing. Dr. Chidambaram suggested that new tests would enhance confidence in India's nuclear stockpile, noting that there was a substantial difference between theoretical studies and practical experiments. Thus, Indian policymakers in a BJP-led government will have to consider closely the costs and benefits of bringing India's nuclear capability into the open. That India is well-positioned technologically to 'go nuclear' quickly is widely recognised. For example, an authoritative November 1997 US Department of Defense report, titled Proliferation: Threat and Response, indicated that: 'India's nuclear infrastructure has allowed it to produce enough fissile material and components for several nuclear weapons, which could probably be assembled fairly quickly. India presently has fighter aircraft capable of delivering a nuclear payload. It also has ballistic missiles that may be capable of delivering a nuclear payload in the future.' But any decision to field an overt nuclear capability would have enormous consequences. Regionally, Pakistan would react harshly and tensions between the two countries could be expected to rise rapidly. Sino-Indian relations also could be expected to deteriorate. For its part, the United States also could be expected to oppose any Indian nuclear deployments and could well move to place sanctions on New Delhi.
Agni's Prospects Aside from nuclear policy, a commitment to deploy the Agni long-range ballistic missile is the other controversial component of the BJP's platform. Yet this commitment appears to be gaining widespread support within the broader Indian strategic community. For example, Indian analyst Braham Chellaney, writing in the 25 February 1998 edition of Delhi's The Pioneer, argues that missile power is an essential component of the emerging strategic environment. Without it, 'a state could fall victim to punitive military actions not for directly threatening a great power but for refusing to accept its 'global' rules and standards.' Moreover, 'missiles and other unmanned systems that can accurately deliver weapons to intended targets are the cutting edge of a modern military machine.' Given this background, Chellany concludes that 'the only sure way to deter missile terror and blackmail is through a capability to strike back with missiles.' He sees 'the lack of a missile deterrent force [as] the main deficiency in Indian defence. It is a matter of national shame that political rather than technical barriers at home have slowed down India's missile advance.' Without going nuclear, writes Chellany, there can be no meaningful next phase of the Agni missile, which was last tested four years ago. A nuclear warhead for the Agni should be tested first, in an underground explosion, he says. In addition, the missile program should now move to a focus on the system's mobile launchers, transport vehicles, flight programming codes, electronic fire control units, and security elements. In sum, Chellany writes, 'India should now rapidly operationalise the IRBM options opened up by the Angi programme. Separately, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, stated in a 23 February Indian Express report that Agni could carry a chemical or biological payload, in addition to a nuclear warhead He apparently said, in a lighter vein, that the decision to put a particular payload on the missile depended on who would receive it. Copyright © Raison Ltd, 1998. Click here for the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
