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Although U.S.-Russian relations have rebounded somewhat from the low point reached during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, several obstacles to more cooperative ties will confront Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin during their July 27 meetings in Washington. Of course, serious tension is unlikely to be visible during the meetings; after all, each side is eager to put a good face on the trip - to demonstrate, as Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin attempted at the G-7 summit in Cologne, Germany, that the dialogue between Washington and Moscow is back on track. To this end, as in the case of previous Gore sessions with Russia's various prime ministers, the talks are almost sure to result in a number of relatively minor (but still useful) agreements on cooperative projects. It would be a mistake, however, to view these agreements as a sign of real progress in the relationship. It is nearly always possible to come up with something to sign in such circumstances and, moreover, the meetings would not have been scheduled in the first place if both sides were not confident that they would have something to show for it afterward. But on more substantive issues - the role of NATO and the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, for example - the two sides are very far apart. NATO's attacks on Yugoslavia laid bare the fundamental flaws of the Founding Act, the agreement between NATO and Russia in which Moscow acquiesced to NATO enlargement in return for a role in its deliberations through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The final formula reached by the Clinton Administration to explain Russia's participation in the Alliance's deliberations - "a voice but not a veto" - may have seemed to be creative ambiguity at the time, but in fact almost guaranteed a major rupture in relations. Given that both sides already had clear and incompatible positions on the conflict in Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia's ethnic patchwork virtually assured further fighting in Bosnia, Kosovo, or elsewhere, it was very likely that at some future time and place, NATO would decide to intervene in Yugoslavia without a U.N. mandate (which Russia and China would clearly block) over Russian objections. Russia's reaction to such a development was very predictable. Because of the NATO action, which most Russians saw as an illegal intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, Russia is now deeply skeptical of the Alliance and its new, more broadly defined mission. This skepticism is only enhanced by the fact that the Clinton Administration repeatedly assured Moscow that the new, enlarged NATO would remain a strictly defensive alliance. As a result, Russia has cut off all discussions with NATO save on the narrow issue of coordinating its participation in KFOR, the Kosovo peacekeeping force. Taking into account that Russia is about to begin several months of election campaigns (parliamentary elections are in December and presidential elections follow in July, 2000), a NATO-Russia dialogue is unlikely to resume any time soon. The two sides also have widely divergent positions on the ABM Treaty. The U.S. seeks changes in the treaty to permit the development and eventual deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system - seen as an essential protection against attacks by "rogue" states, unauthorized or accidental missile launches, or terrorist strikes - while Russia is firmly opposed to any changes in the treaty. Although Boris Yeltsin agreed to discuss the treaty during talks at the Cologne summit, he grows physically and politically weaker with each passing day. Few others among Russia's political elite are willing even to discuss the treaty - especially in advance of crucial elections, when no one dare risk being branded insufficiently attentive to Russian security interests. At the same time, however, the revision or abrogation of the treaty has become an important political issue in the U.S., which is entering its own presidential campaign. The likely result is an escalation of unproductive rhetoric in both countries. These are just two of the key issues that must be tackled if today's shaky relations are to be maintained, let alone improved. There are many others - the START II arms reduction treaty, a potential START III treaty, and nuclear non-proliferation also come to mind. Unfortunately, however, these and other security issues are becoming only more difficult to address as the goodwill generated on both sides by the collapse of communism rapidly evaporates. In fact, the loss of that goodwill (especially on the Russian side) may well be the greatest single challenge to improving ties between Washington and Moscow - and overcoming it must therefore be among our highest priorities. Tragically, it is much easier to lose goodwill than to win it back. Repairing our relations with Russia will take much more than a few summit meetings and cooperation on projects like the international space station (although both are constructive). Ultimately, it requires a fundamentally different view of our relationship - in both countries. Russians need to realize that despite its overzealous, messianic foreign policy, the United States is neither interested in nor capable of global hegemony (an aspiration frequently cited to explain NATO's evolution) and should change their rhetoric, and their behavior, accordingly. The thought that the Yugoslavia operation was a prelude to attacks on Russia is understandable from a certain point of view but still ridiculous. For its part, Americans have to recognize that Russia has always recovered from periods of weakness and chaos and will do so again. While it may seem easy to ignore Russia now, we will pay a heavy price down the road if we fail to take Russian interests and perspectives into account. The U.S. should not make unnecessary concessions to Russia where truly important interests are at stake, but should be prepared to compromise in other areas to make an investment in the relationship. The dividends of cooperative ties between America and Russia could be very important to U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century.
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